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RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 26

JAN.—JUNE 1936

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXVI

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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXVI.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 1/1/91]

No. 1.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 1, 1930.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 30, 1929.

ON the 24th December Ibn Mashhur, with following of 200, including thirty women, having entered Iraq and refused to leave under threat of force, surrendered unconditionally to Iraq police, who were supported by Royal Air Force armoured cars. They were disarmed and escorted to Busaiyah post.

On 29th December Dawish and his following were routed by loyalist Harb force, who were assisted by some Iraqi tribesmen, near Riqai, close to Iraq frontier. Mutair (Dawish's own people) fugitives on foot, mainly women, are collecting on the Iraq frontier. Iraq police on the frontier met fugitives, who claimed to be Dawish's. They refused to parley.

In the meantime, the Royal Air Force armoured cars are evicting Ajman rebels, who crossed the Nejd frontier some days ago and camped on Koweit-Iraq boundary. It is probable that the latter will refuse to go, and will surrender to the armoured cars in view of Dawish's defeat.

Disposal of refugees presents problem which I am actively discussing with Iraq Government, and I will telegraph further on this subject as soon as possible. (Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 1/1/91]

No. 2.

High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 2, 1930.)

(Confidential.)

December 31, 1929.

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram of 30th December [see No. 1].

Regarding disposal of Ibn Mashhur and his following: They are not Nejd but belong to Ruwallah tribe from Syria. Undertaking given by His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government to Ibn Saud does not therefore appear to apply to them. Moreover, Ibn Mashhur states that Ibn Saud has excluded them from the offer of terms made to the rebels on the grounds that he does not want them. I suggest, therefore, that the Iraq Government, having settled their own account with them, should let them return to Syria. Please telegraph whether I may

advise the Iraq Government accordingly. As regards the rebel Mutair and Ajman: Rebels on Koweit-Iraq frontier with women and children are now refusing to recross the Nejd frontier even under the threat of Iraq police cars, R.A.F. armoured cars and aeroplanes. Mutair fugitives, also with women and children, may be expected to cross into Iraq near Riqai and adopt the same attitude. The situation has therefore arisen of which Ibn Saud was warned by the British Agent at Jedda in paragraph 5 of his letter of 16th October and which Ibn Saud has apparently taken no steps to avert. In these circumstances it is clearly impossible to bomb or shoot down the rebels, and the alternatives are, (a) as first proposed by the Iraq Government, to expel them to foreign territory, e.g., Syria, and (b) to accept their surrender, arresting the leaders and disarming and interning the remainder, the only condition being that they are not handed over to Ibn Saud against their will. I have informed the Prime Minister that (a) would not be acceptable to His Majesty's Government and must be ruled out; (b) accords with demands 4 and 5 contained in aide-memoire enclosed in Jedda despatch No. 306 of 30th November and Iraq Government have now agreed to this procedure. Since the situation admits of no delay locally, police and Royal Air Force commanders have been instructed to take action accordingly. If the rebels surrender as anticipated, leaders will be imprisoned and the remainder escorted to Jarishan, on Iraq-Koweit border, where adequate grazing exists. Iraq Government can then settle accounts with the rebels who have raided Iraq in the past and subsequently negotiate for their ultimate disposal with Ibn Saud.

[E 38/1/91]

No. 3.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 2, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 31st December [see No. 2]: Rebel refugees. If course (b) is adopted surrender must be wholly unconditional. Question of ultimate disposal of refugees is now under consideration by His Majesty's Government and I will telegraph further when decision has been reached, but, in the meantime, no promises of any kind should be given which would limit future freedom of action of His Majesty's Government or Iraq Government.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Jedda and Jerusalem.)

[E 39/1/91]

No. 4.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 2, 1930.)

BAGDAD telegram of 31st December, 1929 [see No. 2].

Recent conversations have impressed me with special importance which King and all shades of opinion with which I am in contact would attach to delivery of the person of Dawish if he crosses and surrenders in Iraq territory. I have already, in my telegram No. 155, mentioned doubts entertained here where Iraq is concerned as to sincerity of British attitude towards Ibn Saud, and, although credit is generally given for efforts made by His Majesty's Government to carry out their undertakings, anxiety is still felt on this score. I am convinced that His Majesty's Government will be held responsible and accountable for action taken by Government of Iraq towards Dawish and rebels and that it will be interpreted as proving or disproving sincerity of His Majesty's Government.

Whatever the facts may be, there is a strong feeling that Iraq and Koweit Governments have to some extent been playing Dawish's game, and if rebels are not readily handed over or are only handed over under pressure, I fear idea may become established that His Majesty's Government have connived at this all along in spite of categorical assurances given.

As regards action proposed by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq (1) *vis-à-vis* Ibn Mashhur and (2) *vis-à-vis* rebels, (1) apparently contemplates allowing

Mashhur to proceed to Syria without providing for his actions against this country. I do not consider, in view of spirit of assurances given, that such action could be successfully defended on technical grounds before public opinion in Arabia or that it would be interpreted otherwise than as granting a refuge. As regards (2), I am firmly convinced that the King and Government will expect rebels to be handed over unconditionally, and that in this respect assurances given would be considered to override any argument based on absence of an extradition treaty. Demands (4) and (5) quoted by the High Commissioner are, I think, subsidiary demands referring to isolated cases of evasion and should not be held to affect main demand, No. 2, which I believe is intended to cover any situation in which rebels as a force may succeed in placing themselves out of the reach of the King's forces.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire, Koweit and Jerusalem, No. 2.)

[E 50/1/91]

No. 5.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, January 3, 1930.

FOLLOWING is gist of note received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

Hejaz Government have been informed that Farhan-bin-Mashhur and some followers were allowed to enter Iraq territory a few days ago and are residing near Busaiyeh post.

Note continues as follows:—

"The repeated promises made by the British Government in their own name and in the name of the Governments of Koweit, Iraq and Transjordan were to the effect that no rebel force should be allowed to cross the frontier and still less reside in territories of those Governments. I cannot understand the reasons which have led the British Government to allow Farhan-bin-Mashhur and his party to take refuge in Iraqi territory.

"Farhan-bin-Mashhur is a criminal in the opinion of the British Government, who have made representations about him in the past, and he is also a criminal in the opinion of the Hejaz Government."

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs therefore officially requests his extradition and enquires how this may best be effected.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is also informed that Ibn Lami has escaped to the Koweit frontier and requests that he and his followers be either expelled or handed over to Hejaz Government.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire, Jerusalem, and Koweit, No. 4.)

[E 57/1/91]

No. 6.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 3, 1930.

FOLLOWING from Koweit, 3rd January:—

"Hafidh Wahba has to-day presented me with official note for His Majesty's Government demanding, in the name of His Majesty Ibn Saud, that (1) Rebels be driven across the frontier and for reassurance of repeated British promises; (2) His Majesty be informed as soon as possible of military measures carried out, so that any misunderstanding or regrettable incidents be prevented. Adds that it is impossible for Ibn Saud to watch rebels sheltering and himself stand in front of them with hands tied."

[22271]

B 2

[E 79/1/91]

No. 7.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office January 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

January 4, 1930.

MY telegram of 2nd January and your telegram of 31st December. [See Nos. 2 and 3.]

This extremely difficult question has now been considered by His Majesty's Government, who have reached following tentative conclusions:—

(a.) In the first place, while recognising force of your argument, based on demands 4 and 5, contained in aide-memoire enclosed in Jedda despatch No. 306 of 30th November, they do not feel that they can in fact confidently take their stand on this. As will be seen from Jedda telegram No. 174 of 27th November, repeated to you, a letter from Ibn Saud written immediately before Fuad Hamza's communication was received simultaneously with it, in which His Majesty asked specifically that rebels crossing the frontier should be arrested and handed over. Though no specific guarantee to this effect was given by His Majesty's Government in replying, they did inform the King that instructions had been given to concert the necessary military measures for the ejection of any of the contending forces that might enter Koweiti or Iraqi territory, and for the interception, wherever possible, of isolated groups of rebels entering such territory for the purpose of merging with local tribes. While not committing themselves on the question of handing over, they did not qualify these assurances by any reference to Fuad Hamza's demands. It was for these reasons that the instructions in my telegram No. 1 of 2nd January were sent you.

(b.) As regards Ibn Mashur and his party, His Majesty's Government feel considerable doubt whether they can take their stand on his Syrian status. Not only was he repudiated by his paramount chief in 1926, and has severed all connexion with Syria and embraced Wahabism, but his close association with rebels and references made to this position by Ibn Saud in recent correspondence (cf. Jedda telegrams of 17th May and 25th May, Nos. 63 and 68, repeated to Bagdad), make it, in their view, doubtful whether he should not be considered as part of the contending forces. But I am prepared to leave it to Ibn Saud to make representations regarding the disposal of him and his party. In any case, His Majesty's Government could not, however, agree that he should return to Syria except after reference to the French Government and with their consent. For the moment I suggest that Iraq Government should take such action against him as may be justified by his crimes against Iraq (in this connexion, please see paragraph (f) below), and High Commissioner for Transjordan will no doubt consider whether Transjordan Government should similarly take action against him in respect of raid against Beni Sakhr in February 1928. You will, of course, appreciate that whole party must be kept under close surveillance.

(c.) His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn approximate numbers, if any, of rebels who have surrendered on explicit understanding that they will not be handed over to Ibn Saud against their will, and whether they include any important rebel leaders. They fully recognise that pledge must be honoured. It will, however, be necessary to furnish an explanation regarding it to Ibn Saud, and they propose, subject to any observations you may offer, to inform him that while pledge given precludes surrender of these people against their will, they will be interned at a safe distance until the end of hostilities, when their disposal will be settled in negotiation with him.

(d.) As regards rebels who may, after receipt of these instructions, offer to surrender, they should be warned that they will be disarmed, and that question of their disposal will depend on negotiations with Ibn Saud. Do you consider that, if they refuse voluntarily to surrender their arms, it would be possible forcibly to disarm them?

(e.) Subject to any observations which you may have to offer and which they will be glad to receive as early as possible, His Majesty's Government now propose to communicate with Ibn Saud on lines set out above, and to invite him to state conditions on which he would be prepared to take over the refugees from the Iraq Government, when, provided conditions were satisfactory, arrangements for their handing over could be concerted with Ibn Saud.

(f.) What exactly is covered by the term "settle accounts" in your telegram of 31st December? Please telegraph explicit statement of action contemplated in this respect.

(g.) Since foregoing paragraphs were drafted His Majesty's Government have received Jedda telegram No. 2 repeated to you. This shows importance of exercising greatest care in dealing with refugee rebels if His Majesty's Government are to avoid charge of failing to implement assurances given to Ibn Saud. They must therefore retain complete freedom, except in so far as they may already be committed by pledges referred to in paragraph (c) above, to negotiate with Ibn Saud as to disposal of refugees.

(Repeated to Bushire, Jedda, Koweit and Jerusalem.)

[E 63/1/91]

No. 8.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 4, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. 1 [see No. 3]. Your orders regarding wholly unconditional surrender have been communicated to the local Royal Air Force commander who is attempting in co-operation with Iraq police to expel rebels who have crossed Nejd frontier and camped on Koweit-Iraq border. Latest report indicates that Mutair leaders, Dawish and Ibn Hithlain, are in Koweit territory and refuse either to surrender unconditionally or to return to Nejd.

Presence of women and children with the rebels precludes air action by the Royal Air Force. In the meantime, messages received from Ibn Saud grow more threatening. In the circumstances Royal Air Force commander proposes to attempt to effect arrest of the two leaders to-morrow. I have given instructions that he should hand over prisoners to Iraq police if arrested in Iraq, and to concert measures for their disposal with political agent at Koweit if arrested in Koweit territory.

[E 81/1/91]

No. 9.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 6.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 5, 1930.

YUSUF YASIN, secretary to Ibn Saud, arrived at Glubb's Camp in Iraq to-day and telegraphed following urgent message to me:—

"We are informed that Mutair and Ajman within boundaries of Koweit. Ibn Saud with his army arrived at Kharja. Presence of rebels in Koweit contrary to undertaking of British Government. We request either that British Government evict them by force or grant permission for us to attack them where they are. We expected British Government to attack them before, but it did not do so. Request reply very urgently as we have no water in present camp."

I have replied:—

"I have referred your message to London. In the meantime, Royal Air Force in Koweit are engaged in attempting to expel rebels to Nejd and I am unable to give permission for Ibn Saud's forces to enter Koweit territory in order to attack or pursue rebels."

I presume orders of His Majesty's Government on policy to be pursued in Koweit will be sent direct to Bushire. I will reply to your telegram of 4th January [see No. 7] as soon as I have received further situation report of Southern Desert. So far as I am aware no surrenders have been accepted with conditions, but I am verifying this by enquiry from officers on spot.

[22271]

B 3

[E 100/1/91]

No. 10.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, January 6, 1930.

FOLLOWING is gist of note just received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs with reference to his note reported in my telegram No. 4:—

He has now been informed that Dawish and his followers are themselves encamped within Iraq frontier and are in constant touch with Captain Glubb and the officer commanding Iraq frontier districts. If true, this would be most regrettable and surprising.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs then refers again to general promises given; also to my note based on your telegram No. 147 regarding instructions issued to Captain Glubb.

If information is correct, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs protests strongly against the action of above officers, which he says violates undertakings of His Majesty's Government and is contrary to profession of friendship frequently made.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire and Koweit.)

[E 110/1/91]

No. 11.

Resident in Bushire to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 6, 1930.

REFERENCE Bagdad telegram of 6th January [see No. 9].

Koweit is quite defenceless and has no regular police or any force at their disposal capable of enforcing any order that His Majesty's Government may issue regarding ejection or internment of rebels. Further, while Ibn Saud would probably hesitate to commit aggression against Iraq, he might possibly not have similar compunctions regarding Koweit, even to extent of threatening town, and serious situation might arise involving landing of naval forces, as was done in 1928. I therefore recommend, subject to concurrence of High Commissioner, that if any surrenders are made to Royal Air Force or arrests made by them in Koweit territory, they should be regarded as being made to Iraq forces, and individuals concerned should be handed over by Royal Air Force to Iraq authorities or otherwise disposed of under order of High Commissioner. Political Koweit, with concurrence of sheikh, has authorised Chief Staff Officer, with whom he held consultation to-day, to call in any Iraq police cars he requires, to assist in rounding-up operations.

He reports Dawish with most of his following now close to Jahrah, and may himself any moment try to make a dash for Koweit if he sees all up. This Dickson is trying to avoid at all costs, and he is himself proceeding to Jahrah.

[E 113/1/91]

No. 12.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident in the Persian Gulf.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 6, 1930.

BAGDAD telegram of 5th January [see No. 9].

1. From your telegram of 2nd November it seems just possible that rebels might be prepared to return to Nejd if they were allowed to leave their women and children in safety in Iraq or Koweit territory. If you consider that there is any prospect of solution on these lines, I suggest for your consideration that Ibn Saud be informed that presence of women and children with rebels makes it very difficult forcibly to eject them, and be asked whether he would have any objection to our allowing rebels to leave their women and children in Iraq or Koweit territory on condition that they themselves returned to Nejd forthwith. It could be explained that once rebels are separated from their women and children they can, if necessary, be ejected by force.

2. Unless you see objection Ibn Saud should, in any case, be informed immediately that sole reason for delay in implementing our undertaking to expel rebels is presence of women and children, which renders it difficult to employ force, and that every effort is being made to find some way of overcoming this difficulty.

3. Situation is clearly becoming critical, and there seems real danger that, unless something is speedily done to counteract tendentious reports which are reaching Ibn Saud as to our treatment of rebels and to convince him that real attempt is being made in circumstances of great difficulty to carry out assurances given to him, he may take matters into his own hand and invade Koweit or Iraq territory with his forces. Until His Majesty's Government are in receipt of High Commissioner's reply to my telegram to Bagdad of 4th January [see No. 7], they are not in a position to issue definitive instructions, either as regards disposal of refugees or reply to Ibn Saud's representations. They are inclined to think that once decision has been reached, it would clear the atmosphere if arrangements were made for Dickson, preferably accompanied by representative of Air Officer Commanding, to have a personal meeting with Ibn Saud with the object both of communicating decisions reached and of discussing whole position with him.

4. In the meantime, His Majesty's Government suggest that it might produce a good effect if, when communicating message suggested in paragraph 2 above to Ibn Saud, he were informed that His Majesty's Government, in order to avoid delay and with a view to placing Ibn Saud in full possession of the position as it presents itself to them, would be willing immediately to despatch Colonel Dickson, with whom he is well acquainted, accompanied by a representative of the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, to his headquarters in the field to discuss with him a solution of the present difficulties, and that His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn as soon as possible whether he agrees to this proposal, and is prepared to furnish Colonel Dickson and his party with the necessary safe conduct to his headquarters.

5. Communication on lines of paragraph 4 should not, of course, be made unless you feel satisfied that despatch of Dickson and party would involve them in no personal danger. Dickson, in any case, should not actually leave until His Majesty's Government are in a position to furnish him with full instructions and until safe conduct from Ibn Saud has been received.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Koweit, Jerusalem, Jedda and Government of India.)

[E 111/111/91]

No. 13.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930.

PRIME MINISTER asked to see me this morning and brought letter from himself marked "very urgent," gist of which is as follows:—

"Since Ibn Saud is now encamped close to Iraq frontier, Iraq Government feel excellent opportunity presents itself for a joint meeting in order to discuss settlement of outstanding questions between the two Governments. Feisal is so impressed with the necessity for seizing this opportunity of making friendly overtures to a neighbouring King on his borders, that he is ready to meet Ibn Saud himself, either in neutral zone or at some convenient place near the frontier, for discussion of these questions. Iraq Government request me to convey this invitation to Ibn Saud."

Prime Minister explained that Feisal is very anxious to try to dissipate present atmosphere of distrust between Iraq and Nejd Governments by personal meeting with Ibn Saud, and would be glad if I could take part in conference, which would probably be attended by Prime Minister and Cornwallis. Matters for discussion include (a) disposal of rebel refugees; (b) return of loot; (c) breaches of article 4 of Bahrah Agreement; (d) extradition; (e) Treaty of *Bon Voisinage*; (f) mutual recognition of two Governments and exchange of representatives; (g) desert posts (which is regarded as most important of all). *Primâ facie*, I am in favour of this proposal, as feeling of hostility between Iraq and Nejd could hardly be worse and there seems a chance that even if conference fails to solve any outstanding questions, way might

be prepared by personal contact for a better mutual understanding. Since it is unlikely that Ibn Saud will remain near Iraq border for long, I request instructions by telegram as to whether I am authorised to despatch invitation to Ibn Saud as suggested. If meeting approved and takes place before question of rebel refugees in Koweit is settled, I suggest that representative of Koweit should be invited to attend.

[E 114/1/91]

No. 14.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 4th January [see No. 7].

(a) Difficulty regarding expulsion is due to the fact that Dawish and other rebel leaders are accompanied by women and children, which makes effective action against them almost impossible. Surrender on terms suggested in my telegram of 31st December [see No. 2] seemed only immediate feasible solution, but offer was withdrawn on the receipt of your telegram of 2nd January [see No. 3], and Royal Air Force have been unable to make any headway in Koweit, though there are apparently no rebels left in Iraq territory.

(b) Handing over of Ibn Mashhur to Hejaz Government is not barred by terms of his surrender, which was unconditional. Iraq Government have ordered that he should be kept under close surveillance pending result of negotiations for his disposal.

(c) Further reports from local officers show that no surrender of rebels has been accepted with conditions.

(d) A surprise attempt was made by Royal Air Force armoured cars on 5th January to round up rebels in Koweit territory, with object of forcibly disarming them if they refused to return to Nejd. Royal Air Force failed to come up with them, owing to mud caused by recent heavy rains. Latest report shows that bodies of rebels have slipped past Royal Air Force armoured cars in north-north-east direction towards Jahra. Further attempt will be made by the Royal Air Force to expel or disarm rebels when they can get in touch with them.

(e) I agree to proposed procedure as affecting Iraq, provided that decision to hand over rebels captured in Iraq should not be taken without concurrence of Iraq Government.

(f) This is matter for discussion with Iraq Government, but Prime Minister informs me that it is their intention to recover loot taken from Iraq tribes and punish rebels who have raided into Iraq. Action will presumably be taken under Section 27 of Tribal Disputes Regulations.

Glubb reported yesterday morning that he was at Obeid with fifty Iraq police and that Ibn Saud was only 4 miles away with large force. He asked for reinforcements, and Iraq Army Motor Machine-Gun Detachment left Bagdad yesterday morning for his camp to assist in dealing with any rebels who might attempt to enter Iraq territory.

[E 116/1/91]

No. 15.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 7, 1930.

FOLLOWING telegram has been addressed by the Political Agent, Koweit, to the Chief Staff Officer, and repeated to me and Bagdad:—

"Proceeded to Jahrah after you left to see if any rebels there. Found Dawish and Ibn Lami with their families camped in Palm Grove, also many camels and tents. Dawish said that you had just dropped six bombs close by. I told him eleventh hour had come and asked him to accompany me to your camp and make surrender to you. I emphasised that his surrender must be

without any conditions at all, and that you would send him to Basra as a prisoner and his tribe to Jarishan. I even offered to accompany him in aeroplane if he is nervous. After some hesitation, in spite of his son's persuading him, he stated in clearest terms that he simply dared not give himself up with prospect of being handed over to Ibn Saud. I urged him to face things as a brave man, but nothing would shake his determination. Warned him not to attempt to come to Koweit or try to make Dakhala on sheikhs or myself, as this impossible by His Majesty's Government's orders. Dawish said that he had no intention of doing this but merely wanted supplies, of which he is in direct need, afterwards was marching south to try conclusions with Ibn Saud. He asked for two days' grace and permission to take one week's supply. I said that this was quite impossible. Dawish then expressed intention of moving to-morrow, direction of Manaqish. This last may be bluff or may not."

To "make Dakhala" is Arab expression seeking asylum. Under Arab custom person with whom asylum is sought must protect refugee even to extent of fighting for him.

(Repeated to Jedda and Government of India.)

[E 116/1/91]

No. 16.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930.

FOLLOWING telegram has been received from Glubb:—

"Letter arrived from Ibn Saud asking despatch following telegram to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, copy to Koweit:—

"Encamped to-day Kharja, our secretary interviewed Glubb at Ubaid. Glubb informed him rebels escaped and arrived west of Jahra. Situation very critical. We repeat our demand to evict rebels from boundary or permission from the British Government for us to attack them where they are."

[E 129/1/91]

No. 17.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930.

FOLLOWING telegram has been received, dated 6th January, from Glubb:—

"Sheikh Yasir (Ibn Saud's secretary) requests despatch of the following to you:—

"Your telegram received, and desire to emphasise His Majesty only moved out with the object of punishing Mutair and Ajman and their guilty followers for past crimes in Iraq and Koweit, and he has now reached the frontier of Nejd joining with Iraq and Koweit. He found none of the rebels in our frontier and ordered me to repeat the following demand to your Excellency: Firstly, British Government to evict the remaining rebels by force from Koweit and inform us of their eviction through British Government post. Secondly, if this is impossible, British Government to stand aside and we can finish the affair in the shortest possible time. Thirdly, if the British Government does neither of the above, requests reply that we must abstain from dealing with the rebels because they are in Koweit. In that case, His Majesty, with deep regret, compelled to return home, and responsibility for the events which may occur will rest with those who gave the rebels asylum."

If reply of His Majesty's Government to this message is telegraphed to me, I will forward it to Glubb for communication to Ibn Saud. I have no further developments to report.

[E 131/1/91]

No. 18.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 7, 1930.

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad:—

"Secretary of State for the Colonies' telegram of 6th January to me [see No. 12].

"I am consulting Dickson regarding possibility of solution suggested in paragraph 1.

"I have instructed Dickson to transmit message contained in paragraph 2, and also, unless he sees any objection, to add message contained in paragraph 4.

"Dickson may have difficulty in forwarding message at once. Could you please transmit message contained in paragraph 2 to Ibn Saud through Glubb in reply to message contained in your telegram of 7th January" [see No. 15].

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 133/1/91]

No. 19.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 7, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 7th January [see No. 13].

His Majesty's Government agree that personal meeting between King Feisal and Ibn Saud at this juncture might have excellent effect. But they doubt whether this is the best moment for proposals for a conference to work out a general settlement such as Iraq Government propose, which would clearly be a lengthy business. Moreover (see paragraph 2 below), question of refugees presents serious difficulties. In these circumstances, they would much prefer that meeting should not be on basis of formal agenda or with reference to any list of subjects, but with object of establishing personal contact and co-operation against rebels. His Majesty's Government consider it essential that you should be present at meeting in person, and it should be made clear in your invitation to Ibn Saud that you will be there. Question of further meeting of more formal character could be considered in light of outcome of meeting. If you and Iraq Government agree, please act accordingly at once without further reference to me.

2. Question of refugees. His Majesty's Government are apprehensive of effect on Ibn Saud of claim by Iraq Government to deal in first instance with rebels who may surrender themselves [see No. 14, paragraph (f)]. They regard it as essential, if at all possible, that rebels should be handed over with minimum of delay to Ibn Saud, if necessary under guarantees from him that adequate punishment will be meted out by him in respect of crimes against Iraq. (His Majesty's Government would not, however, raise objection to retention by Iraq Government or Koweit of Iraqi or Koweit loot found with refugees.) We should be glad to learn what conditions, if any, you contemplate Iraq Government would be likely to wish to attach to their concurrence [see No. 14, paragraph (e)], and whether, if Iraq is asked to take over for custody rebels who may surrender in Koweit (whether to Iraq elements operating there or not) [see No. 11], they would regard this as entitling them to any voice in ultimate disposal of such refugees. Are we right in thinking that, save for Ibn Mashhur and his party, no rebels have so far surrendered in Iraq territory? You should not, at any rate at this stage, commit His Majesty's Government as regards acceptance of any conditions which Iraq Government endeavour to impose in connexion with surrender to Ibn Saud of refugees.

(Repeated Bushire, Koweit, Jedda and Government of India.)

[E 132/1/91]

No. 20.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 7, 1930.

ROYAL Air Force armoured cars are now at Jahra, temporarily weather-bound. Mutair rebels, with women and children, are moving south, as a result of aerial reconnaissances, accompanied by occasional warning bombs. Ibn Saud is moving east along Nejd-Koweit border with his whole force. Entirely new situation has thus been created, and if bombing is continued effect will be either that rebels will break back or that they will be driven into jaws of Ibn Saud, when His Majesty's Government will have to face stigma of responsibility for massacre of women and children which may result. Bombing has accordingly been temporarily suspended, and will not be resumed pending further instructions. I adhere to view expressed in my telegram of 31st December [see No. 2], that best hope of satisfactory outcome is to accept surrender of rebels on the lines suggested. In discussing case of Ibn Mashhur to-day, King Feisal told me that he could not agree to hand over any rebel refugee to Ibn Saud against his will, as this would be grave violation of tribal custom—even if surrender had been unconditional. He added if Sheikh of Koweit agreed to such a proceeding his daughter would remain for ever unmarriageable.

(Repeated to Bushire and Koweit.)

[E 150/1/91]

No. 21.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 8, 1930.

IRAQ Government are unwilling to agree that rebels who surrender or are captured by Royal Air Force or Sheikh of Koweit in the [? his] territory should be regarded as prisoners of Iraq Government or that they should be imprisoned in Iraq territory.

(Repeated to Bushire and Koweit.)

[E 156/1/91]

No. 22.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 8, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 6th January [see No. 12].

Political Agent of Koweit, who is at Jahrah, reports that countryside is covered with panic-stricken persons, out of control and in terror of attack both from our aeroplanes and from Ibn Saud. Solution suggested in paragraph 1 is therefore not now possible. He hopes that Ibn Hithlain will surrender unconditionally this morning. Mutair, with exception of parties referred to in my preceding telegram of today,* are moving south to frontier. Messages contained in paragraphs 2 and 4 of your telegram of 6th January [see No. 12] were sent by Dickson to Ibn Saud yesterday. He hopes to fly to Riqa to see situation and if Ibn Saud is himself definitely in vicinity. I do not think there would be any danger, and consider that personal meeting very desirable.

I have just received Bagdad telegram of 7th January and your reply [Nos. 13 and 19]. I suggest that Dickson and representative of Air Officer Commanding should proceed as soon as safe conduct is received to visit Ibn Saud, and inform him somewhat on the following lines: As Ibn Saud knows, in accordance with Arab customs refugees cannot be surrendered without negotiations (*vide* concluding

* Not printed.

portion of Bagdad telegram of 7th January), and that in order to carry out these negotiations and also to effect general settlement of outstanding questions, it is proposed that conference should be held at which representatives of Iraq and Koweit attend. This would probably relieve immediate situation and allow time for deliberation regarding conference.

(Repeated to Jedda, Bagdad, Government of India and Jerusalem.)

[E 156/1/91]

No. 23.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 9, 1930.

FOLLOWING reply received from Ibn Saud:—

"In reply to your message of 7th, His Majesty accepts the proposal of His Majesty's Government for interview with Dickson and representative of the Royal Air Force. He will camp to-day north-west of Musannat, to-morrow Jau-al-Huwar, day after that Baniya Jofan. Please inform us time of arrival of deputation, also if by car or air. His Majesty has ordered Hafidh Wahba to come with deputation. Please afford assistance; request reply urgently."

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and Government of India.)

[E 157/1/91]

No. 24.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 8, 1930.

REPORT just received from Burnett, commanding Royal Air Force in Koweit, that Naif-bin-Hithlain, Ajman Sheikh, surrendered unconditionally with his tribe to-day. Hithlain, with three servants, has been conveyed in Victoria as Royal Air Force prisoner to Royal Air Force camp, Shaibah. Burnett was unaware of Iraq Government objection to internment in Iraq territory, and Air Officer Commanding is now trying to arrange for Hithlain's detention in sloop or steamship "Patrick Stewart," lying in Shatt-al-Arab, pending His Majesty's Government's instructions as to disposal. Burnett has ordered Ajman tribesmen, with women and children, to proceed in the direction of Jarishan, but has been unable to disarm them. In view of Iraq Government's unwillingness to allow them to cross into Iraq, I trust that every effort will be made by Koweit authorities to prevent this. Iraq Government are being asked to co-operate on their side of the frontier. Dawish, accompanied by his fighting men, is apparently continuing his march southward towards Nejd frontier. Burnett has carried out dangerous operation in the face of enormous difficulties, and I trust that his action, which was obviously dictated by the exigencies of the critical situation, will receive the approval of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 157/1/91]

No. 25.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 9, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 7th January [see No. 19]. Invitation is being despatched to Ibn Saud on lines directed. His Majesty's Government may perhaps consider that meeting between Dickson and Ibn Saud could more profitably be merged into larger meeting a week or so hence if Ibn Saud accepts invitation. A further consideration is that meeting at this moment might be inopportune if report is true that forces of Feisal and Ibn Saud are converging. If early meeting with Dickson still considered

desirable I trust that Iraq Government will not be committed by instructions referred to in paragraph 5 of your telegram of 6th January [see No. 12].

2. Question of refugees. Prime Minister informed me to-day that Iraq Government would be unwilling to agree to handing over to Ibn Saud of rebels who had surrendered unconditionally in Iraq except on terms which rebels had themselves accepted. Mashhur and his party are the only rebels concerned at present.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 158/1/91]

No. 26.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 9, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 7th January [see No. 20].

His Majesty's Government have no desire that action should be taken which would have effect of forcing refugees directly into the arms of Ibn Saud's forces, and possibly resulting in massacre of women and children. In the circumstances explained in your telegram you were clearly right in suspending bombing operations. His Majesty's Government, however, consider it desirable that military and political action on the lines of that already taken, which has now led to the unconditional surrender of Ibn Hithlain and the Ajman, should be continued with the object of inducing remaining rebel refugees either to surrender also or to leave Koweit territory. With regard to bombing, this must be left to your discretion, but it should be only as last resource, and, if found necessary, it should be conducted, as has already been the practice, with the object of intimidating refugees rather than causing casualties, and every effort should be made not only to avoid casualties to women and children, but also to restrict casualties among male refugees to the smallest number consistent with achieving the effect desired.

2. In view of attitude adopted by King Feisal on question of ultimate disposal of refugees and desirability that His Majesty's Government should retain a free hand to negotiate conditions governing their handing over to Ibn Saud, His Majesty's Government consider it important that any refugees that may surrender in Koweit territory should be retained there at exclusive disposal of His Majesty's Government in the custody of the Royal Air Force, and should not be handed over to the Iraq Government, or, unless absolutely necessary, accommodated in Iraq.

3. His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn at the earliest opportunity what conditions, short of that suggested in your telegram of 31st December [see No. 2], you consider that His Majesty's Government could properly require from Ibn Saud in return for surrendering refugees to him. His Majesty's Government would also be glad of the views of the Resident on this point.

4. Provided you see no objection, I consider that steps should be taken immediately to inform Ibn Saud of the surrender of the Ajman, and that every effort is now being concentrated upon securing the surrender of remaining refugees, or, alternatively, their expulsion from Koweit territory.

5. Since foregoing paragraphs were drafted, I have learnt through Air Ministry of surrender of Dawish and his party, leaving only Ibn Lami's party still at large.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Jedda and Government of India.)

[E 159/1/91]

No. 27.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 10.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, January 9, 1930.

FOLLOWING from Koweit:—

"Just returned from Jahra.

"At 11 A.M. to-day Naif-al-Hithlain surrendered unconditionally and was sent to Basra by Victoria in the afternoon; his tribe, under Khalid, ordered to march to Jarishan at once. About 200 more terrified Mutair women, excluding children, are said to have found their way back to Jarishan. They have taken

refuge in the village, unable to face the prospect of battle and massacre if Dawish forced across border. Dawish is not yet out of Koweit, but advance party camped close to border. Dawish sent me message by Ibn Hithlain that, if only ray of hope given that he would not be handed over by His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud and to his death, he would surrender to me at once. The Sheikh of Koweit is terribly upset at whole of business, and has asked me to offer to Ibn Saud all Koweit camels for life of Dawish. The sheikh says that we are forcing him at the point of the bayonet to dishonour himself in the eyes of all Arabs.

"[Addressed to Bushire. Repeated to Bagdad.]"

(Repeated to Jedda and India.)

[E 159/1/91]

No. 28.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 9, 1930.

REFERENCE to Bagdad telegram of 8th January [see No. 21].

Shiekh proposes to intern leaders on Falaicha Island or in Koweit town, and their following east of Janyah-Safwan road, allowing them to retain arms for self-defence. I have approved locations, but am consulting Dickson regarding arms. In any case, it will probably be some time before proposal can be given effect to. Hithlain is being put temporarily on board "Patrick Stewart," which is now at Basra, but will be transferred to H.M.S. "Lupin" on arrival. I recommend that he should then be brought to Koweit.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 164/1/91]

No. 29.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 9, 1930.

AIR-COMMODORE BURNETT has arrived at Bagdad, and reports that Dawish surrendered to him unconditionally to-day. Dawish and one of his sheikhs, Ibn Edami, with three retainers, have been conveyed by aeroplane to Sheibah, and will be removed to steamship "Patrick Stewart."

Ajman and Mutair tribesmen, who are included in unconditional surrender, are moving into Northern Koweit. One special section of Mutair have crossed into Nejd.

(Repeated to Bushire and Jedda.)

[E 192/29/91]

No. 30.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 11, 1930.)

(No. 616.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 27, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the local press published on the 15th December the information that Mirza Habibullah Khan Hoveida (formerly Ain-ul-Mulk) had been appointed Persian "diplomatic representative" to the Sultan of the Hejaz.

2. Mirza Habibullah Khan Hoveida was the representative whom Persia sent to the Hejaz on a special mission in the spring of this year—a compliment which King Ibn Saud reciprocated during the summer.

3. It is not yet known definitely whether Mirza Habibullah Khan Hoveida will accept the appointment; were he appointed Minister he would do so, but he fears that he may be sent only as Chargé d'Affaires with an insufficient allowance, and although he may be compelled to obey the order, he would, in those circumstances, go unwillingly.

4. Should he eventually go as Persian representative to King Ibn Saud, the British agent will find him a friendly colleague, as did in the past British consuls in Damascus. He is well known to this Legation, and has said that, in the event of his going to the Hejaz, he would always be most willing to help his British colleague in any way he could. He speaks Arabic fluently.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt and Iraq, and His Majesty's consul, Jeddah.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 169/1/91]

No. 31.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 10, 1930.

I HAVE instructed Dickson to inform Ibn Saud that he hopes to visit him very shortly, but is awaiting final instructions from His Majesty's Government, and to ask whether he is remaining at Baniya Aifen (just north of Abu-al-Hiram), or whether he is moving elsewhere. I submit following for consideration of His Majesty's Government: The Sheikh of Koweit is an independent ruler, and we can hardly compel him to agree to measures which would irretrievably dishonour him in Arab eyes without making it perfectly clear that whole responsibility is ours. I suggest that he should visit Ibn Saud with Dickson and negotiate in accordance with Arab custom as one Arab ruler with another on behalf of tribesmen who have surrendered in his territory. Dickson's rôle would then be that of personal friend of both parties, who would endeavour to compose differences that might arise. Any agreement arrived at would, of course, be subject to approval of His Majesty's Government, but sheikh would have had full opportunity of effecting settlement himself, and it would do much to raise his prestige, which has been severely damaged lately by the somewhat high-handed measures which we have been forced to adopt towards him, and if no settlement was effected, His Majesty's Government would be in a stronger position to ask the sheikh to agree to such measures as they considered desirable. It would, of course, be necessary to obtain concurrence of Ibn Saud to visit of Sheikh of Koweit. If this suggestion is not approved, then only course would appear to be for Dickson to visit Ibn Saud by himself, ascertain from him what conditions he is prepared to offer if rebels are surrendered to him. Meanwhile, I recommend that Dawish, Lami and Hithlain, who are being transferred from "Patrick Stewart" to H.M.S. "Lupin," should be kept on board the ship for the present, and should not be landed at Koweit.)

(Repeated to Jedda, India and Bagdad.)

[E 197/1/91]

No. 32.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 10, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 9th January [see No. 26].

2. I agree that it is essential that all refugees who have surrendered to the Royal Air Force in Koweit territory should be retained as prisoners at the exclusive disposal of His Majesty's Government.

3. As regards Dawish, Lami and Hithlain, who have been removed to steamship, "Patrick Stewart," I strongly recommend that they should be interned in some remote country which will render it impossible for them to cause trouble to Nejd, Koweit or Iraq in the future. This essential condition could not be secured in my opinion if handed back to Ibn Saud on any condition or if they were interned in Koweit or Iraq territory.

4. As regards Ajman and Mutair tribesmen who have surrendered in Koweit, I consider that Ibn Saud should be informed that he is debarred from negotiating their return to Nejd until His Majesty's Government have agreed to the necessary preliminary conditions since they are regarded as prisoners of His Majesty's Government.

5. Conditions should include satisfactory arrangement for making good losses inflicted on Koweit and Iraq and on undertaking to be given by Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Government regarding their disposal after their return to Nejd.

6. This undertaking should provide for safeguard regarding their treatment which would be acceptable to the refugees and for suitable guarantees regarding future protection of Koweit and Iraq from their depredations.

7. I recommend that Burnett and Dickson should be instructed to meet Ibn Saud as soon as possible to announce these orders. I consider Burnett's presence is essential in order to emphasise the fact that surrenders were made to the Royal Air Force, and that His Majesty's Government are determined to retain the question of disposal of the prisoners in their own hands.

8. I request that His Majesty's Government's orders on these points may be telegraphed to me as person responsible for the operations of the Royal Air Force in Koweit.

(Repeated to Bushire, Jedda, Government of India and Koweit.)

[E 198/1/91]

No. 33.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 10, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 9th January, paragraph 4 [see No. 26].
I despatched following message to Ibn Saud through Glubb yesterday:—

"Please inform Ibn Saud immediately from me that Dawish and Naif-bin-Hithlain have surrendered to the Royal Air Force in Koweit and have been interned on board one of His Majesty's ships pending receipt of instructions from His Majesty's Government.

"Main portion of Ajman and Mutair have also surrendered to the Royal Air Force and are being interned temporarily in Northern Koweit. Small section of Mutair last seen moving south-west in the neighbourhood of Minaqish."

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit and Jedda.)

[E 201/1/91]

No. 34.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, January 11, 1930.

FOLLOWING is gist of a note dated 10th January which I have received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he presses for a categorical answer to demands already made for delivery of rebels, and states that procrastination would have most serious results:—

He learns that rebels have been permitted to cross the frontier of Koweit. This is contrary to the undertaking given that, if they crossed the boundary, they would be expelled by force.

Their movements within Koweit and Iraq boundaries without action being taken against them in accordance with assurances given have produced serious doubts as to the friendly intentions of His Majesty's Government repeatedly expressed. He adds that the policy of *laissez-faire* would unfavourably affect the good relations between the two countries.

He requests to be informed with all frankness and at the earliest opportunity of the position which His Majesty's Government are taking up.

In a second note of the same date, despatched on receipt by him of the news of Dawish's surrender, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs requests that rebel leaders, particularly Dawish-bin-Mashhur, Ibn Lami and Ibn Hithlain, should be handed over. Acceptance of their surrender is, he says, contrary to the undertakings of His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Koweit, No. 8.)

[E 202/1/91]

No. 35.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 9, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 9th January and Bushire telegram of 8th January [see Nos. 22 and 25].

His Majesty's Government consider it important that main question of disposal of refugees should be settled before proposed meeting between Ibn Saud and King Feisal takes place and therefore that meeting between Dickson and Ibn Saud should first be held. Except as regards Ibn Mashur, the Iraq Government are not directly concerned with question of refugees and presence of representatives of Iraq at discussions between Dickson and Ibn Saud in regard to disposal of bulk of refugees would have no obvious justification and might conceivably prejudice the success of the negotiations. His Majesty's Government anticipate that once this question is disposed of a more favourable atmosphere will prevail and thus that proposed conference between King Faisal and Ibn Saud will have great prospect of success.

When His Majesty's Government have received your views and those of Resident in regard to conditions to be required of Ibn Saud in return for handing over refugees [see paragraph 3 of No. 26], they will be in a position to furnish Dickson with instructions on this subject and proposed meeting between him and Ibn Saud can then take place without further delay.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Jedda and Government of India.)

[E 221/1/91]

No. 36.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 12, 1930.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his general utterances, is openly accusing His Majesty's Government of breach of faith. He has spoken strongly to this effect to a party of journalists, representing leading Egyptian papers, who have been attending anniversary celebrations here as guests of the Hejaz Government.

I am inclined to think that Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' action has not met with Emir's entire approval, and although I can sympathise with the former's feelings, I think, in view of tenor of his notes, that a somewhat curt reply might have salutary effect.

I would therefore propose, subject to your approval, to limit myself to stating: "The matter in question is being dealt with direct between His Majesty's political agent at Koweit and the King, and after consultation with the latter, arrangements are being made for a meeting with the King in order to discuss with him personally the various points at issue. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government prefer to await outcome of this meeting before replying to his notes."

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Koweit, No. 11.)

[E 236/1/91]

No. 37.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq and the Resident in the Persian Gulf.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Private and Personal.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, January 10, 1930.

IT seems clear that in the event of rebel leaders being handed over to Ibn Saud, His Majesty's Government, and in a lesser degree the Sheikh of Koweit, will incur considerable odium as having committed an act which is contrary to Arab tradition. If leaders are handed over to him, Ibn Saud may either cause them to be put to death or may pardon them. In the former event, His Majesty's Government would apparently incur blame for having committed an act of inhumanity and breach of Arab custom; in the latter event, Dawish and other rebel leaders would doubtless

prosecute further raids against Iraq and Koweit, either with or without the direct encouragement of Ibn Saud, and would again become a thorn in our flesh.

It has been suggested to me that a possible solution of the problem would be to deport to some such place as Cyprus such of the leaders as would be likely to be put to death by Ibn Saud, or, if pardoned, to be a source of future trouble to us, and to keep them there in confinement or under close surveillance for a number of years and until they can safely be released. Ibn Saud is unlikely, it is suggested, to punish the rank and file of the rebel tribes with undue severity and these could be surrendered to him on such conditions as seem desirable. Moreover, he would have no legitimate grievance so long as the rebel leaders were definitely immobilised and, for example, he was promised that they would not be permitted to return to Arabia without his consent.

The other interested departments of His Majesty's Government have not yet been approached about this suggestion and before this is done I should be grateful for your views on it generally and also to learn:—

- (1) Whether the suggested solution would be likely to accord with local sentiment
- (2) Approximately how many persons, men and women, it would be necessary to deport.
- (3) Whether the rebel leaders and their relatives could be relied upon to provide the funds necessary for their deportation and subsequent maintenance or whether these would have to be provided by His Majesty's Government.

A very early reply would be appreciated. A similar telegram is being sent to Bushire (Bagdad), to whom your reply should be repeated.

[E 236/1/91]

No. 38.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Private and Personal.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, January 11, 1930.

I AGREE with proposals contained in your private and personal telegram of 10th January, which are similar to those put forward by Bagdad. I believe settlement would accord with local sentiment, and would safeguard position of Sheikh of Koweit. I am making enquiries from Dickson about (2) and (3) and will telegraph further. Suggestion contained in my telegram of 10th January [see No. 31] may therefore be ignored, though sheikh might suitably meet Ibn Saud later. I suggested possibility of settlement on Arab lines through sheikh as way out of the difficulty, only because I thought that His Majesty's Government might feel their hands tied to some extent by previous assurances to Ibn Saud.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 236/1/91]

No. 39.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Personal and Private.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, January 11, 1930.

PLEASE refer to Bagdad telegram of 10th January [see No. 32].

Dickson is, in my view, a good choice for negotiations with Ibn Saud, as he knows him personally. Moreover, he gets on very well with Arabs and is a very good linguist, and if given free hand should do very well. He is, however, somewhat temperamental. If Air Officer Commanding's representative is senior to him (as Burnett is), latter would presumably be head of mission and Dickson would be practically relegated to rôle of interpreter. He is not well suited for this, and I much fear there would be friction. He has himself asked not to be sent in this capacity.

I recommend, therefore, that Royal Air Force representative should be junior to Dickson, who as political officer should be head of mission.

I have not repeated this to Bagdad.

[E 236/1/91]

No. 40.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, January 11, 1930.

PLEASE refer to Bushire telegram of 10th January, which crossed my telegram of same date [see Nos. 31 and 32].

I trust that preliminary meeting will be between representatives of His Majesty's Government (Burnett and Dickson) and Ibn Saud alone, and that any discussion between Sheikh of Koweit and Ibn Saud may be postponed till proposed meeting with Feisal takes place.

(Repeated to Bushire and Koweit.)

[E 236/1/91]

No. 41.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Private and Personal.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, January 11, 1930.

REFERENCE your private and personal telegram of 10th January [see No. 37].

You will see from my telegram of 10th January [see No. 32], which crossed your private and personal telegram, that I have made identical recommendation regarding disposal of leaders.

I also agree as regards rank and file, but I feel that first essential is to inform Ibn Saud at once of His Majesty's Government's intention to keep in their own hands negotiations as to disposal, otherwise prisoners will disperse and start negotiating direct with Ibn Saud, with the result that Koweit and Iraq claims will be ignored.

Answers to your questions are as follows:—

1. I am advised that solution which you suggest, as amplified in my telegram [No. 32], would accord with local Arab sentiment. Internment of leaders outside Arabia would probably be unpopular with Iraq Government, who hoped to use them as lever to extract concessions from Ibn Saud. But they have no justification for this attitude.

2. I will telegraph numbers later. There are probably a few more sheikhs who would not dare to return to Nejd, or who would be thorn in our flesh if they did.

3. His Majesty's Government should be prepared to pay for costs of deportation and probably of maintenance. I will, however, make enquiries on latter point.

Burnett is waiting here for instructions from His Majesty's Government, which were requested in my telegram [No. 32], to which I shall be grateful for very early reply. I consider that his presence at meeting with Ibn Saud is of greatest importance.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 236/1/91]

No. 42.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Private and Personal.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 12, 1930.

BAGDAD private and personal telegram of yesterday [No. 41] has just reached me. From this and from concluding paragraph of his telegram of 10th January [No. 32], it is clear that Humphrys's view is that Burnett should be head of mission. Apart from personal factor which I have pointed out, this seems to me to put mission

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on wrong basis. I take it that we are sending Dickson, who is personal friend of Ibn Saud, to have friendly discussion regarding disposal of rebels, and I imagine that His Majesty's Government would be ready to meet Ibn Saud's wishes as far as possible, subject to two conditions:—

1. That settlement arrived at shall not offend local sentiment; and
2. That Ibn Saud shall give guarantees that persons handed over to him shall receive reasonable treatment and shall not be put to death.

If this view is correct, it would seem undesirable to send mission headed by military officer "to announce orders." If we can settle disposal of refugees in the first instance, then question of Koweit and Iraq claims and other cognate matters might be left for discussion at subsequent meeting between Feisal, Ibn Saud and Sheikh of Koweit. Another solution of the difficulty would be for me to head mission myself, taking Dickson as my assistant. In this case there would be no objection to Burnett being the Royal Air Force representative, if Bagdad still [word omitted] there would be no objection.

[E 237/1/91]

No. 43.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 12, 1930.

FOLLOWING from political agent, Koweit:—

"My man has just returned from Ibn Saud. Latter is camping at Rijam Aifan, south-east of Jebel Hiram, a little north of Gara. Return journey took four hours. With Ibn Saud are twelve lorries, about thirty touring cars, and camel force of about 5,000 men, camping in approximately 400 tents; camels all starving. Ibn Saud will camp five days present position, afterwards must move. He is very angry at rebel leaders being sent to Basra; asked my man why I had not adopted simple course of bringing them to him personally, with their women, and ask for their pardon. He would readily have forgiven them, and was still prepared to do so if approached in right way. Asked why I had not visited him, said that he expected me at Safah, wanting me to come as soon as possible for friendly talk. In letter which he also sent he thanks me for having got rid of Awazim. My man reports rebel force under Ibn Ashwan was destroyed, also party which escaped via Manaqish yesterday. Ibn Saud led car attack in person. My man, who was with Ibn Saud, pleaded for and saved ten lives. Repeated to Aviation and Chief Staff Officer."

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and India.)

[E 238/1/91]

No. 44.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 14.)

(Private and Personal.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 13, 1930.

REFERENCE to my personal and private telegram of 11th January [see No. 38], Dickson reports that each sheikh would probably be accompanied by about ten persons. He considers it very improbable that relatives could find costs of deportation or maintenance, since sole wealth of Bedouins is their flocks and herds and they have little or no cash.

In any case, once tribes have been surrendered only means of recovering cost would be through Ibn Saud. This would probably be difficult, since he is certain to oppose deportation.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 258/1/91]

No. 45.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, January 14, 1930.

MY telegram No. 8.

I have now received a long note from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 13th January enumerating undertakings of His Majesty's Government and once more urging immediate delivery of rebels for reasons which he sets out in detail.

Note is in the main a recapitulation of representations previously made, but is couched in conciliatory language.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Koweit, No. 13.)

[E 260/1/91]

No. 46.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, January 13, 1930.

REFERENCE is to my immediately following telegram.

You will see that only difference between Ibn Saud's attitude and that of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in Jedda telegram No. 7 to Foreign Office [No. 34], is that Minister for Foreign Affairs is even more uncompromising. While agreeing that a curt reply would be salutary, I suggest instead of draft contained in Jedda telegram No. 8 [No. 36], the following message should be sent through me to Ibn Saud, and repeated to Jedda for identical communication, *mutatis mutandis*, to Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"I have repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Government your Majesty's message, communicated to me through political agent at Koweit, and I am instructed to reply as follows: 'His Britannic Majesty's Government have never promised to surrender the persons of rebel leaders to your Majesty. Such proceeding would, as your Majesty is aware, be entirely contrary to all local custom and international usage. As has been already explained to your Majesty, the only thing that prevented His Majesty's Government from expelling rebel tribes was that they were accompanied by their women and children, against whom it was impossible to take military action. Your Majesty was warned of this contingency as long ago as the middle of October.'"

(Vide Foreign Office telegram No. 107 of 14th October to Jedda.)

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit and Jedda.)

[E 260/1/91]

No. 47.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 13, 1930.

IN reply to message reported in my telegram of 10th January [see No. 33], I have received following from Ibn Saud:—

"In reply to your Excellency's telegram regarding confinement of Dawish, Hithlain, and most of the Mutair and Ajman. Despite our seeing the slowness of His Majesty's Government in fulfilling its promise, we, with our troops, are still expecting fulfilment of the same, given repeatedly in its letter, and request now handing over of Dawish, Hithlain and Mashur, and driving out of all Mutair and Ajman. We have no doubt that the British Government will appreciate the difficulties which we and the people of Nejd have endured, trusting in its promise, also, that it will appreciate the position of our troops on the boundary with their hands tied, while enemy is in security. They therefore request for early fulfilment of promise. Please accept our respects."

[E 265/1/91]

No. 48.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jerusalem, January 14, 1930.

YOUR telegram to Palestine of 3rd January [No. 7]: Disposal of Ibn Mashur. I do not desire any action taken in respect of raid against Zebn in February 1928 against Mashur. He was, I understand, punished by Ibn Saud; but demand for restoration of property stolen still stands against Ibn Saud.
(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire, Jedda and Koweit.)

[E 273/1/91]

No. 49.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 15, 1930.

FOLLOWING from Koweit of 15th January:—

"One of Ibn Saud's cars arrived last evening. Hafidh Wahba this morning delivered very friendly verbal message to me from Ibn Saud asking me to prevent Royal Air Force flying over Nejd territory. Three and two machines, he said, had flown over his camp and over his camels on successive days. He thought airmen probably acted without authority, but in any case he would like warning given them, as it excited his people, and was irregular. Hafidh Wahba further informed me that Ibn Saud had received communication regarding visit of King of Iraq, and obviously welcomed idea, as he had ordered marquees, tables and chairs to be got ready in Koweit and transported by dhows to Ras-al-Zor as soon as arrangements visit definitely fixed. From this it looks as if he would soon move Wafra, as suggested him by me."

(Repeated to High Commissioner for Iraq and Jedda.)

[E 275/1/91]

No. 50.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident in the Persian Gulf.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 15, 1930.

HIS Majesty's Government have carefully considered question of disposal of rebel refugees in the light of your views and those of the High Commissioner, and have reached the following conclusions:—

1. In view of the importance of the issues involved and of the delicate situation which has arisen, they consider it in the highest degree desirable that you yourself should assume personal charge of mission to Ibn Saud, and should take with you both Dickson and, subject to the High Commissioner's consent, Burnett, to whose presence as a military adviser His Majesty's Government attach great importance. They trust that you will immediately put in train the necessary arrangements for your mission, in consultation with the Air Officer Commanding. It seems desirable that, if practicable, you should take a wireless set with you to Ibn Saud's camp.

2. Jedda telegrams of 11th and 12th January and Bagdad telegrams of 13th January [see Nos. 34, 36, 46 and 47] have been carefully considered. Having regard to the fact that the assistance and co-operation of the military forces of His Majesty's Government have been the determining factor in the suppression of the revolt against Ibn Saud, they cannot but take exception to the tone of the recent communications from him and his Government. In the circumstances, they consider that a dignified and stiff remonstrance is called for. They consider, however, that it is preferable that this should be conveyed by word of mouth rather than by a written communication. On your arrival at Ibn Saud's camp, you should therefore explain

to him that His Majesty's Government never agreed to hand over rebels who might surrender, and, as has already been explained to him, the only thing that prevented His Majesty's Government from expelling rebel tribes prior to their surrender was that they were accompanied by their women and children, against whom effective military action could not be taken. You should remind Ibn Saud that he was warned of this contingency as long ago as the middle of October. You should leave him in no doubt as to the exception taken by His Majesty's Government to his recent communications. (You should know for your guidance that His Majesty's Government do not regard themselves as committed, and cannot agree to unconditional surrender or to surrender on conditions repugnant to Arab custom or British traditions.)

3. His Majesty's Government note that both you and the High Commissioner consider that deportation of the Mutair and Ajman leaders would be the alternative least open to political objection. They assume that leaders, if faced with alternative of surrender to Ibn Saud or deportation, would willingly choose the latter. You will appreciate that compulsory deportation would be extremely difficult to justify on juridical grounds, and might involve His Majesty's Government in serious legal difficulties.

Even voluntary deportation, however, is open to serious objections on ground of expense, which I understand from you would have to be borne by His Majesty's Government. This expense might expose His Majesty's Government to criticism in Parliament, especially as liability once incurred might continue indefinitely. It is also open to objection on ground of legal difficulties attaching to transfer of leaders and detention in a British Colony.

Unless, therefore, you feel strongly that alternative of handing over rebel leaders to Ibn Saud is politically impracticable, and that no undertakings given by him (even if formally assumed towards His Majesty's Government) would be sufficient to ensure humane treatment and satisfy Arab sentiment, and, at the same time, to protect Iraq and Koweit from further raids, His Majesty's Government would much prefer not to adopt alternative of deportation.

4. If, however, you are satisfied that deportation of leaders is essential, His Majesty's Government authorise you to inform Ibn Saud that they see no alternative to adoption of that course. His Majesty's Government have not, however, yet decided whether to choose Cyprus or some other Colony as a place of exile, and you should avoid committing yourself on this point. In communicating foregoing to Ibn Saud, you should make every effort to render it palatable and to secure his concurrence. You might explain that, in all the circumstances, deportation is obviously the best course to adopt, both from his point of view and that of His Majesty's Government, as (a) inflicting on leaders the extreme punishment of exile; (b) removing them from all possibility of further raiding or rebellion; and (c) satisfying British sentiment and saving the face of local Arab rulers, the importance of which he will no doubt appreciate. You are yourself in a position to speak as to feelings of Sheikh of Koweit. If, in spite of your utmost endeavours, you are unsuccessful in persuading Ibn Saud to acquiesce in deportation, you should, without giving any indication that His Majesty's Government are prepared to modify their attitude, ascertain and communicate to me his own opinion as to conditions which should govern surrender of leaders, and should inform him that you have no authority to discuss any alternative solution, but must report to His Majesty's Government for further instructions.

5. If, on the other hand, you do not feel that deportation is really essential, you should endeavour to obtain from Ibn Saud written and binding guarantees that, if leaders are handed over—

- (a) Their lives and those of their relatives will be spared.
- (b) Any punishment inflicted shall not be excessive or such as to outrage Arab sentiment or run counter to British traditions.
- (c) Effective measures will be taken to eliminate the possibility of Iraq or Koweit suffering further at their hands.

6. His Majesty's Government note that it is considered unlikely that Ibn Saud would wish to punish rank and file of rebel tribes with undue severity, but, in their case also it is clearly important to satisfy local and humanitarian sentiment. Consequently, before agreeing to hand them over, you should obtain from Ibn Saud guarantees similar to those suggested in paragraph 5 above, and of a nature which, in your opinion, the refugees themselves could reasonably be required to accept.

7. As regards the question of recovery of loot, His Majesty's Government do not feel that they are on very strong ground. Iraqi and Koweiti claims for compensation have never been accepted by Ibn Saud, and, as regards Iraq, Ibn Saud is understood to intend to present large counter-claims. Moreover, special machinery for adjustment of such claims is provided for in Bahra Agreement. His Majesty's Government doubt, therefore, whether they could take matters into their own hands and seize property of refugees to satisfy local claims, or, alternatively, could make restoration of loot a condition of surrender of refugees. On the other hand, they realise that, once refugees have been surrendered, Iraq and Koweit will not be in a very strong position to demand restoration of loot. In all the circumstances, His Majesty's Government can only leave it to you to do what in your judgment is practicable at this stage, but trust that at least it will be possible to obtain satisfactory guarantees from Ibn Saud on this point. You will appreciate that the question will inevitably be raised in later discussion with Iraq and Koweit, and it is, therefore, very desirable to clear the ground so far as possible at once.

8. The position of Ibn Mashur (whose surrender has now been demanded by Ibn Saud) is not quite on all fours with that of other rebel leaders [see Nos. 2 and 7]. If Ibn Saud raises the question, you should emphasise this disparity and explain that Ibn Mashur is at present in the custody of the Iraq Government, and that question of his ultimate disposal can better be handled at subsequent meeting with King Feisal.

9. Finally, His Majesty's Government would be glad to be assured that three principal sheikhs only are concerned in proposal for deportation, and that thirty may be regarded as the maximum number of persons who must accompany them. They assume that £50 per head per annum would cover cost of their maintenance, but would be glad of confirmation. They are anxious to reduce party to absolute minimum consistent with objects in view, and trust that it may be possible to reduce total below thirty-three. In particular, they feel under no obligation to deport and maintain full complement of female relatives or children of leaders unless surrender of these persons to Ibn Saud would lay His Majesty's Government open to charge of inhumanity. Subject to your views, His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that governing consideration should be whether persons to be deported would be exposed to risk of death or barbarous treatment if handed back to Ibn Saud.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Koweit, Jedda and Government of India.)

[E 284/1/91]

No. 51.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 16, 1930.

MY telegram of 9th January [see No. 25]. I have received cordial reply from Ibn Saud accepting invitation to meeting with Feisal and myself and asking me to suggest convenient date.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Jedda and India.)

[E 295/1/91]

No. 52.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 16, 1930.

MY immediately preceding telegram [No. 51]. I have been discussing the dates with the King and Prime Minister and was on the point of despatching invitation to Ibn Saud to meet Feisal and myself on the 25th January at Rukhaimiya in Iraq-Nejd neutral zone when I received your telegram of 15th January [No. 50]. January 25th was selected as giving time to both parties to make the necessary preparations and also to conclude their meeting (!) before Ramazan, which begins 30th January. As you will see from my telegram of 6th January [No. 8], I contemplated that the preliminary visit of Dickson and Burnett to Ibn Saud would

merely be for the purpose of communicating decision of His Majesty's Government as to disposal of rebels. Now that His Majesty's Government have decided that this question is to form subject of negotiations, I have modified my reply to Ibn Saud as in my immediately following telegram addressed to Bushire.

[E 295/1/91]

No. 53.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 16, 1930.

FOLLOWING addressed to Bushire:—

"Reference to the Secretary of State for the Colonies' telegram of 15th January and my repeat to you [see Nos. 50 and 52]. I agree that Burnett should accompany you and have authorised Air Officer Commanding to make arrangements with you direct. I see from a telegram from Tehran that you propose to fly to Koweit, and I feel sure that you will appreciate the desirability from our point of view of your negotiations with Ibn Saud being concluded as soon as possible.

"I shall be glad if you see no objection if Dickson can be authorised to thank Ibn Saud from King Feisal and myself for his courteous message, and to say that it is hoped that Rukhaimiya in Iraq-Nejd neutral zone will be acceptable as the meeting-place, and to request His Majesty to let me know the earliest possible date after the 25th January on which meeting at Rukhaimiya can take place."

[E 334/334/91]

No. 54.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 20, 1930.)

(No. 329.)

Jedda, December 31, 1929.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 196 of to-day's date reporting that I have this day notified the Hejaz Government of the raising of the status of the British agency in this town to that of a Legation.

2. I have not delayed in doing so, as the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs recently raised the subject again and was obviously anxious that the change should take place as soon as possible. I am, furthermore, due to preside at a banquet on the 24th instant, at which all the chief officials of the Government and the leading notables of Jedda and Mecca, about eighty persons in all, are to be present. The moment seems to me, therefore, to be particularly opportune for notifying the Hejaz Government of the fact, and I do not anticipate in the near future any occasion for doing so on which a better impression is likely to be created.

3. I have the honour to enclose a copy of my note to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4. I have also sent copies to the following posts for information: Jerusalem, Bagdad, Cairo, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein, Delhi, Khartum, Port Sudan, Lagos, Aden, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Beirut, Basra; also to the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Mr. Bond to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

(After compliments.)

Your Excellency,

Jedda, December 21, 1929.

I HAVE much pleasure in informing your Excellency that, having regard to the wishes expressed in your Excellency's note of the 18th June last, His Majesty the King has given his Royal approval to the proposal to raise the status of this agency at Jedda to that of a Legation, and to the proposed establishment of a Hejaz-Nejd Legation in London.

2. Steps are being taken to select a suitable senior officer for appointment as British Minister to Jedda, and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba's name will in due course be submitted to His Majesty, as requested in your Excellency's note, as Hejaz-Nejd Minister at London.

3. I myself have been appointed Chargé d'Affaires pending the arrival of a British Minister, and new credentials as such are to be sent to me as soon as possible. (Respects.)

W. L. BOND.

[E 342/334/91]

No. 55.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 20, 1930.)

(No. 337.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 30, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 329 of the 21st instant, enclosing a copy of a note which I addressed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs notifying him of the raised status of the British agency in Jedda, I have the honour to enclose a copy of Sheikh Fuad Hamza's reply, dated the 25th instant, in which he expresses considerable pleasure at the action taken by His Majesty's Government, and makes the usual polite remarks about myself.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 55.

Fuad Hamza to Mr. Bond.

Sir,

24.7.1348 (December 25, 1929.)

I AM not exaggerating when I say that I am very greatly delighted to hear the news you communicated to me in your letter of the 21st December, 1929 (20.7.1348), to the effect that His Majesty King George V has approved the proposal to raise the status of the British agency to that of a Legation. My delight is due to two reasons: firstly, to the fact that the status of the British agency has been raised to that of a Legation, and secondly, to the confidence placed in you by your Government in selecting you to act as Chargé d'Affaires for the British Legation. My congratulations to you are, therefore, naturally doubled.

I would not like to allow this opportunity to pass without referring to the noble sentiments which you have always shown in performing your important duties, and I wish to assure you that you will meet from all officials of the Hejaz Government every co-operation and encouragement so that you will persevere in the protection of friendly relations, the maintenance of which, I consider, is one of our most sacred duties.

I hope that the day on which you will be able to ask me to arrange a time for presenting your credentials in your new capacity is near.

With highest respects,

FUAD HAMZA.

[E 329/1/91]

No. 56.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 20.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 18, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 15th January [No. 50]. It is not clear to me whether His Majesty's Government prefer to regard rebel tribes as prisoners or as refugees. Air Officer Commanding points out that if His Majesty's Government are to be responsible for their ultimate disposal on lines negotiated between Resident and Ibn Saud, he must be allowed to reinforce Royal Air Force in Koweit, who are not strong enough to ensure that rebels will neither dribble into Iraq (possibly

encouraged by Feisal) nor become inextricably mixed with Koweit tribes, nor even return to Nejd in consequence of direct overtures from Ibn Saud. He has asked me to agree to half-company Assyrian levies being sent in motor cars to Koweit to assist Royal Air Force. It appears to me that employment of Iraq levies outside boundaries of Iraq is difficult to justify except in Iraq interests, and it appears from paragraph 7 of your telegram under reply that in this case effect may be to encourage Iraq Government to hope for more than they are likely to obtain. I have therefore told Air Officer Commanding that I cannot concur without specific authority from His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Koweit.)

[E 391/1/91]

No. 57.

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Koweit, January 21, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 15th January [see No. 50].

I have discussed return of rebels with Ibn Saud. He agrees to following conditions:—

(i) Neither amongst the leaders nor the tribesmen shall any person be put to death.

(ii) The punishment to be awarded shall not be contrary to Arab sentiment.

He has given me private assurance that he proposes to insist on Dawish and the other leaders submitting publicly to him, and that he will keep them under surveillance either in Riyadh or in camp with him in the same manner as Ibn Raschid, Bijad Sheikh of Ataiba and the others who have fought against him have been treated.

As regards the tribes, he proposes to take from them all camels, sheep, &c., which they have stolen, and will probably order them to reside in specified areas for some time to come.

(iii) He undertakes to take effective steps to prevent raids into Koweit or Iraq in the future and should raids by Mutair or Ajman occur he accepts full responsibility for them and undertakes to pay compensation for all property stolen and blood money for anyone killed.

(iv) As regards Koweit, he agrees, should sheikh desire it, to commission, on analogy of that provided in Bahra Agreement, to examine claims between Koweit and Nejd, and is also ready, should Iraq Government desire it, to agree to commission under Bahra Agreement for settlement of claims between Nejd and Iraq and accepts responsibility for all claims found by commission due from him.

Ibn Saud's attitude is very conciliatory now. He has expressed regret for the tone of the recent notes sent by his Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is, with suppression of this revolt and that of Ataiba, stronger now than he has been for some time past and therefore will probably be able to enforce his orders for some time to come. He is ready to confirm the above arrangements by exchange of letters. Chief Staff Officer is of the opinion that [while] permanent peace on the Iraq-Nejd frontier cannot be guaranteed without the deportation of the leaders and the return of loot before the surrender of the tribesmen, and I share this view. We realise, however, the force of considerations mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 7 of your telegram under reply and the desirability of early settlement. May I therefore be authorised to arrange surrender of rebels on above conditions?

I request reply by to-morrow if possible, as Ibn Saud wishes to shift camp.

(Repeated to Bagdad, India and Jedda.)

[E 412/412/91]

No. 58.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 12, 1930.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 487 of the 20th September, 1929, regarding the signature of the Perso-Hejaz treaty, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy in translation of the articles of the treaty in question.

2. The treaty was ratified by the Majlis on the 8th January.

Copies of this despatch and enclosure have been sent to the Government of India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Treaty of Amity between Persia and Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the Shah of Persia, on one hand, and His Majesty the King of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, on the other, animated by the same desire to establish friendly relations between the two countries and to consolidate the foundation of the same, and realising that the establishment of the said relations will be the cause of tranquillity, peace and progress of the two nations, have decided to conclude a treaty of amity, and for this purpose have named as their plenipotentiaries, viz. :—

His Majesty the Shah of Persia: His Highness Mehdi Kuli Khan Hedayet Prime Minister;

His Majesty the King of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies: Sheikh Abdulla-al-Fazl and Sheikh Mohammed Abdul-Rawaf;

Who, after the exchange of their credentials, which were found according to usage (good), have agreed as follows :—

ARTICLE 1.

Between the Imperial Persian Government and the Government of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, and between the subjects of the two countries, everlasting peace and sincere friendship will be established, and the two high contracting parties will use all their efforts to maintain and strengthen the said relations.

ARTICLE 2.

In view of the fact that the two high contracting parties are desirous and have the right to despatch their Ministers plenipotentiary and consuls to each other's countries, they have agreed that, on condition of reciprocity, the representatives of each of the parties in the other party's country be given treatment in conformity with the rules and usages of the general international laws.

ARTICLE 3.

Each of the high contracting parties will undertake to give the subjects of the other party in its territory all the rights and privileges which the subjects of the most-favoured-nations enjoy. The Government of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies undertake to give Persian pilgrims in every respect the same treatment as they give to other pilgrims, and to allow no difficulty to be created in regard to the ritual ceremonies of the pilgrims to the Kaaba and the discharge of religious obligations by Persian pilgrims. Likewise, the Government of Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies undertake to provide means of safety, comfort and security for the said pilgrims.

ARTICLE 4.

The two high contracting parties are desirous to take measures in due time for the conclusion of political, commercial, economic, &c., agreements.

ARTICLE 5.

This treaty has been signed in four copies, in Persian and Arabic. The Persian and Arabic texts are equally authoritative and valid.

Dated Tehran, Shahriwar 2, 1308, Rabiul Awal 18, 1348 (August 24, 1929).

(L.S.) MEHDI KULI.

(L.S.) ABDULLA-AL-FAZL.

(L.S.) MOHAMMED ABDUL-RAWAF.

[E 407/1/91]

No. 59.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 22, 1930

REFERENCE Resident's telegram of 21st January [No. 57]

If terms proposed are sanctioned, it will mean that His Majesty's Government have, in fact, capitulated to the demands put forward with such insistence by Ibn Saud. His conciliatory attitude is not surprising, as proposed settlement will give him all he wants at once, while His Majesty's Government and Iraq Government only get promise, which experience has hitherto shown to be illusory. View held here is that if rebel leaders are handed over to Ibn Saud without their consent Arab tradition will have been violated; while, if Ibn Saud makes terms with them without Iraq's participation, the interests of the Iraq Government will have been compromised. I trust that in their reply to Resident, Persian Gulf, His Majesty's Government will make it clear that there can be no question of any individual being handed back against his will. Also that final disposal of the leaders (except by deportation, in which case concurrence of neither party would be necessary) cannot be decided until Iraq Government have had opportunity to express their views, preferably at proposed meeting between King Feisal and Ibn Saud. Otherwise, I shall find it extremely difficult to convince Iraq Government that His Majesty's Government have not taken an *ex parte* decision to their detriment.

(Repeated to Resident (at Koweit) and India.)

[E 417/1/91]

No. 60.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Koweit, January 23, 1930.

MY telegram of 21st January [see No. 57].

I interviewed Dawish, Hithlain and Lami morning of 22nd January on board H.M.S. "Lupin." They are willing to return to Ibn Saud on terms proposed.

(Repeated to Bagdad, India and Jedda.)

[E 418/1/91]

No. 61.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 23, 1930.

MY immediately preceding telegram to Resident in the Persian Gulf. His two telegrams, which appear not to have been repeated to London, convey message from Ibn Saud that he regrets he cannot move to Rukhaimiyah owing to difficulties about supplies and inadequate transport. He suggests that King Feisal and I should meet him at Wafra or Kubrat Dawish in Koweit-Nejd neutral zone, and asks that we should bring our own tents from Bagdad.

If Ibn Saud still unwilling to agree to Rukhaimiyah, Iraq Government ask whether His Majesty's Government would be willing to arrange meeting with Ibn Saud's consent on board one of His Majesty's ships at any place outside the territory. Colonel Ward, who happens to be here, informs me that "Nearchus," belonging to Basra port authorities, is available for King Feisal's party, which will consist of the King and six high officials and four servants. "Patrick Stewart," he suggests, could pick up Ibn Saud wherever he wished, and he could remain on board with his suite until the conference was over. It is suggested that Air Officer Commanding and myself with staff of two officers could remain on board one of His Majesty's ships in the Gulf, and that meeting with the two Kings could take place on this ship at some place such as Shatt-al-Arab lighthouse, which is well outside territorial limit. If meeting on board ship could be arranged Bagdad party would be ready to start at two days' notice. I request that everything possible may be done to facilitate meeting between the two Kings, and I trust His Majesty's Government will agree to authorise Resident in Persian Gulf to convey this new invitation to Ibn Saud as an alternative, if he is still unwilling to agree to Rukhaimiyah.

[E 454/1/91]

No. 62.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, Koweit.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 23, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 21st January [No. 57]: Negotiations with Ibn Saud; and your telegram of 23rd January [No. 60].

His Majesty's Government assume that you are satisfied that settlement on lines recommended by you will not run counter to Arab sentiment. On this assumption and subject to qualifications which follow, they authorise you to arrange settlement as you propose.

(a) Condition (2). You are best judge of what can be secured from Ibn Saud, and His Majesty's Government leave you full discretion. But they feel strongly that in case of leaders (and perhaps their immediate male relations, or any of their lieutenants who might replace them as raid leaders) specific undertaking should be obtained in proposed exchange of notes, to effect that they will be kept permanently under control at Riyadh or other centre equally distant from frontier or in camp under Ibn Saud's immediate surveillance. In the case of the tribes, we do not wish to raise question of time limit, but it is essential to make sure that period during which they will be restricted to specified areas shall be sufficient to reduce risk of recrudescence of raiding to minimum.

In view of Ibn Saud's now declared intention to take from rebel tribes camels, sheep, &c., which they have stolen, you will no doubt consider possibility, despite paragraph 7 of my telegram of 15th January, of securing some undertaking as regards restitution of Koweiti and Iraqi loot independently, and in anticipation of arrangements referred to in your condition (4).

(b) Condition (3). You should endeavour to ascertain as precisely as possible nature of "effective steps" promised by Ibn Saud. Presumably, it would be impracticable to make any detailed reference to them in proposed exchange of letters, but you will no doubt consider possibility of making his undertaking under this head as categorical and complete as possible. In this connexion, His Majesty's Government regard it as important that his acceptance of responsibility and undertaking to pay compensation and blood money should not be restricted to the Ajman and Mutair, but should be extended so as to cover possible raids by any other Nejd and Hejaz tribes.

(Repeated to Bagdad, India and Jedda.)

(Communicated to Bagdad, India and Jedda.)

[E 454/1/91]

No. 63.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 23, 1930.

I APPRECIATE force of arguments in your telegram of 22nd January [see No. 59], but these are directed rather against considered policy of His Majesty's Government as stated in my telegram of 15th January to Bushire [see No. 50], and it would have been preferable if they had been advanced before Biscoe proceeded to negotiate on that basis. Latter has, in fact, exercised discretion given him in paragraph 5 of that telegram by His Majesty's Government, who therefore assume that he is satisfied that Arab sentiment will not be violated by surrender on terms in question. It would be impossible at this stage to go back on arrangements now provisionally made by him with Ibn Saud in accordance with instructions of His Majesty's Government.

Nor can I agree that Iraq Government have any *locus standi* as regards disposal of rebels and their leaders other than Ibn Mashhur, whose case is not now in question. Efforts of His Majesty's Government have been consistently directed to keeping control of this matter in their own hands. Leaders of tribes, with exception of Ibn Mashhur, have surrendered in Koweit and to Royal Air Force, and in deference to Iraq Government's views we have acquiesced in Iraqi forces not being used to round up the rebels.

I cannot see how, in these circumstances, Iraqi interests are compromised, especially in view of binding and extensive character of assurances now offered by Ibn Saud. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government have felt no option but to send to Resident instructions contained in my immediately preceding telegram.

(Repeated to Political Resident, Koweit, India and Jedda.)

[E 455/1/91]

No. 64.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 23, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 18th January [see No. 56] and Koweit telegram of 18th January repeated to you [not printed].

I am advised that, juridically, rebel tribes must be regarded as refugees and not as prisoners. I agree, however, that it is important to prevent their dribbling into Iraq or Nejd or mixing with Koweiti tribes, pending result of negotiations as to their disposal.

I agree that it is undesirable that levies should leave Iraq, if this can be avoided, and if Air Officer Commanding still considers there is danger of infiltration of refugees into Iraq, he will doubtless consider desirability of posting detachment of levies near frontier, as suggested by Biscoe.

(Repeated to Koweit.)

[E 456/1/91]

No. 65.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 24, 1930.

AIR Officer Commanding enquires what is now responsibility of the Royal Air Force with regard to rebels in Koweit. Up to the present their duties have been as follows: Firstly, shepherding the rebels into a small area; secondly, moving them into north-west corner of Koweit; thirdly, protecting them against attempts by Iraqi tribesmen to recover some of their stolen property. The rebels are now collected in the north-west corner of Koweit, but problems of water and grazing are making it increasingly difficult to keep them there. The rebels are also

becoming less amenable to control. As regards the third duty, the Royal Air Force have already arrested some Iraqis, and restored to rebels flocks of sheep that Iraqis were driving off. Air Officer Commanding is uncertain whether rebels are still regarded by His Majesty's Government as in Royal Air Force custody, and presumes, once the terms for their return to Nejd have been communicated to them, Royal Air Force has no further responsibility and can return to Iraq.
(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit and Jedda.)

[E 457/1/91]

No. 66.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 24, 1930.

REFERENCE your telegram of 23rd January [see No. 62].

As regards *locus standi* of Iraq Government, I submit that they have materially contributed to suppression of revolt against Ibn Saud. This they have done at the instance of His Majesty's Government, doubting whether their own interests were best served thereby. In my telegram of 16th December, I suggested that, in the circumstances, His Majesty's Government should press Ibn Saud strongly for return of loot taken from Iraq tribes. Shortly before this Dawish had actually arrived at Iraq-Nejd frontier and had made direct overtures to Iraq Government, who could have bargained with him for future security from Mutair raids and for return of loot or, alternatively, could have allowed Iraq tribes to recover it. Instead of doing this they refused to parley and ordered him to go back [see Part XXV, No. 89], after which he entered Koweit. It is true that Iraq Government did not see their way to send police cars to co-operate in Koweit territory, but I should find it difficult to use this as an argument against their being consulted as to the disposal of the rebels, in view of considerations which led them to refuse (*vide* my telegram of 7th January [see No. 20]).

I should be grateful for early instructions as to the moment when, and terms in which, decision of His Majesty's Government should be communicated to the Iraq Government.

(Repeated to Resident, India and Jedda.)

[E 480/1/91]

No. 67.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 26, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 23rd January [see No. 62]. Negotiations have come to a standstill.

Ibn Saud has agreed to setting up of a tribunal under Bahra Agreement any time at my request, month's notice. Then, as suggested in paragraph (a) of your telegram, I asked that some restitution should be made independently and in anticipation of Bahra Agreement, and proposed 1,000 camels should be delivered within a month of tribes' return. After prolonged discussion, Ibn Saud has offered to collect tribes in specified area, when he can take from them stolen camels, and British authorities can send representative to be present whilst this is being done, and he will hand over to him one-third of total camels which are taken from rebel tribes and send them up to the frontier. He absolutely refuses, however to specify any number on ground that he has no idea how many camels will be found. Without some minimum figure, however, I think arrangement will be of little value, except as gesture, since there would probably be collusion between Nejd officials and tribesmen to conceal camels, &c. I am making further efforts to-day, Sunday, 26th January.

[E 481/1/91]

No. 68.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Koweit, January 26, 1930.

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad:—

"Your telegram of 23rd January [see No. 61].

"Ibn Saud accepts the invitation to meeting on board ship with pleasure, but states that he has to go to Hassa, and so cannot proceed to meeting for a period of twenty days, and will give seven days' notice. He adds that this is conditional on satisfactory settlement of present negotiations, otherwise he will go off into the interior. This refers to deadlock reported in my immediately preceding telegram."

(Repeated to India and Jedda.)

[E 480/1/91]

No. 69.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Koweit, January 27, 1930

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad:—

"Negotiations concluded. Ibn Saud agreed to pay £10,000 compensation on account on 1st March. Details follow. Mutair and Ajman will be moved south as soon as possible. Meanwhile, I trust Iraq authorities will take steps to prevent their tribes raiding."

(Repeated to India and Jedda.)

[E 512/1/91]

No. 70.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Koweit, January 27, 1930.

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad:—

"My telegram of 26th January [see No. 68].

"Ibn Saud now proposes 20th Ramazan should be definitely fixed for the meeting, and that preliminary conference of Ministers should take place, preferably at Koweit, as soon as possible. Any matters not settled by then would be left over to Kings' meeting. He can only meet King Feisal for two days, as he has to get back for Idd. He wishes 'Patrick Stewart' to embark him at Bahrein and return with him there after the meeting. He did not like the idea of Shatt-el-Arab as the meeting-place, but the commander of H.M.S. 'Lupin,' whom I have consulted, can suggest no other place offering some shelter, and Ibn Saud is bad sailor. I think if it were made quite clear that the meeting-place would be outside territorial waters he would probably agree. He is remaining in present neighbourhood for six days and then leaving for Hassa, when it will be difficult to communicate with him, and so request early reply."

[E 528/1/91]

No. 71.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Koweit, January 28, 1930.

MY telegram of 26th January [see No. 69].

Letters were exchanged between Ibn Saud and myself yesterday, and I returned to Koweit. Rebel leaders are being flown to Ibn Saud's camp this morning, and will be handed over personally by Dickson. Chief Staff Officer is arranging return of tribes. Following is gist of Ibn Saud's letter to me: (1) Though rebel leaders and their followers deserve punishment for their offence, in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government, he undertakes to spare their lives. (2) While it is his prerogative to punish them, any punishment awarded will be "saturated with the spirit of kindness and mercy," but he reserves the right to recover from them any plunder that they may have taken. (3) He promises categorically to prevent any raids in the future by Mutair, Ajman, or any other Nejd tribes into Iraq or Koweit territories. Should any such raids occur, he agrees to effect a settlement without delay under machinery provided in the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and to restore immediately anything plundered from Koweit in accordance with the customs current between Koweit and Nejd. He is ready to negotiate an agreement with Koweit similar to the Bahra Agreement should the sheikh desire it. (4) He agrees to settle all past claims by tribunal provided in Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and in accordance with current practice in the case of Koweit, provided that all Mutair and Ajman, and their followers and property, at present in the hands of the British military authorities are returned to Nejd territory. In view of the friendship existing between him and His Majesty's Government, he agrees to pay £10,000 through Jedda on 5th Shawal (3rd March) as compensation to the tribesmen in Koweit and Iraq in anticipation of final settlement of account. Finally, he agrees to appoint representative to the Bahra Agreement Tribunal at any time at one month's notice, but requests the month of Haj (pilgrimage) being excluded. Comments are contained in my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and India.)

[E 528/1/91]

No. 72.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Koweit, January 28, 1930.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Reference your telegram of 23rd January [see No. 62].

In view of his categorical promise to prevent raids, Ibn Saud strongly resents any dictation as to the means by which this was to be implemented. Also, I think any undertaking regarding place of confinement of the leaders, &c., would not have been of much practical value. So long as he intends to fulfil undertaking to prevent raids, he will certainly take the necessary measures to control the leaders and tribes. If he does not mean to keep that promise, then he is not likely to fulfil any promise he may make regarding the leaders. Secondly, these people have rebelled against Ibn Saud, and I think that, in his own interests, he will take drastic measures to obviate the possibility of their doing so again. Having regard to these considerations—necessity of early settlement, importance which Chief Staff Officer and I attached to the early payment of some compensation, and discretion accorded to me in this matter—I did not press the point and trust that you will approve.

Undertaking to prevent raids and settle claims applies to all Nejd tribes, and the Bahra Agreement is tightened up by spontaneous promise to appoint member(s) of tribunal within one month.

£10,000 is the approximate value of 1,000 camels, and cash payment obviates difficulty of taking charge of camels, driving them up, &c.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jedda and India.)

[E 528/1/91]

No. 73.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Koweit, January 28, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 27th January [not printed].

Ibn Shiblao and representative of Ibn Saud, bearing letter of forgiveness, came to Koweit yesterday, and interviewed rebel leaders and received from them message to the tribes to return. Also, I think, overtures have been made to them for some days past by Ibn Saud [see No. 56]. Chief Staff Officer left to see the tribes this morning and is arranging for the Royal Air Force to shepherd them to the border, and I do not anticipate much difficulty once they know their leaders have returned.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 534/1/91]

No. 74.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 25, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 24th January [see No. 65].

As Resident is negotiating with Ibn Saud terms upon which rebel tribes should be handed back, it is clearly necessary that they should be kept under control, and that every effort should be made to prevent their dispersal into Iraq or Nejd or mixing with Koweit tribes, in order that when Biscoe's negotiations are completed His Majesty's Government may be in a position to consider how they can carry out their share of bargain. Responsibility of Royal Air Force must therefore continue until that time.

As regards loot, I will telegraph further as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Resident in the Persian Gulf and Jedda.)

[E 534/1/91]

No. 75.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, January 28, 1930.

MY telegram of 25th January [not printed].

Now that Biscoe has concluded settlement in regard to refugees, question of loot can only be dealt with in accordance with that settlement.

(Repeated to Koweit and Jedda.)

[E 535/111/91]

No. 76.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, January 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, January 29, 1930.

FOLLOWING addressed to Bushire:—

"Reference your telegram of 27th January [see No. 70], I shall be glad if you will communicate the following message to Ibn Saud:—

"His Majesty King Feisal is very glad to hear that your Majesty accepts the invitation to meet him on board ship, and agrees with pleasure that the 20th Ramazan should be definitely fixed for the meeting and that it should last two days. As regards place of meeting, King Feisal suggests that the most convenient place would be outside territorial waters and within easy reach of Koweit harbour in case the sea is rough. I will telegraph later to your Majesty on the question of preliminary meeting between Ministers."

[E 572/1/91]

No. 77.

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 1.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 31, 1930.

FOLLOWING from Koweit, dated 30th January :—

"Very cordial open letter, dated 29th January, to your address received, begging His Majesty's Government be informed that rebel leaders were duly handed over to him on 28th January in accordance with term of agreement made between you and him. He is deeply grateful to His Majesty's Government for their fulfilling their pledge so faithfully, and is confident that future relations between His Majesty's Government and Nejd will be strengthened and established more firmly than ever, and in particular His Majesty's Government's act will assist him in carrying out his engagement and preserve peace on his boundary; lastly, he trusts that the handing over of the rebel tribes will very shortly be completed. Letter follows by post."

[E 612/612/91]

No. 78.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 25.)

Jedda, January 20, 1930.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the accession of King Ibn Saud was celebrated on the 8th and 9th January in conformity with an elaborate programme of festivities which had been devised for the occasion. These were the first celebrations of the sort that have taken place, and it is stated that the King was at first opposed to them, although he subsequently gave his consent.

2. In Jedda the streets were beflagged and a general holiday was proclaimed on the 8th January. The day began with receptions and a salute of 101 guns, the foreign representatives and consuls and their staffs in uniform being received by the Governor at 11 A.M. Simultaneously, the Emir Feisal was holding a reception of notables in Mecca.

3. In the afternoon the Emir Feisal arrived from Mecca for a review of the local troops outside the town at Kandara. These consisted of a company of infantry of the Jedda garrison in their semi-European uniform, who presented a rather sorry spectacle compared with a few wild horsemen and a picturesque contingent of about 200 men on gaily caparisoned camels who followed. The artillery was represented by the four saluting guns, which were drawn by mules commandeered from the market place for the purpose. The review was preceded by tea at the palace at Kandara, to which some 300 guests had been invited.

4. In the evening an official banquet was held at Kandara at which about 150 guests were present, including the foreign representatives and a number of representatives of the leading Egyptian newspapers, who had been invited by the Hejaz Government to attend the celebrations. The banquet was the occasion for a number of complimentary speeches extolling the virtues of the King and the progress made under his reign. There had, I am told, been a sharp dispute between the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Governor of Jedda as to who should deliver the Government's address. The matter had been referred to the Emir, who had decided as a compromise that Sheikh Fuad's speech should be read by a citizen of Jedda.

5. Sheikh Fuad's speech was in the main also a eulogy of the King and his works. He enumerated the objects which the King had set out to achieve since his accession and commented on the results obtained. I enclose a résumé of his speech.*

6. For the following day a lunch had been organised by the Municipality of Mecca at Wadi Fatma, about 15 miles from Mecca, where tents had been erected among palm groves. The foreign representatives and the Egyptian journalists were again invited. Lunch was served to 250 guests at a long table in one tent. The arrangements for lunch were excellent, although the super-abundance of food was calculated to daunt all but the hardiest trencherman, and the guests, in spite of

* Not printed.

appetites sharpened by a two hours' drive across country, managed to make very little impression upon it. The time was occupied both before and after lunch by speeches and poems delivered in a reception marquee by selected orators, who vied with one another in showering fulsome praise on the King and his representative, the Emir.

7. The celebrations were organised, I am told, on an unprecedented scale for Arabia, and were obviously intended to impress both the foreigners and the Arabs. No expense was spared and the organisation was, on the whole, good.

8. The invitation extended to the Egyptian journalists was a clever move on Sheikh Fuad's part. They were treated with assiduous courtesy and were loud in their praises.

9. The celebrations marked, I think, a definite departure from the rigid precepts which the Akhwan had succeeded temporarily in imposing. Photographs were taken freely; an official photographer had, in fact, come from Egypt and photographed the Emir on every possible occasion. Smoking was indulged in openly or with only a pretence at concealment. In fact, there seemed to be a general relaxation of regulations and a desire to get away from the irksome restrictions which, in Jedda at any rate, have never been popular.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt, Iraq and Palestine, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agent at Koweit.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 632/1/91]

No. 79.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 24.)

Jedda, January 20, 1930.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that I yesterday received a private visit from the Governor, obviously inspired, in which he stated that the acceptance of the surrender of the rebel leaders has produced a very bad effect on Arab opinion generally, and repeated the same arguments that have already been advanced by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that they should be handed over. He said that the present situation was being exploited by our enemies, indicating Sheikh Fuad Hamza and the Syrian party, to our detriment, and he gave me to understand privately and confidentially that there was a possibility of a hostile demonstration before the British Legation.

2. I told him that the question of the disposal of the rebels was now being dealt with direct between the King and the local British authorities, and that I had every hope that the whole position would be cleared up to the satisfaction of all concerned. The Governor was obviously worried, and was anxious for some information which would serve to allay fears and counteract anti-British propaganda. I thought it as well, therefore, to state to him that the position, as I myself saw it, was that His Majesty's Government had been asked to co-operate in suppressing the rebellion, that British forces had been sent to the frontiers of Iraq and Koweit for this purpose, that the rebels had been caught between two fires, and that they had thus been forced to surrender. There was, I said, no other course but to accept such a surrender, particularly as the rebels were accompanied by women and children, and it was simply a question of arranging for their disposal, a question which, in the nature of things, must necessarily involve negotiation, and which must have regard both to Arab custom and to British tradition. I added that it had not been a case of giving refuge to rebels, as had been misrepresented here, but simply that these rebels had been received as enemies, disarmed and rendered innocuous pending their ultimate disposal.

3. I then went on to discuss the harm that would be done by any ill-considered action, such as a demonstration here, while the negotiations were in progress with the King, and the bad effect that such an event must inevitably have on our relations and on British public opinion.

4. I think that my words had some effect, as the Governor left in a more cheerful frame of mind, and he will, I am sure, take all possible steps to forestall

anything in the nature of a demonstration. I am, however, myself also taking steps privately to counteract hostile propaganda.

5. I should add that the Governor is personally opposed to Sheikh Fuad Hamza and his policy, and there is no love lost between them. His influence is, however, greatly inferior to that of the Syrian party, which has been gaining strength while the King has been away.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agent at Koweit.

I have, &c.
W. L. BOND.

[E 630/95/91]

No. 80.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 22.)
Sir,

Jedda, January 17, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegram No. 13 of the 15th instant regarding the activities of Mahmoud Nedim Bey, ex-Governor-General of the Yemen.

2. On his return from Massowah, Nedim Bey asked to see me and I received him, as reported, on the 14th instant.

3. At the interview he began by reciting the history of the Yemen since the Great War and the part he played in it, drawing particular attention to his action in securing the release of Colonel Jacob's mission in 1919. He also stated that he had strongly urged the Imam to come to terms with His Majesty's Government as Great Britain was the only country that could be of real use to him. He added, however, that the Imam was an opportunist who would readily run into any alliance that seemed advantageous at the moment and that the situation in the Yemen had steadily deteriorated under his rule.

4. The tribes he said were now thoroughly discontented and if matters did not improve they would welcome the intervention of any Power if it held out a promise of settled conditions.

5. This statement may have been intended to mean either that Great Britain or for that matter any other interested Power might play an important rôle in the Yemen, or else that Ibn Saud himself might take advantage of the present situation. In any case Nedim Bey was obviously anxious to emphasise his own influence with the Yemen tribes.

6. I enquired whether he was still intending to proceed to Sanaa. He replied that while in Massowah he had met a number of refugees from the Yemen, and that in view of the reports which they had given him of the conditions there he did not feel particularly anxious to go there just now. He had furthermore learnt that Colonel Jacob had gone to Sanaa, he imagined in connexion with the suggested reopening of negotiations with His Majesty's Government, and he preferred now to await information regarding the result of this visit before deciding on his next step.

7. The interview was inconclusive. Nedim Bey's explanation of his delay in proceeding to Sanaa and of his proposed continued presence here was not convincing, and I am left with the impression that there is some other reason for his seeking to establish relations with this Legation which he will probably disclose later.

8. Nedim Bey's presence here lends some colour to an unconfirmed report which I have received to the effect that Ibn Saud intends to take some action against the Yemen after the pilgrimage, and that Nedim Bey has been induced to come here for propaganda purposes with the Yemen tribes. It is further stated that Fuad Hamza has strongly opposed his employment and that, having failed, he has communicated information on the subject to the Italian representative with the result that Nedim Bey has now been refused permission by the Imam to enter the Yemen.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Resident at Aden.

I have, &c.
W. L. BOND.

[E 653/1/91]

No. 81.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 5.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, February 3, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 15th January, paragraph 8: Ibn Mashhur [see No. 50].

I have received letter from Ibn Saud demanding surrender of Ibn Mashhur, together with his companions and Ajman who accompanied him, "all of whom were arrested by the authorities who work under your Excellency's control (or supervision)." He reiterates claim that an agreement exists between himself and His Majesty's Government for these persons to be handed over to him. I propose, with King Feisal's concurrence, to reply that persons named are in the custody of Iraq Government, and that their disposal appears to British and Iraq Governments to be a matter for discussion at meeting between the two Kings. Fuad Hanza left for Koweit last week.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 681/1/91]

No. 82.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 7.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, February 5, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 3rd February [No. 81].

I concur generally in proposed reply to Ibn Saud, but suggest for your consideration and that of Iraq Government that, in order not to risk disturbing harmony of meeting between Ibn Saud and King Feisal, it might be preferable that question of disposal of Ibn Mashhur should in first instance be discussed (and, if possible, settled) at preliminary meeting between Ministers.

2. Please inform me at earliest possible date what are the proposals of the Iraq Government regarding disposal of Mashhur and his following.

3. Both in framing your reply to Ibn Saud and in your discussions with Iraq Government, you will doubtless bear in mind considerations set out in paragraph (b) of my telegram of 4th January and correspondence with Hejaz Government regarding presence of Mashhur in Koweit territory last May (see Jedda despatches of 18th May and 27th August, and Jedda telegram to Foreign Office, No. 68 of 25th May, 1929, repeated to you), which would make it difficult to argue that Mashhur is in different category from other rebels.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 785/1/91]

No. 83.

*Headquarters, R.A.F., Iraq, to Air Ministry.—(Received in Foreign Office,
February 13.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 11, 1930.

REPORT of 11th February on situation in Southern Desert. On the morning of 8th February the last of the Mutair and Ajman tribes, with all stock, crossed into Nejd. According to reports from Ibn Saud, there are still a very few rebels who have mingled themselves with Koweit tribes and remain hidden. The political agent, Koweit, reports that the Sheikh of Koweit is searching these out. All the armoured-car sections have been withdrawn to Shaibah, and one section has been ordered to return to Hinaidi. On 3rd February the detached flight of the 55th Squadron returned to Hinaidi, and on 12th February the "Victorias" attached to Shaibah are returning.

[E 800/1/91]

No. 84.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, February 12, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 5th February [No. 82].

Iraq Government, to whom I conveyed the purport of your telegram, have agreed to the question of Mashhur being discussed at the preliminary meeting and have instructed their representatives to adopt the following lines of argument:—

1. Iraq Government undertaking to expel Dawish and his followers referred to the persons who had raided into Iraq and whom Ibn Saud wished to punish. Mashhur is not of this category.
2. Undertaking referred only to Nejd tribes, whereas Mashhur is a Syrian.
3. If Ibn Saud will agree to handing over Dhafir and Dahamshah chiefs who have taken refuge in Nejd, and also Ibn Mizyad and his Mutair followers who murdered Iraq police at Busaiyah, Iraq Government will consider handing over Mashhur.

Iraq Government do not anticipate any agreement being reached at the preliminary meeting, and consider that it will be necessary for the two Kings to discuss the question, and it seems likely that they are right. Whilst I have communicated to them the argument used in the latter half of your telegram, I submit that the argument that, by the adoption of Wahabism and two years' residence in Nejd, Mashhur has lost his Syrian status and becomes a Nejdi is a dangerous one, since on the same grounds Ibn Saud could repudiate Iraq's claim to allegiance of Dhafir and Dahamshah sheikhs who have gone to Nejd.

[E 871/92/91]

No. 85.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 22, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to the 31st December, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Federated Malay States, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the Senior Naval Officer Red Sea Sloops, and His Majesty's consul at Basra.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 85.

Jedda Report for Period December 1 to 31, 1929.

ON the 29th November an official communiqué was issued by the Hejaz Government in the following terms:—

"After the brilliant success achieved in the punitive expeditions against the rebels, whose intention was to create disturbances in Nejd, His Majesty the King has given orders to all the forces to proceed to the frontier regions where the remnant of the rebels have sought shelter, so that decisive measures may be taken against them.

"All arrangements have been made, and the soldiers have actually begun their march in every appointed direction. The town soldiers have been ordered to gather at Shuka, while the Bedouin forces and their auxiliaries have been instructed to concentrate in their appointed places. The forces of the Harb left Bareida on the 16th instant, and those of the Ataibah moved on the same day from Shafra to Hafar-el-Atz, while the Bahtan also marched from Jefir.

They will all be concentrated at Shuka, whence the whole army will advance to any regions where any remnant of the rebels remain.

"Furthermore, the Emir Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaad received orders to proceed to Shaabia (presumably Shaibah), where he has been joined by the men of Shaara and Aneiza. The present plan is to encircle the rebels (from every point), and thus render their escape impossible.

"Two days after the mobilisation of the above-mentioned forces, His Majesty the King proceeded to General Headquarters, where he gave the order to advance on the 22nd November. Prior to his departure His Majesty issued a decree appointing His Highness Prince Saoud as Regent during his absence.

"When the rebels realised that their situation was critical and that their obedience to those who desire to fish in troubled waters would bring inevitable disaster upon them, they petitioned His Majesty the King, offering to surrender. The King, however, informed them that it was impossible to pardon them until they had submitted to the arbitration of the law of God (Sharia). Thus, within a few days the punitive operations will have been brought to a successful issue."

2. The march of events during the month under review has largely justified the optimism of the concluding sentence. After his unsuccessful attempt to obtain terms from Ibn Saud, Feisal-ed-Dawish appears to have given up his idea of attacking Ibn Saud's forces at Ajibba, and with a considerable portion of his following moved towards Riqai, south of the eastern extremities of the Iraq-Nejd neutral zone, giving the Ajman instructions to follow.

3. On the 13th December the Administrative Inspector of the Iraq Southern Desert, when reconnoitring near Shaib-al-Anja with police cars, was approached by two horsemen, who stated that Dawish was close by and wished to speak to him; also that the rebel leader with Ibn Mashhur and Rufidi with Mutair and Ajman tribesmen were all camped together in the neighbourhood. Captain Glubb refused to see Dawish. The latter subsequently addressed a letter to him professing friendship and readiness to obey Government orders and requesting an interview. The Iraq Government instructed Captain Glubb not to meet or communicate with Dawish or any other rebels, but to give out that any attempt by rebels to cross the Iraq frontier would be prevented.

4. Feisal-ed-Dawish's situation seems to have become rapidly worse in the latter half of the month, as evidenced by the secession of several leading sheikhs. On the 24th December Ibn Mashhur, with a Rawalla following of 200, having entered Iraq and refused to leave under a threat of force, surrendered unconditionally to the Iraq police, who were supported by Royal Air Force armoured cars. They were disarmed and escorted to the Busaiyan post.

5. On the 30th December His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq reported that, on the previous day, Feisal-ed-Dawish and his following were routed by the loyalist Harb force, who were assisted by some Iraqi tribesmen, near Riqai close to the Iraq frontier, and that Mutair fugitives on foot, mainly women, were collecting on the Iraq frontier. At the same time, Royal Air Force armoured cars were also engaged in evicting Ajman rebels, who had managed to cross the Nejd frontier a few days before, and had encamped on the Koweit-Iraq boundary. His Majesty's High Commissioner is discussing with the Iraq Government the question of the disposal of the refugees, who had crossed into Iraq territory.

6. At the beginning of the month a letter was addressed to the King in reply to his letter of the 17th November, in which Ibn Saud alleged that obstacles were being placed in the way of the accomplishment of his task by the attitude of the British Government in regard to the neutrality of Iraq and Koweit and the failure of the authorities in Koweit to prevent the rebels from crossing the border (November report, paragraphs 15 *et seq.*). In this reply it was made clear that His Majesty's Government had never failed in the undertakings which they had repeatedly given to the King, to use all the means in their power to prevent the improper use of Koweit and Iraq territory by the rebels. It was also shown that the efforts which the latter have made to take refuge in Koweit territory had, indeed, been frustrated on more than one occasion, and the King was given to understand that the overtures for peace which Feisal-ed-Dawish was reported recently to have addressed to him were in all probability due principally to the uncompromising attitude which His Majesty's Government had taken up in reply to those requests. Ibn Saud was further reminded of the material assistance rendered him, which in itself afforded a proof of the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to co-operate with him, and he was warned against accepting reports from interested and unreliable sources.

7. In reply to the specific requests contained in the King's note, he was informed that (i) renewed instructions had been issued which should ensure that the pledges already given should be fully implemented, (ii) instructions had been given to secure the removal of all Koweit tribes and of the refugee Awazim from the vicinity of the frontier and from any scene of possible conflict, (iii) instructions had been given to concert the necessary military measures for the ejection of any of the contending forces that might enter Koweit or Iraq territory, and to intercept wherever possible isolated groups of rebels entering such territory for the purpose of merging with the local tribes in the manner suggested by the King; also, that similar instructions had been issued in regard to the Transjordan frontier. It was made clear at the same time, however, that His Majesty's Government could not in any circumstances modify their decision against allowing the King's armed forces to enter Koweit or Iraq or Transjordan territory, and that any attempt on the part of his forces to cross the frontier might bring them into conflict with the British forces. It was also pointed out once more that the task of the British military authorities would be rendered less difficult if the King could designate an emissary from his military forces to keep the local frontier authorities at Koweit informed of the movements of his troops and of those of the rebels.

8. With reference to the assurance given to Ibn Saud, as mentioned above, His Majesty's political resident in the Persian Gulf reported on the 15th December that, as regards the eastern half of the Koweit frontier zone, all tribal elements had been removed, leaving only isolated shepherds and woodcutters within that area. On the 17th December the evacuation of the western portion to a depth of about 15 miles was also reported complete.

9. On the 5th December a note was addressed to Ibn Saud in reply to his protest in regard to the action taken *vis-à-vis* of the Awazim tribe, who with the consent of His Majesty's Government had been given a formal assurance of protection by the Sheikh of Koweit, and had been ordered to move up to the Jahrah area (November report, paragraph 2). It was explained to the King that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the Awazim, having surrendered to Feisal-ed-Dawish, could no longer be regarded as part of the King's forces, but they equally could not be regarded as insurgents. The attitude of His Majesty's Government was not, therefore, inconsistent either with their decision not to allow Ibn Saud's forces to cross the frontier or with their undertaking not to allow the rebels to find refuge in Koweit. Furthermore, according to the statements of the leading Awazim sheikhs, if refuge had not been granted them, their only alternative would have been to throw in their lot with the rebels and to fight against the King, a course which they had wished to avoid. In the circumstances, it had appeared to be entirely in the King's interests that the Awazim should be definitely neutralised by admission into Koweit territory.

10. As regards the King's request for their expulsion, this, it was explained, could be only effected by the use of force, and His Majesty's Government considered that it was impossible to contemplate such a breach of the obligations which the Sheikh of Koweit had assumed when he gave the Awazim permission to escape from the rebels by taking refuge in his territory. Nor were His Majesty's Government of the opinion, in view of the considerations mentioned above, that their pledges to Ibn Saud necessitated any such action in the present case.

11. In point of fact, the Awazim did not avail themselves of the permission accorded to enter Koweit territory, but remained encamped in the neutral area, meanwhile drawing their supplies from Koweit. An ultimatum was, therefore, addressed to them by the Sheikh of Koweit on the 8th December ordering them to enter the Koweit tribal area within ten days, failing which they would be regarded as part of the belligerent forces and would be refused access to Koweit territories and denied supplies.

12. On the 19th December a reply was received from the Awazim stating that, in the event of Ibn Saud moving northwards, they would be afraid to enter Koweit territory; in the contrary event, they would go in later, as their camels were then in poor condition. In view of this, the Awazim were treated as being part of the contending forces and were denied supplies from Koweit. The immediate result was that they commenced raiding inside Koweit territory; three raids were reported before the end of the month. It was suggested that this action was taken by the Awazim in order to regain favour with Ibn Saud.

13. On the 18th December letters were addressed by the King to His Majesty's political resident in the Persian Gulf and His Majesty's political agent at Koweit in reply to the representations made to him at the beginning of the month. He stated

that he did not intend to cast doubts on the intentions of His Majesty's Government and gratefully acknowledged the material assistance given. The only thing of which he complained was that the rebels were freely obtaining supplies from, and were watering their animals in, Koweit. If His Majesty's Government made investigations they would, he said, be convinced of the truth of his allegations regarding the encouragement received by the rebels from high quarters in Bagdad; it was, however, unnecessary to discuss these matters further. He thanked His Majesty's Government for the orders issued to eject the rebels from Koweit, Iraq and Transjordan which, if enforced, would render it unnecessary for his forces to enter neighbouring territory. He proposed to launch an attack against Dawish, and would inform the nearest military stations on the frontier of any fresh changes and developments. Meanwhile, he renewed his protest regarding the action taken *vis-à-vis* of the Awazim. He added in his letter to His Majesty's political agent at Koweit that Dawish had asked him for pardon and security, and that he had promised him his life on condition that he returned all plunder. This Dawish had refused.

14. Five raids by Hejaz-Nejd subjects are reported on the Transjordan frontier. As against these, ten raids, mostly of minor importance, are reported by the Hejaz Government to have been committed by Transjordan tribes against Hejaz-Nejd.

15. On the 5th December a letter, dated the 23rd November, was received from the King protesting against the persistent raids committed by the Transjordan tribes (November report, paragraph 23). If matters continue thus, he says, the people of Nejd will be compelled to take action themselves. He offers the following alternative solutions of the trouble: (i) That His Majesty's Government should act as sole arbiter and be responsible for the execution of the arbitral decisions in so far as Transjordan is concerned. Ibn Saud undertakes to carry them out as regards his own territory. His Majesty's Government are then to take effective measures to prevent further raids. This would involve exemplary punishment of offenders and the return of loot. (ii) If the first proposal is impracticable, that the Bedouin be left free to settle matters among themselves, towns remaining neutral as regards their agreements or disputes. Such a course, the King points out, would be fraught with dangers, and he only suggests it as the Transjordan Government has so far been unable to prevent its subjects from attacking his people. (iii) That he himself should be left free to arrange matters amicably with the Transjordan tribes—an object which he states he could accomplish without difficulty.

16. In reply to this letter a note was addressed to the King on the 21st December to the effect that, for reasons of general policy, His Majesty's Government could not contemplate either the second or the third alternative. The measures which they had already taken, or were in process of taking, were, however, practically identical with the first solution proposed. They were proceeding immediately to the selection of a suitable officer to act as arbitrator, and he would be instructed to proceed to the affected area at the earliest possible moment. His Majesty's Government then refer to the execution of the arbitral awards and state that they will take the necessary measures for their execution in Transjordan.

17. As regards measures to be taken to prevent attacks and punish offenders, it is pointed out that punitive action has, within the last few months, been taken in a large number of cases against Transjordan tribes convicted of having carried out raids into Nejd and the Hejaz, and in some cases loot has actually been restored, whereas no loot has yet been returned by Ibn Saud's tribesmen. Measures taken in the case of Transjordan tribes have, however, it is explained, been rendered exceedingly difficult by the fact that no corresponding measures have apparently been taken against Hejaz and Nejd tribes who have been guilty of raids against Transjordan on a more extensive scale.

18. In view, however, of the increasingly unsatisfactory situation as regards raids both from Transjordan and from Ibn Saud's dominions, His Majesty's Government, the King was informed, were reconsidering the whole of the problem in consultation with the High Commissioner for Transjordan.

19. With reference to the foregoing, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan has been requested to report as soon as possible whether existing and contemplated arrangements are, in his opinion, still sufficiently comprehensive to remedy a situation of increasing gravity, or whether he considers that new measures are necessary.

20. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has put forward a request for formal negotiations in respect of various matters which, he states, the King wishes to raise in connexion with Persian Gulf affairs. These fall under the general

headings: (i) customs and transit dues collected in Bahrein on goods imported into Nejd; (ii) certain points relating to the nationality and passports of Hejaz-Nejd subjects in the Persian Gulf; and (iii) the position of Ibn Saud's agents in Bahrein and Koweit.

21. Mahmoud Nedim Bey, erstwhile Turkish Governor-General of the Yemen, has reappeared in Jedda. He was apparently invited by the Imam of the Yemen to join him as adviser, but some hitch seems to have occurred in the course of his journey to Sanaa, and he got no further than Massowah, returning thence to Jedda.

22. Information was received by the Air Ministry towards the end of the month that the hangars and stores ordered by the Hejaz Government for the use of the new air force had arrived at Bahrein. Instructions were therefore sent for the aeroplanes themselves to be flown from Iraq to Darin Island, on which they are to be based.

23. The published figures of the number of pilgrims who had arrived by sea by the 27th December are 14,222. These compare favourably with the corresponding figures of last year, which totalled 12,859. The very large majority of these are Javanese pilgrims.

24. Under pressure from the Government, which stands to gain larger fees, the mutawwifs are inducing as many pilgrims as possible to travel to Mecca and Medina by car instead of by camel. The camelmens are suffering in consequence, but their protests are unavailing.

25. On the 5th December His Highness the Emir Feisal officially opened a new reservoir which has been built in Mecca to store the waters of the spring known as "Ain Zubeida" and keep them free from pollution. This reservoir will contain approximately 10,000 tons of water, which will be available for the pilgrims during the Haj. It will not suffice to remove all difficulties concerning the supply of water, but will certainly be of great benefit during the rush period. Three further reservoirs are being built along the road to Muna. At Muna itself two new roads have been opened in order to facilitate the pilgrim traffic.

26. The acting Egyptian consul, has, he states, succeeded in reaching an agreement with the local authorities, who have now waived their objections to the despatch of an Egyptian medical mission during the forthcoming pilgrimage, and he is also satisfied with an assurance which he has received regarding the free importation of medical stores (June report, paragraph 27).

27. There is an idea on foot in Mecca of suggesting to the King that the Mahometan world should be farmed out to the mutawwifs by auction, every Mahometan district being assigned for pilgrimage purposes to the exclusive exploitation of the mutawwif who bids highest. The system is a pernicious one, although it is calculated to bring in a greatly increased revenue to the Government, as it would place the pilgrims at the mercy of the mutawwif and would expose them to various forms of extortion.

28. Money is now flowing into the country in a steady stream, but the Government has much leeway to make up, and it is ever on the look out for means of imposing fresh taxation. A municipal tax is being collected at Mecca and Jedda of 2 per cent. on rent, and a small further charge of anything up to one pound a year is payable by shopkeepers.

29. With the approval of the King, a "Committee for the Study of Projects of Reform" has been constituted, and has published a notice inviting the services of foreign experts (i) to survey for minerals in areas to be selected, and (ii) to submit plans, giving estimates of expenditure, for the construction of an up-to-date quay and a customs house at Jedda. Applications are to be addressed to the committee at the Department of Finance, Mecca.

30. On the 27th December the Rotterdam-Lloyd steamship "Madeon," carrying pilgrims, ran ashore on the Mismari reef, thus illustrating once again the necessity for beacons to indicate the approaches to Jedda. She was subsequently floated off with her bows badly damaged.

31. During the period under review, one male slave, of Sudanese origin, took refuge in this Legation and applied for manumission and repatriation. He was sent to his home *via* Suakin.

32. The status of the British agency at Jedda was raised on the 21st December to that of a Legation, and Mr. W. L. Bond was appointed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, pending the selection and appointment of a Minister. His Majesty's approval has also been obtained for the proposed establishment of a Hejaz-Nejd Legation in London.

[E 872/334/91]

No. 86.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 29.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 24, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that I presented my credentials as His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 22nd instant at the local office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. I was in uniform and was received with a guard of honour.

3. The ceremony was of a simple nature in contrast to that which took place three weeks ago when my French colleague, as reported in my despatch No. 11 of the 10th instant, presented to the Emir Feisal similar credentials as Chargé d'Affaires, which were, however, addressed by the President of the French Republic to the King.

4. I took the opportunity of assuring the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that I should continue to devote myself to the cultivation of friendly relations between Hejaz-Nejd and Great Britain, and added a few complimentary remarks. Sheikh Fuad replied in suitable terms, and after a little further conversation I left. No one else was present at the interview.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 868/1/91]

No. 87.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 17.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, February 14, 1930.

YOUR telegram of the 12th February [see No. 84]: Disposal of Ibn Mashur. His Majesty's Government are very apprehensive as to effect on Ibn Saud of line referred to in your telegram. It is of such importance that meeting between Ibn Saud and Feisal should take place in a friendly atmosphere, alike from point of view of future relations between Nejd and Iraq and from that of His Majesty's Government themselves, and the refusal of Ibn Saud to persevere with meeting because of a dispute over this relatively unimportant matter would be so unfortunate that His Majesty's Government regard it as desirable to make all possible efforts to arrive at an understanding with him. From a different standpoint, in view of assurances given to Ibn Saud, they would be placed in a most embarrassing position *vis-à-vis* Nejd if Iraq Government persist in their present uncompromising attitude. Although, perhaps, it is arguable that case of Ibn Mashur is not expressly covered by terms of the pledges given by Iraq Government, His Majesty's Government feel that it would be most difficult to contend that his case is not affected by guarantees given by them in November as to expulsion of "contending forces" and "concerting of necessary military measures" for that end.

His Majesty's Government's own inclination would be to hand over Ibn Mashur subject to similar guarantees to those obtained in case of other rebel leaders. They do not, however, object to Iraqi Government endeavouring to use Ibn Mashur as bargaining counter for securing a satisfactory settlement of Dahamshah and Dhafir question. It should, nevertheless, be realised that Iraq Government have no claim under article 4 of the Bahra Agreement to expulsion of sheikhs of these tribes.

On the other hand, the demand for the surrender of Ibn Mizyad is, in His Majesty's Government's opinion, quite unjustified as being directly contrary to article 1 of the Bahra Agreement, which provides expressly for the administration of punishment for raiding by Government to which the raiders are subject. It makes no provision for the handing over of Nejd offenders by Nejd Government to Iraq, which, other considerations apart, would probably lead to embarrassing counter-claims from Nejd.

In the circumstances, Iraq Government should be informed that, while His Majesty's Government are prepared to support the Iraq Government in their endeavour to obtain a satisfactory settlement as regards the Dahamshah and Dhafir sheikhs, although not necessarily as a condition of handing over Ibn Mashur, they nevertheless are definitely unable to support the demand for the surrender of Ibn

Mizyad, and you should use your utmost endeavours to induce them to substitute a demand that Ibn Saud should inflict upon him and his followers "severe punishment," which would be in accordance with article 1 of the Bahra Agreement.

If, however, Iraq Government persist in maintenance of a wholly unpromising attitude as regards Ibn Mashur, and in this way jeopardise the prospects of a satisfactory settlement with Ibn Saud, it may be found necessary for His Majesty's Government to instruct you to dissociate yourself from their action, and you should warn Iraq Government accordingly.

(Repeated to Bushire and Jedda.)

[E 894/1/91]

No. 88.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, February 16, 1930.

I HAVE already pointed out to Iraq Government that Ibn Saud may refuse to discuss the question of desert posts, in which case it will be necessary to fall back on Arbitral [group omitted].

I suggest that my part at meeting will be that of an adviser, and that I should do what I can to encourage Kings to come to any agreement that would not be prejudicial to British interests.

Utmost I expect from meeting is frank statement of conflicting views with an agreement of mutual recognition and a promise to exchange representatives.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 878/1/91]

No. 89.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, February 16, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 15th February [see No. 87].

I agree that demand for surrender of Ibn Mizyad is wholly unreasonable, and I should have mentioned this in my telegram. Mesopotamian Government were incensed at reports that he was in high favour with Ibn Saud, in whose train he was said to be riding stolen Mesopotamian she-camels.

I propose with them to confine their demand in his case to request for adequate punishment.

With regard to Ibn Mashur, I agree that, if meeting of Kings were to be abandoned on his account, it would be most unfortunate, but I should find it very difficult to persuade Feisal to abandon his chief bargaining counter in advance of the meeting, and blame should surely rest on Ibn Saud if he wrecks the conference on this point.

Feisal himself suggested to me the other day that no useful purpose would be served by his meeting Ibn Saud unless latter agreed beforehand to his attitude about the desert posts. I dissuaded him from adopting this attitude, and suggest Ibn Saud should be similarly dissuaded if he attempts to make his own attendance at meeting conditional on prior agreement to surrender Ibn Mashur.

Present position is that preliminary conference, which was friendly but unfruitful, has broken up. Telegrams from Mesopotamian delegation indicate that question of Mashur was raised only at first of three meetings and not pressed. Nejd delegates left Koweit 14th February to join Ibn Saud, who is apparently moving south to embark 20th February at Ras Tanurah for meeting. Mesopotamian delegates are due at Bagdad to-morrow, and I will report further, if necessary, after hearing what they have to say.

(Repeated to Bushire and Jedda.)

[E 952/111/91]

No. 90.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, February 19, 1930.

YOUR telegrams of 16th February [Nos. 88 and 89].

I agree that as far as possible you should occupy the position of impartial adviser to both sides, your primary function as representative of His Majesty's Government being (1) to bring about settlement which is satisfactory to all parties on as many outstanding points as possible, and (2) to secure that the meeting, even if it is inconclusive, shall at least break up in an atmosphere such as to make resumption of negotiations possible. His Majesty's Government earnestly share your hope that this meeting may at least result in mutual recognition and a promise to exchange representatives.

As regards Ibn Mashur, the Dahamshah sheikhs and desert posts arbitration, you should be guided by my telegram of 15th February [see No. 87], and in case of need act on last paragraph of that telegram.

[E 966/111/91]

No. 91.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 21.)

(Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, February 20, 1930.

AS a result of discussion with myself, King Feisal and the Prime Minister have orally agreed to the following subjects being discussed at meeting between the Kings on the lines indicated:—

1. *Question of Posts.*—If Ibn Saud adheres to uncompromising attitude adopted by his delegate at the preliminary meeting, King Feisal will declare that Iraq Government are ready to refer the question to arbitration forthwith; that they accept draft Arbitral Convention enclosed in your confidential despatch of 2nd August, 1929; that they are ready to appoint their member and to propose third arbitrator under article 2. In default of agreement as to third arbitrator, King Feisal will offer to accept nominee of His Majesty's Government.
2. *Bahra Agreement Tribunal.*—Iraq Government views have already been stated in my telegram of 18th February [not printed], and King Feisal will try to persuade Ibn Saud to agree to earliest possible date for meeting of tribunal.
3. *Ibn Mashur.*—King Feisal will endeavour to reach agreement with Ibn Saud in the first place (he is confident that he will succeed). Question of Ibn Mizyad will be definitely dropped.
4. *Recognition.*—King Feisal will agree to recognise Ibn Saud as King of Hejaz provided Ibn Saud's attitude towards question No. 1 is satisfactory.
5. *Representation.*—If Ibn Saud insists that his capital is now in Hejaz, King Feisal will agree to be represented at Jedda or Mecca, with a consul at Riyadh.

Please telegraph if you approve.

[E 1014/92/91]

No. 92.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 42.)
Sir,

Jedda, February 7, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 31st January, 1930.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force officer commanding in Palestine

and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), His Majesty's consul at Basra, the Government of the Federated Malay States and the senior naval officer, Red Sea sloops.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 92.

Jedda Report for the Period January 1 to 31, 1930.

THE final spark of the Akhwan revolt fizzled out when Feisal-ed-Dawish, following the defection of several of his leaders, himself surrendered unconditionally to the British Air Force on the Koweit frontier on the 9th January. Naif-bin-Hithlain, paramount chief of the Ajman, and Ibn Lami, who had also surrendered, were, with Feisal-ed-Dawish, interned on board H.M.S. "Lupin" pending a decision as to their ultimate disposal. The main portion of the Ajman and Mutair also surrendered to the Royal Air Force, and were interned temporarily in Northern Koweit. In a final engagement on the 11th January a force of rebels under Ibn Ashwan, and also a small section of the Mutair, which left Koweit in an attempt to escape, were destroyed by the forces of Ibn Saud, who led the attack in person.

2. The surrender of the rebels to His Majesty's forces and the problem of their disposal at once raised in acute form the question of carrying into effect the pledges given to Ibn Saud. On the 6th January His Majesty's political resident at Bushire was instructed to inform Ibn Saud immediately, unless he saw objection, that the sole reason of the delay in implementing the undertakings of His Majesty's Government to expel the rebels was the presence of women and children, which rendered it difficult to employ force, and that every effort was being made to find some way to overcome that difficulty. His Majesty's Government also suggested that it might produce a good effect if, when this message were communicated to Ibn Saud, he were informed that His Majesty's Government, in order to avoid delay and with a view to placing him in full possession of the position as it presented itself to them, would be willing immediately to despatch His Majesty's political agent at Koweit, with whom he was well acquainted, accompanied by a representative of the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq, to his headquarters in the field to discuss with him the solution of the present difficulties. A reply was received from Ibn Saud on the 9th January accepting this proposal and stating that he had ordered Sheikh Hafiz Wahba to accompany the deputation.

3. On the 9th January also a message was sent to the King informing him of the surrender and internment of Feisal-ed-Dawish and Ibn Hithlain. In acknowledging the receipt of this communication, Ibn Saud stated that, notwithstanding the delay on the part of His Majesty's Government in fulfilling its promises repeatedly given, he with his troops was still expecting their fulfilment, and requested that Feisal-ed-Dawish, Ibn Hithlain and Ibn Mashhur should be handed over to him, and the rebel tribes themselves expelled from Koweit territory at an early date. The British Government, he added, would doubtless appreciate the difficulties which he and the people of Nejd, trusting in the promises of the British Government, had experienced, no less than the fact that his troops were then in position on the frontier with their hands tied while the enemy enjoyed security within Koweit territory.

4. Voluminous protests in the same sense but in less temperate language were also received from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who went so far in his public utterances as to accuse His Majesty's Government of breach of faith. Sheikh Fuad Hamza was informed on the 16th January that the question of the disposal of the rebels was being dealt with direct between the local authorities and the King, and that, after consultation with the latter, arrangements were being made for a meeting with him in order to discuss with him personally the various points at issue. In the circumstances His Majesty's Government preferred to await the outcome of that meeting before replying to his notes.

5. In the meanwhile His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq was informed by the Prime Minister of the Iraq Government that, as Ibn Saud was now encamped close to the Iraq frontier, the Iraq Government felt that an excellent opportunity presented itself for a joint meeting in order to discuss the settlement of outstanding questions between the two Governments. King Feisal, he added, was so impressed with the necessity for seizing this opportunity of making friendly overtures to a

neighbouring King on his borders that he was ready to meet Ibn Saud himself either in the neutral zone or at some convenient place near the frontier for a discussion of these questions.

6. The Prime Minister was requested by the Iraq Government to convey this invitation to Ibn Saud. In doing so, he explained that King Feisal was very anxious to try and dissipate the existing atmosphere of distrust between the Iraq and Nejd Governments by a personal meeting with Ibn Saud, and suggested that Sir F. Humphrys should also be present. Matters for discussion included (a) disposal of rebel refugees; (b) return of loot; (c) breaches of article 4 of the Bahra Agreement; (d) extradition; (e) treaty of *bon voisinage*; (f) mutual recognition of the two Governments and exchange of representatives; and (g) desert posts, the last of which was regarded as the most important point of all.

7. Sir F. Humphrys reported that he himself was *primâ facie* in favour of this proposal, as the feeling of hostility between Iraq and Nejd could hardly be worse, and there seemed a chance that, even if the conference failed to solve any outstanding questions, the way might be prepared by personal contact for a better mutual understanding. His Majesty's Government, however, considered it important that the main question of the disposal of the refugees should be settled before the meeting took place between Ibn Saud and King Feisal, and therefore that the meeting between His Majesty's political agent at Koweit and Ibn Saud should first be held. His Majesty's Government anticipated that, once this question were disposed of, a more favourable atmosphere would prevail, and thus that the proposed conference between Ibn Saud and King Feisal would have greater prospects of success.

8. On the 16th January His Majesty's Government communicated to the political resident at Bushire the conclusions which they had reached regarding the disposal of the rebels. In view of the importance of the issues involved, and of the delicate situation which had arisen, they considered it in the highest degree desirable that he himself should assume personal charge of the mission to Ibn Saud, and should take with him His Majesty's political agent at Koweit, and, subject to the consent of the High Commissioner in Iraq, Air Commodore Burnett, to whose presence as a military adviser His Majesty's Government attached great importance.

9. His Majesty's Government also stated that, having regard to the fact that the assistance and co-operation of the British military forces had been the determining factor in the suppression of the revolt, they could not but take exception to the tone of recent communications from Ibn Saud and from the Hejaz Government. In the circumstances they were of opinion that a dignified and stiff remonstrance was called for. They considered it to be preferable, however, that this should be conveyed by word of mouth rather than by written communication.

10. Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe was accordingly instructed to explain to Ibn Saud on arrival at his camp that His Majesty's Government had never agreed to hand over rebels who might surrender, and, as had already been explained to him, the only thing that had prevented His Majesty's Government from expelling the rebel tribes prior to their surrender had been the fact that they were accompanied by their women and children against whom military action could not be taken. Ibn Saud was to be reminded that he had been warned of this contingency as long ago as the middle of October. At the same time, he was to be left in no doubt as to the exception taken by His Majesty's Government to his recent communications. His Majesty's Government also laid stress on the necessity of obtaining from the King written and binding guarantees that, if the leaders were handed over, (a) their lives and those of their relatives would be spared; (b) any punishment inflicted should not be excessive or such as to outrage Arab sentiment or run counter to British tradition; and (c) effective measures should be taken to eliminate the possibility of Iraq or Koweit suffering further at their hands. The alternative, it was tentatively proposed, was deportation of the leaders and their immediate entourage, a course which was objectionable on various grounds and which His Majesty's Government would be loth to adopt.

11. Similarly, as regards the rank and file of the rebel tribes, although it was considered unlikely that Ibn Saud would wish to punish them with undue severity, it was, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, clearly important to satisfy local and humanitarian sentiments. Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe was therefore instructed, before agreeing to handing them over, to obtain guarantees similar to those mentioned above and of a nature which, in his opinion, the refugees themselves could reasonably be required to accept. As regards the recovery of loot, His Majesty's Government hoped that it would be possible to obtain satisfactory

guarantees from Ibn Saud, but left it to Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe to do what, in his judgment, was practicable at that stage.

12. As regards Ibn Mashhur, who had surrendered to His Majesty's Air Force in Iraq territory and whose delivery was also demanded by Ibn Saud, Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe was instructed to explain, if Ibn Saud raised the point, that his position was not quite on all fours with that of the other rebel leaders, that he was, at the moment, in the custody of the Iraq Government and that the question of his ultimate disposal could better be handled at subsequent meetings with King Feisal.

13. On the 21st January, as a result of a meeting which he had had with the King, Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe reported that Ibn Saud had agreed to the principal desiderata of His Majesty's Government. He was subsequently able to report that complete agreement had been reached and letters embodying it exchanged between Ibn Saud and himself on the 27th January; also that the rebel leaders were being flown to Ibn Saud's camp where they would be handed over personally by Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, and that arrangements were being made for the return of the tribes.

14. The gist of Ibn Saud's letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe is as follows:—

- (1) Although the rebel leaders and their followers deserve punishment for their offences, in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government he undertakes to spare their lives.
- (2) While it is his prerogative to punish them, any punishment awarded will be "saturated with the spirit of kindness and mercy," but he reserves the right to recover from them any plunder that they may have taken.
- (3) He promises categorically to prevent any raids in the future by Mutair, Ajman or any other Nejd tribes into Iraq or Koweit territory. Should any such raids occur, he agrees to effect a settlement without delay under machinery provided for in the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and to restore immediately anything plundered from Koweit in accordance with customs current between Koweit and Nejd. He is ready to negotiate an agreement with Koweit similar to the Bahra Agreement should the sheikh desire it.
- (4) He agrees to settle all past claims by a tribunal provided for in the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and in accordance with current practice in the case of Koweit, provided that all the Mutair and Ajman and their followers and property at present in the hands of British military authorities are returned to Nejd territory. In view of the friendship existing between him and His Majesty's Government, he agrees to pay £10,000 through Jedda on the 5th Shawal (March 3) as compensation to tribesmen in Koweit and Iraq in anticipation of the final settlement of the account. Finally, he agrees to appoint a representative to the Bahra Agreement tribunal at any time one month after the receipt of a request to do so, the month of Haj (pilgrimage) being excluded.

15. On the 29th January Ibn Saud addressed a very cordial letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe begging that His Majesty's Government be informed that the rebel leaders were duly handed over to him on the 28th January in accordance with the terms of the agreement. He expressed himself as being deeply grateful to His Majesty's Government for fulfilling their pledges so faithfully, and as being confident that the future relations between His Majesty's Government and Nejd would be strengthened and established more firmly than ever; in particular, the act of His Majesty's Government would assist him in carrying out his engagements and in preserving peace on his boundaries. Lastly, he trusted that the handing over of the rebel tribes would very shortly be completed.

16. The proposal for a meeting with King Feisal and Sir F. Humphrys was cordially accepted by Ibn Saud. Owing to difficulties which have arisen over the selection of the place of the meeting, the original intention of holding it near the Nejd-Iraq frontier has been abandoned, and it has been decided by common agreement that it should take place on board one of His Majesty's ships outside territorial waters. The date has been fixed for the 20th Ramadan (February 19) and the conference, it has been decided, is to last two days. The question of a preliminary meeting between Ministers is under discussion.

17. On the 21st January the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that he had been summoned to join the King, and he left Jedda on the following day. The Emir Feisal has assumed charge of foreign affairs.

18. As a result of the renewed protests received from the King in the latter half of December regarding the action taken *vis-à-vis* of the Awazim tribe (December

report, paragraph 13), a note was addressed to Ibn Saud on the 2nd January, in which His Majesty's Government expressed the belief that Ibn Saud's protest was based upon a misapprehension of the facts. In explaining to Ibn Saud the position as it had then developed, His Majesty's Government informed him that, as the Awazim had not moved into Koweit territory, instructions had been given for the denial to them of all supplies from Koweit and for the use of force, if necessary, to expel them should they cross the frontier. In a letter subsequently addressed by the King to His Majesty's political agent at Koweit, Ibn Saud expressed himself as grateful for the measures thus taken.

19. The news of the return of the rebels by His Majesty's Government has been acclaimed in the Hejaz as the crowning act of a successful campaign, and it was celebrated in Mecca by a reception held by the Emir Feisal, to which the officials and notables of the town were invited. In Jedda, too, it had an immediate effect on the political atmosphere. The chief notables, who had been led by seditious propaganda, emanating from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, into doubting the assurances given by His Majesty's Government, now assert that they felt all along that all would be well, and, in the absence of Sheikh Fuad Hamza, they give due credit to the part played by His Majesty's Government in the suppression of the revolt.

20. No raids on the Transjordan frontier were reported during the month. The views of the High Commissioner for Transjordan on the general question (December report, paragraph 18) were forwarded to His Majesty's Government on the 25th January.

21. The Hejaz Government were informed on the 4th January that the four aeroplanes purchased by them had arrived safely at Darin. (December report, paragraph 22.)

22. The accession of King Ibn Saud was celebrated on the 8th and 9th January in conformity with an elaborate programme of festivities which had been devised for the occasion. These were the first celebrations of the sort that have taken place. The King is said to have been opposed to them at first, although he subsequently gave his consent.

23. The celebrations which, it is generally agreed, were organised on an unprecedented scale for Arabia, and were obviously intended to impress both foreigners and Arabs alike, may be said to mark a definite departure from the rigid precepts which the Akhwan had succeeded temporarily in imposing. Photographs were taken freely; an official photographer had, in fact, come from Egypt, and photographed the Emir on every possible occasion. Smoking was indulged in openly or with only a pretence at concealment. In fact, there seemed to be a general relaxation of regulations and a desire to get away from the irksome restrictions which, in Jedda at any rate, have never been popular. A clever move was an invitation issued to a number of representatives of the leading Egyptian newspapers who attended the celebrations and were loud in their praises.

24. The status of the French consulate and of the Soviet agency has been raised to that of a Legation.

25. The Soviet steamship "Vostok" (formerly steamship "Loos"), which arrived in Jedda on the 6th January with a consignment of medical stores for the Soviet Legation, brought a Russian professor who is said to be a specialist in eastern diseases and to have come for research work. He was accompanied by his wife, a doctor assistant, and an interpreter and his wife. These are attached to the Soviet Legation, which has for some time past included a lady doctor on its staff.

26. A telegram from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Afghan Foreign Secretary, published in the local press, reports the official recognition by the Hejaz Government of His Majesty Mohammed Nadir Khan as King of Afghanistan.

27. The number of pilgrims, as published, who had arrived by sea by the 31st January was 31,802, as compared with 28,904 for the corresponding period last year. It is estimated that practically all the Javanese and the majority of the Malay pilgrims have now arrived.

28. Jedda was subjected on the 4th and 5th January to an exceptionally heavy rainstorm which lasted for about sixteen hours. According to measurements taken locally, over 5 inches were registered in that period.

29. No slaves took refuge at this Legation during the period under review.

[E 1076/111/91]

No. 93.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 26.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, February 23, 1930.

REFERENCE my telegram of 23rd February [see No. 91], conference between the two Kings concluded to-night with the following results:—

1. Kings have exchanged letters in which they state that they will attempt to arrive at agreement regarding desert posts during next six months, in default of which each will nominate two arbitrators, and should they fail to agree about the fifth arbitrator, which seems inevitable, they will accept as president any person appointed by His Majesty's Government.
2. They both agree that the tribunal should meet in June at Koweit under the presidency of Fowle or Dickson as may be decided by His Majesty's Government.
3. Ibn Saud pardons Ibn Mashur, and Feisal promises to do all he can to persuade him to return to Nejd, and if he refuses to insist on his leaving Iraq territory. There is no *quid pro quo*.
- 4 and 5. Draft of a *Bon Voisinage* Agreement has been accepted in principle. The preamble cites Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and Nejd and Feisal as King of Iraq, and by one of the articles provision is made for exchange of diplomatic missions. After three months there will be a further meeting of representatives to conclude a formal agreement on this basis.

Outwardly the meeting was characterised by much cordiality, though in private Ibn Saud did not conceal from me his distrust of Feisal, while the latter deprecated the duplicity of Ibn Saud's Ministers. I was asked by both Kings to convey their deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government for their hospitality and for making the meeting possible. Arrangements which the captain of "Lupin" made for meeting were beyond praise.

[E 1081/1/91]

No. 94.

Consul-General Biscoe to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated by the Colonial Office, February 26.)

(Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bushire, January 31, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the negotiations which I have recently carried out with King Ibn Saud regarding the surrender of the rebel Ajman and Mutair tribes.

I received your Lordship's telegram to His Majesty's Minister asking him to obtain the permission of the Persian Government for a flying-boat to come to Bushire to take me to Koweit on the 16th January, and that evening Sir R. Clive informed me that the Prime Minister had telegraphed the requisite permission to the Governor of Bushire. As, however, the mail steamer was leaving the following afternoon for Koweit, and I wanted to take two clerks with me and the journey only took one night, I decided to proceed by steamer instead. I arrived at Koweit on the 18th January, and found that Colonel Dickson had arranged for me to arrive at Ibn Saud's camp on the 20th. I therefore had a preliminary discussion with Colonel Dickson and Air Commodore Burnett, and on the 20th instant I proceeded to Ibn Saud's camp by air. Most admirable arrangements for the transport of myself and the other members of the mission, servants, luggage, &c., were made by the Royal Air Force, and we travelled in three Victorias, accompanied by an escort of three Wapitis.

2. Ibn Saud had asked the Sheikh of Koweit to supply tents, servants, cooks, provisions, &c., for me and my party, and we found a camp ready pitched for us some distance from Ibn Saud's camp, and were accommodated in comfort, while the Royal Air Force made efficient arrangements to maintain wireless communication with Koweit, despite serious atmospheric difficulties at times.

3. I had not met Ibn Saud before, but Colonel Dickson, of course, knew him well, and told me that he had aged a good deal since he last saw him, and his manners had changed; whereas formerly his manners had been those of an important Arab sheikh, he has now assumed to a much greater extent the manners of a Royal

personage, largely due probably to the influence of the Syrians and Egyptians of the Effendi type by whom he is now surrounded. He did not invite me to dinner in accordance with the usual Arab custom, and our party were kept at some distance from his camp, the King coming to our camp for all discussions. The ostensible reason was that the King was living in the simplest style, and was not in a position suitably to entertain distinguished visitors, and that he had with him a number of fanatical and ignorant tribesmen; the real reason, I think, was that certain sheikhs from Iraqi tribes and others were visiting his camp, and Ibn Saud was anxious that we should not become aware of this.

4. In their instructions to me His Majesty's Government had said that they would much prefer to avoid deporting the rebel leaders, if possible, and I felt that there was much force in the reasons advanced by them, though at first sight deportation certainly seemed the simplest course. After a full consideration, however, of all the issues involved, and as a result of my discussions with Ibn Saud and the impression I formed of his feelings and character, I believe it would have been a mistake, for the following reasons: His Majesty's Government have in the past given many signs of their friendship for Ibn Saud; they have supplied him with arms and ammunition, and even with aeroplanes with British personnel; they have taken the most drastic measures to ensure that no facilities should be accorded to the rebel tribes; and their general attitude has been one of readiness to assist him as far as was in their power in his struggle with his rebellious subjects. They had, of course, never offered to surrender the rebels to him unconditionally, and had warned him that a contingency might arise under which they would be unable to eject the rebels from Koweit or Iraq territory. If, however, when this contingency arose, His Majesty's Government had declined to surrender the rebel leaders to him, despite the very categorical undertaking he was prepared to give to prevent raids by Nejd tribes into Koweit and Iraq territory in the future, and his undertaking to spare the lives of all the rebels and make a prompt settlement of claims, then, I venture to think, Ibn Saud would have had some justification for feeling that, while the action of His Majesty's Government did not constitute a breach of faith, it was inconsistent with their former professions of friendship and implied a change of attitude. I am certain that he would have gone back to Nejd completely antagonised. To speak of the terms arranged as capitulation seemed to me to ignore the past relations existing between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud. Had he gone off to Nejd without the rebel leaders being handed over to him, what would have been the position? It would not have been possible permanently to stop the rebel Mutair and Ajman from returning to Nejd territory, which is their home; Ibn Saud would thus have been provided with a weapon ready to his hand, and, though it is true that these tribes would have been deprived of their principal leaders, others would have been forthcoming, and, with Ibn Saud in hostile mood and these tribes again at his disposal, I think there would have been a strong probability of a recrudescence of organised raiding all along the border in the near future. It is, of course, possible that Ibn Saud may not fulfil his undertakings, though personally I believe that he intends to do so, and that organised raiding under his orders and with his encouragement will cease for at any rate some time to come; but I do think that the risk of organised raiding is very much less now than it would have been had Ibn Saud returned to Nejd with what he would have considered a definite grievance against His Majesty's Government. I have stressed the expression "organised raiding"; that petty cattle-lifting raids may occur from time to time is, of course, possible; they are more or less in the nature of a local pastime and of little importance, and are totally different matters to organised raiding carried out with the encouragement or under the orders of the King.

5. There is one other consideration to be borne in mind, and that is the projected air route down the Gulf. A portion of this route runs through Nejd territory, and we have tried in the past to obtain certain facilities from Ibn Saud for emergency landing grounds, &c., but these facilities have hitherto been refused. Possibly one of the considerations that induced His Majesty's Government to supply aeroplanes to Ibn Saud was that these might induce him to change his attitude. They will, I think, be on stronger ground to renew their requests, and he will be less unwilling to accede to them now than would have been the case had the rebel leaders been deported.

6. His Majesty's Government insisted that the surrender of the rebel leaders should be in accordance with Arab sentiment. I therefore asked the commander of H.M.S. "Lupin" to bring them down to Koweit, and flew up to Koweit myself

with Colonel Dickson to interview them. Dawish, after hearing that Ibn Saud was ready to give a formal letter to His Majesty's Government promising to spare his life, at once thanked me profusely, and said he was quite willing to go back. Ibn Hithlain is an impossible person to deal with. He is entirely unstable, very talkative and quite ready to refuse or deny in the morning any arrangement arrived at the previous evening. However, after a discussion with Colonel Dickson and myself, he also agreed to surrender to Ibn Saud. I therefore returned to Ibn Saud's camp quite satisfied. The following morning I got a telegram from the commander of the "Lupin" to the effect that Ibn Hithlain was not willing to return unless the King sent his son to take him over in accordance with a custom that is sometimes adopted among Arabs to give confidence to tribesmen who wish to surrender. The King, not unnaturally, I think, said that the proposal was quite incompatible with his dignity, and, secondly, that this was only done when it was the intention that the person surrendering should be completely forgiven; in the present case this was not his intention nor the desire of His Majesty's Government; on the contrary, his intention was to punish these persons. Colonel Dickson therefore again went up to Koweit to interview the rebel leaders, and Ibn Hithlain again said that he was ready to surrender. I therefore proceeded with the settlement, and arranged that they should be flown down to Ibn Saud's camp and handed over by Colonel Dickson. After the whole settlement had been concluded and our party had left for Koweit, Air Commodore Burnett, Colonel Dickson and I proceeded on board the "Lupin" to inform the rebel leaders that they would be handed over the following morning, and Hithlain then said that he would not go. I told him it was too late to change his mind, and that he would have to go the next morning, and to my surprise he came ashore the following morning quite cheerful and smiling, and stepped into the aeroplane without the smallest demur. Dawish, on the other hand, was perfectly consistent throughout, and reiterated his readiness to return to Ibn Saud, and his gratitude to His Majesty's Government for having saved his life. He himself remarked to Colonel Dickson that Ibn Hithlain had the mind of a child, and it was quite impossible to argue with him as he changed his mind half a dozen times a day. I may mention that Ibn Hithlain and Dawish are closely related by marriage. I have made no reference to Ibn Lami, the third rebel leader. He, however, is a very petty sheikh, who has only sprung into notoriety because he happened to be with Dawish when he surrendered. He is a person of no real importance, however, and was quite ready to return to Ibn Saud, and in the ordinary course would have gone back with the tribesmen and not with the rebel leaders.

7. After the conclusion of the preliminary discussion I sent your Lordship my telegram No. 7 of the 21st January. On the 23rd instant I received your telegram No. 19, dated the 23rd January, authorising me to complete the negotiations on the lines proposed, subject to certain qualifications. The qualification to which Air-Commodore Burnett attached the greatest importance, from the point of view of British prestige, was that Ibn Saud should make some restitution in anticipation of a final settlement. I would point out that the control of the tribes was causing Air-Commodore Burnett much anxiety. They had been located, doubtless for very good reasons, in close proximity to the Iraq border. The Iraq tribes had blood feuds with them and were anxious to recover loot that had been taken from them. Reports were coming in of raids by the Dhafir against Mutair and Ajman, and the tribesmen themselves were becoming less amenable to control; finally, intimation was received that the Iraq authorities contemplated the removal of their police patrol from the border, though, on the representation of Air-Commodore Burnett, this removal was subsequently postponed. It was, in our opinion therefore, essential to arrive at a final settlement without any delay. I, therefore, put the views of His Majesty's Government before Ibn Saud, and he first suggested that the tribes should be collected at some place, such as Jahrah, that we should decide how many camels, &c., they required for their bare subsistence and Koweit, Iraq and Nejd representatives should divide up the balance. I said I would be no party to any such arrangement, which seemed to me little removed from a general looting of the tribes. He then suggested that the tribes should be sent back to him, that he would call for claims from Nejd and that within a month Iraq and Koweit representatives should come to some place when he had collected the tribes and that with the machinery at his disposal he would take from the tribes the plunder that they had stolen and hand over one-third to a British representative. There appeared to me to be many difficulties in this arrangement; there would inevitably have been collusion between Nejd officials and tribesmen to conceal camels, &c., and many difficulties in the way of driving up the camels after they had been handed over, &c., and I therefore suggested that some

definite figure, such as 1,000 camels, should be fixed as the minimum number to be handed over. Ibn Saud, however, absolutely refused to agree; he stated that he had no idea how many camels, sheep, &c., would be forthcoming. The Royal Air Force stated that the rebel tribes had about 5,000 to 8,000 camels; according to his information, they had lost many flocks and herds, firstly, in the attacks made upon them by his tribes; secondly, in the rapid march north; and, thirdly, at the hands of Iraqi tribes who, he stated, had been raiding them daily, and he had no idea what the actual divisible amount was, but he thought it would be much less than the above figure. Presumably, His Majesty's Government did not desire him to make restitution out of his own pocket, and he felt that they were not trusting him and were bargaining with him as one merchant with another. He finally put this in writing in, however, suitable language. I therefore wrote him a letter explaining that it was not a case of distrusting him, but that, as he had declared his intention to compensate Nejd tribesmen at an early date, it was, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, only just that the unfortunate Koweit and Iraq tribesmen should also receive some adequate compensation in anticipation of the final settlement, which would inevitably take time. I added that my objection to the proposal that the British representative should be sent down to take over the one-third of the camels when His Majesty had recovered the plunder was based largely on the practical difficulties. I pointed out that the matter would inevitably be left to subordinate officials and that there would be much risk of friction, &c. Within an hour of the receipt of this letter Ibn Saud sent word saying that he wanted to see me, and came over to my camp about 5 p.m. with a very different demeanour to what he had worn before and, after reiterating his two previous proposals, he finally said that as I would accept neither of them, in order to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government, he would pay £10,000 in anticipation of the final settlement on the 1st March as compensation to Iraq and Koweit tribesmen. As this solution appeared to me to obviate all practical difficulties in the way of collecting camels, sheep, &c., and to be at any rate a substantial payment on account, I accepted it. Subsequently, in the discussion with the Ministers, it was agreed to fix the payment for the 5th Shawal. The 1st of Shawal is a very important Mahometan festival, which generally lasts two or three days at the end of the month of Ramzan, and this delay will allow them to make the payment after the festival is completed. The 5th Shawal is the 6th March. I regret that, owing to a miscalculation, I stated in my telegram No. T. 37 of the 28th January that it was the 3rd March.

8. The evening was spent in drafting his letter to me embodying the agreement, and the following morning, about 11 a.m., the notes were exchanged, His Majesty inspected the "Victorias" and the escort of "Wapitis," and soon after 12 we returned by air to Koweit. Air-Commodore Burnett was most anxious to arrange to move the tribes down, and I felt that it was essential that the matter should be finally settled without further delay. The following morning, therefore, the rebel leaders were flown down to Ibn Saud's camp with Colonel Dickson, who personally handed them over to Ibn Saud, and the Chief Staff Officer left with Ibn Shiblian, and emissaries from Ibn Saud, bearing letters of forgiveness, &c., for Jarishan, to tell the tribes to move south, while I returned that night in H.M.S. "Lupin" to Bushire.

9. I would mention that, in accordance with your instructions, at my first interview with Ibn Saud I informed him that His Majesty's Government took great exception to the tone of the notes addressed by his Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah.

He admitted at once that their remonstrance was justified, and expressed his regret, and it was reported to me afterwards that Ibn Saud had telegraphed for Fuad Hamza to come to his camp and intended to dismiss him and appoint Hafiz Wabha to act in his place temporarily. Now that the meeting with King Faisal is to take place, it is possible that he may decide not to make any change for the moment, and that if Fuad Hamza carries on the negotiations with Iraq successfully he may rehabilitate himself; Ibn Saud, however, was certainly very angry with him at the time. Curiously enough, Hafiz Wabha, who had been rather a nuisance to the political agent at Koweit for some time past, was most helpful during the negotiations; he is, I believe, on very bad terms with the King's private secretary, Yusif Yasin, a Syrian, who was most obstructive in every way, and possibly this had much to do with it.

10. I regret that I was unable to obtain the more definite assurances which His Majesty's Government desired regarding the exact measure of control to be imposed on the rebel leaders and the tribes. As explained in my telegram No. 38 of the

28th January, Ibn Saud resented dictation in this matter; he contended that he had given a definite promise to prevent raids, but that the exact manner in which he was to implement this must be left to him. To have pressed the point would have meant further discussions, and, as I have pointed out above, an early settlement was essential, and I could not help feeling that the matter was one rather of theoretical than of practical importance. Firstly, as regards the leaders, it would have been very difficult to have ascertained whether in fact they were being kept in Riyadh or at any other place. Secondly, as telegraphed in my comments on the agreement, if Ibn Saud means to stop raiding he may be trusted to exercise effective control over both the leaders and the tribes; if he does not intend to fulfil this undertaking, then any promises regarding the control to be exercised over the rebel tribes will certainly prove equally illusory. I think, however, that not merely in fulfilment of his undertakings to His Majesty's Government, but in his own interests, he will take drastic measures to prevent all risk of a further rebellion against his authority. As regards the tribes it was not his intention to restrict them to one specified area; considerations of grazing and water would prevent this; but I think he intends to control their movements generally and not to allow them to move about anywhere they please, for some time to come at any rate.

11. As regards Ibn Saud's promises to settle claims promptly in future, my hands were somewhat tied by the machinery of the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq. Ibn Saud would, of course, have been glad of any excuse to modify the terms of the Bahra Agreement and expressed his readiness to settle claims for raids on Iraq on demand, but said that he assumed that any such arrangement would supersede any arrangement prescribed in the Bahra Agreement. To this, of course, I could not agree, and the only course possible was to try to tighten up the Bahra Agreement; and Ibn Saud offered spontaneously to appoint representatives to the tribunal prescribed in the Bahra Agreement at any time one month after the receipt of a request to this effect by the Iraq Government, the only stipulation he made being that the month of Zi-Haj (pilgrimage) should be excluded from the computation of the month allowed to him, as he said that he made the pilgrimage himself every year and had many preoccupations during that month. He contended, however, that the failure to form a tribunal to investigate claims in the past was not due to him and that he had, on two occasions, sent Hafiz Wabha to Koweit as his representative, and that the latter had stayed there for six months on one occasion and for two or three months on another, and that the Iraq Government had failed to send representatives. I did not know whether this statement was correct and told him that I knew nothing about the matter. As regards Koweit, the current practice for the settlement of claims is for the ruler of Koweit to address Ibn Saud direct and for claims to be adjusted by direct correspondence. This procedure has proved quite ineffectual in the past, and I doubt whether it is likely to prove much more effective in the future, but Ibn Saud stated that he was quite willing to negotiate an agreement with Koweit on the lines of the Bahra Agreement should the sheikh desire it. Finally, he agreed to pay £10,000 in anticipation of a final settlement of account.

It will be seen that, firstly, the leaders have gone back of their own free will; secondly, we have obtained a promise from Ibn Saud that he will treat them and the tribesmen with humanity; thirdly, he has given a categorical promise to prevent any raids by Nejd tribes into Koweit or Iraq in the future and, should any raids occur despite his efforts, the machinery for their settlement has been considerably tightened up, and if the Iraq Government choose to avail themselves of it no undue delay should occur in obtaining compensation. Finally, despite the fact that Ibn Saud contends that his claims against Iraq amount approximately to the same figure as the Iraq claims against Nejd, a substantial sum has been obtained from him on account.

12. As regards the allocation as between Koweit and Iraq of the £10,000, I am confronted by a similar difficulty to that expressed by his Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq in his telegram No. 81 to you of the 31st January, inasmuch as I do not know the amount of the Iraq claims, or the proportion they bear to the Koweit claims. I would, however, point out that Ibn Saud claims to have heavy counter-claims against Iraq, whereas he has not got any counter-claims against Koweit. In any case, the sum of £10,000 is only a payment on account and a final settlement is yet to come. I would suggest, therefore, that, subject to any views his Excellency the High Commissioner may express, £3,000 should be allotted to Koweit and £7,000 to Iraq, whose claims are presumably larger.

13. As regards the proposal for the conclusion with Koweit of an agreement similar to the Bahra Agreement, I consider it most desirable that some such

agreement should be negotiated, not merely with a view to providing machinery for the rapid settlement of claims, but with the object of emphasising the independent status of the ruler of Koweit. I am addressing a separate despatch to the Government of India on this subject, and will here merely say that in my opinion it should be a cardinal point of our policy in the Gulf to uphold, maintain and emphasise in every possible way the independence of this small principality, surrounded as it is by two powerful neighbours, and one of the means to this end would be the negotiation of a formal treaty between Koweit and Nejd. I have, therefore, instructed the political agent to discuss the matter with the sheikh and am examining the question myself. If it is found that the provisions of the Bahra Agreement are applicable *mutatis mutandis* to Koweit with no material modifications, then probably the simplest course would be for the Sheikh of Koweit to request His Majesty's Government to negotiate such a treaty on his behalf, and presumably this could be done through His Majesty's Minister at Jedda. Should any material modification be found necessary, then, doubtless, it will be possible in the near future to arrange a meeting between the sheikh and Ibn Saud and, possibly, if His Majesty's Government saw no objection, the political agent or I could also attend to discuss the matter.

14. In the course of a private discussion with Ibn Saud, I mentioned the matter of Koweit customs, but the latter was entirely uncompromising; at the same time, he was quite frank and said he was in dire straits for money (which I believe to be more or less correct), and that he must get it from somewhere, and that the Sheikh of Koweit had a comfortable income without having to work for it, while he, Ibn Saud, led laborious days and was constantly beset by financial worries. This, of course, was a ridiculous argument, but time did not permit of my pressing this matter further then, nor was the moment altogether propitious. I do not think, however, that there is much use in continuing a discussion on paper with Ibn Saud on this subject. There are many wheels within wheels. For one thing, Ibn Saud's chief financiers are the wealthy firm of Qusaibis at Bahrein. They farm the customs at Oqair and Katif, and it is obviously in their interests to compel trade to pass through those ports in preference to Koweit and, since the introduction of the arrangement by which goods consigned to Nejd only pay 2 per cent. transit duty at Bahrein, their task has been much facilitated, and they naturally have much influence with Ibn Saud. If Ibn Saud could be induced to farm out to them the customs on goods entering Nejd through Koweit, it is very probable that nothing more would be heard of the question of the customs duties on this border and that the trade of Koweit would revive. I think the best thing would be to wait a short time and see whether, with the more peaceful conditions that it is hoped will prevail, there is any revival of trade and lessening of the blockade of Koweit and, if not, to arrange for a meeting between the sheikh and Ibn Saud, accompanied by a political officer, to thrash out the whole matter.

15. As I have reported in my telegram No. 32 of the 31st January, the Sheikh of Koweit paid a formal visit to Ibn Saud while I was there. As I have said above, at Ibn Saud's request he had sent out tents, servants and supplies for us there, and we were really his guests and not those of Ibn Saud. He was anxious to pay his respects to Ibn Saud, and assured the political agent that the visit would merely be a formal one, as he himself is desirous that any discussions with Ibn Saud regarding Koweit affairs should be carried on by us on his behalf. He and some of the members of his family were, therefore, conveyed by air to Ibn Saud's camp, stayed two nights and were flown back to Koweit. He gave me to understand that no controversial matters were discussed, but Ibn Saud recovered from the Awazim the loot they had carried off in the three recent raids, and restored it to him.

16. On my arrival at Ibn Saud's camp the King expressed a desire that the aeroplanes supplied to him by His Majesty's Government should be flown from Darin to his camp, so that he would see them. A telegram was therefore sent to Darin instructing the officer in charge of the aeroplanes to fly them up to Khabari Wadha. Some delay occurred in the transmission of the message, since the wireless set which the Royal Air Force have lent to Darin was not working, but about four days later the aeroplanes arrived, though they had some difficulty in finding the camp, and Ibn Saud was much gratified. The machines had not enough petrol to enable them to get back to Darin, and were still there when I left, but the Royal Air Force were arranging to accord facilities for the transport of petrol from Basra, and they have doubtless returned to Darin since.

17. In conclusion, I desire to express my thanks to the Royal Air Force for the arrangements which were made for the conveyance of myself and my party, and

for the readiness with which they placed machines at my disposal whenever required. The weather in camp was exceedingly cold, and I fear that many of the officers and men underwent a good deal of discomfort. I am particularly grateful to the wireless operators, who often worked in great difficulty till very late hours of the night.

18. I enclose herewith a translation of the letter addressed by Ibn Saud to me. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. V. BISCOE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Ibn Saud to Consul-General Biscoe.

(Translation.)

(After Compliments.)

January 27, 1930.

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter dated the 27th January, 1930. In view of the British Government's undertaking to hand over Faisal-ad-Dawish, Naif-bin-Hithlain, Jasir-bin-Lami, and all the Mutair and Ajman who are held by the British authorities, we hereby confirm our verbal conversation with you as follows:—

- (1) That in spite of the punishment which the three leaders, Faisal-ad-Dawish, Naif-bin-Hithlain and Jasir-bin-Lami, and their followers deserve for their offences against neighbouring Governments and their rebellion against us, we will spare their lives and those of their tribes in compliance with the wish of the British Government.
- (2) We regard it as our prerogative to inflict upon these people such punishment as will restrain them in future, and restrain others whose souls may lead them to do evil; these punishments, however, will be saturated with the spirit of justice and mercy for which we are known, but we reserve the right to take from them any property that they may have taken from others.
- (3) As regards the raids, we promise to prevent any raids against the neighbouring Governments, Iraq and Koweit, whether by the Mutair, Ajman or any other Nejd tribe; should anything of the kind take place in future, we shall be prepared to apply without delay the Bahra Agreement in the case of Iraq, and to restore immediately whatever may be plundered from Koweit in accordance with the custom current between Koweit and Nejd. If the ruler of Koweit desires to enter into an agreement in regard to raids, similar to the Bahra Agreement, we are prepared to enter into such an agreement with him.
- (4) As regards property that has been carried off from Iraq nationals in the past, we are prepared to apply the procedure prescribed in the Bahra Agreement and, in the case of Koweit, to effect a settlement of claims in accordance with the procedure at present in force, provided that none of the rebellious Mutair and Ajman and their followers who are in the hands of the British authorities or their property remain in Iraq or Koweit territory.

In view of the friendship which exists between us and His Majesty's Government, we have agreed to their wishes as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter. We therefore see fit, in mercy to the unfortunate tribes of Iraq and Koweit who have suffered losses, to pay them £10,000 sterling on the 5th Shawal, 1348, through His Majesty's representative at Jedda, this to be in anticipation of a final settlement of claims.

And we shall be ready to send representatives at any time to effect a settlement in accordance with the Bahra Agreement one month after receipt of the request for such tribunal, the month of Zi-Haj being excluded.

[E 1110/111/91]

No. 95.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, February 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, February 26, 1930.

FOLLOWING addressed to Government of India:—

"At the end of conference Ibn Saud informed commander of 'Patrick Stewart' that he wished to visit Bahrein, thence proceed to Ojair by launch. I instructed commander to explain to Ibn Saud that visit at short notice would be inconvenient to sheikh, but that I would arrange for launch to meet him at outer buoy 7 miles out to take him direct to Ojair, and was informed that Ibn Saud had entirely given up idea of visiting Bahrein. Weather, however, was bad, and launch could not go out, so Ibn Saud landed and left the same day by launch for Ojair."

[E 1145/111/91]

No. 96.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, March 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, February 28, 1930.

I HAVE received following telegram from Ibn Saud in reply to valedictory message from myself:—

"I thank your Excellency most sincerely for all the good wishes expressed in your telegram. I was greatly pleased at seizing the opportunity of making your Excellency's acquaintance. On this occasion I feel myself bound to express to the British Government and to you my thanks for the effort which you have made to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the Kingdoms of Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies and Kingdom of Iraq. I hope that Almighty God will always help us to safeguard peace and tranquillity between the two neighbouring States."

Also letter from King Feisal and Prime Minister thanking me in similar terms and expressing great appreciation for facilities as kindly provided by His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Bushire, Jedda and India.)

[E 1157/111/91]

No. 97.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, March 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, March 2, 1930.

I AM very grateful for your congratulations. Conference has enabled the two Kings to understand each other's difficulties. Each affirmed, both publicly and in private, that he was convinced of the genuine desire of His Majesty's Government to promote harmony between their two States, and that such harmony could only be effectively secured through British advice and guidance.

If they fulfil promises which they made to me that each would go a considerable distance to meet expectations of the other, I feel that conference, which has caused great enthusiasm locally, will be fruitful of enduring benefits to both countries.

If, on the other hand, either King falls short of what he is understood by the other to have undertaken, result may be that little real progress has been made.

So far as Ibn Saud is concerned, he professes to place his reliance upon His Majesty's Government rather than upon King Feisal. His signature to the letter on the subject of the desert posts was only obtained at the last moment at a private interview with myself, when he expressed himself as basing his hope for future peace in Arabia on British impartiality and justice.

As a first step I am pressing King Feisal to ensure that Ibn Mashur and his followers should return to Nejd as soon as possible, and have pointed out that this will be regarded by Ibn Saud as a test of good faith.

(Repeated to Bushire and Jedda.)

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 61.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, March 10, 1930.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 219 of the 28th August last, I transmit to you herewith the text of the draft commercial treaty between the United Kingdom and India and the Hejaz and Nejd, as revised in the light of the comments contained in your despatch, and of further consultation with the Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned. I request that you will take an early opportunity of communicating this draft to the Hejazi Government for their consideration.

2. I desire to draw your attention to the following points which arise in connexion with various articles of the draft treaty:—

Article 2.—If the Hejazi Government should raise the question whether Iraqi nationals are covered by the expression "persons under His Britannic Majesty's protection," you should inform them that His Majesty's Government do not regard Iraqis as protected persons for the purposes of this article. Their attention may be drawn in this connexion to the note addressed to King Ibn Saud by Mr. Stonehewer-Bird on the 15th September, 1927, a copy of which was enclosed in Mr. Bird's despatch No. 110 of the 26th September, 1927.

Article 3.—The article has been amended to include Nejd and Nejd vessels.

Article 4.—Since, as pointed out in your despatch under reference, no foreign national may own property in the Hejaz, British subjects do not obtain reciprocal treatment under this article as regards the acquisition and disposal of their property. Should the Hejazi Government contend that they stand to gain little advantage from the conclusion of a treaty on the lines of this draft, this point might be instanced as one in regard to which the balance of advantage lies with the Hejaz.

Article 6.—Articles 6 and 7 of the original draft transmitted to you in my despatch No. 147 of the 25th July have been merged into a single article, the remaining articles being renumbered accordingly. To meet the point made in paragraph 6 of your despatch, the word "articles" has been substituted for the word "goods" throughout. It has not been found possible to adopt your suggestion that the words "by the exporting country" should be inserted after the words "shall not be subjected," since their inclusion might give rise to difficulties in the case of articles which, though of British origin, remain for some time in a third country (e.g., Egypt) before being exported thence into the Hejaz.

You will observe that paragraph 3 of this article lays down, in more detail than did the corresponding clauses of articles 6 and 7 of the previous draft, the special circumstances in which prohibitions or restrictions may be imposed on imported and exported articles. In presenting the draft treaty to the Hejazi Government, you should explain that such provisions are habitually included in commercial treaties negotiated by His Majesty's Government. I would draw your attention to the fact that paragraph 3 (2) is so worded as not to conflict with the undertakings regarding the free exportation of arms to the Hejaz and Nejd given to King Ibn Saud by Sir G. Clayton in his letter of the 19th May, 1927, at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Jedda.

Article 7 (article 8 of the previous draft).—The assumption made in your despatch No. 219 that warships, including His Majesty's sloops in the Red Sea, are excluded from the scope of this article, is correct. The treatment to be accorded to warships is governed by the rules of international law and custom, and is not normally dealt with in commercial treaties.

Nor does anything in this article or article 8 affect the right of the Hejazi Government to make such regulations as they may desire in connexion with the pilgrim traffic, since these articles provide for most-favoured-nation treatment and not for treatment on a basis of reciprocity.

Article 9 (article 10 of the previous draft).—In your despatch No. 219 you drew attention to the fact that for a period of twelve months after its signature, the treaty would be in force as between the Hejaz and Nejd on the one hand, and any British Colony, Protectorate, or mandated area administered by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the other, in respect of which notice to that effect is given by His Majesty's Government, whether its application to such Colony, &c., is agreeable to the Hejazi Government or not. Consideration has been given to the point. It is, however, now customary to embody a clause in this form in all similar treaties negotiated by His Majesty's Government, and other Powers have found no

difficulty in agreeing to its inclusion. There is no question, moreover, of the accession of Iraq to the treaty under this article to which the Hejazi Government might wish more particularly to make objection, since Iraq is not a mandated territory. In these circumstances it is not considered necessary or desirable to modify this article to meet the point raised in your despatch.

It has now been decided that no attempt shall be made to include Iraq in the present negotiations. The protocol relating to Iraq attached to the previous draft has therefore been abandoned.

3. When you submit the draft treaty to the Hejazi Government, I shall be glad if, in addition to giving them the explanation referred to in connexion with article 6 above, you will inform them, on behalf of the Government of India, that the Indian States have the right to impose duties, which may not be the same as British Indian duties, but that under the tariffs of those States, whatever those tariffs may be, the produce of the Hejaz and Nejd will receive treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the produce of any other foreign nation.

4. In paragraphs 2-5 of your despatch under reply, you drew my attention to the fact that the proposals of His Majesty's Government are, in your opinion, likely to make a somewhat disappointing impression upon the Hejazi Government. This aspect of the question is being dealt with in a separate despatch.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 98.

Draft Anglo-Hejazi Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

PREAMBLE.

HIS Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies,

Desiring to facilitate and extend still further the trade and commerce of their respective countries and to regulate by means of a treaty the commercial relations between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and India and such other territories under the sovereignty, protection or authority of His Britannic Majesty as he may desire should be bound by the treaty on the one side and the Hejaz and Nejd on the other side,

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

.....A.B.

For India,

.....C.D.

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies,

.....E.F.

who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The territories of the High Contracting Parties to which the present treaty applies are, on the part of His Britannic Majesty, Great Britain and Northern Ireland and India, and the territories in respect of which notification of accession is given under article 10 or notice of application is given under article 9.

And on the part of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies.

The expression "territories of the one (or of the other) High Contracting Party" in subsequent articles of this treaty means the territories of such High Contracting Party to which the treaty applies.

ARTICLE 2.

The rights conferred by the present treaty upon subjects of His Britannic Majesty shall be enjoyed equally by all persons under His Britannic Majesty's protection.

ARTICLE 3.

All vessels which, according to British law, are deemed to be British vessels, and all vessels which, according to the law of the Hejaz and Nejd, are deemed to be vessels of the Hejaz and Nejd, shall, for the purposes of this treaty, be deemed British or Hejazi and Nejd vessels respectively.

ARTICLE 4.

The subjects of either of the two High Contracting Parties, including companies and other associations organised in accordance with the laws in force in the territories of that High Contracting Party, shall enjoy unconditionally in every respect in the territories of the other High Contracting Party treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the subjects or citizens and the companies and other associations of any other foreign country. This provision shall extend to all matters of commerce and navigation, the establishment and carrying on of any description of business, the treatment of commercial travellers and their samples, the exercise of professions or occupations, residence and the acquisition and disposal of property.

ARTICLE 5.

The subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties in the territories of the other shall enjoy, in respect of their persons, their property rights and interests, and in respect of their commerce, industry, profession, occupation or any other matter, in every way the same treatment and legal protection as the subjects of that party or the subjects or citizens of the most favoured foreign country, in so far as taxes, exactions, customs duties, imposts, fees which are substantially taxes, and other similar charges are concerned.

ARTICLE 6.

1. Articles produced or manufactured in the territories of either of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy, unconditionally in the territories of the other treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to articles produced or manufactured in any other foreign country. In particular, they shall not be subject on importation or subsequently to other or higher customs duties or charges or to other prohibitions or restrictions than those to which similar articles produced or manufactured in any other foreign country are subject.

2. Articles produced or manufactured in the territories of either of the High Contracting Parties exported to the territories of the other shall not be subjected to other or higher duties or charges, or to other prohibitions or restrictions than those to which similar articles exported to any other foreign country are subject.

3. Exceptions to the general rule laid down in the preceding paragraphs of this article may only be made in the case of—

- (1) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed in the interests of public security.
- (2) Prohibitions or restrictions regarding traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and other military supplies, in accordance with the conditions set forth in the Arms Traffic Convention signed at Geneva on the 17th June, 1925.
- (3) Prohibitions or restrictions on the trade in opium or other substances included now or hereafter within the scope of the International Opium Convention signed at Geneva on the 19th February, 1925.
- (4) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed for the protection of public health.
- (5) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed for the protection of animals or plants, including protection against disease, degeneration or extinction, as well as measures taken against harmful seeds, plants and animals.

4. It is understood, however, that no claim will be made under this article to the enjoyment of any special duties or charges which may be accorded by the Hejaz and Nejd to the articles of any State in Arabia, or of any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey and is contiguous to the Hejaz and Nejd.

ARTICLE 7.

Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes to treat in every respect the vessels of the other not less favourably than national vessels or the vessels of the most favoured foreign country. This equality of treatment shall extend to the right to import or export any goods which may be legally imported or exported and to carry passengers outwards and inwards, and to any duties or charges levied on the vessels, their cargoes and passengers, and also to facilities for the stationing, loading and unloading of vessels in ports, docks, quays, harbours and roadsteads, as well as to tonnage or other dues, charges and payments of all kinds levied on ships, such as sanitary, port, quay, harbour, pilotage, quarantine, lighthouse and other similar dues levied in the name of or for the profit of the Government, public functionaries, private individuals, corporations or establishments of any kind.

The two High Contracting Parties undertake that imported or exported goods shall not be subjected anywhere in their territories to any differential due, surtax, charge or disability of any kind based on the flag of the ship by which the goods are imported or exported, and to the detriment of the flags of either of the two High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 8.

The provisions of this treaty relating to the mutual concession of national treatment in matters of navigation do not apply to the coasting trade, in respect of which the subjects and vessels of each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other, treatment as favourable as that accorded to any other foreign country.

In the event of the coasting trade of either party being exclusively reserved to national vessels, the vessels of the other party may nevertheless proceed from one port to another, either for the purpose of landing the whole or part of their cargoes or passengers brought from abroad, or of taking on board the whole or part of their cargoes or passengers for a foreign destination. Such vessels shall, moreover, if engaged in trade to or from places not within the limits of the coasting trade so reserved, not be prohibited from the carriage between two ports of the territories of the first party of passengers holding through tickets or merchandise consigned on through bills of lading to or from places not within the above-mentioned limits, and while engaged in such carriage these vessels and their passengers and cargoes shall enjoy the full privileges of this treaty.

ARTICLE 9.

1. His Britannic Majesty may, through his Representative at Jedda, give notice of his desire that the present treaty shall apply to any British Colony or Protectorate or to any mandated area administered by his Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and from the date of the said notice the treaty shall be in force as between the Hejaz and Nejd and the territory specified in such notice.

2. Either of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to terminate the application of the treaty to any territory to which it shall have been made applicable under this article at any time on giving twelve months' notice to that effect.

ARTICLE 10.

1. His Britannic Majesty may, by a notification made by his Representative at Jedda, accede to the present treaty in respect of any of His Majesty's self-governing Dominions.

2. After the expiry of a period of nine years from the coming into force of the present treaty, either of the High Contracting Parties may, by giving twelve months' notice, terminate the application of the treaty to any of His Majesty's self-governing Dominions in respect of which notification of accession has been given under paragraph 1 of this article.

3. Any notification made under paragraph 1 of this article may include any dependency or mandated area administered by the Government of the territory in respect of which the notification of accession is given; and any notice given under paragraph 2 shall be applicable to any such dependency or mandated area which was included in such notification of accession.

ARTICLE 11.

So long as in any territory referred to in article 9 or 10 which is not bound by the present treaty goods produced or manufactured in the Hejaz and Nejd are accorded treatment as favourable as that accorded to goods produced or manufactured in any other foreign country, goods produced or manufactured in such territory shall enjoy in the Hejaz and Nejd completely and unconditionally treatment as favourable as that accorded to the goods of the most favoured foreign country.

ARTICLE 12.

1. The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at as soon as possible. It shall come into force immediately on the exchange of ratifications, and shall be binding during a period of ten years from the date of its coming into force.

2. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other twelve months before the expiration of the said period of ten years of its intention to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration of one year from the date of such notice.

3. His Britannic Majesty may give a notice of termination in respect of either Great Britain and Northern Ireland or India separately.

4. In the absence of an express statement to that effect in such notice, a notice given under the second paragraph of this article shall not affect the operation of the treaty as between the Hejaz and Nejd on the one hand and any territory in respect of which notification of accession has been given under article 10 on the other hand.

[E 1372/663/91]

No. 99.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, March 16, 1930.

IBN SAUD requests me through Emir Faisal to convey to His Majesty's Government a message with reference to memorandum communicated on 21st December (*vide* my despatch No. 330). Following are salient points:—

King's last proposals were made because neglect to effect settlement was causing disturbances. Situation has now changed, and raids have taken the form of regular military offensive, tribesmen from Transjordan having actually besieged Tebuk and Teima and operated near Jauk and Hail, cutting roads between these towns, motor cars being used for swift organised attacks. He feels sure that past attacks have been made in order to embarrass him in his recent campaign, to cause friction between himself and His Majesty's Government, and to make him appear to his subjects powerless to defend them.

He urgently requests His Majesty's Government to adopt following measures: (1) To resolve immediately question of looted property claims; (2) to inform him of measures taken by them to discover the criminals and their instigators and to state punishments inflicted; (3) to take decisive measures to prevent further hostile action and to punish evil-doers whatever their instigation may be.

The King excuses his importunity and asks for reply very urgently.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 44.)

[E 1385/93/91]

No. 100.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 57.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 2, 1930.

WITH reference to paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 323 of the 19th December last, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum indicating the steps which have been taken up to date in connexion with a scheme for supplying Mecca and Jedda with electricity. The subject, which was first broached two or three years ago and has occasionally been mooted since, is now being seriously canvassed.

2. The scheme is at present in its embryonic stages, and, although in its broad outlines it has received the approval of the King, its details still require royal sanction. It is, perhaps, early yet, therefore, to consider it as a serious project.

3. I will, however, follow its development and will report again later if it shows signs of materialising.

4. It is stated that the Government intend to call for tenders in the usual way, but this may be nothing more than a stratagem to conceal the fact that the contract has already been promised or parcelled out in anticipation to interested persons.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Memorandum.

Proposed Scheme for supplying Jedda and Mecca with Electricity.

THERE is a movement on foot in the Hejaz, supported by the King, to establish a power-station for the purpose of supplying Mecca and Jedda with electricity.

The supply of electricity for Jedda is at present dependent on a small plant of inadequate performance which works in conjunction with the condenser.

The first step in the scheme was the appointment by the Government of a special committee of local notables, dubbed for this purpose "experts," for considering the scheme and estimating the benefits which would accrue from it.

The committee met several times and decided, as a first step, that a public meeting should be held at which the decisions arrived at during its session should be announced. A general meeting was accordingly held on the 27th January at the Ministry of Finance in Mecca to which all the notables and others were invited.

His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal was present and listened, with the rest of the audience, to a long, disjointed speech on the subject delivered by Sheikh Ahmed Ghazzawi, a member of the Committee for the Study of Projects of Reform.

This sheikh, acting as spokesman for the committee, stated that the purpose of the meeting was to make public the decisions of the Government and of the special committee. After dwelling for some time on the interest shown by the King in this scheme in particular, and in all schemes in general tending to raise "the prestige of this dear land to a level consistent with its holiness and purity," the sheikh proceeded to enunciate these decisions as follows:—

1. A company is to be formed for the purpose of administering the scheme. Two-thirds of the shares are to be taken up by the Municipality of Mecca and the Ministry of Finance.
2. The remaining third of the shares is to be open to public subscription.
3. The price of these special shares (*i.e.*, the remaining third) is to be £3 each.
4. Those who wish to subscribe must make an immediate deposit of one-third of the value of each share—£1; this will entitle them to effective participation in the scheme.
5. The rest of the money due on the shares is not payable until the managing committee of the company has been formed, all details of administration, &c., settled, and effective measures taken to ensure a prosperous future for the company.
6. The managing committee is to be formed as soon as possible.
7. The managing committee is to be invested with the general control of the company and will watch over its interests and those of the shareholders.
8. Any proposals made by the shareholders concerning the future development of the company will be heard, and those that have the support of the majority of the shareholders will be adopted.

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The speech closed with an assurance that the Government will watch over the company and this, it was said, will necessarily ensure a golden future for it.

The issue of the "Umm-el-Qura" of the 7th February contained a long article recapitulating what was said at the meeting and dwelling at length on the divers benefits which would accrue to the country from the scheme. The greatest of these benefits would appear to be that the introduction of electricity would immediately cause a great reduction in the number of the various oil lamps and other lighting appliances which are at present imported into the country in great quantities, thus reducing the amount of money that leaves the country each year. The idea of reducing the amount of money which goes abroad annually is, in fact, very dear to the promoters of the scheme, and it is one of the main arguments they employ in endeavouring to enlist public support.

The next step was the holding of a meeting in the Jedda Municipality, presided over by the Governor, to which all the notables and rich merchants of the town were bidden. The Minister of Finance came down from Mecca for the purpose of attending.

A speech was read at this meeting in which Jedda citizens were urged to subscribe to the scheme, and were invited to follow the example of their colleagues in Mecca, who, it was stated, had made a splendid response to the call. A list was drawn up of the names of those who wished to subscribe.

It is stated that lists containing names of the shareholders will soon be published.

The general feeling about the scheme is that, if properly managed, it will be a success, but that the essential condition for this is European control in the engineering department. It is for this reason presumably that Bahra, which is outside the zone forbidden to non-Muslims, is suggested as the headquarters of the scheme.

Abdullah Suleiman, the Minister of Finance, who is, apparently, the moving spirit of the scheme, is considering also the engagement of a European as managing director to ensure the proper handling of the financial side of the concern; royal assent for this has, however, not yet been obtained.

The chief drawbacks to the scheme as at present contemplated are, firstly, that the proposed capital of £60,000 will not suffice to cover the cost of any effective scheme, and, secondly, that the people have no confidence in the honesty of the Government's intentions, and fear, for instance, that the Government will not pay for the power it uses. As the Government will probably be the largest consumer, this would be quite sufficient to wreck the scheme. The fate of the Saudieh Motor Company, a scheme which was launched in very similar circumstances, is fresh in the public memory.

The public is showing little enthusiasm in taking up the shares offered and is awaiting further developments before committing itself.

If the idea comes to anything, the towns of Mecca and Jedda are likely to consume an amount of current out of all proportion to their size. The population is by temperament and by custom inclined when they can to use a number of lights greatly in excess of normal requirements, and there would certainly be a strong popular demand for cheaper electricity if it became available.

[E 1431/1/91]

No. 101.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, March 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, March 18, 1930.

REFERENCE Jedda telegram No. 28 to the Foreign Office [non-payment by Hejazi Government of £10,000 advance compensation for loot].

I suggest that the matter should be mentioned to the Emir Feisal.

In this connexion political agent at Koweit reports that Ibn Saud's representative, who searched Koweit territory with the sheikh's men for refugees, informed him that he was satisfied that none remained there. Secondly, Ibn Saud has taken from rebel tribes and handed over to his own forces all camels recognised and claimed by them. Having satisfied his own people, he may reasonably be asked to fulfil his undertaking to Iraq and Koweit.

(Repeated to Jedda, Bagdad and Koweit.)

[E 1540/29/91]

No. 102.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 59.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 6, 1930.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 24 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to state that the Soviet Agent and Consul-General, Nazir Bey Turakouloff, presented his credentials as "Representative Plenipotentiary" to His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal on the 26th ultimo.

2. Translations of the speeches exchanged between Nazir Bey and His Royal Highness on the occasion are enclosed herein. They are of a very cordial tone.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 102.

Extract from the "Um-el-Qura" of February 28, 1930.

(Translation.)

THE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE U.S.S.R. PRESENTS HIS CREDENTIALS.

ON Wednesday evening last his Excellency Nazir Bey Tourakouloff, the Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the U.S.S.R., presented his credentials to His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, the Viceroy, according to the usual custom. We give below a report of Nazir Bey's speech and of His Royal Highness's speech in reply.

The Minister's Speech.

"Your Royal Highness,

"The Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. has entrusted me with a great honour and has placed upon my shoulders a task of much responsibility by appointing me as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to His Majesty Abdul Aziz bin-Abdurrahman-el-Faisal-el-Saud, the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

"As the sole aim of this appointment is to strengthen and confirm the friendly relations which fortunately exist between the two Governments, I, relying on these relations and the surprising kindness and courtesy extended to me by His Majesty, your Highness and the officials of His Majesty's Government ever since my arrival in this country, will spare no effort to confirm these ties, and I earnestly hope that in my new task I shall meet with the same friendliness and courtesy.

"In this confident hope I beg that your Royal Highness will be good enough to convey this expression of my feelings to His Majesty the King, and to offer my best wishes for His Majesty's constant prosperity as well as for that of the members of the Royal Family and for the well-being of the Kingdom of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies.

"In this connexion I beg that your Royal Highness will be good enough to convey to His Majesty the King and his noble people the greetings and the good wishes of the president of the Central Executive Committee. At the same time I have much pleasure in presenting to your Royal Highness my credentials, whereby I am appointed to my new post, with the request that your Royal Highness will be so good as to forward them to His Majesty with my sincere greetings, and graciously to accept my heartfelt respects."

His Royal Highness the Emir's Speech.

"Your Excellency,

"It affords me much happiness and pleasure to receive on behalf of His Majesty my Lord and King the credentials by which his Excellency the president of the Central Executive Committee of the Government of the U.S.S.R. has been good enough to entrust you with the post of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

"The noble sentiments you have been kind enough to manifest and the good wishes you have expressed are a sure indication that the desire for the continuation of the best of sincere and friendly relations and for the strengthening of all that supports these is a mutual one which both nations cherish equally.

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"I have no doubt that this new era which we usher in to-day in the relations between our countries will be a new and firm support in the building up of the friendship which exists between them.

"I am fully confident that you will receive from His Majesty the King every form of kindness and co-operation, which will facilitate for you the carrying out of the charge entrusted to you. You will also discover in me and in His Majesty's officials every true desire for co-operation with you in every subject that may further strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries.

"In this spirit I accept your credentials on behalf of my august parent, and I should be glad if you would be good enough to convey best greetings and good wishes to his Excellency the President of the Central Executive Committee and his noble people in the name of His Majesty the King and his people, and I wish you every success in your work."

[E 1541/1054/91]

No. 103.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 60.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 6, 1930.

AS instructed in your telegram No. 31 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum on slavery and the slave trade as practised in this country, including the measures adopted to suppress it.

2. I am indebted for much useful information on the subject to Commander F. Ratsey, R.N., senior naval officer of the Red Sea sloops, and to Munshi Ihsanullah, the Indian vice-consul attached to this Legation.

3. This memorandum should be read in conjunction with Mr. Bullard's note on slavery in the Hejaz forwarded to the Foreign Office under cover of his despatch No. 54 of the 9th June, 1924.

4. I am not making any distribution of this despatch and memorandum from this post.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 103.

Memorandum on Slavery and the Slave Traffic in the Kingdom of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

THE practice of slavery in the Hejaz and Nejd presents certain distinctive features peculiar to this country. The conditions in Arabia are very different from those prevailing in most, if not all, other countries where slavery exists. In approaching the subject and in trying to discover a remedy for the existing state of affairs, it is important to bear in mind from the start the moral and material considerations which govern the attitude of the people and of the King towards slavery, and the general attitude of the slaves themselves. It will then be easier to understand the difficulties which beset the problem of its abolition.

2. The Government of the country is a strong theocracy, and the Koranic law recognises slavery as an institution, although it attempts in many ways to limit its extent and to provide for the welfare of the slaves themselves. Thus, to free a slave is held to be an expiation for sins. The Prophet on his deathbed strongly urged his followers to adopt a tolerant attitude towards slaves and to practise the virtue of manumission. Moslems are adjured to give their slaves to eat what they eat themselves, and to give them to wear what they wear themselves. Charity, it is decreed, should be directed, among other things, towards the liberation of slaves. In short, while recognising slavery, Islam enjoins equitable, just and sympathetic treatment of slaves. It does not, however, countenance slavery as practised in Arabia to-day. It is worth emphasising the Koranic view because one is dealing with a people who claim to be puritans and with a ruler who owes his position to a fanatical assertion of this claim.

3. Although the present practice of slavery in Arabia in its divers forms admittedly goes far beyond and outside the limits of Koranic sanction and, in fact, flagrantly contravenes Sharia law, the treatment of slaves, so far as I have been able

to judge, is, taken all round, in conformity with the exhortations of the Koran. Socially, there is no stigma or degradation attached to their condition. They enjoy an equal social status with their masters. A slave, notwithstanding that he is a slave, may offer his prayers by the side of the King and may dine at the same table with the most respectable free man. He can transact business, buy and sell in his own name and of his own initiative. He can and does buy property in his own name, although such property is legally considered to belong to his master. A freed slave acquires on his manumission all the rights and privileges, moral and material, of citizenship. He can even marry a sheikh's daughter. A slave or his children can rise to the highest positions in the State. Islamic history is full of instances of rulers and luminaries of Islam who were originally slaves. To quote Lane-Poole: "While a brilliant ruler's son is apt to be a failure, the slaves of a real leader of men have often proved to be the equals of their master." One of the most prominent members of Jedda society and the most active and influential on committees, over which he sometimes presides, is a slave.

4. This attitude of the people towards their slaves is reflected in the attitude of the slaves themselves. There are many instances of slaves of character and intelligence occupying positions of authority, who would have no difficulty whatever in purchasing their own freedom or of obtaining it from their owners on request, but who take no steps to do so for the reason that they are entirely satisfied with their state and see no acquisition of dignity nor other advantage to be gained in effecting a nominal change in their status. There have been many cases, too, of slaves who have taken refuge at the British agency in the heat of the moment, but who have changed their minds and have returned to their masters. Cases also occur quite frequently of slaves who have been repatriated to the Sudan and Eritrea returning to the Hejaz in spite of the risk involved. Many cases can be cited of slaves who left for the Sudan with their owners during the general exodus in 1924 and 1925, at the time of the Hejaz war, and who, voluntarily, and with their eyes open, elected to return with their masters. This was probably true of the majority of cases. There are examples, too, of dhows manned by slaves, who trade on the African coast and return to their owners, after several months, with the profits earned. There are, daily, a number of slaves who pass in and out of the British Legation itself, coming either for medical treatment or on business, who are fully aware of the opportunities offered for manumission and repatriation, but have not the least desire to avail themselves of them. Some of these cases are obviously exceptional, but on the whole they may be taken as indicative of the attitude of the slaves in general.

5. If a distinction were to be drawn, the slaves in Arabia might be divided into those who were enslaved as children and have forgotten their people and country, and those who were enslaved later in life and retain a vivid memory of their homes and freedom. The former become more readily inured to their environment and conditions, not remembering anything better. As a rule they are not dissatisfied with their lot, and evince little or no desire to return to their countries of origin. Their aspirations, where the opportunity exists, centre on becoming free and being themselves slave-owners in the same way as they have seen come to pass in the case of other slaves; to their mind freedom, unless accompanied by assured conditions of life at least as good as those to which they are accustomed, would normally suggest very little improvement in their conditions. The latter class of slaves is the more to be pitied, and care is taken that no opportunity is given for them to escape and take refuge until eventually their desire for freedom is broken and they also become inured to the state of slavery. They are not brought to Jedda, but on disembarkation are despatched straight into the interior.

6. The evidence thus tends to show that in the towns at any rate, especially the big towns, where facts can be more easily ascertained, slaves are better off now than they have been in recent years, and that their conditions are a distinct improvement on those, for instance, of the Hashimite régime. Information about conditions in the interior is less readily available and more difficult to control, but the exigencies of life in the desert almost compel the Bedouins to treat a slave as one of themselves. That numerous cases of ill-treatment and cruelty exist, both in the towns and all over Arabia, is, however, undoubtedly true; this unfortunately is inherent in any system of slavery, and whatever may be done to ensure humane treatment generally, these cases will always exist so long as the institution itself is allowed to remain. The fact that slaves are on the whole well treated is all to the good, but it does not, of course, affect the issue.

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7. The average Hejazi, as has been said elsewhere, is by nature and opportunity a parasite; his view of slavery as it affects himself consists in a very lively appreciation of the material advantages of the institution and an equally strong disinclination to give it up. In the Hejaz and Nejd the most necessary and desirable of all possessions are slaves, male and female. On them depends the Arabs' comfort, enjoyment and indulgence, respect and dignity. They represent so much capital, and they are to Arab ideas the most paying form of investment. The desire to possess them is a ruling passion. The townsmen will sell their wives' ornaments and jewellery and the Bedouin their beasts of burden in order to possess a slave. A rich Arab would lose the respect of his fellow-townsmen if, for instance, he failed to give a female slave as dowry at his daughter's marriage. An Emir's dignity, influence and reputation, often his life, is dependent on the number and physique of his slaves. Slaves are the mainstays of the middle-class Arab townsman's household and the most trusted of his servants, whilst in the case of the poorer Arabs they often earn their master's or mistress's livelihood when the latter have no other means of support. They commonly act in this way like devoted members of the family and are treated as such. They are used in every sort of capacity from camelman to Commander-in-chief. They serve as water carriers, labourers, clerks, cashiers, managers, fishermen, masons, housekeepers and everything else. They are employed inside and outside the house. Skilled workers are hired out or ply a trade and bring their earnings to their owner. A female slave is at once a wife and servant to a master, who may not be able to afford to keep a regular wife. In fact, public opinion in Arabia is, as it always has been, strongly in favour of slavery, and, whilst it would probably be generally admitted by all educated Arabs that abuses have crept in, a suggestion that it is ethnically a vicious institution and should be abolished on that ground would scarcely be considered to merit serious consideration.

8. It may well seem a formidable task, therefore, for European Powers to attempt to bring home the crime itself and the degree of its iniquity to a people who, apart from any question of ethics, are distrustful of the West, and whose rise to a recognised place among the nations derived much of its motive power from an abomination of Western ideas and Western influences. Fortunately for the case against slavery, public opinion in the Hejaz and Nejd is not at present either coherent or powerful. It is the King who counts, and he himself, whatever his personal inclinations may be, is for reasons of policy, if for no other reasons, more likely to have regard for foreign opinion and to be influenced by it. He is, too, more accessible. It is therefore advisable to examine the King's attitude somewhat closely.

9. It may be asked why the Wahhabi ruler, declaredly puritan, has not taken steps to suppress the present-day abuses which he himself has admitted to be contrary to Koranic law. The answer is, I think, firstly, that the matter touches in a high degree his own comfort, prestige and influence; secondly, that he has never previously felt himself sufficiently strong to attack the deep-rooted social system of the country, and has considered that any attempt to do so would have no other result than a loss of authority if it did not bring the whole social fabric tumbling about his ears.

10. Independently of political considerations, I greatly doubt whether he himself favours the abolition of slavery. His private practices at any rate are at variance with his official declarations. These latter may be summarised as follows:—

11. On the 30th January, 1926, Mr. Jordan reported one of the several interviews on the subject which he had had with the King, in the course of which the latter had enquired whether, if he took the necessary measures to stop the importation of slaves on all sides of the territories under his control, His Majesty's Government would consent to cease giving refuge to slaves at the British agency.

12. The King stated then that, whilst recognising in principle the necessity of abolishing this practice, he could not at that time go beyond his offer without causing much trouble and possibly a revolution in the country; he hoped that eventually slavery, on account of the stoppage of importation, would die out and the necessity for more drastic measures be avoided. He assured Mr. Jordan of his ability to stop the importation of slaves, and offered to back his irade with a religious fetva obtained from the ulema of Mecca. At the close of the interview the King asserted that he was in principle opposed to slavery, and would do all in his power to eradicate the barbarous practice from his domains, but that it was necessary to go slowly and explore every possible channel in order to satisfy the people whilst assuring the liberty of all slaves. The King further promised to consult his ulema

and endeavour by persuasion to obtain from them religious arguments against the practice and so educate the people as quickly as possible to bring about the desired results. In reporting the above, Mr. Jordan expressed the opinion that the King sincerely wished his country to be acknowledged as a civilised Power, and to that end was prepared to make many sacrifices of and modifications in the established customs of the country.

13. There are two other expressions of opinion by the King, prior to the Jedda Treaty, which are perhaps worth recalling. Acting on instructions contained in Foreign Office despatch No. 48 of the 22nd April, 1926, Mr. Jordan made fresh representations to the King and informed him that the Secretary of State recognised that the abolition of slavery in a country where it had a traditional hold must be carried out by stages, the first of which should be the abolition of the slave trade and the prohibition of the importation of slaves into the Hejaz and Nejd. At the same time the King was informed that His Majesty's Government could not give up the right of manumission as had been requested. The King replied to the effect that it was not easy to abolish the slave trade for trifling reasons, that he could not accomplish this unless the right of manumission were given up and he were thus provided with good grounds for introducing measures of compulsion. Such measures, however, to be effective, would, he stated, have to be taken gradually. He regretted that he could not make any further concessions.

14. Again, in September 1926, at an interview with the acting British agent, the King stated that his policy was to see that slaves already in bondage were treated properly, and, meanwhile, he was prepared to discountenance fresh importations. It was impossible for him to forbid slavery.

15. I mention these declarations as, to a certain extent, they serve to illuminate the present situation, that is to say, the situation subsequent to the signature of the Treaty of Jedda, by which the King, in article 7, undertook to co-operate by all the means at his disposal with His Britannic Majesty in the suppression of the slave trade; also, they are worth bearing in mind in connexion with any fresh representations which may be made. It will be recalled here also that, in the course of the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Jedda, Ibn Saud made it clear that he would not agree to the inclusion in the treaty of a provision recognising the right of manumission by His Majesty's consular officers.

16. The effect given to article 7 of the Jedda Treaty again reflects the King's attitude. Of active co-operation there has been none. No action, legislative or administrative, has been taken, no moral pressure has been exercised, in fact, nothing whatever has been done to suppress or to discourage the slave trade; this may or may not be due to the fact that the King's mind and time have been fully occupied with other problems, and no one but himself could hope to attack a problem of its dimensions with any success. No steps, for instance, have been taken to abolish the customs duty on slaves of 20 per cent., payable *ad valorem* or in kind, at the ports of disembarkation. I believe that this is still imposed at the smaller ports down the coast. It is true that since the signature of the Treaty of Jedda the importation of slaves as a cargo through the port of Jedda has ceased. I imagine that the slave traders have received a hint from the authorities that this might be embarrassing to them. I do not think that there is any more creditable reason for it, as the trade, I am informed, goes on through other Hejaz ports with the connivance, if not with the active support, of the local sheikhs. In other respects also, owing, no doubt, to the Treaty of Jedda, no facilities are officially given to the slave trade, but slave dealing is carried on undisguised in the houses of the brokers in the towns, and by retail dealers in the interior. Slaves are not at present being sold in Arabia in public market in the ordinary sense of the word, but this is due not to any grace on the part of the local authorities but to the cessation of wholesale importation.

17. The King's practices and his private attitude towards slavery leave little ground for anticipating his wholehearted support, whatever action he may be induced to take for reasons of policy. The demands of the Royal household do not decrease, and, although some degree of secrecy may be observed in meeting them, it is well known that in 1928 a hundred slaves were sent from Asir and Lith overland to the palace at Riyadh. That this is regarded by the King as a normal proceeding may be judged by the fact that, on one occasion, when Munshi Ihsanullah was trying to impress upon him the illegality and cruelty of slavery as practised in his dominions, and drew his attention to cases of the importation of Takruni (West African) slaves and the enslavement of Takruni women and children on pilgrimage, he retorted by referring to the condition of his own slaves, and by saying that Takrunis were people

who lived like beasts, that they were much better off as slaves, and that if he had his way he would take all Takruni pilgrims as his slaves, raising them thus out of their depraved state and turning them into happy, prosperous and civilised beings.

18. The attitude of the King and of the people towards slavery indicates that the Hejaz and Nejd constitute essentially as keen a market for slaves as ever. There is no lessening of the desire to possess slaves. Thanks, however, in part to the fact that political considerations in Arabia are militating against the practice of keeping slaves, but in a greater measure to the fact that the supply is curtailed by preventive measures taken independently of Arabia, the numbers actually employed are falling off, and there are signs that economic laws are operating to reduce them still further. By political considerations, I refer to the regard which now has to be paid to foreign opinion, chiefly British public opinion, both in view of the closer relationship with other countries which is becoming necessary, but much more as a result of the signature of the Treaty of Jedda; the right of manumission may be included under this heading. The preventive measures referred to may be divided into those taken (1) in the countries of origin; these do not concern this memorandum; (2) *en route*, to prevent slave-traders reaching the African coast; and, particularly, (3) in the Red Sea. I will comment on (2) and (3) later.

19. The declaration of the King as embodied in the Treaty of Jedda was a great step forward. Although he has done nothing as yet to implement his undertaking—an undertaking given, be it noted, in exchange for material advantages to be gained, the very fact that he is committed to do so has introduced an element of insecurity into the ownership of slaves, and has made it a doubtful investment to buy them. Also, so far as the big centres of slavery—Jedda, Mecca, Taif, and even Medina—are concerned, the possibility that a slave can at any time achieve manumission without difficulty at the British Legation makes would-be purchasers hesitate to pay the prices which are demanded.

20. I have referred above, in connexion with the political considerations which militate against the practice of keeping slaves, to the exercise of the right of manumission. There are one or two aspects of the matter worth more particular mention.

21. Although the letters on the subject exchanged between the late Sir Gilbert Clayton and the King on the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda may be regarded as consecrating an existing right, which thus rests on firmer ground than previously, the position now is in one respect weaker. In article 1 of the Treaty of Jedda the complete and absolute independence of the King's dominions was recognised. In view of this stipulation, it appears to me to be more than doubtful whether, if the occasion arose, jurisdiction could now properly be claimed by the Legation over refugee Sudanese or Takruni slaves, even if there were no major political objections to claiming such a right. This leaves the door open for trouble if the local authorities desired to be obstructive. It is easy for the owner or for the Hejaz authorities themselves to accuse a slave of crime and to demand his trial and punishment; the Hejaz Government would, of course, claim jurisdiction. Accusations have, in fact, frequently been made in the past, but, so far, they have either been easily disproved, or else it has been possible to find a solution without raising questions of principle. Although in one case, in 1927, a slave accused of theft was temporarily and as a private arrangement handed over to the Hejaz authorities for trial under guarantees, matters were so arranged that the case was dismissed and the slave was brought back to the British agency. It might be no easy matter, however, in certain circumstances to insist on guarantees, and to protect a slave, if handed back to the Hejaz authorities for trial, from the barbarous penalties which are still sometimes enforced. It might even be difficult to get him back at all.

22. I have stated above that nothing positive has been done by the King so far to co-operate in the suppression of the slave trade. Nevertheless, it must, I think, be attributed in the main to his attitude, though it is a negative one, that no serious opposition, veiled or otherwise, on the part of the Government or of the local officials, except on one or two occasions when their own private interests have been affected, has obstructed the exercise of this right by the British Legation; it would have been an easy matter to create trouble. Credit for this is largely due to the Governor of Jedda, who is invariably helpful, and to Munshi Ihsanullah, the Indian vice-consul, who has always succeeded in carrying matters through without a hitch, and, even in the difficult cases when slaves have taken refuge at the Legation but have not wished to be repatriated, has by tact and persuasion managed to secure their manumission by their owners. I should also like to acknowledge here the assistance which has always been rendered by the commissioner at Port Sudan, and which has made the disposal of slaves an easy matter.

23. The exercise of the right of manumission, a fact which is thoroughly well known in Arabia, is, I think, a guarantee for the good treatment of slaves who live within reach of the British Legation as well as being a general preventive measure discouraging slave owning. The statistics of the manumission and of the repatriation of slaves by this Legation form, so to speak, a barometrical gauge of their treatment. One point which has struck me since I have been here is the very small number of slaves, comparatively speaking, who take refuge. The figures for the last four years are as follows: 16 female and 24 male in 1926, 4 female and 36 male in 1927, 12 female and 27 male in 1928, and 6 female and 15 male in 1929.

24. Mr. Bullard, in the note on slavery enclosed in his despatch No. 54 of the 9th June, 1925, also referred to cases where slaves, having been manumitted locally at the instance of the British or other foreign consuls, have been re-enslaved, and he suggested that provision should be made for the repatriation to Africa of every manumitted slave who wished to leave the Hejaz. The cases of manumission without repatriation are now somewhat rare, perhaps half a dozen in a year. When they do arise manumission is—and I think can only be—secured by means of persuasion. Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter only claims the right of manumitting those slaves who apply for manumission and repatriation. On the other hand, the local authorities could hardly withhold in such cases the co-operation promised by article 7 of the Treaty of Jedda, and it would, I think, usually be effective, although they might plead absence of legal authority to act if a private slave-owner proved recalcitrant. In cases of local manumission it is the present practice of this Legation to retain the certificate of manumission as a precaution against re-enslavement; a receipt is given to the slave and he or she is advised to inform this Legation of any further oppressive action taken by the former master. In point of fact, however, the number of local manumissions now being small, it has almost invariably been possible to keep in touch with the slaves' subsequent movements, and no case of re-enslavement is known to have occurred recently. As shown above, there has been no serious difficulty latterly over the repatriation of slaves who wish to leave the Hejaz.

25. Jedda and Mecca are more affected than other towns by the exercise of the right of manumission. One result of the inconvenience caused and the risks involved is that certain well-to-do Arabs in these towns are beginning to employ paid servants instead of slaves for menial tasks. There are several instances of this. The advantage gained is not alone a material one reckoned in diminished figures, but the fact that certain upper-class Arabs are deciding that a large household of slaves is no longer essential to support their dignity has another bearing also; it is important in that it serves to undermine such part of the present practices as rests on custom and tradition. The number of slaves in Jedda has, I am informed, perceptibly decreased in the course of the last few years. This is evidenced by the fact that several well-known traders have gone out of business and have adopted other means of gaining their livelihood.

26. I may mention that practically no slaves nowadays take refuge in other Legations or consulates in Jedda. In the very rare cases when this has happened within the last year or two, the slaves have, after *pourparlers*, been handed over to the British agency for manumission and repatriation. The foreign consulates would appear to be apprehensive of becoming embroiled with the Hejaz Government by taking action themselves. As Mr. Jordan had occasion to report in 1925, a fact which is even more true to-day, the foreign consuls, with the exception, now as then, of the Netherlands consul, take little or no interest whatever in the slave question. For the repatriation of Abyssinian slaves the Italian consul allows free passages on the Italian boats calling at Jedda and proceeding to Massowah, but will have nothing to do with them. They must be placed on board by a member of the staff of this Legation, and everything done to dissociate the Italian Government from any possible idea of being implicated in their release. This attitude is regrettable, but I do not think that in present circumstances the other foreign representatives concerned could be persuaded, or would be instructed, to do otherwise. From the point of view of bringing pressure to bear on the King, it would be of advantage if this were so, but in practice action on their part would seldom be called for and their co-operation would, therefore, in the ordinary course of events, have little practical effect in discouraging slave owning, and I do not think for a moment that their Governments would consider it worth while raising the issue. It might, perhaps, be difficult, in any case, for His Majesty's Government to ask these Governments to co-operate over manumission, as His Majesty's Government is bound separately by Sir Gilbert Clayton's letter to the King of the 19th May, 1927, which contemplates in certain eventualities the renunciation by them of the right of manumission.

27. The exercise of this right has undoubtedly been, and is, of great benefit, but its chief importance lies, I think, in its value as a bargaining asset in any negotiations which may take place for the legal abolition of slavery, and the right should not be abandoned, I feel sure, except, finally, if and when legislation to this end is passed and is rigorously enforced.

28. There is no means of estimating the number of slaves owned in the Hejaz and Nejd. In the towns the proportion of slaves to the total population is high, possibly even as high as 10 per cent. Prices vary. Those paid for young female slaves may be anything from £70 to as much as £200, while male slaves may fetch anything from £20 to £150, according to age, skill, general health and physique. These slaves are bought in Abyssinia by the slave dealers for a few pounds.

29. The average prices of slaves have risen in the course of the past few years, but the difference is not as marked as the increasing difficulties of importation might suggest. The comparative stability of prices is, I think, due to the fact that in many cases owners, for one reason or another, can no longer afford to buy and keep slaves as they used to do, and the demand has to this extent diminished. Moreover, so far as the Hejaz is concerned, the Government control of the pilgrimage and the heavy dues collected from the pilgrims leave the Hejazis meagre pickings, so much so that regular trade is also suffering.

30. Another factor affecting the demand for slaves in the Hejaz, in however small a degree, has been the introduction of motor cars into the country. The widespread adoption of this means of transport for pilgrims, encouraged as it is by the Hejaz Government owing to the larger dues recoverable, has struck a blow at the livelihood of the camelmen and camel owners, a not inconsiderable proportion of the Hejaz population. Among the latter figure the lesser sheikhs and a number of wealthy merchants who have been in the habit of employing slaves to manage their camel transport business. The demand for slaves for this purpose is thus disappearing.

31. Peaceful conditions and the security now prevailing also make it unnecessary for large bodies of slaves to be maintained for purposes of attack and defence.

32. It would be a mistake, however, to think that slave-trading within Arabia generally has decreased to an extent which would warrant any relaxation of the measures adopted to prevent the importation of slaves. I have referred to these measures above, but before going on to consider them in detail it may be useful to review the sources of supply and the methods of the slave traders.

33. The demand for slaves is met, to the extent that it can be met: (1) by the organised capture and importation of slaves from Africa, the great majority coming from Abyssinia; (2) by the opportunities afforded by the pilgrimage; and (3) by the purchase of slaves from the Yemen and the enslavement of Yemenis. As Mr. Bullard has shown, this last forms a problem by itself. Its solution is, I fear, outside the bounds of practical politics as conditions are at present, and can only follow from a solution of the major problem of putting a stop to slavery in Arabia generally. It is not included within the scope of this memorandum.

34. Such evidence as it has been possible to obtain during the past few years has gone to show that by far the largest proportion of the slaves imported from Africa are transported to the coast through French Somaliland and Eritrea, chiefly the former, and are shipped from Tajura or from other ports or points in those territories. The transport of slaves through the Sudan is, I understand, now effectively stopped as a result of legislation and of administrative action taken. It would appear that the slave dhows either cross the Red Sea at the Straits of Bab-el-Handeb during the night and land their cargoes on the opposite coast—the more usual procedure—or that they work northwards along the Yemen coast up to the comparative protection of the reef area north of Kamaran, or else that they proceed northwards along the Eritrean coast, putting in during the day wherever convenient, waiting for a favourable opportunity to cross into the reef area and land their cargoes on the Arabian coast. In this connexion I note the opinion of the commander of H.M.S. "Dahlia" that very few slaves are carried across the Red Sea in the summer, as contrary or deficient winds make the passage too dangerous. It is more than probable that slaves are also landed on the Southern Arabian coast anywhere between Perim and Mokalla.

35. An important, if not the chief, distributing centre on the Arabian coast is Medi, where, I am informed, there are vested interests. From Medi slaves are shipped in small dhows to other ports along the coast north and south. I believe

that arrangements exist at all ports of any size for their reception and disposal. The choice of the Arabian port of disembarkation would no doubt in many cases depend on the circumstances existing at the time, particularly on the whereabouts of the sloops if known; but in most cases, I think, arrangements are made beforehand with specific agents.

36. One improvement that it is generally agreed may be written down to the credit of the last few years, thanks to the vigilance of His Majesty's sloops, and perhaps equally to the prestige which they enjoy, is the fact that the wholesale traffic is moribund as an organised business, if it has not disappeared altogether. It is not, under present conditions, worth the risk attempting to ship large cargoes across the Red Sea, just as it has also become more difficult to transport them down to the African coast. The armed expeditions by sea also which used to be fitted out for the purpose of raiding towns and villages on the western coast of the Red Sea are no longer practicable. The traffic has become retail and more difficult to carry on in consequence. This has without doubt considerably lessened the volume of the trade from Africa, and although there have been no actual captures since 1924, this fact alone justifies and is a testimonial to the work of the sloops.

37. The retail traffic is extremely difficult to suppress either on land or on sea. It is equally difficult to gauge its dimensions; estimates vary from 300 or 400 to over 1,000 slaves, principally children and adolescent girls, imported into Arabia annually. The measures taken in French Somaliland are, for whatever reason, generally admitted, I believe, except by the French officials responsible, to have been singularly ineffective in checking the trade. The Italian land patrol in Eritrea is, I understand, more earnestly carried out, and slave-traders find it more difficult to transport slaves to the coast through Eritrean territory than through French Somaliland. In both cases, however, I greatly doubt whether the local officials have adequate means at their disposal to enable them, even with the best will in the world, to cope with the problem successfully. All things considered, I think that, whatever part may have been played by the French and Italians in the past or is played at present, their co-operation by action on the African mainland may for practical purposes be discounted in considering further possible steps for checking the retail traffic, and that the only way to reduce it still further, in the absence of measures taken by the Hejaz Government itself, or, in addition, to measures which may yet be taken by it, is to concentrate on improving the patrol by sea.

38. The patrolling of the Red Sea is, in theory, the duty of the French, Italian and British Governments. According to this theory, the French patrol a small portion of the coastline opposite Perim and the French Somali coast outside, and the Italians patrol the Eritrean coast, while the duty of patrolling all other coasts, as well as the Red Sea proper, devolves upon the British Government. In practice the French and Italian patrol appears to be of the most superficial nature. There is no French ship patrolling the Red Sea or stationed at a French Somaliland port, and the only semblance of a sea patrol by the French is the spasmodic appearance of a French sloop which is attached to a Mediterranean base and despatched on a cruise in the Red Sea twice a year. The Italians maintain a sloop at Massowah, but I understand that it is used more for surveying work than for patrolling, and, in any case, its prolonged sojourns in port would render entirely nugatory any pretence it may have of catching slave-runners.

39. The British patrol is carried out by two sloops, at present H.M.S. "Clematis" and H.M.S. "Dahlia." Actually, as a general rule, only one sloop is engaged at a time, the other refitting in the meanwhile at Malta. The whole of the Red Sea from Akaba to Perim is patrolled, a few visits being paid to Aden and an occasional cruise being undertaken further east along the southern coast of Arabia.

40. It is obvious, therefore, in the nature of things that the preventive measures at present in force, whatever results they may have and however valuable they may be as a deterrent, must fall far short of achieving the object in view, if this object is to prevent slave-trading in the Red Sea altogether or to reduce it to such small proportions as would effectively discourage the demand for slaves. It is too easy to ship small numbers of slaves across, five or six at a time, possibly more. These slaves may be carried with other cargo and figure as part of the crew, or, in the case of children, as part of the family of the dhowman or as apprentices. The case may or may not be genuine. Their presence on board is not in itself a cause for suspicion. Dhows have been known to carry forty men and thirty apprentices and to have proved innocent. If the children carried are black, as opposed to brown, there is rather more ground for suspicion, but that is all. Outside the pilgrimage season

there is nothing so far as I know to prevent dhows from carrying passengers. In consequence, as the commanding officer of H.M.S. "Dahlia" has pointed out, no significance is necessarily to be attached to any arrangements for carrying a large number of persons. Dhows' papers are notoriously loosely drawn up, if carried at all, and it is as a rule impossible to obtain evidence, particularly from children, such as would justify the seizure and detention of a dhow, or would warrant its being towed long distances to the port of adjudication, Aden. I feel bound to express the opinion here, and I think that the Commissioner at Port Sudan would agree with me that, in spite of the assurances given by the Italian Government, dhows are still leaving Massowah with pilgrims. The control of the dhow traffic is therefore rendered so much the more difficult.

41. The work of the sloops is handicapped by the comparative ease with which dhows can ply within the reef area north of Kamaran, which covers over 10,000 square miles, and in the many other waters where navigation is impeded by reefs. The commander of H.M.S. "Dahlia" states in a report of his that no ships can approach the Arabian coast in the Red Sea, even in daylight, except at a few well charted places, and that no ships can approach it with safety at any point after dark. One route only through the reef area north of Kamaran is known to be adequately charted and passable for sloops, and that one only by daylight. Whatever the odds normally in favour of the dhows may be, these are enormously increased once they reach the reef areas, where the slave-runner can manoeuvre more freely, and if he hugs the mainland can lie concealed in the inlets or run his dhow ashore and escape into the security of the desert on sighting a ship.

42. Another thing that detracts from the effectiveness of the patrol is the impossibility, as things are at present, of obtaining reliable advance information about the movements of slave dhows. No organised intelligence service exists, at any rate on the Arabian side, through which such information might be obtained. I gather that a somewhat ambitious proposal for something of this nature was rejected in 1928 on the ground chiefly of expense. Personally, I find it well-nigh impossible, without something more elaborate in the way of an intelligence service than I have at present, to obtain any reliable information which would be of practical assistance in leading to the capture of slave dhows. Add to this the fact, which is, I think, established, that good workable arrangements exist by which slave traders are apprised of the movements, and on occasion also of the intended movements of the sloops, and it may well be conjectured how it has been possible to achieve any results at all.

43. There is another difficulty which I would like to mention, although it has already received consideration. It arises over the question of the sanctity of territorial waters. According to present arrangements His Majesty's sloops are debarred from operating in the territorial waters of French Somaliland and Eritrea. This embargo is a very real one, and experience has shown that any departure from the punctilious observance of international custom in this respect at once evokes a strong protest. I have already drawn attention to the illusory nature of the French and Italian patrol of these waters. I do not think that it can be disputed that slave dhows are practically free to sail northwards along the African coast without interference until they choose their time for crossing. This is doubtless known to the slave traders.

44. So far, I believe, no serious difficulties have arisen with the Hejaz or other authorities over the question of the right of search of Arabian dhows whether on the high seas or in territorial waters; as regards these latter, it is questionable what are territorial waters in the Red Sea, whether, that is to say, reef and island areas are included. Some difficulty arose in the early part of last year over the right of the British sloops to call at Hejazi ports without obtaining previous permission, notification of the expected visit alone having been given in the past. For a period of the year it was considered advisable that the sloops should abstain from calling, but the question is momentarily dormant. All these matters may require formal settlement with the Hejaz Government at any time, but a discussion of them does not fall within the scope of this memorandum. Nevertheless, I should like to record my opinion that, setting aside the question of the French and Italian territorial waters to which I have referred above, the exercise by the sloops of the right of search in the Red Sea of dhows of all nationalities, whether on the high seas or in territorial waters, is an essential factor in the suppression of the slave trade. To abandon it would be to render the patrol entirely ineffective. It would be fatal, in my opinion, to yield to a possible request of the Hejaz Government to do so, a request which incidentally would raise the question of the treatment of all Arabian dhows

alike in this respect, as, failing similar treatment, all dhows engaged in slave running would simply transfer to the Hejaz flag.

45. In connexion with the right of search, it is interesting to note that during the last fourteen months out of 116 dhows examined only six were definitely proved to be of Hejaz nationality, although another eight or nine were possibly Hejazi also. Proof of nationality is, however, difficult to obtain, and dhows often carry a selection of flags for use as occasion may suggest. As the commander of H.M.S. "Dahlia" has reported, Arabian-owned dhows seldom fly flags of any sealed pattern. Red is the predominant colour, with white edges, crescent, daggers or stars added to taste; but a purple chequered loin-cloth will serve just as well.

46. It is clear that the Red Sea patrol labours under considerable difficulties. On the other hand, it is not easy to see how matters can be improved to any appreciable extent without incurring further expenditure, expenditure of a somewhat speculative nature, which might not easily be justified beforehand. I venture, however, to put forward the following suggestions; where expenditure is involved it is not, I think, likely to be excessive, having regard to the objects in view:

(1) In order to make it easier to establish the innocence or otherwise of a suspect dhow, inspected or searched at sea, rigorous control and surveillance of dhow traffic should be exercised at the ports of departure on the African coast. This would involve the enforcement by international agreement of regulations regarding the possession of papers properly drawn up and recently endorsed. I would attach special importance to the careful registration of any children or young women carried, and to the entry on the dhow's papers of full particulars regarding all persons on board.

There are, no doubt, many ways in which a control of this sort could be circumvented. In many ways, admittedly, it would not be effective. I feel sure, however, that the present irregularities operate greatly in favour of slave running, and that to penalise the absence of proper papers, or irregularities in them, would go some way towards improving matters. Any improvement here would be all to the good. I do not know whether there would be insurmountable difficulties in enforcing such regulations on Arabian-owned dhows, but I imagine that pressure could be put on them by administrative means when they enter African ports.

The point is also worth considering, I think, in connexion with a possible question over the right of search of Hejazi dhows, to which I have referred above.

(2) It is most desirable, in connexion with the work of the sloops, as also it is necessary in order to make any control of the West African pilgrimage effective, that steps should be taken to ensure that the Italian authorities in Eritrea scrupulously carry out the undertakings given to prevent pilgrims crossing from Eritrea to the Hejaz in dhows.

(3) I have commented on the extensive protection afforded to slave dhows by the reef area north of Kamaran, which covers Medi. It seems to me that, in addition to the regular patrol of the sloops, some form of localised patrol is required, and I would suggest that some small craft of shallow draught, perhaps one or, better, two boats in the nature of the size of the motor launches used in the war might be based at Kamaran for the purpose of cruising inside the reef area. I am assuming that there would be no political objections to Kamaran being used as a base in this way, or, if so, that they could be overcome. It appears to me also that seaplanes based on Kamaran, if this is feasible, could also play a useful part. The question of having a local patrol based on Kamaran may be considered also in connexion with the following suggestion:

(4) Although, as I gather, an elaborate scheme for obtaining advance intelligence of dhows' movements may be impracticable for various reasons, I think that something might be done towards this end by the employment of one or two agents. There are, of course, certain obvious difficulties about this. Trustworthy and reliable agents would be hard to find; also, if available, local agents would only be useful in places where ready means exist of communicating with British political officers or with the patrol. If a local patrol were based at Kamaran it should not, I imagine, be impossible to establish contact with Medi and obtain advance information from there. An essential condition for the success of this or, for that matter, of any such scheme involving obtaining intelligence from natives would be the payment of large prizes for information leading to a conviction.

I have not explored the possibility of obtaining reliable local information from other ports, ports, that is, which are in communication with Jedda. It would, I imagine, be largely a question of expense. It might not be impossible, but, on the

other hand, I consider that there are strong political objections in attempting to do so which would outweigh the problematical advantage to be gained.

(5) I presume that the question of having a localised patrol based on Perim, similar to that suggested above, limited to patrolling the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and operating, perhaps, as far as Aden, has already been considered. The effectiveness of such a patrol would, of course, depend largely on the facilities for obtaining advance information rapidly from the coastal tribes within range, and being able to use it.

(6) It would be useful, I think, if more frequent visits were paid along the Southern Arabian coast, as far, perhaps, as Mokalla.

(7) It is not within my province or competence to discuss the existing equipment of the sloops themselves, but it is important, also, apart from the question of localised patrols, that the most suitable type of motor boat, as indicated by the experience of the past few years, should be carried for examining the inlets where the sloop itself cannot proceed.

(8) The idea of using armed dhows in the same way as "mystery ships" was mooted in 1926. His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa suggested then that, whilst being less conspicuous, they might be more numerous and possibly better adapted for keeping a close watch on the movements of other dhows. This suggestion was rejected by the Admiralty, the reason given being that their employment off the Somaliland coast to suppress arms traffic had proved a failure owing to the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently fast craft and expert crews, and to the fact that their identity became known to those engaged in the illicit traffic; moreover, it was found that such service had a demoralising effect on the crews. If, as I believe, this proposal contemplated manning dhows with a naval crew, I think, too, that an attempt to employ them against slave dhows would not be more successful. The manning of dhows with native crews, however—again with the large prize as a bait—might, I think, give good results, particularly if these dhows worked in conjunction with a local patrol.

(9) Every possible precaution should be taken to ensure that the sloops' movements, intended calls at and departures from ports, should be kept secret (*vide* in this connexion Admiralty letter to the Under-Secretary of State dated the 3rd July, 1924).

(10) The idea of coming to an agreement with the French and Italian Governments with the object of throwing open the territorial waters reciprocally to the patrols of all three Powers was considered in 1928 as part of a wider scheme for co-operation in the suppression of the slave trade, a scheme which envisaged, among other things, patrol by air. This project was dropped as a result of misgivings entertained by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, and so far as I know it has not since been pursued.

In his despatch to the Foreign Office No. 279 of the 3rd December, 1928, His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa suggested that one of the proposals made, namely, that British and French territorial waters should be opened to the patrols of both Powers, might be less open to objection than the others. He went on to say that, on the assumption that there were no Admiralty objection to allowing specified foreign vessels of war to enter British territorial waters for the particular purpose in question, and for that only, he was inclined to think that an agreement to that end between His Majesty's Government and the French and Italian Governments (for Italian waters would certainly have to be included) would be useful. He saw no reason why, if negotiations were confined to this particular point without raising the more difficult and contentious problems involved in air patrol, it should not be possible of attainment. He therefore suggested that this matter might be taken up with the French and Italian Governments. An all-round waiver of the sanctity of territorial waters could, in the opinion of the British officers engaged on the patrol, make the business of the slave dhows more difficult, even if it did not lead to actual capture.

I should like to associate myself with that view. It is important that the British sloops should be at liberty to inspect a dhow and examine her papers, if any, whenever this appears expedient and whenever the dhow is found; it would also greatly help matters, of course, if they could take further action against a suspicious dhow, if only by towing her into the nearest port of her nationality to be further dealt with there. If triangular agreement with the French and Italians proved impracticable, perhaps it would be possible to come to an agreement with one or other country separately.

(11) Failing any more definite agreement as suggested in the foregoing paragraph it would be useful if, at least, the three Powers concerned came to an informal understanding not to insist meticulously on the punctilious observance of international rights, and if instructions were sent accordingly to local officers.

(12) I fear, in the light of past experience, that it would be useless to expect from local French and Italian authorities their whole-hearted and active support for any co-ordinated effort to suppress slavery; it might, however, serve to stimulate local individual effort if an agreement were made to exchange regularly information regarding numbers of dhows searched and other specific action taken, and if a procedure were evolved for doing so both locally and by the Governments.

47. In putting forward suggestions with regard to the naval patrol, I speak without technical knowledge, and there may be technical or service objections which escape me. I am also for the most part unaware to what extent the present proposals may have already been considered. I do not in any case wish to imply that their adoption would put a stop to the slave trade in the Red Sea altogether. I do think, however, that they would go a long way towards increasing the effectiveness of the patrol at a reasonable cost. I think, too, that any additional measures taken would have a large moral effect in discouraging slave-running, and that due consideration should be given to this fact in estimating the cost.

48. The second means to which I have alluded, whereby the demand for slaves is met, is by the opportunities offered by the pilgrimage.

49. Mr. Bullard, in his note on slavery, has quoted examples of the ways in which young people and others are brought or come to the Hejaz on pilgrimage and are sold into slavery. The position, except so far as security on the road is concerned, is much the same now as then, although a tightening up of the control of the Malay and Javanese pilgrimage makes it more difficult in some respects to import slaves from those parts, and, so far as Africans are concerned, some pressure which it has been found possible to bring to bear on the Sudanese and Takruni sheikhs has also had good results. I am informed that a small number of young girls from Malay, Java and the Far East, mostly of Chinese origin, are brought on pilgrimage annually under the guise of wives, children or servants of pilgrims and are sold in the Hejaz. It is, however, again impossible to estimate numbers or entirely to stop the practice. A strict control in Malaya and Java, including a searching police investigation of the circumstances in which pilgrims are proposing to undertake the pilgrimage, is, I think, the most effective method of keeping this traffic down.

50. The number of Africans who are sold into slavery while on pilgrimage is equally impossible to calculate, but I am inclined to think that these cases also are not numerous. Were it otherwise, the fact would have come to the knowledge of this Legation. As it is, only one or two cases have been reported in the last two or three years. The trouble is, however, that very little control can be exercised at present over the African pilgrimage, which is in the hands of the local sheikhs, and that these sheikhs, both in Jedda and elsewhere in the Hejaz, as Mr. Bullard has pointed out, take an active part in the slave trade when they can and share in the profits. Appointed by the local Government, they are, taken all round, an unprincipled and rapacious band of rogues who grovel to authority and, to protect themselves against summary dismissal, are commonly believed to assist the junior executive officials of the Hejaz Government financially and to work hand in hand with them to the detriment of the pilgrims' interests. The African pilgrims are entirely at their mercy, and, as stated, there are a number of ways in which the pilgrims are hoodwinked and sold into slavery.

51. From time to time reports of these sales are received from West Africans resident in this country. The particulars given are always vague and detection is practically impossible. In many, if not in most cases, the informant has an axe to grind or wishes to get an enemy into trouble. In no case has it been possible to obtain definite proof of guilt or even good evidence.

52. I am convinced myself that the plight of these African pilgrims has in only one respect been really improved during the Saudian régime as a result of action taken by the Hejaz authorities, namely, in the protection now afforded against brigandage and kidnapping along the road. These practices have now ceased, and the pilgrims can proceed on their way in complete security.

53. As things are at present I see no means of effectually stopping these sales altogether, but an elaborate system of control of the West African pilgrimage on the lines suggested last year would greatly help towards doing so. The application of such a scheme, in addition to introducing a closer passport control and certain

other safeguards, such as the canalising of the whole of the African pilgrimage through Jedda, would also enable this Legation to exercise a stricter control over the Takruni sheikhs than is possible at present.

54. Given the necessary funds it should not be impossible to institute a simple system of intelligence to furnish information as to sales and other malpractices. The appointment of a paid agent in each of the towns of Jedda, Mecca and Medina would probably produce results, but so long as slavery as an institution remains and the present practices are condoned by the King, and African slaves continue to be sought after, it would be a waste of time, I think, to attempt to induce the local authorities to take severe action against offenders—action that is of a nature to discourage the practice itself—although possibly in the isolated cases that might be brought to their notice the authorities might make some sort of pretence of doing so as a sop to British representations.

55. There are one or two other points in Mr. Bullard's note on which I should like to comment. He suggests that some restriction should be enforced on the taking of children or young persons on the pilgrimage. This would also mean that women could not accompany their husbands. Such restriction would certainly serve its purpose, but it would materially affect the volume of the pilgrimage, and the countries responsible for doing so would have to face an outcry in the Hejaz. As Mr. Bullard states, few Far Eastern pilgrims come to the Hejaz for less than four or five months; many of these stay for a second pilgrimage or even for several years, and many of them bring their children with them. In the case of Africans, it is the rule rather than otherwise for pilgrims to be accompanied by their women and children, and they are often accompanied by other young persons too. An attempt to impose such restrictions would in all probability also meet with considerable opposition from the pilgrims themselves and from their communities, and might be represented as unwarrantable interference in religious matters.

56. The threat alone to introduce regulations of this sort might, however, be useful as a means of coercion, and, if it were possible by a method for instance such as I have suggested above to obtain good evidence of cases of sales, it might serve to compel the King to take really effective measures to stop them. Action on these lines would, however, be much more effective if Dutch co-operation were secured in respect of the Javanese pilgrims.

57. As regards Mr. Bullard's proposal that there should be in the Sudan an institution—under the control, perhaps, of some anti-slavery society or some missionary organisation—to which slaves would be sent as a matter of course, I think that such an institution might serve to attract a number of local slaves who might otherwise remain in slavery, having misgivings about taking refuge owing to the uncertainty of their future. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether its creation would appreciably affect the numbers of slaves who take refuge and do so for the most part on account of bad treatment or for fear of it. It would certainly be a good advertisement of manumission though, and within limits would do good. Its utility would, however, be greatly enhanced if it gave an assurance of employment and a secure future in reasonably good conditions.

58. The only radical solution of the whole question, however, lies with the King and with the King only. Unless he himself cuts out the demand for slaves, the supply will continue somehow. The various suggestions and recommendations made, if adopted, would do little more than disturb the surface of the problem a little more than at present without going deep. They affect the subject externally when drastic internal treatment is required. It may be inferred from the King's attitude in the past that, if he had his own way, he would prefer to leave matters as they are. The extension of his kingdom and the growth of his power has, however, brought him into more direct and closer contact with foreign countries who condemn the practice of slavery, and, whatever may have been his attitude in the past, he has to look to the future, and he has everything to gain by conciliating foreign opinion. It remains to be considered how to make that opinion felt and what is the best line of approach.

59. It would appear from the King's attitude during the recent negotiations that, apart from any feelings of gratitude which he may entertain for the assistance received, he has come to realise that His Majesty's Government's active sympathy and co-operation are factors on which he will have to rely to consolidate his kingdom and carry out a progressive policy. That he does not intend to rest on his laurels, but intends to inaugurate reforms, is clear from many statements which he and his Ministers have been making and from the tone of letters which he has sent to individuals in Mecca and Jedda since the re-establishment of peace.

60. There may be a good opportunity, when the King returns and the first chorus of popular adulation has subsided, for the newly-appointed British Minister to make a fresh demand for full, that is to say, active co-operation as understood by the treaty. The King, the declared Moslem reformer, is likely to be particularly susceptible to comparisons between the present state of affairs in the Hejaz and Nejd and those prevailing under the more enlightened régime in Iraq under King Faisal. It is not outside the bounds of possibility, too, that he might envisage the admission of the kingdom to the League of Nations.

61. It is, however, impossible to forecast his attitude with any certainty. The enforcement of measures for the immediate abolition of slavery would entail a major operation which the King may perhaps hesitate to undertake, insisting still, if he agreed in principle at all, that the process should be a gradual one. In that case there are several measures, short of the ideal of making the ownership of slaves and slave dealing punishable at law, which might well be recommended for adoption. Those, for instance, which were recommended in the case of Abyssinia would be applicable in the main to Arabia also. The most important, here as there, as in the case also of the Cyprus Involuntary Servitude Declaration Law of 1879, would be to make the state of slavery no longer recognised by law and thus to grant permissive freedom to slaves without making it a criminal offence to keep them with their own consent. The suggestion also that slaves should be registered, those not having been registered by a certain date to be liberated, has also much to recommend it. These are, however, also drastic measures which again might prove unacceptable, and there would be more chance for success, perhaps, in concentrating first on the abolition of practices which have no Koranic sanction, such as the importation of human beings for the purpose of slavery and the buying and selling of pilgrims. In any case conditions promise, I think, to be more favourable than they have been since the King's accession for strong representations and for an attempt to secure the abolition of slavery or, at any rate, the adoption of measures which may seriously discourage the demand for slaves. If action were taken in concert with other countries, this would be all to the good, but the predominant instrument in any chorus of protestation should most certainly be the British drum.

[E 1658/1054/91]

No. 104.

Memorandum concerning the existence of Slavery and Slave Trading along the Eastern and South-Eastern Coasts of Arabia.

THE position in so far as slavery in Red Sea coastal countries is concerned is discussed fully in the despatch of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, No. 60 of the 6th March. The conditions of slavery in the coastal area from Aden to Koweit differ somewhat from those on the Red Sea coast of Arabia, owing to the existence of the date-growing and pearl-fishing industries. As explained in Mr. Bond's memorandum, the lot of the domestic slave compares very favourably with the existence of the average free man of tribal Arabia. Of the two, the slave is perhaps the more certain of securing the absolute necessities of life. The conditions of life of slaves working in the date gardens of Oman or employed in the pearl fishing industry of the Persian Gulf approximate to the European conception of slavery as it existed in the American and West Indian plantations of the 18th century. The status of slavery is recognised in the Koran, and slavery has existed in Arabia for centuries, the slave population being maintained not so much by the importation of fresh slaves from abroad, as by the practice of slave-owners providing wives for their slaves, their offspring being brought up to know no condition other than slavery. To expect Arabia to abandon slavery otherwise than as the result of a very gradual process of education would be futile. To attempt to secure its abolition by wide measures of coercion would be useless. From time to time it is possible for a British political agent or for His Majesty's Legation at Jedda to arrange for the manumission of a slave, but this practice cannot appreciably affect the main situation.

Suppression of Slave Trading.

To eliminate the existing slavery throughout Arabia is one problem, to stop the further importation of slaves into Arabia is another.

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Position under Treaty Arrangements.

Bahrein, the Trucial sheikhdoms and Muscat have formal engagements with His Majesty's Government binding them to abstain from and to suppress slave trading within their territories, and empowering His Majesty's Government to search their vessels on their behalf not only on the high seas but in their own territorial waters. There is no formal engagement with the Sheikh of Koweit, but the degree of control exercised by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India may be held to form an effective check on slave trading in his territory. Unfortunately, however, the rulers of these territories are not always really desirous, or, being desirous, in a position, to respond to their treaty obligations, the Sheikh of Dubai and the Sultan of Muscat being perhaps the worst delinquents.

Sources of Supply.

There are two traditional sources of supply: (a) Zanzibar and the east coast of Africa; (b) the coastal region of Persian Baluchistan known as the Mekran. To these may be added of late years a third, (c) interior Oman, but its function has been more that of an entrepôt than of a natural source of supply.

(a) The African and Zanzibar trade, as shown in Mr. Bond's memorandum, has dwindled not only because of the effect of punitive measures against slave carriers, but also because the birth-rate among slaves imported into Arabia in earlier times has sufficed to maintain the supply in a market which tends to diminish.

(b) The Mekran coast. From the fact that about 50 per cent. of the natives of such places as Matrah and Debai are Mekrani, it may reasonably be inferred that slave trading with the Mekran has been carried on for years. A certain Birkhat Khan is said to be the person chiefly engaged in the traffic, but the Persian Government have hitherto been unable, or unready, to take effective action against him.

(c) Owing to drought resulting in the failure of the date gardens, and a consequent incapacity to support its population, interior Oman has of late years been disposing of its slaves to the Trucial Coast and to the Batinah.

Is there positive Proof that fresh Slaves are still being imported into Arabia, and what Measures of Control are being, or can be, taken to impede such Traffic?

In July 1928 information was received that a dhow was carrying slaves from Bunji to the Oman coast, but His Majesty's navy did not succeed in intercepting it. In December 1928 the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf informed the senior naval officer of the Persian Gulf that a slave dhow and slaves had been seized at Debai. H.M.S. "Lupin" proceeded to Debai, where, acting in conjunction with the political agent at Shargah and with the approval of the Political Resident, the three local sheikhs, Said of Debai and Sheikhs Juma and Haskir, were invited aboard H.M.S. "Lupin," and their responsibility for assisting His Majesty's Government to suppress the slave trade was impressed upon them. Subsequently, the dhow was burned. At the time of capture it carried ten slaves, but six of them, with the owner of the dhow, escaped into the interior.

On the 12th July, 1928, the senior naval officer, interpreter, assuming the rôle of a well-to-do Arab stranger, asked the master of a dhow where he could buy a concubine. From subsequent conversation it emerged that a certain Birkhat Khan, referred to above, exported slaves from the Mekran, shipping them one or two at a time to the Arab coast, and that he always had a few available. The nakhoda (dhow master) offered to arrange all the details of the transaction.

When at Shargah, in July 1929, the senior naval officer was stopped by a Baluchi woman, who complained of the kidnapping of her three boy children, and later on the same day he saw at the house of the residency agent three Baluchi men who had been kidnapped on the Mekran coast and had been liberated by the residency agent. These men were subsequently repatriated to Bandar Abbas.

From the evidence accumulated during his visits, the senior naval officer was convinced that slave trading from the Mekran coast existed, that there was some traffic from Africa and some kidnapping in the Arab villages of free-born Baluchis.

Measures of Control.

As shown above, Persian Baluchistan and the Mekran coast are the principal sources of supply of slaves imported into the north-east parts of Arabia. The Persian Majlis recently abolished slavery throughout Persia by ordinance, but in the districts in question the Shah's writ does not run, and the ordinance is disregarded with impunity. The tribal chiefs in these districts obtain their supplies of slaves partly by kidnapping, partly by accepting the children of their debtors in part payment of their debts, and partly by working on the credulity of the Baluchis, whose intellectual standard is extremely low, telling them that they can go as "free men" to Arabia, where they will earn high wages. The slaves from the Mekran coast are landed chiefly in the territory of the Sultan of Muscat or in the territories of the Trucial sheikhs. Both His Highness and the sheikhs are bound by anti-slavery treaties, but they, themselves, all own slaves, and a violent death would probably be the result of an attempt on their part to enforce on their subjects and dependents their anti-slavery engagements. The residency agent at Shargah, Khan Bahadur Isa Latif, O.B.E., does manage to secure the release of a few slaves, perhaps a dozen, each year, but any really active interference on his part would most likely result in his being murdered. As it is, he carries his life in his hands, and it is certain that no British officer could live on the Trucial Coast without strong military support.

In considering measures of control it should be remembered that, owing to the strict watch kept by His Majesty's navy, the trade is no longer carried on as it used to be with big dhows bringing large numbers of slaves from Africa, but is confined to small dhows which carry from time to time, among other passengers, two or three persons who, while actually slaves, may or may not realise their condition, or who, realising it, may possibly not admit it for fear of punishment should they, as might easily happen, be enslaved again. A few slaves may be brought in the large dhows which arrive mostly at Sur (Sohar) during each monsoon, but these dhows are so large that one or two human beings could easily be hidden on board without fear of discovery by a search party at sea. At present the whole burden of control of slave trading on the Arabian coast is borne by His Majesty's Government, and it is open to doubt whether much assistance would be derived from the co-operation of other Powers, except perhaps that of Persia, were such co-operation practicable. The measures taken under the Anglo-Persian Convention of 1882 have reduced slave trading in the Persian Gulf to relatively unimportant dimensions, but Persia is disposed to press for the abrogation of the convention as being derogatory to Persian dignity. She has signed, but not yet ratified, the League of Nations Slavery Convention of 1926. Were she to ratify it, it is improbable that she could respond to her obligations. She has at present no navy, and the character of local officials in the Gulf is stated to be such that, were it not for the convention of 1882, they would themselves participate in the slave traffic.

O. A. SCOTT.

Foreign Office, March 27, 1930.

[E 1821/9/91]

No. 105.

Text of Identic Notes exchanged between King Feisal, of Iraq, and King Ibn Saud, of the Hejaz and Nejd.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, April 4.)

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

My dear Brother,

It has been a source of pleasure and gratification for me to be afforded this happy opportunity of meeting your Majesty and making the acquaintance of your noble person and of establishing relations of firm friendship and of amity and intimate understanding between ourselves, our kingdoms and our peoples. The memory of these two happy days I shall ever hold among the best and kindest of memories.

With the help of God, I shall never forget what has been revealed to me as to the sincerity of your Majesty's words and the genuineness of your Majesty's desire for the dawning upon our two countries of a new era of accord and union such as God (may He be praised and exalted) has enabled us to lay the foundations thereof in the course of our present meeting.

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In view of the very limited time remaining available for the representatives of our Governments to discuss the questions outstanding between the two countries, I would like to refer to the agreement reached between us in regard to the question of the desert posts and the necessity of settling the said question within the next six months, provided that if, may God forbid, no understanding was reached between the two Governments within the said period, the question should then be referred to an arbitration board to pass a definite decision thereon, such board to consist of two members to be nominated by my Government and two other members to be nominated by your Majesty's Government, and, failing agreement between these members, the two Governments will ask the Government of His Majesty King George V, subject to no objection on her part, to appoint a person to preside over the said board, and both Governments agree in advance to accept the person so appointed by her.

In conclusion, I wish your Majesty abundant good lasting happiness.

Dated 24th Ramadan, 1348 (February 23, 1930).

[E 1901/14/34]

No. 106.

The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India, New Delhi.—
(Communicated by the India Office, April 12.)

SLAVE trade in the Persian Gulf. Reference your letter of the 4th December, 1929.

I have waited before replying in order to make myself conversant with the local conditions of slavery, which, as pointed out in the enclosure to my despatch No. 637 of the 18th March, 1930, on domestic slavery, differ in different localities.

2. Before replying to the specific enquiries contained in your letter, I think it would be convenient to give a brief résumé of the slave trade in this area, various aspects of which have already been dealt with by my predecessors at different times. This résumé, read with my despatch quoted above, will give, I hope, some sort of picture of slavery in the Gulf as a whole.

3. There are three principal slave routes:—

- A. From India to the Oman and Trucial Coasts, via Persian Mekran.
- B. From Persian Mekran to the Oman and Trucial Coasts.
- C. From Ibn Saud's territories in Hejaz and Nejd to the whole of the Arab coast.

4. The somewhat formidable term slave routes, with its suggestion of large convoys of slaves being moved about the Gulf, is, however, a misnomer, and suggests a state of affairs which—fortunately—does not exist. Nothing much more than what may be described as, at most, a steady trickle passes along these ways, and along one of them not even this. I am happy to state that it is of route A, for which the Government of India has the most responsibility, that this last statement can be made. About two years ago a case of four Indian boys, kidnapped from Karachi and sold on the Arab coast, gave rise to suspicions that this traffic might be the result of a regular organisation operating on a large scale. Investigation by Sir Lionel Haworth proved these suspicions to be groundless. He pointed out that such cases were very few, and that, when they did occur, almost all were recovered by this Residency. Various authorities in the Gulf reported that they had never heard of an Indian being employed in a pearling boat—where slave labour is most desired. The presence of Hindu merchants, too, at all the pearling and trading centres on the Arabian coast, who would immediately report the existence of Indian slaves (as they had done in the case of the four boys), was, in itself, a guarantee against such a traffic. (Bushire Residency letter of the 10th June, 1928.) The Government of India agreed with his views in their letter of the 22nd August, 1928.

5. Route B has two bifurcations, the northern from Bungi and Sirik to Katar, Abu Dhabi, Khor Falkan and Diba, and the southern from Sugaieh, Chaluq, Gohurp, Parag, Puzim and Kunerk to the Batinah coast of Oman. The extent of traffic on this route was described by the political resident last October as a "steady, though small, trickle of slaves" (*vide* this Residency letter of the 15th October, 1929, to the British Legation, Tehran, copy forwarded to the Government of India under Bushire endorsement No. 2351 of the 16th October, 1929). The captures and enslavements in Persian Mekran are carried out entirely by the local inhabitants, the chief slave supplier being a Baluchi chief, one Barkat Khan. A particularly

bad case occurred six years ago, when no less than twenty-one unfortunate people were at one blow sold into slavery by another Baluchi chief; twelve into Persian Baluchistan and nine to the Batinah coast (*vide* this Residency letter of the 10th June, 1928). Operations on this scale are, however, exceptional. There are no slave-dhows as such: commercial dhows carry a few slaves now and then in addition to other cargo. The weakness of the Persian Government in Mekran may be judged by the fact that, in July 1928, ten slaves took refuge in the Persian fort at Jask, but were delivered over by the Persian officer commanding to a pursuit party of sixty armed men headed by a local Baluchi chief, who threatened to attack the fort unless his property was handed back (*vide* this office letter dated the 23rd September, 1928, to Tehran; copy forwarded to Government of India under Bushire endorsement No. 1781, dated the 23rd September, 1928).

6. Route C covers the whole Arab littoral of the Gulf and Oman to Koweit. It is impossible to say how many slaves are brought in by the "back-doors" of the various sheikhdoms concerned. Probably the term already used for the Mekran coast, "a small, though steady, trickle," would be applicable here also, but I am informed by various authorities that there is really little demand for slaves nowadays in Oman and Trucial Coast, as the number of existing slaves is sufficient for the requirements of the people.

7. It will be seen that, of the slave routes enumerated, the Government of India are only wholly responsible for the first (A), and that on this operations are practically non-existent. On the other two (B and C) the Government of India have no responsibility whatever for the slave supply at source, which rests with the Governments of Persia and Nejd respectively. The efforts of the Government of India, and their officers in the Gulf, and those of His Majesty's ships, to put down slavery are negatived because the above Governments will not, or cannot, exercise effective control in their dominions. Slavery is a question on which British and international opinion is rightly exercised, and I venture to suggest that, if (and when) the subject of slavery in the Gulf is raised in public discussion, whether in Parliament or at Geneva, the Government of India—in its own interests—should give due publicity to this aspect of the case.

8. A further advantage of such publicity might well be to force from the Persian Government, who seem quite impervious to official remonstrances on the slave trade (*vide* Tehran letter No. 472 of the 7th November, 1928), but who are sensitive to public opinion in Europe, some degree of co-operation in the suppression of slavery. The "Shafagh-i-Surkh," for instance, a Tehran Persian newspaper, in its issue of the 21st May, 1928, published a long leading article on a reply to a question (quoted by Reuter's) given by Mr. Locker-Lampson in the House of Commons, to the effect that the slave trade still existed in Persian Baluchistan. The article, of course, doubtless officially inspired, violently denied that such a trade existed, but the attention that was given the matter shows the value which the Persian educated classes attach to Western opinion on the question.

9. You ask how far it has been possible to bring pressure to bear on the sheikhs to suppress the slave traffic. I have recently returned from a tour of the Trucial Coast, and took the opportunity of warning the sheikhs there of the displeasure of the Government of India which they would incur if any connivance by them in the slave trade, or slackness on their part to suppress it, came to light. It must be borne in mind, however, that the life of a Trucial sheikh is a precarious one; he has to walk warily to avoid offending his relatives or his people, and he wields little real authority. The isolation of the Trucial Coast will be broken down ultimately by the establishment of the air route, and with closer contact with the outside world that aircraft, wireless and improved means of communication will inevitably bring about. When this occurs it will be possible to obtain much better information of any cases of traffic in slaves that occurs, and to deal with it much more rapidly and drastically than is at present the case. The game will become a risky one, and ultimately will be found to be not worth the candle. At present the only measures that can be adopted are to try and induce the Persians to stop the supply at the source, and to compel the sheikhs to surrender any slave brought into their respective territories from outside. The difficulty really is to obtain information about cases of slavery, since there is no open sale as in the pre-treaty days. The domestic slave is usually well aware that he can obtain his freedom by applying to the nearest British authority; the stranger brought from Mekran is not—and it frequently happens that cases of slave traffic are only brought to notice because the relatives of the slave seek him out, or he meets a compatriot who informs the Residency agent.

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10. In *Oman* the Batinah coast is the principal centre of the slave trade. It is occupied by the Yal Saad, the largest Omani tribe, who are semi-independent of the Sultan of Muscat. The following are the views of the political agent, Muscat (with which I agree), on the subject of slavery on the Batinah coast, expressed in a letter to this Residency written last September:—

"Although I do not think the immediate use of force would have commensurate results, I have every hope that the construction of the road along the Batinah which is already under way and which will no doubt be carried out within the next couple of years, the consequent advent of motor cars and the formation of closer relations with Muscat will tend towards making this tract too conspicuous a venue as an entrepot for the slave trade. The trade will then probably cease automatically. The Muscat State will then be in a better position also to put a stop to the practice."

At *Bahrein*—as explained in my report on domestic slavery—there is no slave trade.

11. The difficulty of obtaining information has been mentioned above and there is no doubt that a small special secret service grant to be spent in assisting political agents and the Residency agent, Shargah, to obtain information as to the slave trade, and in rewarding those who come forward with information on the subject, would be of great value. I suggest that a sum of 2,000 rupees be put at my disposal for the ensuing year for this purpose.

12. Concerning the possibility of the arrest of Mohammed Dawar, the notorious slave dealer, to which you refer, and his disposal when arrested, I am informed by the political agent, Muscat, that he is "wanted" by the Muscat State on other counts besides slavery, so probably the best course to pursue in the event of his capture would be to hand him over to that State for punishment, who, I think, can be counted on to deal with him adequately, and his arrest would produce a salutary effect. The political agent, Muscat, recently reported that he had gone to Ibn Saud with camels, and would perhaps return via Koweit or Bahrein. The political agents at these places have been asked to request the sheikhs to arrest Dawar if he enters their territories. The possession by me of a secret service fund as mentioned above would give a greater chance of capturing this individual, though the matter is far from being an easy one.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, and to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, to be read in conjunction with my report on domestic slavery, a copy of which is being sent to him by me.

H. V. BISCOE,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Bushire, March 18, 1930.

[E 1900/1054/91]

No. 107.

The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India, New Delhi.—
(Communicated by the India Office, April 12.)

Sir,

Bushire, March 18, 1930.

DOMESTIC slavery in the Persian Gulf.

As desired in your letter dated the 14th January, 1930, I have the honour to submit a note on the above subject.

A copy is being sent direct to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

I have, &c.
H. V. BISCOE,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Note on Domestic Slavery in the Persian Gulf.

THE subject on which a report is asked is "the Abolition of Domestic Slavery in Territories under British Influence in the Persian Gulf" (*vide* Mr. Mander's question in the House of Commons, attached to India Office letter of the 19th December, 1929). The area covered by this report, therefore, is the Arabian side of the Gulf (other than the portion belonging to Nejd), since there are no territories on the Persian Coast under such influence.

2. The term "slavery" is often given such an indiscriminate signification, and vague terms such as "virtual slavery" and so forth are so widely used that, to avoid confusion, it seems convenient to decide what actually constitutes slavery. In the Geneva Slavery Convention of the 25th September, 1926, the following definition has been adopted:—

"Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised."

The cognate question of the slave trade or traffic in the Gulf I have dealt with in a separate report (*vide* my despatch No. 638, dated the 18th March, 1930). The two reports taken together give, I trust, some sort of picture of slavery as a whole in the Gulf.

3. The Arabian coast, for the present purpose, may be divided into four areas:—

Oman, the Trucial Coast, Bahrein and Katar, and Koweit.

The Hasa coast, belonging to Nejd, is outside the scope of this report.

Oman.

4. Domestic slavery is general throughout Oman, and may conveniently be considered under two categories, (a) household and (b) industrial. It is important to note that these two divisions exist all along the Arabian coast. Category (a) covers individuals employed as bodyguards to sheikhs (slaves being outside dynastic intrigues are often considered by their masters as being more faithful than the free tribesmen), as coffee makers and domestic servants. The lot of slaves in this category is generally far from hard—as local conditions go—and not seldom compares favourably with that of the free tribesmen. Category (b) includes the date gardener and the pearl diver, and it is with regard to these two classes that hardship exists; the latter, in point of numbers, being much the more important, since the whole of the Arabian coast to a large extent lives on the pearl trade, while considerable date groves are few. Mr. Thomas, the Wazir of the Muscat State, in the course of a valuable report, summarises the slave situation as follows:—

"Shara Law is perhaps the most sacred and powerful institution in tribal Arabia, and no authority can defy its ordinances without being discredited if not incurring odium. By Shara Law the slave is property, and on a master's death the slave forms part of the estate and its value, subject to the usual rigid laws of Moslem inheritance. While a change of public opinion in recent years has greatly modified the once hard lot of the slave, and to-day there is no wholesale buying and selling as in pre-treaty days, the operation of the Shara Law sometimes entails the slave changing hands on a monetary basis."

5. As the pearling season approaches each year there is a great migration to the Trucial Coast—off which some of the best banks lie—from Oman, as many as 5,000 coming from the Batinah tribes, while perhaps 2,000 come from other districts. Of this total about 1,000 are believed to be slaves. The freeman enjoys the fruit of his labours, but, of course, has to support himself for the rest of the year, while the slave's earnings go to his master, who, however, has to support the slave in comparative idleness till the next season. At the end of the season divers return to Oman. Amongst the Omani divers, free and slave alike, the Trucial Coast is said to be unpopular as compared with Katar and Bahrein, where more equitable conditions prevail, the divers getting a fairer share of their dues.

6. We have a slave treaty with Muscat, and any slave can obtain his manumission by applying to the political agent of that place.

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Trucial Coast.

7. Throughout the Trucial Coast slavery is common, both household and still more industrial, since unlike Oman, which has other sources of livelihood, this desolate coast depends almost entirely on the pearl trade. The inhabitants earn enough from their share of the trade in the four pearling months (July to October) to maintain themselves—eked out by fishing—for the rest of the year. As already described, Omani divers come here in large numbers during the season, and are joined by the local divers—free and slaves. No estimate is available of the number of the latter. Slaves are concentrated in the villages of the coast, the local Bedouin, who subsist with difficulty in the desert hinterland, being far too poor to maintain more than a very few. There is nothing approaching a slave-market on the coast, and no buying or selling of slaves on a large scale exists, though slaves occasionally change hands.

8. We have slave treaties with the Trucial chiefs, and any slave can apply for manumission to the residency agent at Shargah, who refers his case to the Resident.

Bahrein and Katar.

9. It is satisfactory to be able to report that in Bahrein slavery is almost extinct; such individuals as still remain domestic slaves do so entirely by their own wish, since they have only to apply to the political agency to obtain their manumission. The State courts refuse to recognise the status of slavery in, for instance, testamentary disputes. The case of the pearl divers, to which public reference is sometimes made (*vide*, for instance, "Slavery," by Lady Simons, p. 58), though hardly coming under the definition of slavery quoted in paragraph 2 above, has been receiving the careful attention of the political agency and the Residency for some years past. I am happy to state that by a patient and judicious pressure brought to bear on the pearling merchants and other authorities concerned, and by the exercise of tactful supervision, the hard lot of these divers had been alleviated, and the system by which the latter—having received an initial advance—remained "wage-slaves" for the rest of their existence, is being gradually improved. In this connexion, I attach as an appendix to this report a note by Mr. Belgrave, financial adviser to the Bahrein State.

10. Slave conditions in Katar generally resemble those on the Trucial Coast. We have a slave treaty with the Sheikh of Katar, but no resident manumitting authority. Bahrein is, however, within easy reach of the peninsula.

Koweit.

11. It is estimated that there are about 2,000 household and industrial slaves in Koweit, the former considerably exceeding the latter. The number is now less than formerly, and many have of late years been given their freedom, since this is considered a virtuous act, enjoined by the Mahometan religion. The treatment of slaves here is reported to be the best in the Gulf—not a little owing to the influence of the present sheikh, a very humane man. Pearling is the principal industry of Koweit, and slaves are employed on it, though not, it is believed, in very large numbers.

12. There is no slave treaty with Koweit, and consequently we have there no manumitting authority.

13. The above short résumé gives a picture of the conditions under which domestic slavery exists in the Gulf. It will be seen that the system is widespread, and for it the inhabitants claim the sanction of their religion, and any attempt at its sudden suppression would meet with intense resentment and be attended by serious political and economic consequences, while, as was pointed out in the reply to Mr. Mander's question in the House of Commons, in some of the areas mentioned the powers of the interference of His Majesty's Government are strictly limited, and this is notably the case on the Trucial Coast. At Koweit on the whole the situation is improving; a considerable number of slaves have been freed; the remainder are chiefly employed on not very arduous household duties, and their treatment is generally satisfactory. At Bahrein there is practically no slavery, while the virtual slavery of the free pearl diver has been largely mitigated, and the political agent is fully alive to the necessity of maintaining a constant watchfulness to prevent a retrograde movement in the near future. Literacy is spreading, and many of the sons of the present divers will be able to read and write, and will then

be able to check their own accounts and to ensure that they receive their just dues. On the Trucial Coast and in Oman the position is not so satisfactory. As I have explained in my despatch No. 638, dated the 18th March, 1930, on the slave trade, as distinct from domestic slavery, there is a small but steady trickle of slaves brought into this area, and constant vigilance of the British authorities is required to suppress this traffic. The Government of India, however, maintain on the Trucial Coast and at Muscat officials to whom the slaves can and do apply for manumission. The objection which may be made that slaves are prevented by force from so doing has little force, since slaves are, of course, not kept under any sort of restraint, but mingle freely with the community to which they belong. It is universally known throughout the Gulf that the British authorities do grant manumission to any slave applying for it, and there is no doubt that the large majority of the slaves could escape to them and obtain their freedom if they so desired. The reason that more do not do so is that in the large majority of cases the domestic slave is little worse off than the free man; they are both bound by the stern rules of economic necessity, and must obtain their livelihood in a territory where nature renders it peculiarly difficult to do so. The master of the slave in his own interests feeds him adequately, gives him a sufficiency of clothing for this climate and provides him as a rule with a wife and a dwelling-place. I once had in my own employ a slave; when asked why he did not apply for freedom, he replied that his master had fallen on evil days and could not, therefore, afford to keep him, and had turned him out to earn his own living; if, however, he was at any time out of work his master always fed him till he got work, and he expressed his entire readiness to go back and work for his master whenever the state of the latter's finances permitted. This attitude is typical of the large majority of domestic slaves in the Persian Gulf; they are not concerned with abstract considerations, but with a much more practical one, that on the whole they obtain a modicum of the necessities of life without having to worry about the morrow. Further, many of these slaves have been born in their master's families, and regard themselves as members of his household and frequently are attached to him by ties of sentiment. Those that do seek manumission are chiefly persons who have recently been enslaved and who, of course, are under an entire separate category. The value of the British manumitting authorities, however, cannot be gauged merely by the number of slaves manumitted. The presence of such authorities is of great value in ensuring that slaves are reasonably treated by their masters, who know that in case of harsh treatment they may lose their property.

14. There is only one real remedy for the existing state of affairs and one means of definitely abolishing slavery on the Arab coast, and that is to extend our influence, increase our measure of interference and control and break down the isolation in which the Omani Arabs now live. This, however, is opposed to the policy which we have hitherto pursued, namely, to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of these sheikhdoms and principalities provided they maintain a maritime truce and suppress the traffic in slaves. It involves many political considerations, and would certainly have many repercussions, and is not a change which I personally would advocate. It will probably come gradually; hardly any community nowadays can live in complete isolation from the outside world, and even Arabia will one day presumably be traversed by aircraft and visited by tourists. Meanwhile, however, all that can be done is to take all possible steps to prevent the import of slaves and the traffic in slaves, and to deal sternly with any cases of this that come to our notice.

Annex.

Slavery and the Bahrein Pearl Industry.

ALTHOUGH slavery was officially abolished in 1861, when the Sheikh of Bahrein made a treaty with the British Government by which he agreed to abstain from it in return for protection, the condition of the pearl diver was, until a few years ago, almost that of slaves.

The diving community consists of three categories: the shore merchants who do the big buying and selling and who either own or finance the boats, the "nakhodas" or boat captains, and the large inarticulate mass of divers, illiterate Arabs who were previously cheated and oppressed by their employers, or rather their

owners, the boat captains. About 15,000 local divers go out from Bahrein every season, and it has been estimated that about 100,000 men from the whole Gulf are employed on the banks every year.

The diving system is admirable in theory. Each boat's profits are shared proportionally between the captain, the divers and the pullers after the captain had deducted cost of food, general expenses, and the amount which he advanced to the divers at the beginning and end of the season.

In practice the system was abominable. When once a young man took a loan from a captain he could never pay it off, and as long as he was in debt he was forced to dive. The debts were increased by enormous interest being charged on every advance, food and diving materials were debited against the diver at extortionate prices, and as the diver was illiterate he could never check his account. Most divers existed on the small bi-annual advances which were debited against them, with interest. These conditions were favoured by the improvident and extravagant nature of the Arab.

Divers were handed over from one captain to another, sometimes to captains from foreign ports and sometimes to private individuals in payment for debts. If a diver died his house and belongings were seized by his captain or if he had grown-up sons they were compelled to incur their father's debt, if the sons were children they incurred the debt when they became old enough to work. Sales of pearls were conducted privately between captain and merchant, and usually the prices obtained were higher than the amount announced to the divers. The captains pocketed the difference. Infirm old men and young boys were forced to dive and any insubordination was punished by floggings and various tortures. No questions were asked about deaths that occurred at the banks. During the off season the divers were made to work in the houses and gardens of their owners.

Attempts to improve the diving system met with difficulties. The divers were suspicious and apathetic, the merchants and captains were violently opposed to changes that would loosen their hold over the men, and until the present sheikh succeeded his father it was considered unpolitic to press for reforms. In 1924 his Excellency Sheikh Hamad, in conjunction with Major Daly, who was then political agent, and with the support of the Government of India, took the matter in hand. Only a very few of the more far-sighted merchants, and the Shia and Sunni Kadis, supported the movement, but the reforms were finally pushed through mainly owing to the keenness and energy of Major Daly.

The principal features are as follows:—

The amount of the advances and the amount of interest permissible is laid down by law. No other charges may be debited against a diver. Merchants and boat captains are compelled to keep regular accounts, which are made out by a number of diving clerks who are authorised by the Government. Every diver keeps a small book issued by the Government which shows his account with his captain. Boat captains are forbidden to sell the pearls privately but must do so in the presence of not less than three of the divers. When a diver dies his children are not made to take over his debts and dive for his captain, the debt becomes an ordinary one against the estate. No person who does not own a diving boat may take over divers for debt.

These, and various other rules, have greatly improved the diving conditions. Although men who have been diving for a long time are still hopelessly indebted to their captain, and will remain so until they die, the new generation of divers are no longer in the position of slaves. Previously, a diver had no redress against his captain; a court existed, but it consisted of boat captains and its reputation was notorious. Divers now realise when they are cheated and appeal to the courts when they find that the diving rules are not being carried out by their employers.

There still remains an influential party of merchants and captains who bitterly resent the improved conditions and who continually try to upset and evade them. The strictest supervision is needed by the Government and the courts to prevent a return to the previous state.

[E 1955/92/91]

No. 108.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 75.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 23, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 28th February, 1930.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), His Majesty's consul at Basra, the Government of the Federated Malay States and the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Jedda Report for the Period February 1 to 28, 1930.

THE successful issue of the negotiations for the surrender of the rebels created a general improvement in the political atmosphere which augured well for the subsequent negotiations between the two Kings. Nevertheless, at one moment, a slight hitch threatened to occur. Ibn Saud, as a result of incorrect information received by him to the effect that some rebels were still in hiding in Koweit territory, hinted that, if they were not handed over, he might be obliged to postpone his meeting with King Feisal. His information was, however, proved to his own satisfaction to be false. At one time also it looked as if the Iraq attitude over the surrender of Ibn Mashhur and Ibn Mizyad might jeopardise the prospects of a satisfactory settlement with Ibn Saud, but the Iraq authorities were persuaded to modify their demands.

2. A preliminary meeting of Iraqi and Nedji Ministers, held at the proposal of Ibn Saud, took place at Koweit. It was reported by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq on the 16th February to have been friendly but unfruitful. The question of the surrender of Ibn Mashhur was raised but was left for discussion at the meeting of the Kings.

3. The conference between the two Kings took place on the 22nd and 23rd February in H.M.S. "Lupin," near the Rooka Light Float outside territorial waters. The results were as follows:—

(1) Letters were exchanged between King Feisal and King Ibn Saud to the effect that they would endeavour during the next six months to come to an agreement regarding the question of the desert posts. If they failed to agree, each King would appoint two representatives as arbitrators, and if an agreement were not then reached, they undertook to accept as president any person designated by His Majesty's Government.

(2) It was agreed by both parties that either Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson or Major Fowle, as His Majesty's Government might decide, should preside over the tribunal which is to be set up under article 2 of the Bahra Agreement, following on the undertaking given by Ibn Saud in his letter of the 27th January, for the settlement of past claims arising out of raids committed on the Nejd-Iraq frontier. The tribunal is to meet in Koweit in June next.

(3) Ibn Mashhur was to be pardoned by King Ibn Saud. King Feisal on his side undertook to do his best to induce Ibn Mashhur to return to Nejd. In the event of Ibn Mashhur's refusal to do this, King Feisal would insist that he should leave Iraq territory. There was no provision for a *quid pro quo*.

(4) and (5) The Kings agreed in principle to the draft of an agreement of *bon voisinage*, in the preamble of which King Feisal is cited as King of Iraq and Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and Nejd, while an article provides for the exchange of diplomatic missions. There is to be a further meeting of representatives in three months' time to conclude a formal agreement on these lines.

4. The meeting was characterised by much outward show of cordiality. In private conversations with Sir Francis Humphrys, however, Ibn Saud frankly showed his distrust of Feisal, while the latter criticised the duplicity of Ibn Saud's Ministers.

5. At the close of the meeting both Kings asked Sir Francis Humphrys to convey to His Majesty's Government their deep gratitude for the hospitality afforded and for making it possible for the meeting to be held. Letters were also subsequently received by Sir Francis Humphrys from King Ibn Saud and King Feisal as also from the Prime Minister of Iraq expressing gratitude for the efforts made to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries and showing appreciation of the facilities provided by His Majesty's Government.

6. Shortly before the meeting of the Kings a note was received from the Emir Feisal, temporarily in charge of foreign affairs, stating that the King wished to use the opportunity presented by the conference to discuss with British Government representatives certain outstanding matters, which he had previously raised, in connexion with affairs on the Persian Gulf (December report, paragraph 20). The Emir Feisal was informed in reply that, as the conference as arranged was only intended to deal with the questions outstanding between Nejd and Iraq, His Majesty's Government regretted that it was impossible for them at such short notice to extend its scope or to despatch a representative with authority to discuss these questions as desired. His Majesty's Government explained that this was particularly the case as they had not yet received from the Hejaz Government sufficiently full information as to the precise points which the King wished to raise to enable them to issue suitable instructions on the subject. They stated, however, that they would be glad to arrange for a meeting at a later date between the King and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, if the King so desired and if he were prepared in the meanwhile to supply them with a full and detailed statement as to his desiderata.

7. The situation on the Transjordan frontier has taken a turn for the worse. Three further raids by Nejd on Transjordan tribes were reported by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan at the beginning of February. On the 10th February news was received that the Emir Neshmi had crossed into Transjordan territory with 1,000 men and was raiding Transjordan tribes, and it was established a few days later that Ibn Musaad, Governor of Hail, had with 2,000 men raided Transjordan tribes within Transjordan territory killing at least 20 men, looting 3,000 camels, and 1,000 sheep, and destroying 100 tents. There were also indications that further raids into Transjordan were being planned by the Emir Musaad. A strong protest was made to the Hejaz Government together with a demand for the restitution of the looted property and for compensation. The King was also asked to issue urgent instructions to the Emir of Hail to cease his raids and, in order to minimise the risk of further incidents, to withdraw his force from the vicinity of the Transjordan frontier. He was also informed that much resentment was being caused in Transjordan by the fact that the Emir's force was led by high officials of the King and was living on supplies brought from Syria through Transjordan by caravans which, in accordance with the arrangement made last December with the Hejaz Government, were receiving special British protection on their journey. It was pointed out, moreover, not only that acute feeling had been aroused in Transjordan but that it had been necessary to withdraw British forces both to protect Transjordan tribes from further raids and to check any attempt on their part to make counter raids. In the circumstances, while anxious at all times to co-operate with the King in these difficult frontier questions, His Majesty's Government regretted that it would be beyond their power to continue to afford the special protection which had been gladly given in the past to caravans supplying the force in question.

8. In reply to these representations a message was received from Sheikh Fuad Hamza stating that the King had expressed his deep regret at the incident and his disapproval of the act, which had been committed without his sanction. He had also issued urgent telegraphic instructions to Ibn Musaad forbidding him to commit any further raids. A letter was subsequently received from the King confirming this, but at the same time referring to the Transjordan raids against Nejd and the resulting situation as a possible motive for Ibn Musaad's action. The King also again pressed for a speedy settlement of the problem. A similar reply to the above was received about the same time from the Hejaz Government, who stated that strict and definite orders had been issued to their people and officials to stop all raiding.

9. The "Um-el-Qura" announces that the "Kiawa" factory is actively engaged in weaving the holy carpet for this year's pilgrimage and that this, it is expected,

will be completed about the middle of April. I am told that this forecast is somewhat optimistic although the factory is now working at high pressure. It will be recalled that there was trouble last year between the weavers and the manager, as a result of which eight of the weavers had to be repatriated to India by this agency as destitutes, while four more left at their own expense. There has been considerable delay in replacing them, and their substitutes only arrived in fact on the 18th February.

10. A scheme is under consideration for supplying Mecca and Jedda with electric power from a station to be erected, probably at Bahra; this, so far as Jedda is concerned, is intended to replace the present unsatisfactory arrangements by which Jedda is dependent for its electricity on a small plant of inadequate performance which works in conjunction with the condenser. The subject, which was first broached two or three years ago and has occasionally been mooted since, is now being seriously canvassed. A special committee of local notables, dubbed for the purpose "experts," has been appointed by the Government to consider the scheme and estimate the benefits which would accrue from it. Several meetings have been held and, among other resolutions, it has been decided that a company is to be formed for carrying the scheme into effect, that two-thirds of the shares are to be taken up by the municipality of Mecca and the Ministry of Finance and that the remaining third is to be offered to the public for subscription.

11. The general feeling about the scheme is that, if properly managed, it will be a success, but that the essential condition for this is European control, at any rate in the engineering department. It is for this reason presumably that Bahra, which is outside the zone forbidden to non-Moslems, is suggested as the headquarters of the scheme. Abdullah Suleiman, the Minister of Finance, who is apparently the moving spirit, is also considering the engagement of a European as managing director to ensure the proper handling of the financial side of the concern; royal assent for this has, however, not yet been obtained.

12. The chief criticisms of the project, as at present contemplated, are, firstly, that the proposed capital of £60,000 will not suffice to cover the cost of any effective scheme, and, secondly, that the people have no confidence in the honesty of the Government's intentions, and fear, for instance, that the Government will not pay for the power it uses itself; as the Government will probably be the largest consumer, this would probably be sufficient to wreck the scheme. The fate of the Saudieh Motor Company, a concern which was launched in very similar circumstances, is fresh in the public memory. The public is showing little enthusiasm in taking up the shares offered and is awaiting further developments before committing itself.

13. The scheme is at present in its embryonic stages, and, although in its broad outlines it has received the approval of the King, its details still require royal sanction. It is perhaps early yet therefore to consider it as a serious project.

14. His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve the appointment of Sheikh Hafiz Wahba as Hejaz-Nejd Minister Plenipotentiary in London.

15. The Soviet agent and consul-general, Nazir Bey Turakouloff, presented credentials as "Representative Plenipotentiary" to the Emir Feisal on the 26th February. Speeches of a cordial tone were exchanged.

16. H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived in Jedda on the 11th February and left on the 14th February. The usual visits were exchanged.

17. Some difficulties arose recently between the Hejaz Government and Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited) over the purchase of a sea-going launch. The launch, a craft about 40 feet long, purchased at a cost of £3,000, was found on arrival to differ from the required specifications, and to be unsuitable for the purposes of the Hejaz Government and dangerous to take out to sea. Mr. Philby, however, managed eventually to persuade the Hejaz Government to take it over. It has now been forced upon the unfortunate dhowmen despite their protests and they are to pay for it by yearly instalments of £600. This action on the part of the Government has caused great indignation among the dhowmen, who intend to petition the King when he comes to Jedda, and who say, with some truth it would appear, that Mr. Philby should foot the bill himself. For the moment, however, they have no other choice but to comply with the Government's order as they are threatened with the use of the launch by the Government on Government account for the landing of pilgrims in case of refusal, a course which would strike a severe blow at the dhowmen's means of livelihood.

18. It appears that arrangements have now been made for the purchase from Germany of a small second-hand yacht or glorified launch for coastal work, at a cost of £5,000. Small guns or machine guns are to be mounted on it, and it is to be used chiefly for coast guard purposes to prevent smuggling.

19. The total number of pilgrims who had reached Jedda by the 28th February was 37,825 as compared with 34,783 for the corresponding period last year. One Indian pilgrim steamer called at Jedda during the month and landed 1,001 Indian pilgrims. The total number of pilgrims who had arrived by the 28th February from Indian ports was 2,473, out of which 872 were British Indian subjects.

20. No slaves have taken refuge during the period under review.

[E 1952/54/91]

No. 109.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 333.)

Sir,

Cairo, April 3, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that difficulties have risen again this year in connexion with the Egyptian Medical Mission which is annually sent to the Hejaz for the pilgrimage.

2. According to Sheikh Hafez Wahba, who is now here, the mission is rather more extensive than usual. He mentioned that there were eight doctors instead of four as last year, that the mission wished to have establishments at Jedda, Mecca and Medina, whereas formerly it used to establish itself only at Jedda and Mecca, and, after the Mecca pilgrimage, move with such pilgrims as went to Medina. More motor ambulances were with the mission, which also wished to fly the Egyptian flag. Ibn Saud, irritated by Egypt's refusal to recognise him, objected to this enlargement of the Egyptian Medical Mission.

3. According to Dr. Shahin Pasha, Under-Secretary of State for Public Health, the various objections of the Hejaz Government were discussed with the Hejaz agent here. It was agreed that the mission should fly the sanitary instead of the Egyptian national flag. Permission was given to the whole mission to proceed, except to the motor ambulances. Further negotiations on this point are continuing. Dr. Shahin added that Nahas Pasha had sent a message just before his departure to England to the Hejaz agent, suggesting that these difficulties were being raised owing to the non-recognition of Ibn Saud by Egypt and assuring him that the Egyptian Government, on the return of the delegation from England, would tackle this larger question in the most sympathetic spirit.

4. I suggested to Sheikh Hafez Wahba that Ibn Saud was ill-advised to translate his resentment at his own non-recognition into the realm of pilgrimage relief. Such action would help the adversaries of recognition, who would have little difficulty in exploiting this obstruction in a sense unfavourable to Ibn Saud. Hafez Wahba agreed, and said that he had already telegraphed to the Amir Faisal at Mecca, urging that it was not worth while making difficulties about the Egyptian Medical Mission.

5. The Sheikh expressed indignation at the tone of the press, inspired by the Palace. The "Ittehad," "La Liberté" and the "Ahram" have, indeed, published some extremely offensive articles about the difficulties being made by the Hejaz Government over this mission.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 2066/54/91]

No. 110.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 376.)

Sir,

Cairo, April 12, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 333 of the 3rd April, that the Hejaz and Egyptian Governments have arrived at an agreement regarding the Egyptian Medical Mission to the Hejaz. The former Government has offered to put four motor-ambulances at the disposal of the Egyptian Medical Mission, and the latter Government has accepted this solution.

2. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 2111/89/91]

No. 111.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 119.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 24, 1930.

AS you are aware from your recent conversations with members of my office, the question of the raiding and counter-raiding on the Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan frontiers has been engaging the attention of the Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned. As a result, I have decided that you shall take an early opportunity after your arrival at Jedda of discussing the whole matter personally with King Ibn Saud.

2. While I am content to leave to you a wide latitude as to the manner in which the question shall be broached with Ibn Saud, it appears to me desirable to indicate in the following paragraphs the general considerations which you should impress on His Majesty.

3. In recent communications on this subject King Ibn Saud has laid stress on the necessity of resolving the question of the claims arising out of past raids. As the Hejazi Government are aware, His Majesty's Government, acting in accordance with Ibn Saud's own suggestion that they themselves should arbitrate on these claims, have appointed Mr. MacDonnell to investigate and report on the claims in order that His Majesty's Government may be enabled to give their arbitral decisions thereon; and it is proposed that he should begin his task so soon as he has been able to see King Ibn Saud. The necessary steps are thus being taken to liquidate the past.

4. Turning to the present and the future, the earnest consideration which His Majesty's Government have for some time past devoted to the raiding situation on the Transjordan frontier has made it increasingly clear that it is only by strenuous and simultaneous efforts on the part of the authorities on both sides of the frontier that an amelioration of the present regrettable position can be attained. The authorities of Transjordan have recently put into force new measures designed to increase their control over the Transjordan tribesmen, and to facilitate the prevention and the punishment of raids into the Hejaz and Nejd. The principal of these measures is the institution of the Tribal Control Board. His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem is being instructed to furnish you direct with detailed information regarding the results already achieved by the board, the punishments which it has inflicted, and the loot which has been recovered from raiders and returned to the Hejaz-Nejd. In addition to the establishment of this board (a) the local police force has been strengthened in order to facilitate punitive and preventive action against raiders, and (b) mechanical transport is being provided for the Transjordan Frontier Force; this should render more effective the support which this force can in case of need be called upon to furnish in execution of such punitive and preventive action. You are at liberty to make what use you think fit of the above information, with a view to indicate to Ibn Saud that the Transjordan authorities on their side are taking steps to improve the situation in so far as concerns their tribesmen.

5. As stated above, however, it is evident that measures should also be taken by King Ibn Saud to deal with his own tribesmen. The information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government does not lead them to suppose that any effective action has—recently, at any rate—been taken by him either to punish his subjects who have perpetrated raids, or to prevent raids occurring. The particulars to be supplied by Sir J. Chancellor will show that the Transjordan authorities have inflicted punishment in various cases upon Transjordan raiders. But His Majesty's Government are not aware of any punishments having been inflicted upon Hejaz-Nejdi raiders, and in any case no loot has been returned by the authorities of the Hejaz and Nejd to the authorities of Transjordan. You should leave Ibn Saud in no uncertainty as to the views of His Majesty's Government on these points and in addition should refer to the recent raid by Hejaz-Nejd Government forces, under two of Ibn Saud's military leaders, Ibn Musa'ad and Ibn Neshmi, which constituted an infraction of articles 2 and 10 of the Hadda Agreement. Even in this most serious case, so far as His Majesty's Government are aware, no punishment has been inflicted on the guilty.

6. As regards preventive action, Ibn Saud will appreciate the fact that His Majesty's Government were last winter prepared to make every allowance for his pre-occupation in Eastern Nejd. But with the removal of his difficulties in that direction (to which His Majesty's Government were happy to contribute) they have

every right to expect that he will direct his serious attention to the control of his raiding tribesmen on the Transjordan frontier. In addition, you will remind His Majesty that article 3 of the Hadda Agreement has hitherto remained inoperative owing to his failure to issue instructions to his local representative for the maintenance of communication with the chief British representative in Transjordan or his delegate; and will invite Ibn Saud to take immediate steps to implement the spirit of his engagements under this article.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 2171/111/91]

No. 112.

Sir F. Humphrys to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, April 25.)

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, March 15, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the meeting of King Faisal with King Ibn Saud on board H.M.S. "Lupin" in the Persian Gulf on the 22nd and 23rd of February, 1930.

2. Arrangements had been made for the steamship "Patrick Stewart" to pick up King Ibn Saud at Ras Tanurah on the 20th February, and the King had been requested to limit the number of his followers to fifty. Actually, he brought a suite of 118, and, in spite of the captain's protests, insisted on embarking his whole company and a large quantity of stores. King Faisal embarked at Basra on the evening of the 21st February on board the "Nearchus," a ship of about 1,500 tons, which is owned by the Iraq Government. He was accompanied by a suite of twelve persons including Naji Pasha-al-Suwaidi, the Prime Minister, and Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. I embarked myself on the same evening with Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham on H.M.S. "Lupin."

3. The rendezvous, which was 15 miles out to sea beyond the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, was reached by all three ships in the early hours of the 22nd February, and we anchored in line about 400 yards apart with H.M.S. "Lupin" in the centre. After I had ascertained that my suggested programme for the conference was acceptable to both Kings, arrangements were made for their Majesties to board the "Lupin" at three minutes' interval under a salute of twenty-one guns each. King Ibn Saud was the first to come aboard accompanied by his two principal Ministers, Hafiz Wahba and Fuad Hamza, his private secretary, Yusuf Yasin, and three others. King Faisal followed with a suite of the same number, and I brought the two Kings together on the quarter-deck. They seemed to eye one another with a mixture of curiosity and suspicion, but embraced in Arab fashion with every outward appearance of cordiality. After each King had introduced the members of his suite to the other, a move was made to the captain's cabin, which Commander Sir John Alleyne had kindly placed at my disposal for the conference. The two Kings sat down side by side on a sofa and, after a few polite courtesies had been exchanged, I welcomed them in the name of His Majesty's Government and said that it had given much pleasure to my Government to be the means of facilitating a meeting which they confidently hoped would result in the strengthening of the ties of friendship between the two Arab States and in the dissipation of any misunderstandings which had occurred in the past. Each King in reply expressed his appreciation of the endeavours of His Britannic Majesty's Government to further the cause of friendship between Nejd and Iraq, and to the generous thought which had prompted them to bring about on board one of His Britannic Majesty's ships a meeting which would otherwise have been so difficult to arrange.

4. After about half-an-hour's desultory talk, King Faisal, contrary to the plan which had been arranged between us, made a lengthy statement on Iraq-Nejd relations, finally leading up to the disagreement on the subject of the desert posts, and enlarging on their pacific purpose and proved usefulness in the maintenance of order among the Bedouin tribes. King Ibn Saud gave this speech a patient and impassive hearing, but, when it was finished, he said it was not his wish that the friendliness of the meeting should be marred by the intrusion of controversial discussions. He went on to say that he had made it a condition of his acceptance of the invitation to attend the meeting that no formal negotiations should be attempted. I took this to mean that King Ibn Saud had no intention of discussing details in the presence of the Nejd and Iraqi Ministers, and I arranged for them to withdraw and

leave the two Kings alone with myself and Captain Holt, my oriental secretary. The conversations were continued till evening without a result being achieved in any direction. The Ministers were instructed to form themselves into a committee to discuss the details of all outstanding difficulties, while the two Kings opened their hearts to each other and confined themselves to questions of principle.

5. Much to my surprise, King Ibn Saud had accepted my invitation to luncheon, although it was the month of Ramazan, and proceeded to eat a hearty meal and make himself extremely agreeable. In the evening he invited us all to dine with him on board the "Patrick Stewart." The approach to the dining saloon, which was rigged up on deck with canvas and decorated with the flags of the three countries, was between two lines of African negroes dressed in scarlet and gold and armed to the teeth. It was cunningly arranged that we should traverse the whole ship before arriving at the saloon so that the entire force of 110 retainers should be displayed before the eyes of King Faisal and the guests, and the scene, owing to the gigantic height and barbaric splendour of the bodyguard, was most impressive. We were then entertained to an Arab feast which surpassed in the copious variety of its dishes anything I had experienced before. Twelve sheep roasted whole were placed upon the table, while the intervening spaces were crammed with meats of wonderful variety and flavour. King Ibn Saud started the proceedings by breaking the ribs of the sheep opposite with his clenched fist and ladling out the contents of its stomach on to my plate with his hands. This delicate attention, His Majesty informed me, was a sign that he wished the bond of friendship, which we had just begun to form, to be permanent.

6. On the following morning, the conference was resumed on board the "Lupin" at 9.30 and, while the committee of Ministers were engaged in examining the draft of a Bon-Voisinage Agreement, I discussed with the two Kings the conclusion of an arbitral convention on the subject of the desert posts. The crux of the problem was found to be the nomination of a fifth arbitrator to give the casting vote when, as was assumed to be inevitable, the four Nejd and Iraqi representatives were unable to reach an agreement. It was clear that neither King relished the risk of the award going against him. I suggested that, in case of disagreement, the presiding arbitrator should be nominated by the British Government. King Ibn Saud opposed this suggestion, on the ground that, His Majesty's Government having already declared their views on the question of the interpretation of article 3 of the Ujair Protocol at his meeting with the late Sir Gilbert Clayton, any arbitrator nominated by them would share their view and would be unable to approach the question with an open and unbiassed mind. He admitted that the posts were quite harmless to Nejd, but said he had pledged himself to his people that he would never consent to their remaining, and he could not go back on his word. The posts at Sulman and Shabichah, he maintained, were indisputably sited on watering-places which were recognised throughout the desert as being the rightful resort of the Nejd tribes, and Busaiyah, he contended, was sited on such bad water that sooner or later the Iraq Government would be compelled to move the post elsewhere. He suggested a compromise and, in an aside, he assured me that nothing should be done to interfere with the proper protection of the trans-desert oil pipeline. He then reverted to the question of the presiding arbitrator and said that he should be an Arab. King Faisal was opposed to this, on the ground that no Arab fit for this task could be found who would not be either under his own or King Ibn Saud's influence.

7. As neither King showed any signs of budging from his own standpoint, King Faisal withdrew, and I was left alone with King Ibn Saud. I travelled over again with him all the arguments on the subject of the desert posts, and pointed out how unsatisfactory it would be to re-open negotiations for settlement without making provision for arbitration in default of agreement. I said that I was amazed to hear that His Majesty was unable to trust the impartiality of my Government in the matter of the nomination of a presiding arbitrator. Upon this, he turned suddenly to face me and, dramatically striking his chest, said that he agreed that the British Government should nominate any one they chose as the fifth arbitrator, but asked that, before the matter was referred to arbitration, the parties should try once more during the next six months to find a solution which would be acceptable to both sides. At this point King Faisal returned, and the Ministers were sent for and were instructed to draw up this decision in suitable documentary form.

8. I next opened with the two Kings the subject of the disposal of Ibn Mashhur. At Bagdad, Faisal had always declared to me that he did not require

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my help in this matter. Once face to face with King Ibn Saud, he would challenge him to quote a single precedent from Arab history to justify the demand that he was making for the surrender of a fugitive. He had rehearsed the scene before me. With arm thrown out, pointing the admonitory finger at an abashed Ibn Saud, he would declaim: "O, Abdul Aziz, tell me, on your honour as an Arab, that you would do as you ask me to do if you were in my place, and I will agree to surrender Ibn Mashhur." "You will see," he had said to me, "that Ibn Saud will have to admit that I am right and give up his demand." Unfortunately, when the moment arrived, His Majesty lost his nerve. The question of Ibn Mashhur had scarcely been opened between us when King Faisal, declaring that this was a question which primarily concerned King Ibn Saud and the British Government, excused himself and withdrew somewhat precipitately to another part of the ship. There was nothing that I could do but to assure King Ibn Saud that the surrender of Ibn Mashhur had never been promised by a representative of my Government, and that the question was one for settlement between himself and King Faisal, which I would do my best to facilitate. I therefore brought the two Kings together again, and, after King Ibn Saud had agreed to pardon Ibn Mashhur, King Faisal remarked that the matter was settled. When pressed by King Ibn Saud to explain, he said that, in view of the pardon, he would not allow Ibn Mashhur to remain in Iraq and would do his best to induce him to return to Nejd.

9. At this point we all retired to the "Nearchus," where King Faisal entertained the company to luncheon, which, in sharp contrast to the feast on the "Patrick Stewart" of the previous evening, was served in European fashion. After luncheon we discussed the settlement of claims for raids committed by Nejd on Iraqi tribesmen. Both Kings agreed to the convening of a tribunal on the lines of the Bahrah Agreement at Koweit in the month of July, and accepted the suggestion that Major Fowle or Colonel Dickson should be the president of the tribunal. In private, however, King Ibn Saud informed me that he had no confidence whatever that the tribunal would be able to arrive at a settlement satisfactory to both parties, and he asked me to persuade King Faisal to name some reasonable sum which he would be prepared to pay in final settlement of all claims. He reminded me that the Nejd tribesmen had heavy counter-claims which they would put forward, and said that much acrimonious and indeterminate wrangling would be avoided by fixing a lump sum. I promised to consider this proposal on my return to Bagdad.

10. Meanwhile the Ministers had prepared the draft Bon-Voisinage Agreement, the most important provisions of which were mutual recognition and exchange of diplomatic missions, the principles having been agreed on by the two Kings. It was decided that a further meeting of representatives of both countries would be convened after three months to conclude a formal agreement on the basis of the draft. It was now 5 P.M., and, as the conference had disposed of all outstanding questions at issue, the Kings bade one another an affectionate farewell and King Ibn Saud returned to the "Patrick Stewart." It remained for the Ministers to complete the draft letter which was to be exchanged between the two Kings on the subject of the desert posts.

11. At this stage a most unfortunate *contretemps* arose, which seemed at one time to be likely to wreck the success of the conference. The sub-committee of Ministers had agreed to the wording of the draft, a copy of which was typed and brought by Naji Suwaidi about 7 P.M. for King Faisal's signature. It transpired that Naji Suwaidi, without consulting King Faisal, had inserted the words: "To His Majesty Ibn Saud, King of the Hejaz and Nejd" at the beginning of the letter. King Faisal was furious with his Prime Minister for conceding, in a private letter, the principle of recognition, which was meant to be embodied for the first time in the treaty of bon-voisinage, and flatly refused to sign the letter. The Nejd Ministers were sent for and excitedly declined to agree to the omission of the words "King of the Hejaz" from the letter. A stormy scene ensued between the Ministers and King Faisal, and a complete deadlock was reached. As it was now 8 P.M. and the "Patrick Stewart" was due to sail that night, I had another letter faired and signed by King Faisal, commencing with the words "My dear brother," and offered to do my utmost to persuade King Ibn Saud to sign the duplicate. I then proceeded to the "Patrick Stewart" and found King Ibn Saud furiously angry at the turn which events had taken. After we had dined, I saw him alone in his cabin, and he told me that he had formed the impression that, in spite of his friendly protestations, King Faisal had determined to play him a trick over the question of recognition and the return of Ibn Mashhur. It was only after two hours' debate, from which the

Nejdi Ministers were excluded, that I finally induced King Ibn Saud to sign the letter, and we parted with every expression of friendship.

12. I attach copies of two telegrams exchanged between King Ibn Saud and myself after the meeting. His Majesty's telegram, which was received through the Political Agent at Bahrein, shows clearly the deep concern which King Ibn Saud felt on the two points he considered to be the test of King Faisal's good faith. Happily, one of these points has already been settled, as King Faisal has recently despatched a friendly letter to King Ibn Saud as the sequel to the initialling of the draft of bon-voisinage by the Ministers of Nejd and Iraq at Bagdad, in which he clearly alludes to King Ibn Saud as "King of the Hejaz and Nejd." I am pressing King Faisal to secure the early return of Ibn Mashhur and his followers to Nejd, and when this has been done and a lump sum has been agreed upon in full settlement of the claims of the Iraqi tribesmen against Nejd, I feel that the ground will have been prepared for the settlement of the most important question of all—that of the desert posts. This question has been already brought much nearer to a final settlement by the agreement of both Kings to a nominee of the British Government being appointed as the presiding arbitrator.

13. It is too early yet to say what the effects of the Lupin Conference will be, but the results achieved so far have exceeded my expectations and are a good augury for the future. It can at least be claimed that the two Kings, who have hitherto regarded one another with the darkest suspicion, if not with positive abhorrence, have been brought together in a friendly atmosphere and have listened to a frank expression of each other's difficulties and embarrassments. It is, perhaps, not too much to hope that, if nothing spectacular has been achieved, each King will be more ready in future to move some distance towards meeting the point of view of the other. In Bagdad, the conference is frankly acclaimed as a success and as a sign that there is no longer any insuperable obstacle to friendship between the two Arab peoples. King Ibn Saud professes to take the view that peace and friendship between Nejd and Iraq will still be impossible to maintain without the constant mediation and good offices of the representatives of His Majesty's Government. He made it clear to me, however, that, so far as he was concerned, his faith in the genuine desire of His Majesty's Government to promote goodwill between the peoples of Arabia had been strengthened by recent events, and that he was ready to place complete reliance on British impartiality and broadmindedness. I feel convinced that the generous hospitality of His Majesty's Government, which made possible the meeting of the two Kings, will be found to have been well worth while if only because of the personal contact which has been established between them for the first time.

14. In conclusion, I wish to express my sincere gratitude for the assistance I received throughout the conference from the captains, officers and crews of the three ships which attended the conference. To Commander Sir John Alleyne, Bart., D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., the captain of H.M.S. "Lupin," I am particularly indebted for the admirable manner in which he controlled the movements of the ships and carried through without a hitch the difficult arrangements connected with the meeting. To the skill of the three captains, and especially to the good sense and geniality of the two Kings themselves, the success of the "Lupin" Conference is chiefly due.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Government of India, the Hon. the Resident in the Persian Gulf, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, and the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosure 1 in No. 112.

Telegram from His Majesty King Ibn Saud to His Excellency the High Commissioner, Bagdad (Received under Political Agent, Bahrein's, Note of February 26, 1930).

Ramadhan 26, 1348.

WE have the pleasure to express our gratitude to your Excellency for your good efforts in binding the friendly relations between us and our brother, His Majesty King Faisal, and also between our two Governments and two nations. We are waiting for your Excellency to fulfil your promise to us in the last meeting in settling

the question of Iraq acknowledging clearly the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and Dependencies, as also in settling the question relating to Ibn Mashhur and others, who entered Iraq from among the rebels, in a satisfactory manner. In doing so you will strengthen the relations and remove every cause which may lead to misunderstanding between the two neighbouring kingdoms. In this connexion, we thought it fit to bring to your Excellency's notice the matters awaiting settlement between Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies, and Iraq, which were discussed during the last meeting: (1) The friendly neighbouring treaty, which was discussed and settled between the delegates of the two Governments, leaving nothing except entering into it in a legal manner; (2) the question of the forts, in which we agreed to the desire of the British and Iraq Governments, as was mentioned in the letter exchanged between us and our dear brother; (3) the question of plunder of the two States, which we authorised our dear brother Faisal to settle. He should either suggest a solution acceptable to us or suggest its transfer to the tribunal, for which we are ready, on condition that the meeting should not be fixed before the month of Safar. If this is desired, we should be informed of it before the end of Dhul Hijjah; (4) the question of Ibn Mashhur; (5) the Extradition Treaty. The proposals suggested by us in this connexion were handed over to the Iraq delegates by our delegates when they were in Koweit, which were discussed and nearly settled in Jedda when the discussion took place with the regretted late General Clayton. The most important matter about which the Hejaz and Nejd people are anxious is the question of executing your undertaking which you promised us. We request your Excellency to reply us very early on the questions mentioned above, so as to reach us before we reach the interior of Nejd. As you know, nothing will remove doubts and strengthen relations between the two countries except the execution of your last promise to us. Please reply soon. (Usual ending.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

Copy of Telegram from His Excellency the High Commissioner, Bagdad, to His Majesty King Ibn Saud (sent to Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire, under Note of February 27, 1930).

I THANK your Majesty for your friendly letter of 26th Ramadhan. It was a great pleasure to me to meet your Majesty, and I share the hope that the meeting between your Majesty and His Majesty King Faisal will pave the way to permanent friendly relations between the two Kings and a satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions between the two Governments and two nations. Your Majesty may rely upon me to spare no effort to ensure this result, which is a matter of the deepest interest to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

[E 2111/89/91]

No. 113.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 67.) R.

Foreign Office, April 26, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. 29 and your despatch No. 65 of 16th March: Nejd-Transjordan raiding.

If you consider some interim reply essential, you should explain to Ibn Saud that it is only by concerted action on the part of the authorities in both countries to control their respective tribesmen and punish raiders that an improvement in the situation can be attained. His Majesty's Minister is due to arrive at Jedda in the very near future, and I feel convinced that matters may be more profitably discussed by His Majesty with Sir A. Ryan than in further written communications.

As regards the request contained in the note enclosed in your despatch that steps should be taken for the solution of the question of past raid claims, His Majesty will be aware that the investigator into these claims has been appointed, and it is proposed that he should begin his task so soon as he has been able to see the King.

[E 2374/1/91]

No. 114.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, May 6, 1930.

YOUR telegram.

In response to continuous pressure from me, King Feisal has given me a promise that he will do his best to force Ibn Mashur to return to Nejd. In any case he will not permit him to stay in Iraq. He is writing to Ibn Saud on question of safe conduct for Ibn Mashur.

(Repeated to Jedda and Bushire.)

[E 2421/54/91]

No. 115.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 81.)

Jedda, April 3, 1930.

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to enclose my report on the 1929 pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

2. In compiling this report I have received considerable assistance from the Indian vice-consul. I am also indebted to the Malay pilgrimage officer and the Indian doctor for much useful information.

3. I regret that, owing to pressure of work, it has been quite impossible for me to despatch this report earlier.

4. I am sending copies to Simla, Singapore, Cairo and Khartum.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Report on the Pilgrimage of 1929.

- (1).—Introductory and general.
- (2).—Statistics.
- (3).—Quarantine.
- (4).—Health.
- (5).—Transport.
- (6).—Customs.
- (7).—Mutawwif.
- (8).—Religious intolerance.

- (9).—Indian pilgrimage.
- (10).—Afghan pilgrimage.
- (11).—Malay pilgrimage.
- (12).—West African pilgrimage.
- (13).—Sudanese pilgrimage.
- (14).—Iraqi pilgrimage.
- (15).—Palestinian pilgrimage.
- (16).—Sarawak pilgrimage.

(1).—Introductory and General.

NO sooner was the 1928 pilgrimage concluded than the political horizon began to cloud over, and omens appeared which boded ill for the pilgrimage of 1929.

2. The first of these was the death of the King's father, Abdurrahman-el-Feisal-al-Saud immediately after the Haj, an event which, in the nature of things, threatened to give rise to domestic trouble and internal strife. It was feared that the King's brother, the Emir Mohammed, who was in a position to exercise considerable influence over certain powerful tribes with whom he was connected by ties of relationship, might revolt. The King, however, showed wisdom and tact in dealing with the situation, and there were no untoward developments.

3. Trouble of a serious nature was brewing nevertheless and culminated in the Akhwan revolt under Feisal-ed-Doweish, Ibn Bujad and other powerful leaders who did not see eye to eye with the King over matters of policy, and who interpreted the inauguration of new measures of reform on the part of the King as being radically opposed to their traditions and religion.

4. All measures taken to effect a compromise or a reconciliation proved unsuccessful, and there ensued a period of anarchy in Northern Arabia which might have been disastrous to the pilgrimage had its true dimensions become generally known to the outside world.

5. The King's victory over the rebels at Sabilla in March 1929 settled matters for the time being. Had the result been different, the lives of many of the pilgrims might possibly have been in danger.

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6. Other factors tending to reduce the number of pilgrims were the failure of the rice crop in Java, and the dullness of the rubber market in Malaya. Some 31,429 pilgrims only came from Java, Malaya and China as compared with 49,394 in 1928. The number of pilgrims from Malaya this year was extremely low, being only 1,455 as compared with 12,184 and 4,418 in the years 1927 and 1928 respectively. The revolt in Afghanistan, as well as the communal riots in Bombay which broke out simultaneously with the advent of the pilgrimage season, were to a certain extent responsible for the decrease in the number of Afghan, and for the comparatively small number of the Indian, pilgrims who arrived. Nevertheless, these last showed an increase of 1,000 over the previous year's figures. The North African pilgrims also came in larger numbers. Egypt, however, showed the greatest increase, having sent nearly 4,000 more pilgrims than in 1928.

7. The total number of pilgrims who came by sea was 85,051, a figure which is nearly 15,000 less than that of the previous year.

8. The number of pilgrims arriving from the interior of Arabia was 80 per cent. less than in 1928. This may be ascribed in great measure to the revolt in Nejd and to the fact that the Government itself considered it inadvisable that the more fanatical tribes should come to Mecca for the Haj in any large numbers. Precautionary measures were accordingly taken by the Government and the small number of pilgrims who did come from the interior were disarmed at the outposts. The decrease in the number of the Nejd pilgrims, however, was to the advantage of the other pilgrims, as these turbulent tribesmen, mounted on their camels, had in former years trampled down numbers of helpless pilgrims in the bazaar of Muna.

9. Taken all round, the pilgrimage for 1929 may be reckoned a successful one, both as regards the number of pilgrims who attended and as regards the sanitary and other arrangements made.

10. "Haj" day fell on Saturday, the 18th May. The weather was moderately cool except on the first day in Arafat, but a heavy shower of rain which fell there on that day brought some relief. The Hejaz Government had provided a few troughs between Mecca and Arafat for the supply of free water, and had also erected wooden sheds in which the pilgrims could rest. The wells and the water reservoirs constructed by the "Nehr-i-Zubaida Committee" also proved of great benefit to the pilgrims. In Jedda, as both the condensers were in proper working order, arrangements for water were entirely satisfactory.

11. The medical arrangements at Muna were good; those at the Central Hospital in Mecca, however, showed little or no improvement on last year. One feature of the general arrangements deserving of praise was the system by which persons suffering from sunstroke were taken in motor-buses from the desert plains of Arafat and Muna to Mecca for medical attention. Measures introduced for the removal of pilgrims who died on the road were also effective.

12. The road between Jedda and Mecca was in a very bad condition in spite of repairs undertaken last year. The project to lay wire netting along the sandiest stretches of the road did not materialise.

13. Arrangements for the recovery of the personal effects of deceased pilgrims were most unsatisfactory. Last year certain regulations were introduced which it was hoped would ensure their safe custody. Unfortunately, the result was quite the contrary, and money and personal effects frequently disappeared. The mutawwifs (pilgrim guides) resumed their old practices of presenting to the Bait-el-Mal a fraction only of the personal estate of pilgrims dying in their charge.

14. The proposal made last year to regulate the exercise of the profession of mutawwif was not pursued.

15. The shipping arrangements were on the whole satisfactory. The Nemazee Line, however, gave ground for complaint, as their returning pilgrims were detained for many days while their ships waited in harbour for a full complement of passengers. The different shipping companies bringing pilgrims did not accept during the season return tickets other than those of their own company. This, as usual, resulted in the enforced detention of pilgrims, a detention which, as has been said before, can only be avoided if the system of compulsory deposits in India is introduced.

16. The number of destitute Indian pilgrims repatriated amount to 139. It would have been smaller but for the facility existing of using the land route through Nejd.

17. Under the conditions prevailing it was easy, setting aside the question of security, for pilgrims to come by boat from any port on the coast near Karachi or on the eastern side of the Persian Gulf, to enter Nejd and to proceed thence to the

Hejaz. The majority of the Indian pilgrims, who afterwards figured as destitutes, came by this route.

18. The poorest section of the pilgrims were undoubtedly the Nigerians and other West Africans, known under the general heading of Takrunis. From these the Hejaz Government derives no financial gain, and they are considered rather as an unwelcome burden. To use the words of the King: "They are obnoxious in the Haram, and occupy a large amount of space in the already congested accommodation of Mecca, to the considerable inconvenience of the other pilgrims." As a matter of fact, though, these Takruni pilgrims are a blessing to the Hejaz Government, being essential to the smooth working of the machinery of the pilgrimage. No regular labour is available in the Hejaz; as soon as the Takrunis set foot in Jedda, they busy themselves in carrying the luggage of other pilgrims and assisting them in various other matters in connexion with transport. Especially are they indispensable in Mecca for the supply of water, which, without them, would for many pilgrims be well-nigh impossible to obtain.

19. These unfortunate Takrunis, despite their utility, are everywhere looked upon with contempt and subjected to humiliation. After the Haj, in order to collect money for their return tickets, they try to obtain employment of some kind or another, and if they are unsuccessful they lead a pariah existence in Jedda, often for months on end. This time, however, those who passed through Suakin were compelled by the Nigerian and the Sudan Governments to purchase return tickets, and it is due to this that Takruni destitutes who appealed to the British agency for assistance in obtaining their return passages were considerably fewer than in previous years. The scheme at present under the consideration of the Nigerian and Sudan Governments for the control of the West African pilgrimage, would, if carried through, go a long way, it is thought, towards ameliorating the unfortunate conditions under which the Takrunis perform the pilgrimage.

20. Afghan destitute pilgrims numbered sixty-five, and they were in a miserable plight after the pilgrimage. The Turkish representative, though claiming to be in charge of Afghan interests, refused to disburse any money for their repatriation. The richer merchants of Jedda, however, took pity on them, and raised a fund by private subscription in order to repatriate them. They were repatriated by the Mogul Line, nominally at the expense of the Jedda merchants, but, as a matter of fact, Messrs. Turner Morrison made no charges; for this they deserve all praise.

21. No Moslem ruling chief visited the Hejaz this year. A few lesser chieftains of the Hadramaut, who generally rejoice in the title of "Sultan," came on pilgrimage. Among others, the Emir of Jaalan (Muscat) is perhaps worth mentioning. The Emir of Jaalan busied himself to some extent with political matters, and with establishing a friendly relationship with the King. A large number of better-class Indians, including high officials, barristers, landlords and merchants came on pilgrimage. A notable Syrian who came was the Emir Shekib Arslan, the notorious Nationalist. He was entertained as a Royal guest, and accommodation was arranged for him with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

22. This year, again, there was no Moslem conference at Mecca. His Majesty the King performed the opening ceremony in connexion with the Holy Carpet of the Ka'aba in the presence of all the notable pilgrims of different nations and sects. His Majesty also gave a banquet which was attended by over 400 of these pilgrims, who thus had the opportunity of exchanging views and also of being introduced to the King and of meeting the higher State officials. This banquet may perhaps be regarded as a substitute for the Moslem Conference.

23. As in 1927 and 1928, no "Mahmal" was sent this year from Egypt. The Holy Carpet was prepared at Mecca, as in the previous year, by Indian weavers under an Indian manager, himself working under the direction of M. Mohammed Ismail Ghaznavi. A dispute between the manager and the weavers resulted in the imprisonment of a few of the workers. A party of these latter came to Jedda in a poverty-stricken condition, complaining of not having received the money for their return passage, nor even certain arrears of salary due to them. Some of them were repatriated as destitutes.

24. The Egyptian Government, as usual, sent a medical mission, but it had a great many difficulties to contend with owing to the obstructive attitude of the Hejaz authorities.

25. As regards revenue, custom dues on articles and goods brought in by pilgrims, produced about the same amount as in the previous year, but much gain

resulted to the Government by the raising of the Kushan tax levied on pilgrims who travelled to Medina by car.

26. The comparative abundance of motor-buses and keen competition among the several motor companies caused the rate of transport between Mecca and Medina to drop from £15 to £9, inclusive of the Government's "Kushan." This, however, while making the journey to Medina easier for large numbers of the poorer pilgrims, did much harm to trade generally. Nearly 60 per cent. of the goods stored by merchants in Mecca and Jedda for the pilgrimage season could not be sold, as a great many pilgrims went on to Medina immediately and had no money on their return for disbursement in the country. The Government is likely to be a loser on this account, as the merchants will probably import considerably less goods for the 1930 pilgrimage, and there will be a corresponding diminution in the customs receipts in respect of general merchandise. Some compensation may, however, be forthcoming from increased importation of grain, as the Government has instructed traders in Nejd to buy this commodity in the Hejaz itself, despite the fact that grain coming from India, the principal country of origin, takes ten days only to reach Nejd by way of the Persian Gulf, as against twenty days, involving so much increased freight, when it is imported via Jedda. This is perhaps intended to enrich the Hejaz at the expense of Koweit.

(2.)—Statistics.

The number of pilgrims who arrived by sea and their countries of embarkation are as follows:—

Country of Embarkation.	Number of Pilgrims.	Country of Embarkation.	Number of Pilgrims.
India	19,656	Syria	962
Dutch East Indies ...	28,277	Mokalla	772
British Malaya	4,297	Russia	207
East Africa	305	Turkish ports ...	317
Sudan	2,334	North Africa ...	4,396
Massowa	652		
Egypt	20,409		82,584

The transport of pilgrims was carried out by ships of the following nationalities:—

Flags.	Number of Pilgrims.	Flags.	Number of Pilgrims.
British	56,588	French	3,805
Dutch	20,199	Russians	524
Italian	652		
Egyptian	815		82,584

Pilgrims were of the following nationalities:—

Nationality.	Number of Pilgrims.	Nationality.	Number of Pilgrims.
Javanese	31,119	Egyptians	18,522
Malayans	1,455	Syrians	962
Various Far Eastern pilgrims	1,115	Palestinians ...	558
Bokharans (Russians) ...	207	Turks	214
Indians	15,146	Tripolitarians and Cyrenaicans ...	132
Senegalese	73	Eritreans	33
Persians	3,808	Algerians	2,200
Muscatis	229	Tunisians	1,496
Iraqis	207	Moroccans	700
Hejazis	968	West Africans and Nigerians ...	2,338
Hadramis	772	Sudanese	1,371
Yemenis	1,867	Other unclassified pilgrims who came by pilgrim ships ...	889
Afghans	1,705		88,558
Nejdis	62		
Somalis (Italian)	14		
Somalis (British)	249		
South Africans	85		
Zanzibar and East Africa	42		

The discrepancy between the figure of 82,584 given as the total of the first two lists above and that of 88,558 shown in the third list is due to the fact that the first two lists are compiled from figures obtained from the shipping companies and are based on payments of quarantine dues, whereas the larger figure is supplied by the local Government, and includes infants whom the shipping companies do not take into account.

The number and nationality of ships employed on the pilgrimage were as follows:—

Nationality.	Number of Ships.	Nationality.	Number of Ships.
British	109	French	2
Dutch	32	Soviet	1
Italian	22		
Egyptian	2		168

(3.)—Quarantine.

(A.) Kamaran.

Pilgrims of all classes again complained vociferously of the formalities to which they were subjected at Kamaran.

Their complaints generally related to the following points:—

(a) *Disembarkation.*—Women and children, as also weak or sick persons, are exposed to the sun in lighters which are unprotected by any sort of awning. As a matter of fact the same thing occurs in Jedda, but possibly as it is the pilgrims' first impression of the Holy Land, this is not made a subject of complaint.

(b) *Transfer from Quay to Quarantine Station.*—Pilgrims have stated that they have to traverse the distance, about a quarter of a mile, over hot sand in the sun, and that this involves hardships for their women and children.

(c) *Baths.*—Objection has been raised against the present system of compulsory baths whereby all pilgrims without any sort of distinction, except for the few who choose to hire a special bathroom at a cost of 5 rupees, have to bathe together in one big hall. Better class pilgrims or those who have a greater sense of cleanliness seem to object to bathing with lower class and dirtier pilgrims. It would not, however, appear possible to provide an alternative unless pilgrims are prepared to pay for the luxury of a separate bathroom.

Similarly, the women have to take their bath together wrapped only in a short lungi. Protests were received to the effect that this offended Mahometan conception of decency and sense of purda, and that it was highly resented.

It is complained that the bath given entails risk to the pilgrims' health, and is thought to have given rise to protracted disorders from which pilgrims suffer occasionally after leaving Kamaran. It is stated that pilgrims have to wait for some time in the open air after leaving the bathing room, dressed only in wet lungis, while they search for their clothes, which are thrown in heaps on the ground after disinfection.

Strong objection has been raised to the mixing of clothes of better class pilgrims with those of less cleanly and lower class pilgrims. This, apart from other and more obvious objections, is stated to cause inconvenience to pilgrims when they attempt to identify their clothing after the bath. The arrangements for disinfection were criticised also on the ground that only such clothing as the pilgrims have on their persons is disinfected, whereas the entire luggage, other dirty clothes, bedding, &c., which they leave on board ship, are ignored.

(d) *Food Supply at Kamaran.*—The food-stuff generally sold in the market is said to be of inferior and unwholesome quality.

(e) *Thefts of Pilgrims' Belongings.*—Complaints were also received of pilferage alleged to have been committed on board ship during the absence of the pilgrims in the quarantine camp. Furthermore, passports, return tickets and money are said to have been taken or lost when the pilgrims' clothes were removed for disinfection.

Since the introduction of compulsory vaccination and inoculation among the Javanese pilgrims these do not land at Kamaran, and their ships stay there for a few

hours only. British subjects take it amiss to see a Javanese pilgrim ship leaving before their eyes, within a few hours of her arrival, while they are still subjected to the inconvenience of the quarantine regulations.

I understand that a suggestion has been made that previous inoculation and vaccination should be made compulsory for Indian pilgrims, and that, if this were so, it might be possible to dispense with their visit to Kamaran altogether. To cut out this visit completely would only aggravate the pilgrims' troubles in Jedda, as the Hejaz Government would then, especially in the case of an epidemic breaking out on board ship, apply their own regulations and relegate the pilgrims to the quarantine island outside Jedda, where they would fare greatly worse than at Kamaran.

The quarantine doctor's partiality for alcoholic refreshment, which he takes at leisure on board ship, before declaring the ship free, has already formed the subject of remarks. One result is that the Indian pilgrimage officer is often kept waiting alongside the pilgrim ships for prolonged periods before he can begin his work. This is regrettable in many ways, for it is important that he should get into touch with the pilgrims and interrogate them before their attention is distracted by the presence of the large number of dhowmen, &c., who, under the existing regulations, board the ship at the same time as Munshi Ihsanullah himself. Representations are being made to the local authorities on this score.

(B.) *Tor.*

The total number of pilgrims who landed at the Tor Quarantine Station in 1929, on their return from Mecca, was 29,358, the largest number since 1908, when 30,429 pilgrims were disembarked.

2. Judging by the statistics, the general state of health of the pilgrims detained at Tor in 1929, though satisfactory, compares unfavourably with that of the pilgrims who passed through Tor in the two preceding years. It is difficult to attribute any reasons for this, especially in view of the fact that the climatic conditions ruling in the Hejaz in 1929 were more favourable than in 1928, and the organisation of the sanitary services more efficient. It can only be assumed that the standard of physical fitness of the pilgrims who visited this country in 1929 was lower than usual and they were in consequence more prone to infection.

(4.)—*Health.*

Small-pox was the only disease which assumed epidemic proportions during the pilgrimage season, and that only during the months of March and April. The number of deaths from small-pox is believed to have amounted to 250, of whom seventy were Javanese, the remainder being Nigerians and Bedouins. The Hejaz official reports are, however, remarkably reticent on the subject of deaths from this cause. Comparatively few Indians suffered from the disease. Among the victims was the Prime Minister of the Maldives Islands; also one of the Indian clerks attached to the British agency.

2. The Hejaz authorities viewed the outbreak of small-pox with considerable alarm owing to the presence of the Nejd and Yemeni pilgrims who were not vaccinated. When the fact was known that an Indian steamer, "Zayani," which arrived on the 18th April, had a case of infection on board, a proposal was made that all pilgrims should be compulsorily vaccinated on landing at Jedda. This proposal, however, was not carried into effect, but a system of voluntary vaccination was introduced instead. It was widely advertised and a number of Hejazis and others took advantage of it. The lymph was locally prepared and supplied free to all medical practitioners.

3. No effective means were taken to segregate infected persons and it was only due to the fact that the hot season had set in in full force before the majority of the pilgrims had reached the country, that the epidemic did not assume greater proportions. The Hejaz Government attempted to fix on the Javanese the blame for having introduced the disease.

4. Dysentery and its kindred troubles are endemic in the Hejaz. This can be accounted for by the system of storing water in cisterns which are never cleaned out, by unhygienic latrines which are never disinfected, and by meat and other food which is exposed to fly-borne infection. Dysentery was responsible for the largest mortality among the pilgrims causing 400 out of a total of 700 deaths. The Indians were particularly susceptible to it. A large percentage of the Indian pilgrims suffered

from malaria. Fortunately, however, fatal cases were few. Pneumonia, bronchitis, fever and colds were also prevalent among the pilgrims; in many cases these illnesses were stated by the pilgrims to have been contracted during the quarantine stay at Kamaran.

Mortality.

5. A percentage of 6 per cent. or 880 deaths were reported among the Indian and Malay pilgrims, whereas in the case of the Javanese the Dutch vice-consul reported that as many as 10 per cent. died. As regards the Indians, the largest percentage of deaths occurred among the Bengalis. A large proportion of the Bengali pilgrims were, however, of an advanced age. At Muna itself the death rate was high, most of the deaths being as usual due to sunstroke. The total number of deaths during the four days' stay at Muna and Arafat, was, however, in the official report declared to be only 241 in 100,000.

6. The temperature in the shade at Muna was 115 degrees as against 124 degrees in the preceding year. The majority of pilgrims were accommodated in low, thin canvas tents, a meagre protection against the intense heat. The poorer class of pilgrims could not even afford such shelter and wandered about in the heat in search of food and water, thus falling an easy prey to sunstroke. Many succumbed on their way to the mosques for the mid-day prayers or when proceeding to offer sacrifices or to perform other similar rites, others while wandering in search of their companions.

Sanitary Conditions (General).

7. Other factors conducive to illness were as follows: The average pilgrim, at any rate so far as the Indian pilgrims are concerned, does not bring to the Hejaz sufficient funds to admit of his hiring decent accommodation. Most of the pilgrims are allotted dark, dingy and unsanitary houses where they are packed together in small, dirty rooms. Proper latrines in the houses do not exist in sufficient numbers and human excreta and water drain into and accumulate in a common soak-pit beneath the ground floor; no attempt is ever made by the landlords to disinfect it or clean it out, and a foul odour persists round the houses polluting the whole atmosphere.

8. The Government has so far done nothing towards building public lavatories. Pilgrims who, for want of house accommodation at Muna, camp in the streets have no other lavatory but the streets themselves, and consequently the stench within yards of any wall is almost overpowering. Such efforts as are made to clean the streets and congested areas where the pilgrims reside are entirely inadequate. In fact the Hejaz officials appointed to look into the question of pilgrim housing accommodation were most lax in carrying out their duties, and the local Government is greatly to blame for allowing such a state of affairs to exist.

9. The pilgrims themselves, however, were not entirely blameless. In many cases they failed to observe the commonest rules of health and sanitation. For instance, although a special enclosure had been railed off for the slaughter of animals, pilgrims occasionally took advantage of the local officials' laxity and slaughtered their animals wherever they happened to be, subsequently leaving the remains to decompose in the immediate vicinity. The intense heat of the sun alone saves the Hejaz from outbreaks of serious epidemics every year from this cause.

Water Supply.

10. At Jedda there was no difficulty in obtaining water as the output of the two condensers was sufficient to meet the demand. The highest price reached did not exceed 6 annas per tin of 4 gallons.

11. The water supply at Mecca was also sufficient, the prices varying from 2 to 5 annas per tin. At Arafat and Muna, however, where the demand was heavy and water carriers were not available in adequate numbers, the price rose to 12 annas per tin. There was no lack of water, however, for those who were prepared to pay the required price. At Arafat a new well was built by a generous Mecca merchant at a cost of £1,200; this was a great boon to the pilgrims. The Government also built new wells both at Muna and Mozelfa, and in addition six reservoirs were erected where free water was distributed to the poor.

Relief Measures at Mecca, Muna and Arafat.

12. The Hejaz Government maintain a central hospital at Mecca with branches in each quarter of the town. It was, however, of no great value to the pilgrims as it was inadequately equipped and understaffed. The medical officers employed were with two exceptions Syrians. Besides being unqualified and inexperienced, these men appeared to be far more anxious to enrich themselves than to afford relief to the pilgrims. They were unsympathetic in their treatment, and charged high fees to outside patients.

13. Arrangements were made by the local Government for doctors and tents to be stationed along the road from Mecca to Arafat. Each tent was provided with a large canvas cistern containing water which was available for the relief of passers-by. The arrangements made for the removal of pilgrims suffering from sunstroke were good. Lorries carrying medical staffs patrolled different areas picking up cases of illness and conveying them to the nearest first-aid station, after which they were transferred to the central hospital in Mecca. Covered cars were supplied to remove the dead.

14. The Egyptian Government was the foremost in providing medical aid for their pilgrims. They keep up a large and well-equipped dispensary at Mecca and Medina, and field hospitals were also brought for the season and functioned at Jedda, Mecca, Muna and Arafat. Two ambulances were imported to attend to the pilgrims at Muna, but the local authorities forbade their circulation.

Government of India Dispensaries.

15. The agency doctor reports that the total number of Indian pilgrims who attended the agency's dispensary was 1,882 at Jedda and 934 at Mecca, and that apart from pilgrims he treated 8,460 cases among resident Indians and other British subjects between the 24th January and the 15th July.

The table given below gives a rough percentage of the different cases treated in the Indian dispensary:—

MEDICAL.		Percentage.
(1) Malaria and its complications	...	29.50
(2) Dysentery	...	15.25
(3) Diarrhoea	...	6.00
(4) Other diseases of the digestive system	...	2.50
(5) Respiratory diseases	...	10.25
(6) Circulatory diseases80
(7) Nervous diseases	...	2.25
(8) Urinary and venereal	...	21.20
(9) Eye	...	3.45
(10) Ear, nose and throat diseases	...	2.50
(11) Diseases of women50
(12) Skin diseases	...	2.25
(13) Heat prostration	...	1.50
Total	...	87.95
SURGICAL.		Percentage.
(14) Wounds, sinus, fistulae and ulcers	...	6.25
(15) Abscesses	...	2.05
(16) Fractures, dislocations and dislocation of joints75
(17) Injuries and contusions	...	2.00
(18) Carious teeth	...	1.00
Total	...	12.05

16. The Indian doctor is considerably handicapped when at Muna and Arafat by the fact that, as things are at present, he, as also the Indian vice-consul, is compelled to encamp in an out-of-the-way and unfrequented locality. Although pilgrims may know of the existence of the dispensary, they experience great difficulty

in finding it. It is very necessary that the tents both of the Indian doctor and of the Indian vice-consul should be pitched in a conspicuous and accessible locality and signboards erected to advertise their presence to the passers-by. At Muna the only suitable place is in the main thoroughfare, which the pilgrims traverse while on their way to prayers. The houses at Muna are not only in a wretched and unsanitary condition, but the rentals demanded are exorbitant (an ordinary house cannot be leased for less than £100 for three days). It is therefore suggested that in future an open space be hired on the main thoroughfare at a cost for the season of anything up to £30 for the dispensary and for the Indian pilgrimage officer.

Dispensary Staff.

17. This year the Government of India supplied a military sub-assistant surgeon and the Government of the Straits Settlements a dresser, who worked in conjunction with the Indian doctor. This is not an ideal arrangement, and it may become necessary to make other recommendations in this connexion (see also observations below, under the heading of the Malay pilgrimage, regarding the appointment of a Malay dresser).

18. It has been represented to me by the agency doctor that it would be preferable that a private assistant surgeon (M.B.B.S.) should be engaged instead of a sub-assistant surgeon as hitherto, and that, if this is not found possible, an older and more experienced sub-assistant surgeon might be selected for the post. In either case it should be clearly brought home to possible incumbents that at least seven hours' daily work will be demanded of them, and that they are debarred from engaging in private practice.

19. Dr. Muzaffar Ali, who was in charge of the Government of India dispensary, performed his duties with zeal, and his services were of great value to the pilgrims.

(5.)—Transport.

The year 1929 showed a considerable increase in the number of motor vehicles used. The total is said to have reached a thousand. Comparatively few touring cars were available, as, owing to their smaller carrying capacity, and to the fact that they pay the same kushan tax and mutawwif's commission as lorries, their use leaves but little margin of profit for the owners. Consequently, even the better-class and wealthier pilgrims had in most cases to travel in motor lorries. In many cases those who had secured cars for Medina could not, even by paying a higher rate, obtain cars for their return journey, and had to put up with all the inconveniences of a journey by lorry. There were frequent complaints on this account, and it was rarely possible, unless strong representations were made by the Indian pilgrimage officer himself, to obtain a refund of the difference between the car and lorry fares. In some cases, however, the motor owners concerned blamed the Government and proved that their cars had been commandeered. In other cases, when pilgrims were detained in Medina for lack of transport, motor companies were obliged to send cars to Medina to fetch their respective pilgrims.

2. Complaints in connexion with transport were also concerned with the following points:—

(1) *Motor Accidents.*—Several reports were received of the overturning of motor buses, resulting in some cases in deaths. Among the British pilgrims several Indians were seriously hurt, although there were no deaths among these. The accidents were mainly due to the incompetence of drivers and to reckless driving.

(2) *Arabias* (a form of conveyance used between the outskirts of Mecca and the pilgrims' quarters).—Motor cars are not allowed to enter the pilgrims' quarters at Mecca, but are obliged to halt at a point anything from a mile to 2 miles distant from them. The pilgrims have to hire arabias to carry their families and luggage for the remaining distance. The rate of hire is exorbitant, ranging from £1 to £2, or even more during the rush period.

(3) *The Kushan System at Mecca.*—For a period of a fortnight immediately succeeding the Haj—that is, during the rush period—the existing

arrangements for issuing the kushans are entirely inadequate. The pilgrims have to wait for long hours at the Kushan Office, and money is often extorted before they are allowed to take their turn. It is proposed to take up this matter with the local authorities with a view to inducing them to issue the kushans beforehand to the motor companies, thus avoiding the delay caused at the Kushan Office.

- (4) The arrangements for the examination of cars at Jedda prior to their departure for Medina often involved the pilgrims in considerable delays; they were sometimes kept waiting for as long as twenty-four hours before the final formalities were completed. The motor companies were also guilty of delays in despatching their cars, and in many cases the intervention of the police had to be sought. A certain Syed Siraj Wali, who besides being the owner of a motor company is also a mutawwif for the Malabar and for certain other Indian pilgrims, was one of the chief offenders.

- (5) *Over-charging on Fares by Mutawwifs.*—The local authorities were induced to make a regulation to prevent the mutawwifs, who possessed cars for hire, from charging the pilgrims a higher rate than that allowed by the Government. This regulation, unfortunately, was allowed to lapse, as is often the case with regulations in the Hejaz. Representations to the Qaimaqam and to the police were, however, to some extent successful in redressing grievances.

- (6) *Refund of return Motor-hire in respect of Pilgrims who died at Medina.*—The local Bait-el-Mal makes no attempt to collect the return half of the motor fare of pilgrims who die at Medina when it takes over the estates of such pilgrims. Steps are being taken with the Hejaz authorities to protect the estates of deceased pilgrims in this respect.

3. The Saudieh Motor Company and a few influential persons, finding themselves unable to withstand the competition of other motor companies and to make a profit, approached the King in order to obtain the enactment of a law regulating motor traffic. In consequence, a "Nakaba" (a committee for the control of the motor traffic) was appointed, and the motor service thus came under the direct control of the Government. All journeys were booked through the "Nakaba," and the motor companies could only obtain pilgrims in their turn. This put an end to the competition prevailing, and the pilgrims had to pay maximum fares and be content to travel by any car or lorry, good or bad, which happened to be available at the time. To meet the expenses of the "Nakaba," a tax of 2 piastres for Mecca and 8 piastres for Medina was imposed, per passenger, on the motor service companies.

4. The mutawwifs lost much of their brokerage through the constitution of the "Nakaba." They were therefore anxious to abolish it. Finding no other pretext available, they gave a religious colouring to their persuasions, and, quoting the example of the Prophet Mohammed, urged that the Haj performed by camel secured greater merit in the eye of God, than if performed by car. The pilgrims were easily duped, and resumed travelling by camel in large numbers. The diminution in the number of persons travelling in motor vehicles affected Treasury receipts, and the Opposition party, seeing their chance, took the matter to the King, with the result that the Royal decree establishing the "Nakaba" was, as an exceptional measure, rescinded. The motor companies, having once more a free hand, began competition afresh, and this resulted in the motor hire falling from £15 to £9, or even £8½ in the case of the journey to Medina, and to 12s. as against £1 5s. in the case of the journey from Jedda to Mecca. This, however, did not benefit the pilgrims much, as they still had to pay the higher rate, the difference between the higher rate and the reduced rate going into the pockets of their mutawwifs, who hired cars for them at the lowest prices available. Protests made against these malpractices on the part of the mutawwifs were effective in some, though by no means in all, cases.

5. Another regulation affecting motor transport was the restriction imposed by the Government on the import of motor vehicles into this country, by which no car could be imported without the previous sanction of the Viceroy. This arrangement greatly profited those persons who had the Viceroy's ear, Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited), among others, deriving considerable benefit. On the other hand, it checked a disproportionate increase in the supply of cars as compared with the demand.

Motor Drivers.

6. The Indian drivers here possess a good reputation for skill and good behaviour. One motor company which had employed Indian drivers was highly popular on this account, and other companies were tempted by this to recruit Indian drivers from India. No complaints were received from the Indian employees of motor companies against their employers, except from those employed by Syed Siraj Wali, already mentioned, who engaged drivers at Bombay at very low salaries, alleging a low cost of living in the Hejaz, and further bound them by an agreement to serve him for fourteen months, in default of which they were to pay him 1,000 rupees in compensation.

7. It is suggested that, in order to safeguard the interests of ignorant drivers, notices should be widely published in the vernacular press in India some time before the pilgrimage season, informing persons who seek such service of the conditions prevailing here.

Camels.

8. Apart from the poorest class of pilgrims who travelled on foot, the majority of the pilgrims travelled by cars. Camels, therefore, were easily obtainable, and pilgrims were not delayed on this account as they have been in previous years.

9. Camel hire between Jedda and Mecca this year was approximately the same as that of the year before or perhaps even lower, owing to a decrease in the price of motor hire compared with 1928. The following is a schedule of the rates of camel hire for the various journeys, and also of other sundry expenses connected therewith:—

(i) Journey from Jedda to Mecca:—

	By Shuqduf. Rupees.	By Shabriah. Rupees.
Camel hire	14/4/-	13/6/-
Cost of Shabriah	5/-/-
Two earthenware jars for water ...	-/6/-	-/6/-
Shuqduf hire	2/8/-	...
Two baskets for jars of water ...	-/8/-	-/8/-
Two mats to cover Shuqduf ...	2/8/-	...
Municipal tax	-/4/-	-/2/-
Wages of servant accompanying to Mecca	-/6/-	-/6/-
Bahra halt charges	-/4/-	-/4/-

NOTE.—The amounts in both cases are for two pilgrims, and include the kushan tax of 10s. in each case.

(ii) Return journey from Mecca to Jedda:—

The camel hire was increased from £1 to £2, while all other expenses remained as for the first journey. This was due to the increase in the Government kushan from 10s. to £1, and also to the additional charge of about 1s. 6d. in the fee of the mutawwifs and of the sheikhs of the camel men. The camel men received what was left. There may have been some justification for the increase charged by the camel men, as they had to pay higher price for fodder, but there was no apparent reason for doubling the kushan tax.

(iii) Journey to Muna and Arafat and back to Mecca:—

	Rupees.
Camel hire, £3	41/-/-
Shuqduf hire, £1	13/8/-
Mats, lighting, servant, and other expenses...	5/-/-
	59/8/-

NOTE.—This amount is for two pilgrims, and includes the kushan tax of £1.

Camels for this journey were easily obtainable, both for the reason given above and in consequence of the fact that the large numbers of Javanese pilgrims, who as a rule blindly follow the dictates of their mutawwifs, were for the most part transported to Arafat four to five days before the Haj. This was of benefit to the Indians, who did not leave Mecca until a day or two before the Haj and were spared the necessity of camping at Arafat in the heat for several days in tents.

(iv) The journey from Mecca to Medina and back to Jedda :—

	Rupees.
Camel hire for Medina, £12 10s.	176
Shuqduf hire	12
Wages of a servant	10
Miscellaneous expenses of lighting, &c.	5
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This, again, is for two pilgrims, and includes kushan tax of £6, or, approximately, 80 rupees. The above are the fixed rates; some pilgrims, however, managed to obtain cheaper rates owing to the great number of camels available.

(6.)—Customs.

Customs formalities in the case of pilgrims entering the country were tightened up owing to attempts on the part of pilgrims and local merchants to use pilgrims' baggage as a means of importing goods in some quantity without paying customs dues. The authorities made a very thorough search of pilgrims' baggage, with the result that there was great congestion in the limited space of the custom-house. It would be as well if a general warning were issued to pilgrims not to attempt to smuggle goods into this country on their own account or on behalf of other persons. In this connexion, some difficulty is experienced by the pilgrims in bringing in linen for shrouds, as is their usual custom. It would save a certain amount of trouble in the Indian pilgrimage office if pilgrims were advised to have it cut into the proper lengths before leaving India. If brought in in short lengths it is not subject to the payment of customs dues, whereas if full, uncut pieces are imported, customs dues are charged. This was frequently the subject of complaint.

2. Several cases of theft at the custom-house were reported by pilgrims. The custom-house officials are, for the most part, of low class, and are poorly paid, and they are not averse on occasion to purloining articles if the owner's attention flags during the customs search.

3. On leaving the country the pilgrims are not searched, but it is the custom to charge dues on cases containing Zemzem water and dates at the rate of about 1s. a case. The pilgrims resent this charge; they were, however, still louder in their protestations when, on embarkation, their Zemzem water was thrown overboard by the ship's doctor, who was ignorant of its nature, and was only concerned with its chemical properties. It would be as well if pilgrims had their cases of Zemzem water labelled as such.

(7.)—Mutawwifs.

The attitude of the mutawwif is the governing factor in the pilgrim's comfort or discomfort in the Hejaz. On landing at Jedda the pilgrim realises at once, and he is forced to realise, that he is no longer a free agent, but that his mutawwif is the sole arbiter of all his actions and movements. A good-natured or well-intentioned mutawwif will ensure a peaceful stay. These are few and far between, and the mutawwif is as a rule an unscrupulous individual, who causes infinite trouble to the pilgrims; in fact, the mutawwif's negligence or ill-will has sometimes resulted in loss of life.

2. The chief difficulty lies in the fact that no proper official control is yet exercised over the mutawwifs. No amount of reforms in other directions will be satisfactory until the mutawwifs are subjected to a rigorous control and severely punished for malpractices. The Indian vice-consul has in many cases, particularly in 1926 and 1927, succeeded in having fines imposed. This had a salutary effect for a time. During the 1929 pilgrimage, however, conditions changed for the worse. On the one hand, the intervention of the Indian vice-consul was misrepresented to the King by certain influential Indian agitators as having a political object. On the other hand, the mutawwifs succeeded in entrenching themselves behind some of the higher officials, and were abetted also by some of the shipping clerks. At Jedda it was still possible to keep the mutawwif situation in hand, but at Mecca it was often very difficult to obtain satisfaction, and complaints regarding the mutawwifs

there were more frequent than in the two years preceding. It is, furthermore, often impossible to secure conclusive evidence of guilt owing to the fact that complaints are generally made verbally, and that there is a disinclination on the part of the pilgrims to substantiate them in writing.

3. A general source of complaint was the fact that the mutawwifs charged high sums for motor hire and for expenses at Arafat, which they collected in advance, while the transport which they eventually provided was thoroughly bad. The accommodation given at Arafat was also of the poorest description, and there was much overcrowding. Many cases of theft were reported at Muna and Arafat. In Mecca thefts took place from the persons of pilgrims in the Holy Mosque itself.

4. Misappropriation of the effects of deceased pilgrims was also of common occurrence. This was abundantly proved by the small amount of cash and effects which were handed over to the British agency in relation to the number of the deceased and their circumstances. The amount of the effects, including cash, of deceased pilgrims handed over was, in fact, obviously and scandalously short.

5. The present chief of the mutawwifs, the Sheikh-el-Mutawwifien, obtained approval last year for a suggestion of his to impose an additional tax of 10s. per head on all pilgrims going to Medina. This he collected himself, the amount so taken being the perquisite of the Viceroy, as was generally known, and not being credited to the Government Treasury. The Sheikh-el-Mutawwifien by this means acquired considerable influence and took to collecting, simultaneously with the 10s. tax, 1s. per pilgrim for himself. All the mutawwifs now, with the support of their sheikh, which carries with it that of the higher Government officials, are able to insist upon the payment of excessive charges practically with impunity.

6. This change in the official attitude has affected pilgrims' affairs generally. The reforms introduced last year are being allowed to fall into abeyance and abuses are again creeping in. Unless serious steps are taken to check this growing tendency on the part of the mutawwifs to evade regulations and abuse their position, they will quickly revert to the same malpractices which prevailed under the Turkish and Shereefian régimes.

7. The remedy for the present state of affairs lies to a certain extent in our own hands. According to present regulations, the pilgrims, with the exception of those of certain provinces, *vide infra*, are at liberty to choose whichever mutawwif they like. This liberty of choice can be used with advantage to bring the mutawwifs to heel. A list of mutawwifs of good reputation might well be drawn up at the British Legation and sent to the authorities at the pilgrims' ports of embarkation. These authorities might then recommend mutawwifs to the pilgrims. The undesirable mutawwifs would thus find themselves automatically deprived of clients. Such a system would be independent of the Hejaz Government, and would, I think, serve the purpose and induce the Hejaz Government to take proper steps itself.

8. The following suggestions are also put forward for consideration: (i) The British Legation should be empowered to refuse a visa for territory under British control to any mutawwif who gives serious cause of complaint or is found guilty of malpractices. The existence of a Black List for this purpose would act as a healthy deterrent, and I do not think that in practice it would be found necessary to refuse many visas after the first one or two cases. Such action is already taken by the Dutch consul in Jedda, and he is helped by the fact that no Dutch consul other than himself is authorised to grant a visa for Java to a Hejazi national, save in exceptional cases.

9.—(ii) There would appear to be some collusion between the mutawwifs and certain Moulvis in India, particularly in Bengal, tending to circumscribe the pilgrims' free right of choice of their mutawwifs. The Moulvis in many cases, it is stated, pose as pilgrims' guides, and at the time of the So'al (*i.e.*, when the pilgrims are asked to state their choice of mutawwifs) they sell their pilgrims to the highest bidders among the mutawwifs who are congregated at Bombay. Information has been received that pilgrims have been passed on in this way at prices amounting to as much as 30 rupees a head. It follows that a mutawwif who has heavy overhead charges of this nature, involving probably his own and a servant's journey to India, can only make a profit if he has recourse to illegal methods. It would be a good thing if some means could be devised for bringing these Moulvis to book.

10.—(iii) It would be advisable to keep a watch over mutawwifs' movements in India. In particular, judging by the complaints received, it is suggested that a closer surveillance should be exercised over their activities in the pilgrims' rest camp at Bombay.

11. There is an idea on foot of farming out the Mahometan world to mutawwifs by auction, every Mahometan district being assigned for pilgrimage purposes to the exclusive exploitation of the mutawwif who bids highest. The system is a pernicious one, although it is calculated to bring in a greatly increased revenue to the Government, as it would place the pilgrims at the mercy of the mutawwifs, and would expose them to various forms of extortion.

12. This system is actually in force in respect of pilgrims from Madras, Ceylon, the Maldives Islands, Bihar and Orissa, Malabar and Burma, those pilgrims having no choice but to accept the mutawwif appointed by the Hejaz Government for their respective provinces. These mutawwifs run no risk of losing clients, and therefore they have no need to nurse their reputation. The pilgrims from these provinces have often complained about their mutawwifs. The mutawwif for Malabar and Ceylon, Syed Siraj Wali, who has already been mentioned in connexion with other malpractices, appears to be the worst of them, to judge by the complaints received about him. The matter is engaging the attention of the British Legation, and it is hoped that when the King returns to the Hejaz it will be possible to secure greater freedom of choice of mutawwif for the pilgrims from the provinces above mentioned.

13. Perhaps it is only fair to add a word in defence of the mutawwifs, however objectionable they may be as a class. The greater proportion of the taxes which are collected nominally on behalf of the mutawwifs are in reality collected on Government account as supplementary to the more recognised and open forms of Government taxation. In fact, the proportion allowed to be retained by the mutawwifs is often far too small to enable them to gain a livelihood by legitimate methods in the exercise of their profession. As long as this is the case the mutawwifs, in order to obtain enough money to carry them through the lean season, will continue to extort money from pilgrims in different ways with the connivance of the local authorities.

(8.)—Religious Intolerance.

The British agency did not receive the usual number of complaints from the pilgrims of interference in the performance of their religious observances, nor was any particular hardship suffered by pilgrims reported from Medina. The main reason of this was that the local Government took precautionary measures, warning the mutawwifs against taking their pilgrims to places where there was any likelihood of disturbance. At Mecca, a wall was built round the site of the tomb of Khadija to screen it from public view.

2. Complaints of interference which used to be received in past years in connexion with observances at the Prophet's Tomb in Medina, came almost entirely from the educated and wealthy section of the pilgrims who were prevented from having access to the tomb. These pilgrims induced the Nejd soldiers, by offering them a small bribe of a few piastres, to allow them to touch the railings surrounding the holy grave of the Prophet. The poorer section of the pilgrims were subjected to a mild stroke of the whip when they attempted to touch the railings, but no formal complaint was received from them at the British agency.

(9.)—Indian Pilgrimages.

The number of pilgrims who sailed from Indian ports for the Hejaz this season was 19,832, including 176 children, as against 21,109 last year. Of this total, British Indians accounted for 14,997, their number being 1,043 in excess of that for 1928. This increase was largely due to an increase in the number of Bengali pilgrims, of whom there were 7,227, as against 5,105 in 1928. The other provinces showed a diminution in numbers.

2. The following table indicates (1) the number of pilgrims from each province in India and the ports at which they embarked; and (2) the approximate numbers of foreign pilgrims who reached the Hejaz by way of Indian ports:—

(A.)—BRITISH Subjects.

Province Distribution.	Bombay.	Ports. Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Bengal	6,180	38	1,009	7,227
Punjab	355	1,845	...	2,200
United Provinces	1,045	93	...	1,138
Bombay	1,004	7	...	1,011
Madras	790	2	...	792
N.W.F.P.	80	189	...	269
Baluchistan	19	349	...	368
Sind	5	775	...	780
Central Province	315	28	...	343
Delhi	159	40	...	199
Burma	117	117
Hyderabad (Deccan)	237	1	...	238
Nepal	9	1	...	10
Bihar and Orissa	296	296
Ceylon	8	8
Mauritius	1	1
	10,620	3,368	1,009	14,997

(B.)—FOREIGNERS.

Nationality.			
Afghans	20	1,142	1,162
Chinese	25	47	72
Persians	69	2,607	2,676
Bahreinis	5	201	206
Iraqis	7	89	96
Hejazis	377	27	404
S. Africans	42	...	42
Russian Turkestan	6	...	6
Yemenis	13	...	13
Bokharans	1	...	1
Javanese, Malays, and other East Indies	157	...	157
	722	4,113	4,835

3. Little difficulty was experienced in securing return passages for the pilgrims, as there was no lack of steamers; the number of pilgrims detained at Jedda for want of accommodation was consequently small. The local agents of Messrs. Nemazee and Co., however, were, as last year, responsible for a certain amount of inconvenience to pilgrims, as, having little confidence, it would appear, in the financial standing of their principals, they were slow in refunding the balance of passage money (30 rupees) due to pilgrims who, having paid for the double journey from Calcutta to Jedda and back, were, on their return, to be conveyed only as far as Bombay.

4. In many cases the members of a family or of one party were separated from one another owing to the fact that some of them had return tickets, while the others were in possession of deposit paid passes. In these cases the local agents of the Nemazee line, after considerable persuasion, were induced to refund 30 rupees to the return ticket holders; but they categorically refused to entertain the claims of the deposit paid pass holders; these had eventually to be sent back to India on ships of the Mogul line. However, none of their pilgrims were detained in Jedda beyond the period allowed, a few pilgrims of the Shustari line being alone so detained.

5. It was anticipated that, owing to the opposition of M. Ismail Ghaznavi and other leading Indian Wahhabis, difficulties would be experienced this year over the constitution after the pilgrimage of the locally organised Haj Committee, which has met each year since 1927, under the presidency of the Indian vice-consul, for the purpose of drawing up lists of the returning pilgrims and of allotting them steamer accommodation for their return journey to India in the order of their arrival at Jedda.

6. Ismail Ghaznavi and various other leading Indian Wahhabis advocated the abolition of this committee, urging fictitious political considerations; they also attempted to secure preferential treatment for themselves and their friends in defiance of the committee's rulings. They were, however, unsuccessful and the committee was formed and carried on its work as usual with the concurrence of the Hejaz Government, which deputed the president of the official Haj Committee to act as vice-president, and the chief of the mutawwifs to be a member. The Persian diplomatic representative, having been invited to participate in the interests of Persian pilgrims returning to their homes via India, also sent a delegate to attend the meetings on his behalf.

Registration System.

7. The working of this system and the advantages gained by its application have been discussed in previous reports.

8. In view of a temporary shortage of staff at the beginning of the season the registration of the pilgrims arriving by the first steamer, the "Khosrou," could not be carried out. Moreover, the permanent clerk in the Indian pilgrimage office contracted small-pox early in April and was unable to fulfil his duties for some time on that account.

As was the case last year, it was found that, while it was a fairly simple matter to collect the return tickets of the incoming pilgrims, their re-distribution on the return of the pilgrims after the Haj against the requisite receipts was far from easy. Incoming pilgrims arrive at Jedda in comparatively small numbers and can be easily dealt with; in the return season, however, it is a different matter. There were this season as many as 12,000 Indian pilgrims who returned to Jedda in the first week after the Haj, and the Indian staff were hard put to it to see that each member received proper attention.

9. It is evident, therefore, that the efficient working of the registration system, which is an undoubted boon to pilgrims, depends very largely on the number and efficiency of the clerical staff of the Indian Pilgrimage Office. The British Indian vice-consul who is in charge of that department is assisted by one permanent clerk and one clerk who is on a year's probation. The daily routine duties have fully occupied all three during the whole of the past year; it is, therefore, strongly recommended that the appointment of the second clerk be made a permanent one. It is suggested also that pilgrims be advised prior to their embarkation in India to deposit their tickets at the British Legation in Jedda on their arrival at that port. Advice to this effect might with advantage be printed in the vernacular on each pilgrim pass. These suggestions would have a greater effect if the control of shipping as advocated above were enforceable by law; pilgrims would then realise that unless they handed over their return tickets as advised, they would be liable to be delayed on their return journey.

10. In conclusion it may be pointed out that the undoubted success with which the registration system has worked is in large measure due to the excellent relations prevailing between the Indian vice-consul and the local authorities and the mutawwifs. This state of affairs, however, may not last for ever and it is most desirable, therefore, that everything possible should be done to place the local control of the pilgrimage on a more solid basis.

Shipping Control.

11. In view of the criticism which has been levelled at the present system of shipping control by interested parties, it is worth while recapitulating some of the considerations which led to its adoption.

12. As soon as the pilgrimage is over the pilgrims flock to Jedda in thousands and the problem of their repatriation immediately becomes acute. The facilities for quick transport offered by motor-cars are so great that a very large proportion of the Indian pilgrims (this year 65 per cent. of the total) return to Jedda within one week of the Haj. The consequent overcrowding in Jedda at this period, inevitable as it is, is the cause of much suffering among the pilgrims who are already tired out and without means when they reach Jedda. Lack of accommodation, bad sanitation, scarcity of water, and illness, all combine to make the pilgrims' stay in Jedda until passages on outgoing steamers can be found for them a period of great strain and hardship. It is, therefore, obvious that this period of waiting should, in the interests of all concerned, be reduced as far as possible, and this can only be brought about if the steamship companies are subjected to effective control.

13. Before the introduction of the present system in 1926 the pilgrims were far worse off than they are now. The mutawwifs in co-operation with the subordinate staff of the shipping agents provided accommodation only for such pilgrims as could afford to bribe them. Some of the shipping clerks through their brokers were in the habit of selling embarkation tickets at a higher rate than that fixed by the companies, pocketing the surplus. Return ticket holders were, at the threat of being left behind, forced to buy fresh tickets at higher rates, while their original tickets were sold by the mutawwifs. Mutawwifs had full powers over their pilgrims and treated them as they liked, while the latter, afraid of being unable to obtain a passage, dared not protest. The result was that the poorer pilgrims, who were the least fitted to endure the effects of a prolonged stay in Jedda under the existing conditions, not possessing the means of bribing the mutawwifs and the staffs of the shipping agencies, were compelled to await the departure of the last ship from Jedda before being able to begin their return journey. It is certain that these conditions would obtain again were the shipping control removed or relaxed.

14. Those most directly concerned in the pilgrim traffic, the local agents of the shipping companies, have on many occasions admitted that they are glad to sacrifice some of their powers of control over the pilgrim ships in view of the benefits which accrue both to themselves and to the pilgrims under the new system of shipping control.

15. Criticism of the scheme has so far only come from those who profited under the old régime. One objection that is advanced is that it is impossible for the Government of India to control its pilgrim ships in Hejaz ports. This contention can be refuted by citing the fact that the Egyptian Government, who, in the beginning, followed the same system as is now employed by the Government of India, have now established control of their pilgrim ships. All that is required is appropriate legislation by the Indian Government.

16. From the foregoing it will be clear that efficient control of pilgrim shipping is the most important factor in the regulation of the return pilgrimage. It is possible that the Hejaz Government may, at some time or other, contemplate suppressing the locally organised Haj Committee. If this were in fact to occur, it would be most advisable to introduce legislation in India to ensure that, in the return pilgrimage season, British ships carrying pilgrims shall be subject to some sort of equivalent control.

17. With regard to the shipping lists furnished, the importance of these cannot be overestimated; on them depends, to a large extent, the success of the registration system, while, subsequently, they form the only complete record of pilgrims' movements in Jedda, coming and going. It is therefore desirable that the greatest care should be exercised in their preparation. In several cases lists have been found to be inaccurately made out.

18. With regard to these lists, the following suggestions are put forward for the consideration of the Government of India:—

- (1) Separate lists should be furnished for each steamer, although it is not necessary for them to be forwarded to Jedda by the steamer to which they refer; they may be sent by the following steamer.
- (2) The name of the ship and the date of its departure should invariably be noted at the top of each list. The date of sailing has often been omitted in the past, thereby making it difficult to trace the names of pilgrims; as often as not, the same steamer will make more than one voyage in one season.
- (3) Some sort of distinguishing marks should, as has already been recommended, be introduced in the list, to show whether the pilgrim passes of the pilgrims figuring on the list were issued at Calcutta, Bombay or Karachi. The marks shown hereunder would be suitable for pilgrim passes supplied to British Indians and foreigners; passes issued to the latter should differ in some way from those issued to the former.

For British Indians—

Bombay : Pass No. B/
Calcutta : Pass No. C/
Karachi : Pass No. K/

For foreigners—

Bombay : Pass No. BF/
Calcutta : Pass No. CF/
Karachi : Pass No. KF/

19. The distinguishing letters shown above should be prefixed to the pass number and should be considered for all purposes as forming an integral part of the pass number; the shipping companies should be instructed to adhere strictly to these distinguishing letters when inserting the pass numbers on the steamer ticket, &c.

Shipping (General).

20. Three shipping companies were concerned in the transport of pilgrims between India and the Hejaz, namely, the Mogul Line, the Nemazee Line and the Shustari Line. The following table shows the number carried each way by each of these companies and the number of voyages made by their vessels:—

	Brought in.			Repatriated.		
	No. of Ships.	No. of Voyages to Jedda.	Pilgrims brought.	No. of Ships.	No. of Return Voyages.	Pilgrims repatriated.
Mogul Line ...	6	9	11,213	7	12	10,038
Nemazee Line ...	3	4	4,453	3	3	3,017
Shustari Line ...	2	3	3,990	2	3	3,512
Total ...	11	16	19,656	12	18	16,567

21. It will be noted that the total number of pilgrims who returned to India after the Haj was 3,089 short of the number that arrived in the Hejaz from India. These were divided among the shipping lines as follows:—

	Number of Pilgrims not returning.
Mogul Line ...	1,175
Nemazee Line ...	1,436
Shustari Line ...	478
Total ...	3,089

22. Of these 3,089 pilgrims, 157 were Javanese or Malays who had travelled to the Hejaz via India, but elected to return to their homes by a direct route; 1,000 approximately were Persians and Bokharis who returned by the Northern route (a few Indians also did this), while 880 deaths took place. The remaining 1,052 may be accounted for by the number of Hejazis who had travelled from India on pilgrim ships and the Indians who decided to remain in the Hejaz after the pilgrimage.

23. Apart from the Indian pilgrims leaving from and returning to Indian ports, the following numbers of persons other than Indians were carried by Indian pilgrim steamers to various ports in the Red Sea and the Arabian coast:—

	Mogul Line.	Nemazee.
Aden ...	78	98
Kamaran ...	94	...
Mokalla ...	182	...
Hodeida	565
Jibouti	98
Total ...	354	761

24. The following list gives the numbers of pilgrims arriving in Jedda from and leaving for Indian ports, classified according to ports:—

	Arrivals.	Departures.
Bombay ...	11,196	12,807
Karachi ...	7,457	3,760
Calcutta ...	1,003	...
Total ...	19,656	16,567

25. The number of 3,760 pilgrims stated to have landed at Karachi cannot be considered as accurate; Messrs. Shustari issued to their pilgrims tickets marked "Bombay or Karachi," and it is not known what proportion of these ticket-holders landed at each of those two ports. It may safely be presumed, however, that the larger number disembarked at Karachi.

26. The number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets or made money deposits in India may be classified as follows:—

	Single Ticket.	Return Ticket.	Deposit paid Passport.	Total.
Bombay ...	661	10,236	299	11,196
Karachi ...	2,958	4,352	147	7,457
Calcutta	672	331	1,003
Total ...	3,619	15,260	777	19,656

27. The subjoined list shows the number of ships available on given dates for the repatriation of pilgrims, the numbers of pilgrims of each line awaiting repatriation, and the number actually repatriated on each date.

Dates.	No. of Ships in Port.	Pilgrims awaiting Shipment.				Pilgrims Despatched.				Pilgrims Remaining.				Names of Ships which sailed.
		T. M.	N.	S.	Total.	T. M.	N.	S.	Total.	T. M.	N.	S.	Total.	
1929.														
May 27	10	5,533	1,513	1,955	9,001	1,773	1,773	3,760	1,513	1,955	7,228	Rahmani.
" 28	9	5,338	1,580	1,955	8,873	967	967	5,338	1,580	988	7,906	Zayani.
" 29	8	5,526	1,745	988	8,259	1,517	1,517	4,009	1,745	988	6,742	Akbar.
" 30	7	4,009	1,854	1,054	6,917	1,504	1,504	2,505	1,854	1,054	5,413	Khosrou.
June 1	6	2,505	1,854	1,078	5,437	1,504	1,599	..	1,599	2,505	1,854	1,078	5,413	Sarvistan.
" 2	5	2,505	255	1,103	3,863	1,433	..	1,103	2,536	1,072	255	..	1,327	Shuja, Sultanah.
" 3	3	1,072	371	..	1,443	..	371	..	371	1,072	1,072	Englestan.
" 4	2	1,433	1,433	1,133	1,133	Dara.
" 7	2	1,161	915	495	2,571	1,161	1,161	..	915	495	1,410	Alavi.
July 2	1	1,161	915	495	1,410	..	915	..	915	495	495	Arabestan.
" 4	1	195	..	495	690	195	195	495	786	Akbar.
" 5	1	55	..	852	907	852	852	55	24	..	79	Sultanah.
" 11	1	183	183	183	183	Jehangir.
" 18	1	138	138	138	138	Alavi.
August 18	1	154	154	Jehangir.
" 27	1	79	79	79	79	Alavi.
September 30	1	78	78	78	78	Jehangir.
October 24	1

T. M. = Turner Morrison.
N. = Nemazee.
S. = Shustari.

28. From the statistics given the following facts may be deduced :—

The ships had in some cases to wait at Jedda, as a sufficient number of their respective pilgrims were not available at the time. The steamships "Englestan" and "Akbar" were obliged to leave with 371 and 145 pilgrims on board respectively, and that at a time when many pilgrims of the Shustari Line were awaiting the arrival of a Shustari steamer to take them. Had the compulsory deposit system been in force, this would not have occurred. Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. were able to deal with their returning pilgrims without much difficulty; their steamers left at short intervals, and many pilgrims holding return tickets of the Shustari Line, who could not wait for the arrival of a Shustari steamer, purchased fresh tickets from the Mogul Line, registering at the British agency their claims for refund of money spent on their original tickets.

29. Certain other difficulties were experienced with regard to shipping, which, though of minor importance in themselves, caused not a little inconvenience at the time. These are briefly mentioned for the information of the Government of India :—

- The shipping companies, considering on occasion that the number of pilgrims booked for Karachi was not sufficient to warrant their calling at that port, proceeded direct to Bombay. This naturally evoked many and violent protests from pilgrims whose homes are in Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab or the North-West Frontier Province. It is not known whether the companies can be compelled to call at Karachi in such cases, or, failing this, to pay the pilgrims' railway fare between the two ports; in any case, a decision should be taken in the matter, so that the pilgrims may be informed accordingly.
- Pilgrims holding return tickets issued by the Shustari and Nemazee lines, who for some reason or other did not return to India, experienced great difficulty in obtaining the refund of their return passage money. It is desirable that the local Jedda agents of these companies should be instructed by their principals to comply strictly and promptly with the regulations on the subject.
- This year these two companies issued a few tickets marked "free for the return journey." Holders of these tickets did not in many cases reach Jedda until after the departure of the last steamers belonging to these lines, and the agents refused to provide an alternative passage, as is done in the case of the usual return ticket holders. The persons concerned in most cases became destitute, and were repatriated at the expense of the Government of India. It would assist matters if the companies in question were requested to refrain from issuing such tickets, a course which involves the Government of India in unnecessary expenditure. Alternatively, if the companies insist for one reason or another on issuing "free" tickets, they should themselves take measures through their local agents to ensure that such persons are not left stranded in Jedda after the pilgrimage.

30. The following points in connexion with the pilgrim traffic are also worth consideration :—

- The shipping companies should endeavour, as far as possible, to employ Moslem crews. This measure would certainly go a long way towards reducing the complaints at present being continually made by pilgrims against the shipping companies. If this is not entirely practicable, it is suggested that, at any rate, ships' doctors, compounders, clerks and water distributors should be Moslems.
- It is desirable that the loading and unloading of pilgrims' luggage in Jedda harbour be undertaken by the shipping companies in the same way as ship's cargo, namely, by engagement of labour and the use of derricks. The companies are in the habit of unloading 40,000 to 50,000 packages at any one time, and there would appear to be no sound reason why the system should not be extended to cover pilgrims' luggage. This is already the practice in the case of the Javanese pilgrimage.
- Connected with the foregoing is the question of landing the pilgrims at the quay. Here, also, arrangements are necessary, such as to lay spare the pilgrims any dealings with the dhowmen, whose main object is to fleece

them in every way. This question has already, I understand, been considered by the Government of India, but the shipping companies who deal with the Indian pilgrimage are apparently strongly opposed to it, and despite the fact that the system has been proved to work satisfactorily in the case of the Javanese and Egyptian pilgrimages, the proposals made in this connexion have not so far been adopted. The matter, however, is important from the pilgrims' point of view, and it is worth noting that the dhowmen themselves, to judge from their own statements, would welcome a system which would relieve them of the necessity of collecting their fares individually from the pilgrims.

The harbour in Jedda is divided into three areas, known as the outer harbour, the middle harbour and the inner harbour. The rates for the transport of pilgrims and their luggage have been fixed by the Government at 1/4/- rupees, 1/- rupees and -/10/- rupees for the three harbours respectively. In 1928, on the suggestion of the Indian vice-consul, the head of the dhowmen agreed to charge one rupee in all cases irrespective of the distance. This proposal was submitted to the Hejaz Government, but in the absence of the King it fell through. It is suggested that by arrangement with the dhowmen, which should not be difficult, the shipping companies should book pilgrims from shore to shore. If necessary, a small extra charge might be imposed and included in the cost of the passage. Such a course would benefit both pilgrims and dhowmen alike.

- (4) Better arrangements should be made for the distribution of water on board the pilgrim ships during the voyage. The quantity of water supplied should also be increased.

The present water allowance, 1½ gallons per pilgrim per day, is altogether insufficient. The Mogul Line have in the past stated that they supplied their pilgrims with much more water than the quantity to which they were entitled, while Messrs. Nemazee have for years been supplying free water. This would indicate that the companies themselves recognise that the ration of water as originally fixed is inadequate. If, however, the companies are compelled to supply food to the pilgrims while on board, the water question will automatically be solved and the above quantity will be more than enough.

In any case, whatever the decision taken on this point may be, it is recommended that extra pumps be installed for the distribution of water, one pump on each deck. This would enable the pilgrims to obtain the water more easily and would do away with many of the complaints which at present arise on this score.

- (5) The question of supplying food to the pilgrims during the voyage was recommended in last year's report. It has been argued, however, that an experiment on the lines proposed was tried by the Mogul Line but that it proved a failure. If this is so, the reason for the failure would appear to be that the pilgrims had already purchased their food before embarkation as they were ignorant of the fact that food could be obtained on board. This explanation was supported by the evidence of several of the leading pilgrims. Pilgrims as a general rule wish to travel as economically as possible, and it is obvious that the aggregate individual expenditure of a shipload of pilgrims on food is much greater than would be the case if the catering were done by the companies.

Experience has shown that pilgrims are generally prepared to pay high steamer fares. In 1927 as the result of keen competition between the various companies, tickets for the return journey were bought by the pilgrims at the low rate of 80 rupees, while this season an approximately equal amount of pilgrims paid 195 rupees for the same journey. If, therefore, the companies would add a further 12 to 15 rupees to the cost of their steamer tickets on account of food, it would make no appreciable difference to the numbers of pilgrims booking passages on their ships. But, for such a measure to be effective it is essential that prior notice of it be widely published and its benefit explained to intending pilgrims.

- (6) During the season over 7,000 Bengalis sailed from Bombay. On arrival in Bombay from Calcutta they find themselves in a strange country where their language is not understood, and they pay the usual toll taken from strangers. It would seem to be greatly preferable that Bengali pilgrims

should be induced by legislation or otherwise to embark at Calcutta. This would also benefit the shipping companies who would then have to deal with a practically uniform class of passenger having the same tastes in food and the same customs. The journey from Calcutta to Bombay is made purely in the mutawwif's interest at present.

- (7) It is recommended that Indian ships should use four ladders for the embarkation and disembarkation of pilgrims instead of two only. This is already obligatory by law in the case of the Egyptian pilgrims, and these operations are greatly facilitated thereby. In this connexion care should be taken to see that the ladders are not placed in close proximity to the discharge of the circulating water or else that the circulating water is not discharged while pilgrims are being embarked or disembarked.
- (8) Pilgrims travelling first or second class have made the following complaints:—

(a) There is no special deck for them and they have consequently to confine themselves to their cabins. Even the gangways outside their cabins are crowded with deck passengers.

(b) In the Mogul Line ships the saloon is reserved for the officers, and pilgrims, though travelling first-class, are not allowed to use it. The Nemazee and Shustari lines actually utilise the saloons as space for carrying pilgrims who are prepared to pay something slightly in excess of the fare for deck passages. It is suggested that this question be considered with a view to reserving separate deck and saloon accommodation for first- and second-class passengers.

(c) It often happens that on the return journey all the first-class passengers of any one line assemble at Jedda at the same time, and on account of the multitude of applicants are unable to obtain immediately the first-class accommodation for which they have paid. They are accordingly offered by the companies the choice of waiting for a later steamer or of travelling as deck passengers. If they choose the latter course, they are induced to sign a declaration to the effect that they are travelling as deck passengers of their own free will and that they have no claim for refund of the balance of their fare. The shipping companies should, I think, be compelled to return the balance of the fare in such cases.

- (9) Masters of ships should be requested to extend to the Indian vice-consul all facilities necessary for visiting pilgrim ships in Jedda Harbour and getting into touch with pilgrims for the purpose of receiving the effects of deceased pilgrims, investigating complaints, &c. It has been found that if complaints are attended to on the spot much trouble is spared to all concerned. In this connexion it would be of advantage if the Indian pilgrimage officer, acting under the authority of His Majesty's Minister in Jedda, were empowered, *mutatis mutandis*, to act under Appendix B, Bombay Act V of 1915, entitled Protection of Pilgrims (clause 9), and his name inserted in this article.

- (10) Before weighing anchor for the return journey from Jedda, masters of ships should be requested to wait until the Indian pilgrimage officer is fully satisfied that the pilgrims embarked have no complaints against persons in the Hejaz and have not left any of their effects behind them on the quays or in the dhows. This would not, as a rule, delay a ship for more than an hour. Hitherto ships have sailed as soon as the last pilgrims have embarked, thus leaving them no time to ascertain whether all their luggage has come on board. Here, again, an appropriate article might be inserted in the Act mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

- (11) The embarkation tickets issued by Messrs. Turner, Morrison are small in size and are consequently easily lost. It is desirable that they should be much larger and that they should consist of two portions, one portion to be retained by the pilgrims. It would also be of assistance if the class of a pilgrim's ticket were entered on the embarkation ticket, as much confusion results at present in the absence of this.

Detention of Pilgrims.

31. This year a small number of pilgrims only, limited to those of the Shustari Line, were detained in Jedda for lack of shipping accommodation beyond the period

allowed; the following table shows the number of pilgrims thus detained, the period of their detention, and the sums distributed to them as compensation:—

No. of Pilgrims.	No. of Days Detained.	Compensation. Rupees.
1	15	15
1	14	14
2	12	24
6	8	48
19	6	114
9	4	36
7	3	21
6	2	12
17	1	17
		301

32. Of the total of 301 rupees shown above, 38 rupees was returned by well-to-do pilgrims to be used for the relief of the more indigent among them.

33. The compensation allowed for such detention is 1 rupee per day for passengers of all classes. First- and second-class pilgrims objected to this on the ground that their standard of living is higher than that of the deck passengers, and that they consequently find it much more expensive to maintain themselves in Jeddah during the period of waiting. They have, furthermore, paid from three to four times as much on their steamer fares as third-class pilgrims, and they see no valid reason why they should only be compensated at the same rate as these latter. Deck pilgrims also complained that the allowance of 1 rupee per day was insufficient to pay for the extra daily expense which they incurred. This was certainly the case, for the cost of living is always extremely high in the Hejaz at the time when the pilgrims are waiting to return home.

Destitutes.

34. The question of the repatriation of destitute Indian pilgrims has been the subject of discussion for several years. Since the introduction of the deposit and return-ticket system the numbers of destitutes repatriated annually has very greatly diminished. A considerable number of cases, however, still occur. Some pilgrims, for instance, reach the Hejaz by the overland route through Nejd. Others make declarations at Karachi to the effect that they intend to make a prolonged stay in the Hejaz, but, in spite of this, apply for repatriation after the pilgrimage; others, again, lose their return tickets. This last category was not numerous, thanks to the institution of the system of registration.

35. Another factor which operated to reduce the number of destitutes this year was the fact that destitute Afghan pilgrims, having been told that neither the Turkish representative nor the British Agency would help them, prevailed upon the wealthier Jeddah merchants to repatriate them. Several Indians from the frontier districts declared themselves to be Afghans in order to benefit from the charity extended to nationals of that country.

36. To put an end to the question of destitutes altogether, so far as arrivals by sea are concerned, the Government of India has only to prohibit the issue of single tickets to pilgrims except in the case of first- and second-class passengers. The system at present in force is not intended to prevent persons of obvious means from travelling as they wish, but neither is it intended to afford probable destitutes with a loophole for evading compliance with the regulations which have been laid down for their benefit. It is therefore recommended that the authorities concerned, particularly at Karachi, should take special care to distinguish between the various classes of pilgrims in this respect.

37. After the season was over, also, a number of pilgrims from Karachi travelled to the Hejaz furnished with single tickets only. Those who have arrived are for the most part persons of restricted means, and several of them will in all probability eventually have to be repatriated as destitutes. This is to be deprecated.

38. The problem presented by pilgrims travelling overland through Nejd is one which is likely to become more difficult to deal with as time goes on. During the Hashimite régime the overland route was to all intents and purposes closed by reason of the disturbances in the interior. The situation has now changed, and the roads are safe. Ibn Saud's officers, in fact, have in some cases secured free conveyance

from Riyadh to Mecca for those pilgrims who had travelled to the capital of Nejd from the Persian Gulf. It looks, therefore, as if the overland route may become more popular. Should this occur, the Government of India will find itself involved in increased expenditure on account of repatriation of destitutes, and it is, therefore, desirable that restrictions be brought into force with a view to reducing to a minimum the numbers of pilgrims travelling by this route.

39. The method of dealing with destitutes at this Legation is as follows:—

No hint of possible repatriation is given until the last minute before the various ships sail. The object of this is to induce those who have money and are concealing the fact, to buy a ticket for themselves through fear of missing the steamer, so that only the genuine destitutes may be left. Secondly, many destitutes during the waiting period receive charity from the richer pilgrims sufficient to enable them to buy a ticket, and there are also many rich pilgrims who take destitutes with them on board at their own expense. The expenses incurred on behalf of repatriation are, in this way, reduced to a minimum. For instance, the number of destitutes who originally applied for repatriation after the Haj reached approximately 300, but, by following the above system, the numbers were greatly reduced, and those actually repatriated amounted only to 139.

40. If the news of repatriation were made public earlier in the return season, then those even who possessed tickets would apply for repatriation and either attempt to sell their tickets locally or apply for a refund on them on their return to India.

41. This practice of not disclosing until the last minute the fact that there will be any repatriation at Government expense, a practice which is essential if expenses are to be kept down, makes it practically impossible for the Legation to furnish the Government of India beforehand with information as to the number of destitutes to be repatriated. Furthermore, up to the last moment, the number continues to be increased by arrivals from the interior.

42. It would, therefore, be in the interest of the Government of India, and it would greatly facilitate matters at this end, if the British Legation were empowered to repatriate in anticipation of sanction. In this way it would be possible to obtain the cheapest rates from the shipping companies, for the Legation would be enabled to take advantage at any moment of the competitive prices which it is possible to obtain when steamers of different lines are in harbour at one time. To illustrate this, it may be pointed out that in 1928, when early sanction was received, it was found possible to secure destitute passages at the rate of £1 per head on account of the competition between the companies; in 1929, however, there being only one steamer in port when the sanction arrived, and consequently no competition, the price was higher, namely, 25 and 35 rupees.

43. The total expense incurred on account of repatriation of destitutes this season was 4,011 rupees, which included the sum of 351 rupees for food on the voyage. Food was supplied at the rate of 3 rupees per head by the Pilgrim Food Supply Company, under the supervision of the master of ship.

44. In case it may be of interest to the Government of India, the following list has been compiled, showing the proportion of destitutes repatriated according to their provinces of origin:—

Name of Province.	No. of Pilgrims.
Punjab	34
Madras	27
Sind	22
United Provinces	18
Baluchistan	17
N.W.F.P.	6
Bengal	12
Central Provinces	2
Bombay	1
	139

45. Of the above destitutes, ninety-nine travelled to the Hejaz by the overland route and forty by sea; the latter had made declarations in India.

Deposit System.

46. The advantages which would accrue from the universal application of the compulsory deposit system have already been submitted to the Haj Enquiry Committee in detail. One recommendation, however, which I should like to urge again is that pilgrims should be induced as far as possible to deposit an additional 30 rupees per head at the time of the deposit made to cover the return journey. This would save them all the inconveniences to which they are subjected on their return to Jedda as a result of lack of funds. This sum could be paid to the pilgrims in Jedda by the agents of the shipping companies, by arrangement, when the embarkation tickets are issued.

47. In this connexion it may be pointed out that, under the existing regulations, the refund of a deposit is made only in India. Those pilgrims who do not intend to return to India after one year's stay in the Hejaz have to apply to this Legation to obtain a refund, and their passes have to be forwarded to India for the purpose. This entails considerable delay for the pilgrims and not a little extra work for the Legation staff. It would, therefore, be of advantage if refund could be made in Jedda, and it is suggested that in the interests of all concerned the name of His Majesty's Minister at Jedda or of the Indian pilgrimage officer be inserted in rule 68-J of Government of India notification No. 1734, Health, of the 15th December, 1926.

Pilgrim Passes.

48. In view of the introduction of the deposit system, several alterations in the form of pilgrim pass were suggested in last year's report for the consideration of the Haj Committee. It was recommended, particularly, that photographs should be attached to the passes in the same way as is the case of regular passports. Another year's experience has confirmed the desirability of this.

49. As regards pilgrims of foreign nationalities, it is recommended that these should be supplied with a special form of emergency pass different from that issued to British pilgrims. This would simplify the procedure at Jedda in dealing with foreign pilgrims.

50. Twenty-six emergency passes were issued by the British agency this season, of which sixteen were granted to Indians whose passes, not having been deposited in the usual way, were lost or stolen, while the remainder were issued to foreigners travelling to India.

Cost of Pilgrimage.

51. The cost of the pilgrimage this year was approximately the same as last year. Pilgrims should therefore be advised that they should be in possession of not less than 600 rupees when they undertake the journey, that amount being exclusive of the steamship fare for the double journey. Should they propose to travel by car while in the Hejaz they should bring a further 100 rupees with them. Considerable difficulties are constantly experienced through pilgrims arriving in Jedda from India with insufficient funds. These have either to endure hardships or beg for charity. One reason for this is that charity tickets are often supplied by well-to-do merchants in India, and that no provision is made for the pilgrims' subsistence while in the Hejaz.

Staff.

52. I have great pleasure in testifying once again to the efficiency and devotion with which Munshi Ihsanullah, the British (Indian) vice-consul, discharged his duties. I can thoroughly endorse all that was said last year by my predecessor. His work is wholly admirable and deserves recognition.

(10.)—Afghan Pilgrimage.

Owing to civil war in Afghanistan during 1929, the number of Afghan pilgrims was considerably smaller than in the previous year, being only 1,162 as against 3,600. Of this total, 1,098 embarked at Karachi and 20 at Bombay, while 44 came from Suez. No notable Afghans made the pilgrimage this year.

The Turkish representative in Jedda claimed that he represented Afghan interests and employed an Afghan as messenger. Attempts were made by this messenger to induce the Afghans to pay certain fees to the Turkish authorities, but, according to all reports, no money was forthcoming.

The British agency, on the other hand, had the thankless task of dealing with all the various questions in connexion with the loss of Afghan passports and return tickets, &c. Forty Afghans lost their return tickets this year; of this number, ten were given emergency passes to enable them to travel as far as India.

There were several declared Afghan destitutes this year. Most of these, however, on account of the low prices prevailing as a result of competition between the various companies, eventually found themselves able to pay their own fares back to India. The remainder, sixty-three in number, were taken in charge by the local merchants, who arranged for their repatriation by the Mogul Line. The company, however, eventually decided to carry them free.

(11.)—Malay Pilgrimage.

The Malay pilgrimage season began on the 18th December, 1928, on which date the steamship "Titan" arrived in Jedda from Singapore with 410 pilgrims. The total number of arrivals from Malayan ports during the period under review was 5,869, among whom were 246 infants under 1 year of age. The pilgrims were conveyed in eleven ships, all of the Blue Funnel Line, the last of which arrived at Jedda on the 20th April, 1929.

2. The number of pilgrims actually from British Malaya, as shown in the register, was as follows:—

Straits Settlements—			
Singapore	242
Penang and Province Wellesley	123
Malacca	64
Federated Malay States—			
Perak	224
Selangor	92
Negri Sembilan	52
Pahang	61
Unfederated Malay States—			
Johore	168
Kedah	160
Perlis	33
Kelantan	142
Trengganu	76
Brunei	14
Labuan	4
Total	1,455

3. This is the lowest number on record since 1924, the year in which the system of registration of Malay pilgrims was begun. This may be ascribed, however, simply to lack of funds, on account of the slump in rubber and the general trade depression existing in Malaya. Taken with the figures for the two previous years:—

In 1927	...	12,184 pilgrims.
In 1928	...	4,418 pilgrims.

The average works out at 6,019 pilgrims a year for the last three years, or the period during which the system of compulsory pilgrim passes for Malay pilgrims has been enforced. This may perhaps be considered the normal figure.

4. The number of Malay pilgrims who came via India this year was thirty-three. It should be noted that a Malay pilgrim ceases technically to be a pilgrim, according to the definition of the word "pilgrim" in the Straits Settlements Merchant Shipping Ordinance, if he travels to the Hejaz via India. Passport officers, particularly in Penang, might well be reminded of this interpretation of the ordinance, so that the practice of giving a visa on the pilgrim pass for the journey to India may be discontinued. This would save confusion in the registration of

such pilgrims in the office of the Malay pilgrimage officer, and perhaps discourage pilgrims from taking a route which they expect to be cheaper and more convenient, but which nearly always turns out to be more expensive and more inconvenient. The many cases in which Malay pilgrims have been swindled in India in the past should be made known as widely as possible, in order to deter others in future from taking this route. It might also be explained that, apart from other disadvantages, they lose their right to claim assistance from the Malay pilgrimage officer at Jedda as pilgrims within the meaning of the law as it now stands.

Pilgrim Passes.

5. A uniform fee of 1 dollar for each pilgrim pass was charged throughout Malaya. It has been suggested that this fee might with advantage be raised from 1 dollar to, say, 2½ dollars, but it is doubtful whether this would be advisable. I would, however, recommend that non-British-protected nationals should be required to pay 2½ dollars for each pass. A large percentage of the so-called Malay pilgrims are originally Dutch nationals who have resided over six months in Malaya, and have lost their Dutch nationality through their omission to register themselves at a Dutch consulate. These persons do not become British subjects, of course, unless they complete the usual formalities; but the fact that the fee for a Malay pilgrim pass is less than that for a Dutch pass or an emergency pass (which, strictly speaking, they should take out) is a strong temptation to these people to claim over six months' residence in Malaya, when they are actually only in transit at the Malayan ports. Malay pilgrim passes have also been given on occasion to Hejazi nationals, Mecca sheikhs or other Arabs born in the Hejaz; this only gives rise to complications. Some suggestions for proposed alterations in the pilgrim pass form will be found under heading "Effects of Deceased Pilgrims."

Pilgrims' Tickets.

6. According to the system in force, pilgrims should have had the option of purchasing either single or return tickets. Those who come to stay in the Hejaz should on principle have purchased single tickets, and, consequently, those who come with return tickets and remained in the Hejaz beyond the period of validity of their tickets (two seasons), were not by right entitled to claim refund on them. Nevertheless, pilgrims did in fact do so, alleging almost invariably that the pilgrim brokers in Penang or Singapore refused to issue single tickets to them. This, I am led to believe, was frequently the case, since it is to the advantage of the pilgrim brokers to have return tickets issued. At the same time there are also cases on record where pilgrims who never intended to remain in the Hejaz have suddenly changed their minds and have settled down in the country or *vice versa*. A sudden unforeseen change in their fortunes, through the death of some relative, for example, may have accounted for this. Then again, there are pilgrims from Malaya who change their mind after meeting in the Hejaz their relatives from other countries, and who return not to Malaya but direct to a port in the Dutch East Indies. All these persons expect the Malay pilgrimage officer to assist them in obtaining the refund on their unused tickets. The first bundle of tickets (those issued in 1926) sent with a request for such refunds was received in 1928, when after much discussion, it was decided to extend the validity of the tickets for a further period of three years. On the other hand, there have been a number of pilgrims who, having decided to stay longer in the Hejaz, possibly for good have not desired the extension but have pressed for the refund. In short, the system which has been in vogue in the past has not only given grounds for dissatisfaction but has also encouraged trade in tickets, the local shipping agents, for reasons of their own being by no means helpful in seeing that tickets are held by their rightful owners. These difficulties will disappear with the adoption of the system by the shipping companies of granting a refund on unused return tickets on demand.

7. Pilgrims' return tickets were collected by the Malay pilgrimage officer on the arrival of the pilgrims at Jedda, and handed back to them on their return from Mecca.

8. As a result of representations made showing the advantages of this system, the agents of the Blue Funnel Line at Jedda have now been authorised to pay refunds on deceased pilgrims' tickets locally, after such tickets have been endorsed by the Malay pilgrimage officer. This was much appreciated by relatives of deceased pilgrims.

9. In order to prevent persons falsely reporting the death of a relative to the Malay pilgrimage officer with a view to obtaining the refund on the pilgrim's ticket, pilgrims were advised to report or insist on their sheikhs reporting the death of their relatives to the Bait-el-Mal and to get from there the certificate of death (production of which is insisted upon before the deceased's ticket is endorsed by the Malay pilgrimage officer), and not try to evade payment of death dues by "forgetting" to report it.

10. There was a certain amount of trafficking in return tickets, a fact which detracted to some extent from the utility of the system of registration. However, with the introduction of the system of allowing refunds on unused tickets, this should not recur.

Shipping.

11. Judging from the absence of complaints from pilgrims, it may safely be assumed that they were satisfied with conditions obtaining on board ships. Nevertheless, the "crowded" appearance of the pilgrim ships, deplored in previous reports, was still evident, but this will no longer be the case when the system of feeding the pilgrims is put into effect and, it may be repeated, when all heavy luggage is not allowed to encumber deck space but is removed into the ships' holds.

12. A number of better-class pilgrims have drawn attention to the desirability of having some accommodation available in pilgrim ships better than that obtaining on the bare deck. It is a matter which is worth the consideration of the shipping companies concerned. Better-class pilgrims have perforce to travel in pilgrim ships as these alone make the journey direct, thus saving them not only considerable expense but also the complication of indirect travelling and they would, it is felt, be prepared to pay for better accommodation. Perhaps the provision of some half-dozen second-class berths, three cabins of two berths each possibly, in each pilgrim ship, or an arrangement whereby cabins could be fixed up and removed as occasion demanded, with a fare of about double that of the deck passage would be found profitable to the companies.

13. The total number of births during the voyage of the pilgrims to Jedda was six and the total number of deaths twenty-five. The fact is interesting in showing the indifference of the pilgrims to their state of health when embarking on the pilgrimage.

14. A question was raised by the pilgrims during the period under review as to whether the relatives of pilgrims who died before their quarantine dues (for Kamaran and/or for Jedda) collected by the shipping companies were paid to the respective authorities concerned, are entitled to a refund of the money.

Expenses in the Hejaz.

15. Payments due by the Malay pilgrims to their sheikhs or mutawwifs were as before made in groups and at the following rates:—

Group 1.—Boat-hire, portage and cartage of luggage on arrival or on leaving, house rent, and Jedda municipal taxes, each case 3-20 dollars or 4 rials.

Group 2 (a).—Camel-hire per pilgrim with luggage—Jedda to Mecca or *vice versa*—£2 to £2½.

Or (b) Car-hire per pilgrim £1 to £1 2 rials and camel-hire for luggage 8 rials to £2 according to quantity.

Group 3.—House rent in Mecca, food on arrival and at Arafat and Muna, Government tax, &c.—£6

Group 4.—(a) Camel-hire, Mecca to Medina and back, £6 to £7, or
(b) Car-hire, Mecca to Medina and back—£10 to £13.

Group 5.—Camel-hire, Mecca to Arafat, Muna and back, £1 each person.

16. Pilgrims would be well advised not to make any payment to the sheikhs for any of these "groups" until they actually fall due. It is often a matter of some difficulty to obtain refund of payments from the sheikhs in case of death, in cases where payments have been made in advance.

Sheikhs or Mutawwifs.

17. No complaints of a serious nature were brought by Malay pilgrims against their sheikhs or mutawwifs or, for that matter, against anyone else, so that the Malay pilgrimage officer had little occasion to go up to Mecca in this connexion.

Health.

18. There were again some cases of small-pox, though only of a mild nature, among the Malay pilgrims this year. Compulsory inoculation and vaccination before embarkation will, however, obviate these troubles in the future.

Mortality.

19. The first intimation received by the Malay pilgrimage officer of the death of a pilgrim was the application of the relatives accompanying the deceased for his ticket. Of the death of pilgrims who have no accompanying relative, the Malay pilgrimage officer can only learn on his return to the Hejaz in the following season when he receives the list of such deceased pilgrims from the Bait-el-Mal. The following figures give the number of deaths among the pilgrims during the season as reported to him up to the date of his departure on the 6th July, 1929.

Straits Settlements—

Singapore	16
Penang and Province Wellesley	3
Malacca	8

Federated Malay States—

Perak	12
Selangor	3
Negri Sembilan	3
Pahang	14

Unfederated Malay States—

Johore	7
Kedah	6
Perlis	-
Kelantan	7
Trengganu	7
Brunei	-
Labuan	3

Total ... 89

This figure represents 6 per cent. of the year's arrivals.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims.

20. Practically all enquiries concerning the effects of deceased pilgrims by their next-of-kin in Malaya were successfully dealt with. It should be remembered that effects deposited in the Bait-el-Mal during the season do not reach the British consular authorities before the Malay pilgrimage officer leaves the country for Malaya at the end of the season. It would assist the Malay pilgrimage officer in dealing with enquiries regarding deceased pilgrims' effects if officers issuing passes would see to it

- that the names of two or more accompanying relatives be given in the pilgrim passes; this to ensure that one of them will be allowed to receive the effects from the Bait-el-Mal, in case of death of the pilgrim;
- that the names of the pilgrims and their "accompanying relatives" be written in clear Jawi (Arabic) characters, as well as in English.

In the case of enquiries for effects, district officers would also facilitate matters at this end if, with a view to establishing whether or not a claim is genuine, they would insist on the production of the pilgrim passes of the deceased by the accompanying relatives who claim the effects. It would also be useful if officers would state in all applications—

- The registration number of the passes and the year of issue.
- The year the pilgrim in question is reported to have died.

- The amount and nature of the effects with names of two witnesses (number of witnesses' passes to be given also) who may have knowledge concerning the effects.
- The name of the deceased's sheikh, if possible.

Pilgrims returning to Malaya.

21. The Malay pilgrims, as in the case of the Indians, were embarked for their return journey in the order of their arrival in Jedda and were conveyed back to Malayan ports in eight ships of the Blue Funnel Line; the first of these sailed on the 27th May and the last on the 28th June.

Appointment of a Malay Dresser.

22. A Malay dresser was seconded from the Federated Malay States for service in the Hejaz to assist in attending to the medical needs of Malay pilgrims. According to arrangements authorised, he was to be attached to the Indian sub-assistant surgeon sent from India for service at Mecca during the pilgrimage season. Unfortunately, the latter did not arrive in Jedda until very late in the season. The Malay dresser, not being qualified himself to open the dispensary, was thus obliged to spend four months in Jedda instead of taking up his work at Mecca when needed. If the present system is continued, the Indian sub-assistant surgeon and the Malay dresser should arrive at the same time. This would mean either that the sub-assistant surgeon should arrive early in the year—earlier, in fact, than is necessary for purely Indian purposes—or else that the Malay dresser should arrive later in the season—that is to say, some time after the Malay pilgrims have arrived in Mecca and need medical attention.

23. It is a moot point, however, whether, under the present conditions, the Indian dispensary being some distance from the Malay quarter, it is worth while engaging a Malay dresser at all. The ideal would be to open and equip a separate Malay dispensary situated in the Malay quarter, properly staffed and in charge of a fully qualified Malay doctor. It is doubtful, however, whether the expense is warranted, and also whether a fully qualified Malay doctor would be available and willing to come.

24. The total number of cases treated by the Malay dresser in Jedda during the first four months of the year was forty-two. Of these, thirty-six were male and six female. The total number treated in Mecca was 422, of which 379 were male, thirty-eight female and five children.

Staff.

25. Haji Abdul Majjid was seconded from the Federated Malay States Education Department for the fifth time to act as Malay pilgrimage officer attached to His Britannic Majesty's agent and consul at Jedda. As usual, he performed his duties with commendable zeal and ability, and it is a tribute to his work that the control of the Malay pilgrimage was carried out without a hitch. The question of the appointment of a permanent Malay pilgrimage officer, possibly with the title of British (Malay) vice-consul, with a permanent clerk under him, has not as yet been settled. The services of a Malay officer to assist His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Jedda in dealing with affairs of Malay pilgrims are, however, in any case, indispensable.

(12.)—West African Pilgrimage.

According to the statistics issued by the local quarantine authorities, 2,338 British West Africans and Nigerians arrived in Jedda this year from Suakin, the recognised point of departure for the Hejaz. There is no doubt, however, that a large number also travelled from Massowa in sambuqs and landed at the Hejazi ports of Lith and Qunfida, whence they proceeded on foot to Mecca. This occurred in spite of the undertaking given by the Italian Government in Rome on the 20th October, 1928, to the effect that they would not permit the transport of pilgrims from Massowa to Jedda unless by steamship. From enquiries made, it would appear that as many as 2,000 Nigerian pilgrims arrived at Lith and Qunfida from Massowa during the year, but it has been impossible to obtain an accurate estimate.

2. In the return season a large number of applications were received from Nigerians for repatriation to their homes via the Sudan. A certain number of these had come to this country from the Sudan and Eritrea both before and after the introduction of the present pilgrimage laws by those Governments. All such applicants were informed that they should return to their homes by the same means and following the same route as on their journey to the Hejaz. In genuine cases of hardship, facilities were made, even for those who had arrived from Massowa, to return via the Sudan. Cases of destitution where relief was afforded were less numerous than in the previous year.

3. I have already commented in a separate despatch on the scheme proposed by the Nigerian Government for the control of the West African pilgrimage. I am in principle greatly in favour of such a scheme whereby it may be possible to co-ordinate the action of the Government of the Sudan, the Government of Nigeria and this agency in dealing with these pilgrims.

(13.)—Sudanese Pilgrimage.

The Hejaz quarantine authorities report that 1,371 Sudanese pilgrims were carried by Khedivial mail steamers to and from the Hejaz this year. These pilgrims, who were all in possession of pilgrim passports and return tickets, returned to the Sudan immediately after the pilgrimage. A few pilgrims lost their papers of identity at Mecca and Medina, but after enquiry duplicate documents were issued. The local agents of the Khedivial line, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., were good enough to grant passages gratis to those pilgrims who were able to prove that they had actually left the Sudan for the Hejaz before the pilgrimage and had possessed documents at the outset.

2. Two separate contingents of pilgrims arrived in Jedda just after the departure of a ship for the Sudan and were compelled to remain in Jedda for ten days. Meetings of protest were held in the agency courtyard and on the roof. They were in each case invited to appoint a representative body to submit their grievance, but found great difficulty in doing so. In the case of the first contingent a deputation was eventually elected and received. In the case of the second contingent a sergeant of a mounted unit in the Sudan showed great ability in electing himself as sole delegate, ignoring with remarkable *sang-froid* the protests of his disappointed but duly accredited rivals. Both contingents dispersed quite happily when it was made abundantly clear to them that there was actually no ship for the time being to take them back.

3. Sixteen Sudanese pilgrims are reported to have died at Mecca and three in Jedda during the season.

(14.)—Iraqi Pilgrimage.

The number of Iraqis who entered the Hejaz through the port of Jedda this year is given as 486. The majority travelled via Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and Egypt. Ninety-six reached the Hejaz via Indian ports.

2. All Iraqi or foreign pilgrims are obliged to obtain pilgrim passes from the Health Department in Iraq and to make a deposit of 100 rupees before leaving the country. This obligation greatly simplified the problem of dealing with destitutes. Instead of the waste of time and money, and unnecessary hardship, such as has been caused to the pilgrims in former years, when each individual case had in the first instance to be referred to Bagdad, an applicant who had a good case was helped and dealt with in a few minutes, advances being made against the deposit.

3. No difficulties were experienced by the Iraqis in obtaining accommodation on board ship in the return season. Those Iraqi or foreign pilgrims who came from or via Iraq, and who were subject to the new regulations governing the Iraqi pilgrimage, were as a rule in possession either of a return ticket or of a letter of guarantee, accepted by the local shipping agents for the homeward passage, in conformity with requirement No. 3 of the conditions laid down for the issue of a pilgrimage pass. A few pilgrims lost their return travel documents, but the shipping companies issued duplicate papers once they were convinced that the applications were genuine.

(15.)—Palestinians.

The number of Palestinians issued with pilgrim passes by the authorities in Palestine this year is reported by them to have been 563, an increase of ninety-two on last year's figures. The majority of these pilgrims came via Egypt, and travelled to and from the Hejaz on ships of the Khedivial Mail Line.

2. According to the official statistics issued by the health authorities, seven Palestinian pilgrims died at Mecca. No deaths are recorded as having occurred in Jedda.

3. In the return season no pilgrim applied to this agency for advances on the sums deposited by them in Palestine, and, consequently, no cases of destitution were brought to the notice of this agency. The Government of Palestine increased the compulsory deposit by £1 as compared with the figure of the previous year.

(16.)—Sarawak Pilgrimage.

Twenty-two natives of Sarawak arrived on pilgrimage. There were no cases of disease or of destitution among them.

[E 2280/92/91]

No. 116.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 82.)
Sir,

Jedda, April 3, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz-Nejd for the period the 1st to the 31st March, 1930.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad (2), Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Simla, Singapore, the chief secretary to the Government of the Federated Malay States, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea sloops and His Majesty's consul at Basra.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 116.

Jedda Report for the Period March 1 to 31, 1930.

THE meeting of the two Kings on board H.M.S. "Lupin" was followed by a meeting of Iraqi and Nejd delegates at Bagdad, where, on the 9th March, a Bon Voisinage Agreement was drawn up and initialled by the Iraq Prime Minister and, on behalf of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, by Sheikh Fuad Hamza and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba. The agreement is between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, on the one hand, and the Kingdom of Iraq on the other, thus implying mutual recognition. It includes an article based on the Bon Voisinage Treaty of Angora and also contains provisions for the exchange of representatives, reference to arbitration of disputes arising out of the agreement (in accordance with a protocol of arbitration attached to the agreement), the prevention of officials from crossing the frontier and mingling with the tribes, and the prevention of foreign tourists from crossing the frontier without permission.

2. The "Um-el-Qura" has not so far published any commentary on the meeting of the two Kings in the Persian Gulf. This omission on the part of the semi-official Government organ, in respect of a meeting unique in the annals of modern Arabian history, is disappointing and would tend to give rise to doubts as to the sincerity of the motives which actuated Ibn Saud in attending the meeting, or it might be interpreted as a desire to forget an episode of little moment in Arabian politics.

3. The Hejazi is inclined to be cynical and only to see in this meeting a conference between irreconcilable foes, whose interests for the moment have so coincided as to demand a spectacular demonstration of goodwill. He does not expect permanent results, but at the same time he applauds British diplomacy for securing a settlement for the time being of the troubles, extending over a period of years, on the Nejd-Iraq frontier.

[22271]

K 3

4. Nothing had been received by the end of the month in respect of the payment of £10,000 which, in the agreement reached on the 27th January over the surrender of the rebels, the King had promised to pay through Jedda in anticipation of the final settlement as compensation to tribesmen in Koweit and Iraq for property looted by the rebels. (January report, paragraph 14.)

5. A message was received from the King on the 14th March in reply to the note from His Majesty's Government addressed to him on the 21st December regarding raids alleged to have been committed by Transjordan tribes (December report, paragraph 16 *et seq.*). In it he states that the situation in the frontier districts has changed and that raids have now taken the form of a regular military offensive, tribesmen from Transjordan having actually besieged Tebuk and Teima and operated near Janf and Hail cutting the roads between these towns and using motor-cars for swift organised attacks. He feels sure that past attacks have been made in order to embarrass him in his recent campaign, to cause friction between himself and His Majesty's Government and to make him appear to his subjects powerless to defend them. He, therefore, urgently requests His Majesty's Government (1) to resolve immediately the question of claims arising out of looted property; (2) to inform him of measures taken by them to discover the criminals and their instigators and to state the punishments inflicted; and (3) to take decisive measures to prevent further hostile action and to punish evildoers, whatever their instigation may be.

6. In connexion with the raid carried out by the Emir-bin-Musaad against Transjordan tribes, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda addressed a note to the Hejaz Government on the 10th March informing them that there was much distress among the victims of this attack, and requesting that the looted property might be restored immediately to the former owners independently of the question of arbitration on past raids.

7. The Hejaz Government have replied that they have already expressed regret for the raid and have ordered investigations, as it was carried out without previous reference to the Government and without orders. They claim, however, that the persons in question are those responsible for besieging Janf and raiding as far as Hail, and that Ibn Musaad was obliged, in order to preserve security in the frontier districts, to pursue and punish them, and that he did so while they were in Nejd territory. Nevertheless, they state, the Hejaz Government is prepared to deduct from its original claims against the tribes of Transjordan the property taken by Ibn Musaad, and they propose to deal with those responsible for the attack in the same way as the Government of Transjordan dealt with its subjects who encroached into Nejd and who, they allege, recently seized over 10,000 camels. They assert that the present sufferings of the Transjordan tribes are a punishment for criminal action in which they were engaged at the time, and they propose that relief should be afforded from the possessions of Nejd subjects which are in the hands of Transjordan Arabs. They intend shortly to forward to His Majesty's Government full details of recent occurrences in those regions.

8. Information was received at the end of the month of a serious raid carried out on the 12th January by a large force of Hejazi tribesmen under the leadership of Sultan-el-Faqir and Sabah-el-Morta'id of the Anriza, and Ibrahim-el-Neshmi with a number of Nejd gendarmes or "Zgurt," who attacked the Nawasra, Darawsha, Samihiveen and Saleemiyeen sections of the Howeitat encamped at El Hofra in the Jebel Tubeil. The raiders killed five Transjordan tribesmen and took 5,000 sheep and 3,000 camels.

9. His Majesty's Government have selected Mr. M. S. MacDonnell, formerly of the Sudan and Egyptian services, and subsequently League of Nations High Commissioner at Danzig, as investigator in connexion with the arbitration of claims in respect of past raids in the Nejd-Transjordan frontier districts. It is considered important that he should meet Ibn Saud personally before beginning his work in order to establish contact and ensure that all steps which may be considered necessary are taken by the Hejaz authorities to facilitate his task. It is therefore proposed that he should reach Jedda early in May. He would afterwards visit the Emir Abdullah and then begin his investigations on the spot.

10. The religious committees, who were given full powers by the Government to punish all citizens transgressing Wahabi doctrines (August report, 1928, paragraph 8), recommenced their activities early this month. The regulations issued by these committees nineteen months ago had been allowed practically to become a dead letter, and the local citizens, who had been congratulating themselves on the gradual evanescence of the tiresome restrictions imposed, were greatly annoyed to find them

resuscitated by lictors or special police imported from Nejd, who carry out their duties with deplorable efficiency. Moreover, whereas in the past these lictors had been content to patrol the main thoroughfares of the town only, they have now been combing out the more remote by-ways. Small boys playing mouth organs have been the first to receive attention. These diminutive miscreants are given a taste of the cane and the offending instruments collected in baskets. Reports received from the local shopkeepers indicate that these same musical instruments are finding their way back into the market. The culprits, in order to revenge themselves, have taken to waylaying the president of the Jedda Committee at street corners and pelting him with melon rind, the Arabian equivalent of tarring and feathering, an attention which is considered to be particularly contumelious.

11. The religious committees are now busily dealing with persons found guilty of smoking, playing music, laxity in attending prayers, &c. These are soundly beaten or taken off to prison.

12. The public, who thought a year ago that the King had established these committees only in order to placate his two principal and most fanatical Akhwan rebel chiefs, Faisal-ed-Doweish and Ibn Humaid, and that with their rebellion and subsequent defeat a new era would set in, has been quickly disillusioned. It is now believed locally that the recrudescence of the activities of the religious committees is due to the expected arrival in the Hejaz of several prominent Nejd chiefs. Ibn Saud, it is thought, is desirous of propitiating them and is as apprehensive of their reaction to the religious state of affairs in the Hejaz as he was in the case of the two chiefs above mentioned. The unfortunate Jeddawi has now resigned himself to the inevitable and is prepared to see the continuance in office of these committees for some time to come. It is also possible that the religious committees have been revived with the object of impressing the pilgrims.

13. A translation of the text of the Perso-Hejaz Treaty of Friendship, which was signed at Tehran on the 24th August last, has now been received. (August report, paragraph 19.)

14. Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Blaihid, Kadi of Hail, a strong personality, who is considered to be one of the most enlightened Ulemas in Arabia, visited Mecca in the month of Ramadan. In 1927, owing to active and somewhat provocative interference in matters outside his own province, he was compelled to resign the post of Grand Kadi of the Hejaz, to which he had been appointed by Ibn Saud in 1925. He played a prominent part at the time of the Moslem Conference convened by Ibn Saud in 1926, but after his transfer to Hail in the following year nothing further was heard of him until his reappearance in Mecca last month. He is very outspoken and his visit has caused some embarrassment to the Hejaz Government.

15. On arrival in Mecca he gave out that he intended to settle there permanently and was proceeding shortly to Hail to bring back his family. On his way to Hail he visited Jedda to engage cars for the journey and asked a member of the British Legation staff who is well known to him to be good enough to assist him in the purchase of cars and the selection of chauffeurs. This news reached the ears of the Emir, whereupon the sheikh was hurriedly informed that the Government would undertake to supply all the transport necessary for the journey. A few days later Sheikh Abdullah left for Hail with Government cars, stating before his departure that he intended to return to Jedda shortly.

16. Various gifts have been presented to the Hejaz Government for the Holy Mosques of Mecca and Medina. Sheikh Abdurrahman Kusaibi has given a number of mats; mats have also been sent by Mohammed Amin, a Calcutta merchant. Two Algerians who came on pilgrimage last year have followed the example of an Indian merchant, who supplied electrical plant for lighting the Mosque in Mecca, by presenting a 40 h.p. engine and dynamo for the mosque at Medina. While the Royal family are spending large sums of money embellishing their residences in Mecca, little or no money is being set aside for the upkeep of the Holy Mosque, which has to depend on the charity of Moslem pilgrims.

17. Owing to trouble between the manager and the weavers of the "Kiswa" factory in Mecca (February report, paragraph 9), work on the Holy Carpet was suspended for three days, but it is now again in full swing. The silk ordered from Germany for the manufacture of the carpet is now reported to have cost the Government £700, and not £500 as previously stated.

18. His Highness the Emir Feisal visited Jedda in the course of the month and stayed for a week. During his stay he received visits from members of the diplomatic and consular corps. He appears to be tolerably well informed on all matters of interest to the Hejaz Government except on the subject of the debts due

by them. He is reported to have had several conversations with Mr. Philby, who has urged the exploitation of the mineral resources of the country as a means of providing a further source of revenue to the State so that it need no longer be dependent on the pilgrimage for its existence.

19. M. Maigret, the French Chargé d'Affaires, left for Beirut on the 20th March. It is rumoured that he has been instructed to open negotiations with Sheikh Fuad Hamza, who is said to have been appointed as delegate of the Hejaz Government, in connexion with the renewal of the Franco-Hejaz commercial treaty.

20. The "Um-el-Qura" published on the 28th March the text of a new regulation dealing with the registration of motor-car drivers. The new rules are apparently intended to penalise the incompetent and careless driving which has been far too prevalent hitherto on the part of native and Indian chauffeurs. The motive underlying these apparently beneficial rules is, however, possibly a desire of the Government to establish a more effective control over all chauffeurs for its own reasons. The requirements of the authorities are such that they often find it necessary to commandeer both motor vehicles and their drivers for Government purposes.

21. Among recent arrivals in Jedda are Suleiman Shefik Pasha, at one time Director-General of Road Construction, Sheikh Abdurrahman Kusaibi, Ibn Saud's agent in Bombay, and Sheikh Abdullah Ahmed Fadl, who, it will be remembered, accompanied the Emir Feisal on his journey to Europe in 1926.

22. The total number of pilgrims who had reached the Hejaz by the end of the month was 40,727, as compared with 38,573 for the corresponding period last year. Of this total, Malay pilgrims number 2,281 and Indians 2,526, as opposed to 1,164 and 3,516 respectively for the same period in 1929.

23. Generally speaking, health conditions in the Hejaz have been normal during the month. Sixty-nine cases of small-pox, which is endemic, were reported, thirty-seven cases of which proved fatal. A heavy shower of rain which fell at the beginning of the month has improved the prospects of cultivators, and such vegetation as there is has greatly benefited thereby.

24. During the period under review seven slaves, all of Sudanese origin and from one village near Jedda, took refuge at this Legation and applied for repatriation. They were sent to their homes by way of Suakin.

[E 2285/29/91]

No. 117.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 91.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 19, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Tehran despatch No. 616 of the 27th December last, regarding the appointment of a Persian diplomatic representative in the Hejaz, a copy of which was forwarded to me, and to state that Mirza Habibullah Khan Hoveida arrived at Jedda on the 6th instant and has taken up his duties. He has been accredited as "Représentant diplomatique et Chargé d'Affaires."

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Tehran.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 2214/905/91]

No. 118.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 17, 1930.

MY despatch No. 130 of 1st May: Proposed service down Hasa coast.

Unless you see serious objection, you should inform Hejazi Government that His Majesty's Government are anxious to establish a fortnightly air service between Basra and Bahrein in connexion with impending pearling season, which will last until October. Owing to difficulties with private companies, service would probably have to be carried out by service aircraft. They therefore desire Ibn Saud's permission for British service aircraft to fly over Hasa coast.

It would also be necessary for aircraft to be able to land on Hasa coast in emergency, and for this purpose one or two emergency landing grounds would have to be reconnoitred and marked out on Ibn Saud's territory. This work could be carried out by the Royal Air Force from Iraq; but, if Hejazi Government would prefer it, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to leave it to Hejazi Air Force.

I leave it entirely to your discretion how to put this proposal forward, including desirability of approaching the King direct, as suggested by Mr. Bond in his telegram No. 30 of 20th March, and of emphasising fact that, since re-establishment of normal conditions in North-Eastern Nejd and employment of Hejazi Air Force in that area, objections originally put forward by Hejazi Government no longer apply.

For your confidential information, if you consider that solution would be facilitated thereby, Air Ministry would be prepared to contemplate payment of suitable rent for emergency landing ground.

(Repeated to Bushire, No. 68.)

[E 2696/905/91]

No. 119.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 22, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. 77.

After a careful review of the correspondence relative to air matters since 1927, I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that proposal regarding pearling flights in the present form will be most unacceptable to Ibn Saud. My principal reasons are as follows:—

1. Proposal to use service aircraft for scheme, which he might dislike even if it were a purely commercial proposition put forward on behalf of Imperial Airways, will cause the King to suspect His Majesty's Government of ulterior motives. Protest dealt with in your telegram No. 72 (to which I replied by despatch) is significant in this connexion.
2. I do not consider creation of a new air force has had the expected effect of making him more favourable to British aerial equipment. Our frequent suggestions in connexion with that force, although always made with the best intentions, have probably given us the appearance in his eyes of wishing to interfere with its management. My telegram No. 62 shows how suspicious his attitude is.
3. Whenever we have previously broached the question of emergency landing grounds, the King has discovered pretexts for putting us off, and he will probably find fresh pretexts in reply to argument that the situation is now different.
4. Ibn Saud's own suspicions will probably be fanned by Fuad Hamza, whose position still appears to be strong.

I feel bound to submit these considerations, as I fear that if I broach this question of pearling flights at a time when I have to feel my way carefully, I shall not only fail, but may prejudice whatever chance there may be of promoting in due course success of larger scheme for route to India. If, however, you think these risks should be faced, my best course will be to sound His Majesty personally at interview, for which opportunity will probably be afforded this week or next, and see how far I can go. In that case, I should be glad to learn whether you consider more than one emergency landing ground essential, and whether I can give any indication of probable position of such a ground or grounds.

(Repeated to Bushire, No. 78.)

[E 2693/2693/91]

No. 120.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 102.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 2, 1930.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 127 of the 29th June last, I have the honour to report the arrival of a Polish delegation consisting of Count Edward Raczynsky of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Grand Mufti of Poland.

2. The delegates are the guests of the Government.
3. The object of the mission is, I gather, an exchange of letters or the conclusion of the commercial treaty referred to in your despatch.
4. The King is expected to come to Jedda from Mecca to-morrow on a flying visit, principally, I imagine, in order to meet the Polish delegation, although he will no doubt hold other receptions also.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 2695/334/91]

No. 121.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 109.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 9, 1930.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 53 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to state that I left London for Jedda on the 22nd April and arrived here on the 6th May via Marseilles and Port Sudan. At the latter place I was very hospitably entertained by the commissioner, Major D. S. B. Thomson, and had the advantage of discussing with him many matters of Red Sea interest.

2. The arrangements for transporting me from Port Sudan to Jedda in H.M.S. "Dahlia" were carried out most admirably by Commander R. A. Jackson, R.N. I should be grateful if a suitable expression of thanks could be conveyed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, provided you see no objection.

3. The Hejaz authorities went out of their way to show attention to me on my arrival. The Governor of Jedda sent the officer commanding the garrison to welcome me on board the "Dahlia," and himself came down to the landing-stage to receive me. In addition to his own greetings, he brought me complimentary messages from the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its dependencies, including an expression of regret that His Majesty had had to leave Jedda (where he had been spending a couple of days), and would be unable to receive me until after the pilgrimage. After responding suitably to these courtesies, I drove to the Legation in a car provided by the Governor.

4. In the evening the King caused further messages to be telephoned to me, and again confirmed them next morning. In addition to replying in the same manner, I asked the Governor, when calling on him on the morning of the 7th May, to convey my warmest thanks to the King, as he, the Governor, was about to go to Mecca for the pilgrimage. At this visit, the Governor, after a cordial exchange of compliments, discoursed to me at some length on the improvements made by Ibn Saud in the arrangements for the pilgrimage, his desire to improve them still further, and his anxiety to collaborate with His Majesty's Government in doing as much as possible to ensure the well-being of pilgrims, especially from the sanitary point of view. I assured the Governor that His Majesty's Government appreciated what had been done, and would be most ready to harmonise their efforts in the same direction on behalf of British pilgrims with those of the King of the Hejaz.

5. I am happy to think that everything connected with my arrival went in such a way as to create a good local impression and to emphasise the importance of the decision of His Majesty's Government to appoint a Minister here. By a fortunate coincidence, my arrival took place on Accession Day. The firing of a further salute and the dressing of ships, including a large number of pilgrim ships, in honour of that anniversary, gave additional dignity to the visit of H.M.S. "Dahlia."

6. On the 7th May, I wrote to the Emir Feisal as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to ask formally for an audience to present my credentials. Although I have had no reply as yet, I have reason to think that the audience will be fixed for an early day after the 12th May. Sheikh Fuad Hamza returned to Jedda from his honeymoon yesterday morning, but has not yet notified his resumption of his duties as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

A. RYAN.

[E 2679/2679/91]

No. 122.

Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 161.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 21, 1930.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 805 of the 19th December, 1929, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the Treaty of Friendship concluded between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic on the 3rd August, 1929, as published in the "Hakimiyeti Milliye" of the 15th May.

2. This treaty was duly approved by the Grand National Assembly at its session of the 15th May last.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS.

Enclosure in No. 122.

Extract from the "Hakimiyeti Milliye" of May 15, 1930.

(Translation.)

THE following Treaty of Friendship has been signed between the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic:—

1. There shall be inviolable peace and perpetual and sincere friendship between the Government of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic, which recognises the complete integrity and independence of the above-mentioned State.

2. The high contracting parties are agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the two States in conformity with the principles of international law. They further agree that the diplomatic representatives of each party in the territory of the other, shall enjoy, subject to reciprocity, the treatment prescribed by the general principles of international law.

3. The high contracting parties agree not to grant to the citizens of the other party in their respective territories treatment less favourable than is granted to the citizens of any third party as regards establishment, travel and judicial procedure.

4. The high contracting parties undertake to initiate negotiations for a separate consular and commercial convention to cover their respective territories.

5. The present treaty, done in Turkish and Arabic, shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged in Angora at the earliest possible moment. The treaty will come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications.

Signed in duplicate at Mecca on the 3rd August, 1929 (27th Sefer, 1348).

[E 2775/1308/91]

No. 123.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, May 28, 1930.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent me, under cover of a personal letter, copies of letters addressed by the King and himself on 25th May to King Feisal and Iraq Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. These letters are in form very friendly, but express the view that "bon-voisinage" will be exposed to continual danger unless definite measures are taken to stop criminal activities against both countries, which can be done by conclusion of agreement on extradition. The writers therefore consider that such an agreement should be negotiated before confirming Nejd-Iraq Treaty of Friendship and Bon-Voisinage, to which Ibn Saud agrees in principle. They propose that necessary negotiations should be undertaken with a view to simultaneous conclusion of both agreements.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me orally to request High Commissioner, Bagdad, to inform Iraq Government of despatch of letters and to acquaint that Government with their nature if questioned as to their contents.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 88.)

[E 2807/1308/91]

No. 124.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, May 28, 1930.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I had a long conversation on this subject with Fuad Hamza this morning. I said I would not discuss it officially except under instructions, but that in my personal opinion King's attitude would cause profound disappointment to His Majesty's Government. I said that I was aware that question of extradition had been linked with that of bon-voisinage agreement in earlier stages, but that it had not been raised at time of "Lupin" Conference, and that postponement of definite conclusion of latter during lengthy period necessary for negotiation of extradition treaty would greatly diminish results achieved at conference. Fuad Hamza said matter had been again raised at Koweit just before the conference, that there had not been time to deal with it on board the "Lupin"; and that when bon-voisinage agreement had been initialled at Bagdad the moment was not suitable for reverting to extradition treaty proposals, as Nejd delegates were already taking certain risks in dealing, as regards bon-voisinage agreement, with an Iraq Government which was known to have resigned.

I may have somewhat shaken Fuad's belief in wisdom of latest move. If you wish me to make any official representation there would be advantage in instructing me before 4th June, as I expect to be received by His Majesty on that or the following day. I gathered that Fuad Hamza himself would be glad if I were then able to say something to the King.

May I have copy of bon-voisinage agreement as initialled if available?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 89.)

[E 2741/2353/91]

No. 125.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 209.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to the Persian Government, dated the 17th May, on the subject of Muscat in Persia.

Tehran, May 19, 1930.

Enclosure in No. 125.

Sir R. Clive to M. Faruki.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, May 17, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Highness that, according to reports which I have recently received from Bushire, the Persian authorities in the Gulf ports continue to treat all the inhabitants of the southern littoral of the Gulf as Persian subjects, levying a fine of 34 krans 50 cents on them on the ground that they are not in possession of Persian passports, and confiscating whatever passports or other certificates of identity they may have on entering Persia.

2. On several occasions during the last year I have been compelled to protest against this entirely unjustifiable conduct on the part of the officials concerned, and have pointed out that the subjects of a State such as Muscat, to which, as far as I am aware, the Persian Government has never laid claim, cannot possibly be regarded as Persian subjects, and are entitled to exactly the same consideration as any other foreign national who may visit this country. This applies with equal force to the natives of Oman and Koweit. The responsible local officials admit, moreover, that they do not know what justification there can be for the procedure of which I have complained, and state that they are simply carrying out the orders which they have received from Tehran.

3. In these circumstances, I should be grateful if your Highness would be so good as to investigate the matter as soon as possible. If, as I can only presume, this treatment is due to a misunderstanding of the orders issued to the local authorities by the Central Government, I should be grateful if amended instructions might be issued forthwith, and if I might be informed of the action taken in the matter.

4. At the same time, I have the honour to bring to your Highness's notice another report which I have received from His Britannic Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, according to which the Governor of the Gulf ports has recently addressed two letters to the Sheikh of Dabai, the first concerning the murder of a man whose family is of Persian origin but has been settled in Dabai for four generations; the second concerning an injury inflicted on a Persian resident of that State. Your Highness will doubtless be aware that by the terms of his treaties with His Majesty's Government, the Sheikh of Dabai, as a Trucial chief, is precluded from corresponding with any other Power. His Excellency the Governor was doubtless not aware of this fact, and I should be grateful if your Highness would be so good as to acquaint him with the position, in order that in future, as in the past, such questions may be referred either to myself or to His Majesty's consul-general for the necessary action.

I avail, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 2696/905/91]

No. 126.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 31, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. 65 of 22nd May: Arabian air route.

His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree that application should be deferred for the present, in view of your opinion that, if formal request were made now, chances of larger scheme for regular India service might be adversely affected.

For the following reasons, however, the question is now becoming more urgent:—

1. It is doubtful whether it will be possible to secure satisfactory renewal of the agreement with Persian Government for use of South Persian route, which expires in April 1932. It may then become matter of urgent importance that it should be possible to use the Arabian air route. Sufficient prior experience of route is therefore of importance to Air Ministry. It has also been assumed hitherto that such preliminary flights as those now proposed would be the most effective way of ensuring a favourable atmosphere in 1932.

2. Telegram has just been received from High Commissioner for Iraq to effect that German Junkers Company, who already operate service between Bagdad and Tehran, would like to form subsidiary company for purpose of conveying pilgrims next season between Kerbela and Mecca by air. His Majesty's Government and Iraqi Government are unlikely to adopt favourable attitude towards this proposal, but Junkers may make direct request for permission for service in Arabia through German Government to Hejazi Government, regardless of attitude as regards Iraq of His Majesty's Government and Iraqi Government. If Ibn Saud gave permission, it would mean that first air service in Arabia would be instituted not by British, but foreign aircraft, and British prestige would suffer accordingly, while if Ibn Saud refused he would be provided with precedent for refusing future British requests. If possible, therefore, it would be a good thing that His Majesty's Government should anticipate Junkers in approaching Hejazi Government.
3. A project for a possible geological survey by air over country between Bahrein and Koweit, extending to 100 or 200 miles inland, has been broached to both Junkers and Imperial Airways by American oil interests. Since Junkers will no doubt ask Hejazi Government for permission through German Government, it may be difficult for His Majesty's Government to refuse to approach Hejazi Government in the matter, if requested by Imperial Airways to do so. It seems possible that request for permission for inland flight of this type, although civil aircraft would be used, might be even less opportune than one for flights down Hasa coast by service aircraft, and if made first have even more undesirable reaction on main scheme.
4. Force of your argument regarding Ibn Saud may well suspect that His Majesty's Government are trying to interfere in affairs of Hejazi air force is appreciated. Air Ministry consider, however, that, owing to lack of facilities for renewals and repairs, condition of that force in twelve months' time may have deteriorated. In that case, atmosphere for obtaining what we want may be even more unfavourable than now.
5. If, as is presumably likely, Ibn Saud leaves for Nejd soon and does not return to Hejaz till next year, question may have to be postponed for a dangerously long time, or, alternatively, difficult negotiation would have to be carried on by correspondence, which might offer greater scope for misunderstanding than personal conversation at the present time.
6. Once the pearling season, which offers valid and convenient reason for suggesting special service, is over, it seems probable that permission could only be asked on general grounds, justification of which might be more difficult.

Having regard to the above considerations, might it not be desirable and possible to sound the King or Hejazi Government informally, with a view to obtaining more definite indications of their probable reactions, but without putting forward any definite proposal? It seems that His Majesty's Government have not approached them directly with regard to the general question since 1927.

On the other hand, we realise that it might conceivably be better that the idea of pearling flights should be dropped altogether, and that our energies should be reserved for determined effort next year to obtain general permission for flights in connexion with Indian air route. This request once made would have to be pressed, and it is arguable that it would be better not to expend our energies beforehand.

It is left to your discretion to take any action you may think desirable before the King leaves.

Please telegraph a full report.

[E 2807/1308/91]

No. 127.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 31, 1930.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 68 and 69 of 28th May: Bon-voisinage and extradition agreements between Iraq and Hejaz-Nejd.

Subject to any observations that the High Commissioner for Iraq may have to offer, you are authorised to make official representations to Ibn Saud on the lines of your conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 2917/1/91]

No. 128.

High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

REFERENCE my telegram of 6th May [see No. 114].

The following is the gist of a personal and secret letter which I have received from King Feisal:—

"I am glad to tell you that I have been successful in persuading Ibn Mashur to return to Nejd. I feel confident that Ibn Saud will keep his word by pardoning Ibn Mashur and treating him indulgently, thereby fulfilling my undertaking to Ibn Mashur. It is of special importance to me to come out of this affair with clean hands, and not to have it said that I betrayed the man who took refuge with me and trusted my word. I am writing Ibn Saud to obtain advance assurances from him regarding his treatment of Ibn Mashur, so that should I receive a satisfactory reply I should be able to order him to leave Iraq for Nejd at once."

Recently, I protested to Feisal regarding a report which I had received to the effect that Ibn Mashur was planning to return to Syria. I trust that in the event of a safe conduct being received from Ibn Saud, there will no longer be any doubt about his early return to Nejd.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 3036/92/91]

No. 129.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 103.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 3, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz-Nejd for the period the 1st to 30th April, 1930.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad (2), Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Simla, Singapore, the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Federated Malay States, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops, and His Majesty's consul at Basra.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Jedda Report for the Period April 1 to 30, 1930.

VERY few events worth recording have taken place in the Hejaz in the course of the past month. During the latter part of the month everything has been hanging fire in anticipation of the King's return to Mecca. The thoughts and energies of the senior officials have been devoted latterly to making feverish preparations for his reception, as it was not known from one day to another when he was likely to arrive. Triumphal arches have been erected, and a large number of houses in Mecca have been requisitioned in order to accommodate the multitude of his expected following. Householders who protested were in several cases turned bag and baggage into the street.

2. The King, arriving from Riyadh, reached Mecca on the 30th April. His retinue was estimated to consist of some 5,000 persons, the Royal party itself numbering over 1,200 persons, and including Ibn Jelawi, Emir of Hassa, and leading ulemas and sheikhs. Ibn Saud had previously despatched to Mecca all the members of his own family, as well as a host of relations. He has now seventeen sons with him in Mecca; it is an unprecedented family gathering, and an indication also that the King intends to remain there for some time to come. Three hundred cars were used for the transport of the King and his following to Mecca, which was accomplished in three journeys. Riyadh is described as having been completely evacuated. It is stated that Feisal-ed-Dawish, Ibn Bujad and a large number of sheikhs of doubtful sympathies have also been despatched to Mecca.

3. The Emir Saud arrived shortly before the King, travelling via Medina. It is rumoured that in the near future he is to be formally nominated by the King in Mecca as his successor, and the opinion is widely expressed locally that he will replace his brother as Viceroy of the Hejaz.

4. Steps are being taken by the King to fortify the wells on the roads leading from Mecca and Taif into Nejd. It is a wise measure, no doubt inspired by the troubles last year with the Ataiba, and it should facilitate the control of the tribes.

5. An interim reply has been returned to the King with reference to the message received from him on the 14th March regarding the situation on the Transjordan frontier (March report, paragraph 5). Ibn Saud has been informed, as regards the general question, that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, it is only by concerted action on the part of the authorities of both countries to control their respective tribesmen and punish raiders that an improvement in the situation can be attained. His Majesty's Government express the conviction, however, that matters may more profitably be discussed in conversation between the King and Sir Andrew Ryan, who is due to arrive shortly, than in further written communications. As regards the King's request that the question of the looted property may be resolved at an early date, the King is reminded that the investigator who is to examine the claims in this connexion has already been appointed, and only awaits the opportunity of meeting him in order to begin his work.

6. The King has notified the despatch of a certain Ibrahim-bin-Arfaj to the vicinity of the Koweit and Iraq frontiers to investigate and settle certain questions outstanding between Nejd tribes in that neighbourhood. This emissary has been instructed to deal with any notifications regarding looting, &c., which may be received from the Iraq or Koweit frontier authorities, and to report to these authorities, if necessary, any acts of aggression that may be committed against Nejd.

7. The financial situation of the Government is far from reassuring. The revenues for the pilgrimage, judging by the pilgrim returns up to date, are likely to fall considerably short of expectations. Furthermore, the Government appears to be contemplating fresh expenditure with a fine disregard of liabilities already incurred. Drafts on the customs can occasionally be negotiated at 5 per cent. to 10 per cent. discount, in anticipation of the arrival of specific consignments of merchandise, but it is no easy matter to encash their value. The Government itself is issuing these drafts to local merchants as security for what are to all intents and purposes forced loans. Although no interest as such is paid on these loans, the amounts of the drafts as a rule exceed the sums loaned by an amount which represents in effect the equivalent of 6 per cent. to 10 per cent. interest on the money. The Governor of Jedda himself was recently obliged to hand over a sum of £5,000, and it is said that the total sums loaned by him to the Hejaz Government in this way exceed £20,000. To make the general situation worse, the Jedda representative of the Ministry of Finance has been instructed to collect a sum of £80,000, to be held at the King's disposal immediately after the pilgrimage.

8. On the 13th April His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires communicated to the Hejaz Government the text of a draft commercial treaty which has been drawn up in deference to a desire for it expressed by the Hejaz Government last year.

9. Pilgrims are now arriving in large numbers. The total arrivals by sea calculated up to the end of April numbered approximately 75,000, a figure which falls by some thousands to fulfil expectations. Of this total, approximately 13,000 are Indians, this figure being over 2,000 less than that recorded for the corresponding date last year. Some 1,200 motor vehicles of all kinds and conditions, lorries for the most part, are in commission for the conveyance of pilgrims. This represents a considerable increase in the use of motor transport, and as a result of it pilgrims are no longer detained in Jedda or Mecca for indefinite periods as in the past for want of transport facilities. This is all to the good, but from all accounts there is little control to see that the authorised rates of hire are applied, and the mutawwifs are practically free to exploit their clients as they wish by manipulating fares. The competition among the motor companies is keen, but it is the mutawwif and not the pilgrim who is benefiting by it, and there is considerable dissatisfaction on this account. Complaints are also being received from pilgrims on the ground that on their way from Mecca to Medina via Jedda they are detained at Jedda sometimes for as long as twenty-four hours while their cars undergo a perfunctory examination before being allowed to proceed. On the whole, though, the pilgrimage is going smoothly, and there has been no serious hitch so far.

10. An awkward situation arose at the beginning of the month as a result of the discovery made towards the end of March that spurious Indian currency notes, apparently of both the 10-rupee and the 100-rupee denominations, were in circulation in Jedda. This discovery created something like a panic. The banks and money changers, unable to distinguish with certainty the good from the false notes, refused to accept notes of either denomination. The consequence was that a large number of Indians found themselves for a time in great straits for money, and applied for assistance. The situation was to some extent relieved through the efforts of the British (Indian) vice-consul, who prevailed upon a number of the wealthier Indian merchants in Jedda and Mecca to accept the notes presented by the pilgrims. After a further period the manager of the local Dutch bank was also authorised by his principals to accept pilgrims' notes as the percentage of false notes was found to be small. What might have become a serious crisis was thus, happily, averted.

11. A fire broke out in the offices of the general hospital at Mecca, but it was apparently extinguished without great difficulty, and without damage to persons or property. The only loss is rumoured to have been the record of certain financial transactions which might have thrown light on various allegations which are being made against the director of the hospital himself.

12. The Soviet steamship "Mikoyan" arrived in Jedda on the 1st April with a consignment of 1,000 sacks of sugar destined for a certain Sakka Jemal, a native of Mecca. No opposition appears to have been offered this time by local merchants to the landing of the cargo as occurred, it will be remembered, in the case of the steamship "Tomp" in November 1927. This forbearance may be due to the fact that the cargo was this time consigned to a Hejazi merchant and not to the so-called Soviet commercial agency, the commercial pseudonym for the Soviet Legation, and that no attempt was made to undercut local prices.

13. Another Soviet ship which called at Jedda during the month was the steamship "Rabotchie." This arrived on the 20th April with 379 Persian and Iraqi pilgrims from the Persian Gulf.

14. A Polish delegation arrived in Jedda towards the end of the month, consisting of Count Edward Raczyński of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Grand Mufti of Poland. The object of the mission appears to be the conclusion of some form of commercial treaty. The delegates are being entertained as the guests of the Government.

15. Mirza Habibulla Khan Hoyeida arrived in Jedda on the 6th April to take up his appointment as Persian diplomatic representative and Chargé d'Affaires.

16. No slaves were repatriated during the period under review. One, an Abyssinian boy, took refuge at this Legation and applied for local manumission, but, after staying seven days, he disappeared and returned to his master.

[E 3039/334/91]

No. 130.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 114.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 18, 1930.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 58 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to state that King Ibn Saud came from Mecca to Jedda on the morning of that day and received me in the forenoon for the purpose of my presenting my credentials. The ceremonial was carried out in accordance with the rules forwarded in Mr. Bond's despatch No. 332 of the 28th December last. The duties of Master of Ceremonies were performed by Hamdi Bey, the Officer Commanding the garrison in Jedda, who conducted me from my residence to what has been dubbed the "Green Palace." This is a modern house of some pretension built by the Director of Customs, a gentleman of poor origin, who, by assiduous application to the duties of his office, has, in recent years, acquired considerable wealth. It is possible that he has already carried out a rumoured intention of presenting the house to the King, who has, hitherto, made use of the barracks, or of the houses of certain resident notables, when he has visited Jedda.

2. My staff and I with Hamdi Bey were conveyed to the "Green Palace" in two very moderate cars driven by still more moderate chauffeurs and not otherwise attended. As we were about to start, one of the telephone posts opposite my front door swayed towards me and gently deposited its load of wires in the fairway. This was the only untoward incident. Military honours were rendered at the Palace, but naturally without any playing of the National Anthem, which might be considered appropriate in an oriental setting, were music not abhorrent to Wahabite principles. The arrangements generally were simple but sufficiently dignified. I was received by Sheikh Fuad Hamza and other officials including Hafiz Wahba, the Minister Designate in London. After a short interval, I was conducted with Mr. Bond and the Legation interpreter into the audience chamber, where the King in solitary state awaited us and his own officers. After he had shaken hands with me I delivered the speech which I had prepared and handed to His Majesty my letter of credence. When my interpreter had read an Arabic version, the King's reply was read by his secretary, Yussef Yasin, and then in a very good English translation by Sheikh Fuad Hamza. I next formally presented my staff consisting of Mr. Bond (whom, I said, it was hardly necessary to introduce as he had been exercising the functions of agent and consul and, later, Chargé d'Affaires), Mr. Wikeley, Munshi Ihsanullah, the British Indian vice-consul, and the interpreter.

3. I had been told that the King would not dismiss me at the end of the formal part of the audience, as it was his custom to detain the representative and wait for the latter to seek permission to leave. Following this practice His Majesty invited us all to be seated and had coffee and lemonade served in succession. We exchanged ordinary oriental courtesies, in the course of which he asked after the King's health, making special reference to his illness of a year ago. He expressed pleasure on hearing how well I had found His Majesty when I kissed hands. He emphasised his desire for good relations with Great Britain, to which I replied that I had had evidence of a reciprocal sentiment of the same kind in all circles at home, when I was preparing to come to Jedda. After this exchange of compliments I retired, my staff and I making a point of walking backwards and bowing in accordance with European etiquette, a touch which, I think, was duly noted. King Ibn Saud again remained alone, while his officers escorted me to the antechamber.

4. King Ibn Saud indulged rather less than I had expected in high-flown phrases, but his reception was in every way cordial. He was perhaps a little fatigued. At any rate his voice was somewhat hoarse, owing, it is said, to the number and length of the theological discourses which he has recently had occasion to pronounce at Mecca. His bearing was stately and impressive in his loose robe, one of the usual Arabian type, but of fine material and handsomely embroidered. His feet were bare. The audience chamber was a room of moderate size, well-carpeted, but otherwise furnished in a debased French style. The most conspicuous object was a green panel high in the wall behind the King, embroidered with the Moslem profession of faith and a hefty sword underneath.

5. After the audience Sheikh Fuad Hamza asked whether I had any objection to a photograph being taken. On my acquiescing an Egyptian photographer from Cairo, who works for the "Graphic" and other papers, took several pictures. In the meantime the King himself had, apparently at the suggestion of some of his officers, intimated his willingness to be photographed also, and a final photograph

was taken, in which he occupied the centre of the group with myself on his right. I then again took leave of him and left the Palace with the same ceremony as when I arrived.

6. I have ventured to describe these proceedings at some length, as it was the first occasion on which a British Minister presented credentials, although Mr. Bond and previous agents have of course been frequently received by King Ibn Saud. I enclose a copy of my speech* together with the English version* of that read on behalf of the King. It may be useful for record if I enclose also a note on certain matters of ceremonial which I had discussed with Fuad Hamza.* Later in the morning of the audience I visited the latter in the manner described in my note. We had a cordial conversation on things in general and the system of examination for the British Diplomatic and Consular Services in particular. He took an opportunity of drawing my attention to the extremely democratic ways of his Sovereign, who did not lay the same stress on punctilio as other rulers. This remark was possibly intended to explain away any departures made by an inexperienced Court from consecrated practice.

7. Following what is I understand a usual practice, Sheikh Fuad Hamza entertained me at dinner on the evening of the 17th May at the local office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The company of fourteen included the leading local notables, Hafiz Wahba, and the principal members of my staff besides Mr. Taylor, Messrs. Gellatly Hankey's manager, and Mr. Philby. Water was served copiously, first, Vichy, and, when that ran out, the product of the Jedda condenser. It was intimated to me after dinner that cigarettes would not be handed round, but that I was free to smoke my own. I refrained from doing so.

8. Ibn Saud left Jedda on the evening of the 17th May. His destination was Taif, where, it appears, the Heir Apparent, Emir Saud, is to be operated on for eye trouble by an Egyptian surgeon. This has led to the cancellation of a visit by the Emir Saud to Jedda, which was planned for the 19th May, and during which I was to meet the prince at another party of Fuad Hamza's. Fuad Hamza, himself, is also returning to Mecca to-day. In these circumstances, I cannot hope to do any personal business with either him or the King before the 25th May, but I have reason to expect that they will both be in Jedda again in the course of the week beginning on that day.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Iraq and Palestine and to the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3040/2693/91]

No. 131.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 115.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 18, 1930.

WITH reference to Mr. Bond's despatch No. 102 of the 2nd instant reporting the arrival of a Polish mission under Count Edward Raczyński, I have the honour to report that the members of this mission were received by the King on the 3rd instant.

2. In a somewhat fulsome speech delivered by him on this occasion, which has been published in the "Um-el-Qura," Count Raczyński dwelt upon the reciprocal advantages to be derived from commercial intercourse between the two nations. He also made some remarks about the King's prowess in the defence of religion which may possibly be regarded by his compatriots as being somewhat inapposite. The following is the passage to which I refer:—

"Your Majesty's reputation as the most pious King and the greatest defender of religion increases and spreads daily among your Moslem brethren in Poland, who have lived in the far north for many centuries. These Moslems have been treated by the Polish nation as brothers because of their excellent reputation and because of their heroism and bravery in the defence of their homeland, along with their Polish brothers, when enemies attacked their country."

* Not printed.

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"Their representative and their Religious Head, the Grand Mufti Yaqub Sinkiwitch, has come here with me to-day in order to establish firm and friendly relations with the source of their religion, and to congratulate your Majesty on your accession to the throne of the Holy Lands and on your defence of them."

3. The reply read on behalf of the King echoed, in rather more moderate language, the sentiments of the Polish Envoy. His Majesty compared the Arab and Polish nations in the matter of courage, referred with pleasure to what had been said about the Moslems in Poland, and expressed confidence that the mission would have the best effect on economic relations between the two countries.

4. The report in the "Um-el-Qura" states that, after the exchange of speeches, the Envoy informed Ibn Saud of his recognition by Poland as King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, for which the King expressed thanks. I am not yet aware of the nature of any agreement which may have been concluded.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3088/223/91]

No. 132.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 11, 1930.

MY telegram No. 71.

The King received MacDonnell on 7th June. Various matters bearing on facilities and mode of conducting the investigation were discussed at the audience and in subsequent interviews with the King's advisers. Record was made of the points agreed on. Following is summary:—

1. The King will attach to mission representative to serve as interim between MacDonnell and the Hejazi Government, to issue necessary summonses, acting generally as agent of the Hejazi Government for submission of cases.
2. MacDonnell will consider proposal by the King that representatives of the frontier tribes appointed beforehand should act as spokesmen of the tribes concerned.
3. The King prefers to leave choice of place or places where investigation will take place to MacDonnell's discretion.
- 4 and 5. The King raised two points as to (a) inadmissibility of certain evidence, and (b) hearing only persons approved by the tribes affected.

MacDonnell is to inform the Hejazi Government of his conclusion regarding 2 and 3 after conferring with the Transjordanian authorities; 4 and 5 may lose their importance if the proposal at 2 is found to provide satisfactory working basis.

MacDonnell left in the sloop on 10th June for Cairo via Port Sudan.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 105.)

[E 3126/223/91]

No. 133.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 11, 1930.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

This result was reached only after laborious negotiation. At the outset the King seemed to want to rule out all MacDonnell's proposals as impractical. Strong effort was made to induce him to stay here to study all Hejazi Government files, and it was more or less suggested he would need no other evidence to prevent [sic: ? present] his [? conclusions]. We both demurred most strongly, and insisted on necessity for independent enquiries.

King and his advisers made very heavy weather over portion of memorandum put forward by MacDonnell at the outset in which he cited his instructions to examine claims which had been notified within reasonable time. It was eventually

settled that I should deal with matter in a covering letter to Minister for Foreign Affairs enclosing record and pointing out that MacDonnell was bound by his instructions, but that I would myself bring the King's view to the notice of His Majesty's Government.

The most serious difference was over the facilities for MacDonnell's movements in the Hejaz-Nejd territory. The King insisted that any entry into his territory would be unnecessary and inadvisable. It proved necessary to omit all mention from record, but in covering letter I have asked for written statement of His Majesty's reasons in order that I may submit the matter for your instructions. I reserve comment until I receive note.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 106.)

[E 3089/2/91]

No. 134.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 11, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. 76.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the King has definitely decided to remove Hejaz Air Force to Jedda. He asks whether (1) permission can be given to fly over Koweit, Iraq and Transjordan, as the direct route across the desert is impracticable; (2) facilities can be given by the British authorities for the supply of fuel, &c.; (3) a Royal Air Force officer could be lent to pilot the fourth aeroplane in place of Hamilton.

Equipment will be sent by sea via India.

I suggested the transfer would afford opportunity for a call at Hinaidi to fit improvement mentioned in your despatch No. 126, and promised to enquire how long that work would take.

I should be glad of an early reply.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Jerusalem, No. 107.)

[E 3144/1308/91]

No. 135.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 12, 1930.

YOUR telegram of 31st May.

I made allusion to representations to Ibn Saud at audience on 11th June under following heads, taking as my basis personal views which I had already expressed to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Bagdad telegram to the Colonial Office of 30th May:—

1. Great disappointment felt by His Majesty's Government and shared by Iraq Government and High Commissioner.
2. Value of agreement, apart from anything else, as instrument involving recognition of Ibn Saud's position by King Feisal, who had only consented to this recognition under pressure from High Commissioner.
3. Difficulty, and indeed present impossibility, of negotiating extradition treaty if only owing to prospect of break-down over "political offenders."

I said my representations involved request that Ibn Saud should reconsider decision, and again impressed on him desirability of proceeding by gradual stages towards establishment of real amity and confidence between him and Iraq.

His Majesty reiterated his conviction that *bon voisinage* agreement was worthless without extradition treaty. He countered my argument that treaty of latter type normally marked advanced stage in relations between States by saying that present case was different, as all questions between him and Iraq related exclusively to criminal activities. He had, however, acted throughout in deference to wishes of His Majesty's Government. If we definitely wished him to confirm *bon voisinage* agreement, he would do so, but must make it clear that he could not hope to give any genuine effect to it without extradition treaty.

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This can hardly be taken as formal assurance, but affords useful basis for future action, before taking which I should be glad to have final text of *bon voisinage* agreement and to know also how Iraq Government have reacted on their side. Personal letter from High Commissioner to Ibn Saud might help. He will be at Taif for some little time.

It is clear from conversations on this and other subjects that the King is full of resentment over Ibn Mashur. He keeps on suggesting that responsibility for his surrender lies with His Majesty's Government. I have contested this every time, but I have, without giving away High Commissioner's telegram of 31st May to Colonial Office, expressed the hope that the question will be liquidated in the near future.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 111.)

[E 3163/89/91]

No. 136.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 13, 1930.

YOUR despatch No. 119.

I discussed Transjordanian frontier situation with Ibn Saud on 11th June. I took as text remarks of his at outset of MacDonnell conversations that it was necessary to explore causes of and find cure for a disease. I said that His Majesty's Government wished to get away from atmosphere of retaliation and counter-protest, but that successful treatment of disease must depend on parallel and sustained action on both sides. MacDonnell enquiry affords hope of liquidating the past, and I then made careful statement based on paragraphs 4 to 6 of your despatch.

King made light of results obtained up to date by Transjordanian authorities, whose action, he said, had produced little effective result. I was unable to pursue this subject very far, as I have not yet received detailed account of work of Tribal Control Board. He made the following statements:—

- (1) He had recently issued stringent orders for punishment of any raids on his side and the return of loot.
- (2) He had dealt suitably with Ibn Mussad, whose enterprise he disapproved of and regretted; though he would not admit it was a raid in ordinary sense, it was punitive action under provocation, and it was not certain that it had been carried into Transjordanian territory. The infliction of public punishment would depend on Transjordanian authorities taking similar measures.
- (3) He had not implemented article 3 of Hadda Agreement because he had had no confidence. He was now taking steps to do so, and hoped soon to put his authorities at Jauf and Kaf into contact with Transjordanian authorities.

I welcomed these statements, especially the last. I said I hoped to discuss the question again at a later date when I had myself studied it in greater detail.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, telegram No. 112.)

[E 3173/905/91]

No. 137.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 14, 1930.

YOUR telegram No. 82.

Having prepared the ground in the manner described in my despatch No. 126, I broached the question with the King on 12th June. I repeated more briefly what I had already said to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to general setting, in which I hoped he would see any communications made from time to time about his air force and about flying over his territory.

As regards latter, I said that, while realising his special difficulties, our desire was to see him come into general movement of mutual accommodation which aerial developments were imposing on the nations generally.

I then explained frankly the position regarding pearling flights. Purely commercial service had proved impracticable this year, and suggestion had been made that service should be tried experimentally this season, with Royal Air Force machines using most convenient route, which lay across the coastal portion of his territory. My instructions were not to make formal proposal, but rather to consult him.

His Majesty said that the matter was not one on which he could express views off-hand. He said spontaneously that objections he had had three years ago no longer existed, and that he was not unduly impressed by the danger of misrepresentation. (Latter remark was significant, as I had been led to expect the argument that, if he now allowed flights, he would be reproached by tribes with having repressed rebellion only to allow foreign intervention, to which rebels had been hostile.) Nevertheless, said Ibn Saud, matter required serious consideration, and he must consult the local authorities before pronouncing himself.

I said that I quite understood. What I most wanted was that he should not only consider the matter in its present form, but should, having regard to his position on the Persian Gulf, fix his eye on the future in the spirit of entry into the world movement which I had described. I mentioned necessity for one or two emergency landing grounds in connexion with any schemes involving flights over his territory, and hinted of financial possibilities without definitely offering rent.

King has already left and I may not see him personally again for a month, although present prospect is that he will spend some time on this side of the peninsula. I still do not expect any definite result this year, but his general reaction was more favourable than I anticipated. I am convinced that nothing is to be gained by forcing the pace, and that it would be a mistake to press question of pearling flights unduly. If you approve my action so far, I can, even in His Majesty's absence, follow that action up gradually, less with reference to that question than with object of impressing on him advantages of liberal policy. It would be useful for me to have some copies of Air Convention.

In discussing at same audience two quite unconnected matters, on which I am reporting by despatch, the King emphasised his desire to work with and seek assistance of His Majesty's Government. There may be something more than conventional amiability in this, if only because his finances are said to be very low.

[E 3204/3204/91]

No. 138.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 120.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 28, 1930.

IN the note on various matters of protocol enclosed in my despatch No. 114 of the 18th instant, I referred to the question of formal visits by foreign representatives to King Ibn Saud's Heir Apparent as one which had not been raised in my conversations with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and which need not arise at present. I have the honour to state that it has in fact arisen much sooner than I anticipated.

2. Late in the evening of the 25th May, I received a telephone message from the assistant to the Governor of Jedda to the effect that the Emir Saud was arriving early next morning, and would receive me the next morning at 10.10 A.M. On enquiry, I found that the intention of the Prince was to receive the foreign representatives officially, and that uniform would be appropriate. He received us in succession, beginning with the Soviet Minister, at the Green Palace, which, Sheikh Fuad Hamza tells me, is now definitely the property of the King. I took with me the same party, minus the Legation interpreter, as when I presented credentials. The Prince, who was attended by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, placed me on a sofa beside him. The reception was on the same lines as the less formal part of the proceedings when the King himself received me.

3. The Governor of Jedda had issued invitations for a dinner, given also at the Palace, but apparently by the local authorities, in honour of the Heir Apparent. It was a hot evening, and it was happily arranged that the European guests might wear ordinary evening dress, in which vogue of attire a black dinner jacket, though all do not own to it, is still the high-water mark in Jedda. Having surmounted the perils of a staircase roughly laid with a carpet almost completely unsecured by rods, Mr. Bond and I were conducted to the roof. Having been welcomed by the Governor,

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we passed between a double file of armed retainers to the furthest end, where the Prince received us. The Soviet Minister had already arrived, and we took our places right and left of His Highness.

4. After coffee and compliments, the company of twenty-three people, including all the foreign representatives, except the Turk and the Persian and the principal officials of Jedda and the King's entourage, went indoors to a long, narrow dining room, which, with attendant servants and slaves, we pretty completely filled. The electric plant having failed, the table was lit by large incandescent lamps. The warmth of the atmosphere was increased by several enormous dishes of mutton, which remained on the table from start to finish, although they formed but one course in a protracted meal. The table was further decorated in a manner which somewhat shocked my sense of Islamic propriety, with images of birds and other animals, executed in what I supposed to be white and gold glass or china, but which, Mr. Bond assures me, were made of sugar. The fruit dishes, in coloured and gilt glass, added to the gaiety of a crowded board. Although the electrical plant was got going in the course of the meal and a revolving fan supplemented the simple slave-driven variety, the relief was general when we again adjourned to the roof, where, after half an hour of further conversation and light refreshment, we took leave.

5. I was distinctly impressed by the personality of the Prince. Tall and slender, he resembles his father cast in a finer, if less imposing, mould. His features are well marked and he conceals his eye trouble behind glasses, and he has a most engaging smile. In his conversation he showed great vivacity. He confined it almost entirely to the Soviet Minister and myself. As M. Turakouloff speaks both Turkish and stumbling Arabic, he was able to converse direct, and was good enough to act to some extent as interpreter between the Emir and me. At the outset of the conversation before dinner the Emir plunged into a glorification of Islam, which my Russian colleague echoed with contributions of his own. After dinner His Highness reverted to the subject, and said how mistaken it was to suppose that Islam was incompatible with civilisation. Eager to be polite without any approach to the profession of an alien faith, I said that, indeed, there should be no conflict. I related how I myself, going to church in Hampstead one Sunday morning in a tramcar, otherwise empty except for the driver and the conductor, had heard one of them say to the other: "What do we want with . . . religions now we're civilised?" and how much more civilised I had felt myself to be than the speaker. It gave me some satisfaction to have this simple tale translated by the representative of Soviet Russia, although I had to omit the epithet preceding "religions."

6. On the 27th May the Prince sent two persons, the Assistant Governor and the officer commanding the garrison, to return the visit which I had paid him.

7. The Emir was expected to stay here a few days, but he changed all his plans and returned to Mecca on the evening of the 27th May. I hear from a confidential source that his recall was due to the arrival of news of some trouble in Nejd. I cannot vouch for this information, but as it was the Prince's first visit to Jedda since 1926 there must have been some important reason for his sudden departure.

8. As my main object in writing this despatch is to provide a full record for future reference of ceremonial now observed here, I may mention that, in addition to calling officially on the other foreign representatives after I had presented my credentials, I also called on the Governor of Jedda, as being the chief local authority in what is becoming the diplomatic capital.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3209/2/91]

No. 139.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 126.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 31, 1930.

WITH reference to the last paragraph of my telegram No. 65 of the 22nd May, I have the honour to state that I had some general conversation regarding air-matters with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, when I saw him for the first time for the discussion of general business, on the 28th May. My object was to provide a sort of general setting for any representations I may have to make from time to time and to do something towards minimising the suspicion to which a series of isolated requests or suggestions might give rise in the mind of Ibn Saud.

2. At our previous meetings, Sheikh Fuad Hamza and I had deluged each other with protestations of our desire for mutual confidence. Taking this as my starting point, I said that I had detected a certain note of mistrust in the rider to his reply to my communication regarding the case of Pilot Hamilton (see the last paragraph of my telegram No. 62 of the 21st May). The question of the use of wireless had nothing to do with that case and I did not quite see why it had been dragged into what was the first communication made to me by the Hejaz Government on a matter with which I was dealing personally.

3. Fuad Hamza explained volubly that the question of wireless did not come into the Hamilton case and that he had merely taken the opportunity of saying something which arose out of earlier exchanges of views. Later in the conversation, I admitted that I had taken that part of the message from Ibn Saud merely as a text and had made the most of my text in order to enforce what I really wanted to say myself.

4. The general run of my remarks was as follows:—

5. His Majesty's Government, I said, had helped the King to create an air force. They had provided him with aircraft on favourable terms. They had secured for him personnel, which, at any rate, in the higher ranks, except for Pilot Hamilton, seemed to be satisfactory. It might in theory be held that our concern with the matter ended there. As a matter of practical politics it did not end there, because we were interested in the successful realisation of a scheme with which we had had so much to do. We must also retain some interest in British subjects whose entry into the King's service we had promoted. What I wanted the King and Fuad Hamza himself to realise was that, if from time to time His Majesty's Government made suggestions, none of them would be made in a spirit of interference, but in a real spirit of anxiety to help. We could, in fact, help in many ways. It would be deplorable if, whenever we tried to do so, it were thought that we had ulterior motives.

6. I cited the alleged violation of Nejd territory, which has formed the subject of correspondence ending with my despatch No. 116 of the 18th May. I was still, I said, awaiting full information before writing to him on that subject. I had already discovered that the British air boat was on its way from India and had visited Darin Island, at great inconvenience, to provide the Hejaz Air Force with spare parts that were known to be urgently needed. The authorities concerned had thought they were doing the Hejaz Government a very good turn. What was their reward? We had received a protest which could hardly have been more categorical, if we had flown gratuitously across Arabia.

7. I passed to another subject. King Ibn Saud's successes had brought him to two seas, one of which was a main thoroughfare for marine navigation, while the other, the Persian Gulf, lay on the axis of possible air-routes of world importance. Air navigation was revolutionising the world system of communications. Every country in Europe was studying the subject and the general tendency was towards co-operation, notably in the matter of a generous policy as regards flying over. We should like to think that Ibn Saud would come into the movement; and that, if proposals were made at any time to fly over his territory with his consent, he would not suspect any desire to encroach on his rights as an independent sovereign, which His Majesty's Government absolutely respected. I had come, I said, from Morocco. A letter could be brought by air from Toulouse to Casablanca in fourteen hours. How? By flying across Spain. And anyone in Europe would laugh, if it were suggested that that constituted any violation of Spanish sovereignty. The same thing applied to such a matter as landing grounds. I had noticed that, when this subject had been broached on one or two occasions, Ibn Saud had demurred. He had had good reasons for this at a time when it might be more unsafe to descend among rebel tribes than to stick to the air, but he had now happily pacified the area involved.

8. I was careful to explain to Sheikh Fuad Hamza that I was speaking generally in that spirit of frankness which we had agreed should be the basis of our relations. I intended, I said, to speak on the same lines more summarily to the King and I should be glad if he would amplify anything I might say. I had adverted to many possible questions, about which I had no instructions to speak, but which might arise separately as time went on. I should have to speak to the King, however, about one matter and I hoped it would be considered in the light of my general remarks on the Hejaz Air Force. The Wapiti aeroplanes, which had been provided, had been sent out, because the King was eager to have them quickly, without certain additions needed to make them as perfect as our own. I was to suggest that the

King should send his aeroplanes to Hinaidi to be equipped with the improvements in question by experts who understood them.

9. I think that my observations to Fuad Hamza may serve a useful purpose. I am confident that, carefully worded as they were, they can at least do no harm, provided I myself confirm them in general terms to the King, thereby reducing any danger of their being unduly distorted. Fuad Hamza received them with every appearance of sympathetic acquiescence. At the same time, I still feel that caution should be used in advancing specific proposals of such a nature as to alarm Ibn Saud and that we should go very slowly at least until I have built up, if I can, a stronger personal position with him.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad and to the Political Resident at Bushire, in the former case, with a short covering despatch explaining how I came to engage in the conversation.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3304/1/91]

No. 140.

*High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 20.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, June 17, 1930.

KING FEISAL has sent me copy of letter written by him to King Ibn Saud on 14th June, in which he says that he has told Ibn Mashur that he must return to Nejd, that if he does so he will be pardoned and "covered with sympathy and mercy." He adds that Ibn Mashur appears very anxious to return to his old allegiance, and he asks Ibn Saud to confirm that he will be pardoned and to send word to this effect direct to Ibn Mashur.

I suggest that Ibn Saud might be informed now that this letter is on its way.
(Repeated to Jedda and Bushire.)

[E 3280/2/91]

No. 141.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).

(Nos. 90 and 91.)

Foreign Office, June 22, 1930.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 75 of 11th June: Proposed transfer of Hejaz-Nejd Air Force to Jedda and development of Arabian air route.

1. His Majesty's Government have no objection to proposed flight of Air Force, on its way to Jedda, over Koweit, Iraq and Transjordan, subject to concurrence of local authorities concerned. Sheikh of Koweit has already concurred, and High Commissioners for Iraq and Transjordan have been pressed for early reply, to be repeated to you direct. If their reply is favourable, you may inform Hejazi Government at once that permission is granted.

2. Air authorities will gladly grant facilities for supply of petrol, &c., in Iraq and Transjordan, but presume Hejazi Government will themselves arrange for necessary supplies of petrol and oil between Maan and Jedda.

3. Air authorities are further prepared, as matter of courtesy, to provide a Royal Air Force pilot to take fourth aeroplane from Darin to Jedda, but it will be necessary for Hejazi Government to make suitable arrangements for his accommodation and subsistence while in Hejaz-Nejd territory, and also for his return to Iraq.

4. Proposed modification to Ibn Saud's aeroplanes could be effected at Hinaidi in about eight days.

(Confidential.)

Air Ministry are anxious that opportunity of grant of these considerable facilities should be taken to ask for some return from Ibn Saud in form of permission to select, mark out, and if necessary utilise, emergency landing-grounds on Hasa coast. I am not unmindful of considerations urged in your telegram No. 65 (of 22nd May), and in penultimate paragraph of your telegram No. 81 (of

14th June), and of sensitiveness of King and Government, see last paragraph of your telegram No. 76 (of 11th June), and am prepared to leave it to your discretion whether to revert to question of Hasa air route and emergency landing-grounds in connexion with present facilities or defer further representations until you consider psychological moment has arrived. You will, however, bear in mind that matter is of some urgency, and that Air Ministry are anxious that question of obtaining *quid pro quo* should not be indefinitely deferred.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Bushire.)

[E 3443/2/91]

No. 142.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 92.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 26, 1930.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 90 and 91.

Using discretion kindly allowed me, I took, on 25th June, following action, which seems to me to go further possible to meet the wishes of Air Ministry without danger of deadlock, in which attempt at bargain would almost certainly land us:—

I sent to the King, under covering note to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, letter informing him of consent of all authorities concerned to proposed flight. I embodied paragraphs 2 to 4 of your telegram, with slight amplifications, including request for assurance regarding financial and other arrangements for accommodation, &c., and return journey of Royal Air Force pilot, and asked to be informed of approximate date of start from Darin. I added the two paragraphs paraphrased in condensed form in my immediately following telegram No. 93. The whole form continues communication which I described as made under instructions of His Majesty's Government.

I had sent the letter before receiving copy of Bushire telegram to Colonial Office, No. 62. I mentioned the accident to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in a telephone conversation this morning.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Jerusalem, No. 129.)

[E 3428/905/91]

No. 143.

Sir A. Ryan to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 93.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, June 26, 1930.

FOLLOWING is paraphrase referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"Your Majesty will appreciate the great goodwill shown by His Majesty's Government in this as in other matters affecting the Air Force. They are confident that the question of flights over Hasa, on which I consulted you on 12th June, will be studied with equal goodwill. Experimental pearling flights this year, if possible to organise, would confer great benefits on important industry and provide experience most [group omitted] yourself in future development of that region. All that would be necessary would be that you should sanction certain number of flights by Royal Air Force aeroplanes at regular intervals and arrange for marking out one or two emergency landing grounds. These need not be equipped with stores. They would merely be known places where aeroplanes could land if necessary. Air Force might mark them out before leaving, unless you would prefer to enlist British assistance.

"I explained to your Majesty, on 12th June, the desire for collaboration between friendly Powers which animates His Majesty's Government in considering such projects. You promised to consider the matter in a similar spirit, though naturally wishing to study all its aspects. I trust you will be able to inform me of your conclusions in the near future."

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Bushire, No. 130.)

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

[E 231/231/89]

No. 144.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received January 14, 1930.)

(No. 117.)

Sir,

Beirut, December 19, 1929.

IN its issue of the 17th December, a local newspaper published a column regarding the alleged arrival from Damascus of Hachem Bey El-Atassi, president of the Syrian Constituent Assembly, and other Nationalist leaders and their doings here. Among the latter was said to be the holding of a "congress" at one of the hotels. The newspaper article was, in many respects, inaccurate, and several of the persons alleged to have come did not do so. Nevertheless, there has been a certain renewal of activity on the part of the Nationalists, and some negotiations between them and the High Commission have taken place. Jemil Bey Mar'iam seems to have had two longish interviews with M. Hoppenot, the acting secretary-general, and there have been other conversations and discussions. The fact that approaches have been made to the High Commission is in the nature of a success for M. Ponsot. Ever since his return suggestions have been made in the press that, for one reason or another, he was going to Damascus, and it was obvious that it was hoped that he would do so. He has not moved nor has he given any indication as to his intentions. His object has been, presumably, to induce the Nationalists to make the first move, and in this he has succeeded.

2. One explanation of their renewed activity is that they have been alarmed by the revival of rumours that, after all, a monarchy is contemplated for Syria. On the 13th, an article by Ramadan Shallash in support of the Emir Sherif Haidar as King of Syria appeared in the "Syrie." As the editor, M. Vayssié, assiduously haunts the corridors and offices of the Grand Serail and is, therefore, reputed to enjoy the confidences of the French officials, it was possibly assumed that, in publishing the article, he was acting on instructions from high quarters. That he or anyone else really knows M. Ponsot's intentions seems most unlikely. The latter's attitude is as oyster-like as ever, and it is improbable that he has as yet taken any decision. He is, presumably, continuing to play a waiting game in the hope that the Nationalists will tire first. I have recently had two conversations with him in which matters bearing on the future of Syria were mentioned. The first conversation, in which M. Hoppenot also took part, turned on the form of government best suited for a Moslem State. The view then finding favour seemed to be that a monarchical form of government was most in keeping with the traditions and mentality of Moslem peoples, and I went away with the impression that M. Ponsot might be turning over in his mind the possibility of introducing such a form of government in Syria. On the second occasion, when M. Ponsot was discussing the effect on the situation in Iraq of the death of the late Prime Minister, the not very novel conclusion was reached that the leaders in mandated territories in the Near East do not really know what they want save that they wish for the disappearance of the foreigner and that the more they are given the more they will demand.

3. There seems reason to believe that the Syrian Nationalists, if they do not succeed in obtaining from the French High Commission some assurances which they regard as satisfactory, may decide to send a deputation to Paris and, possibly, also to Geneva to plead their case. The difficulty will be to find funds for the expenses of the deputation. Attempts made to collect money for the purpose are said to have had but little success.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Damascus and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 580/66/89]

No. 145.

Consul Monck-Mason to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 16.)

Sir,

Aleppo, January 23, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 89 of the 18th December, 1929, I have the honour to report that the Syria-Turkey Frontier Commission has terminated its labours as far as the land frontier is concerned, and General Ernst is now in Aleppo awaiting the nomination of a Turkish naval expert to assist the already appointed French expert in the demarcation of the water boundary of the River Tigris. The French authorities are most anxious that the work should be completed as soon as possible. The general himself is heartily tired of his dealings with the Turks, who, he states, hinder progress at every turn, his treatment at their hands contrasting very unfavourably with the courtesy shown him by the French.

2. The district of the Jezireh may be expected to settle down to a new era of prosperity as soon as the boundaries are definitely fixed, owing to the increasing cultivation of the land by immigrant Kurds and Christian elements from Turkey. I learn from a highly-placed French military officer here that Kameshlie, which owes much of its present importance to the fact that it is the virtual rail-head, will be likely to increase in prosperity, at the expense, of course, of Nisibin. Mahmakie, the actual rail-head, will before the end of this year yield its present passing interest to Tell Ziwan, which point the line is expected to reach then.

3. There are two other places which may be expected to rise into prominence in the near future. One is Kubur-el-Bid, easterly of Kameshlie. Kubur-el-Bid is more centrally situated in the Jeziret than Kameshlie. This spot has the advantage of being comparatively healthy and of having building-stone in the vicinity. The railway line will run about 4 kilom. south of the place. The French are also thinking of establishing a military post, with an "officier de renseignement," at Endivar, immediately opposite Djezireh-bin-Omar, in Syrian territory, and there is every reason to suppose that the latter town will meet the same fate as Nisibin, trade gravitating naturally to the Syrian side of the frontier. This is, indeed, the intention of the French.

4. According to a map given me by Lieutenant-Colonel Anfré, the Chief of Staff at Aleppo, the actual line of the frontier has been traced as follows: north of Mahamakie, south of Girhasin, thence almost straight until Aznaour, included in a small semi-circular Turkish enclave; thence south of the track to a point a little east of a mill just south of Bavord; thence in a straight line to Kharab Raze (in the Izzeddin Dag), which remains in Turkey; from here nearly straight, passing south of Tell Atrit and Ghabani, and then breaking off nearly due east to leave Babil in Turkey. Thence north-east, the frontier passes just south-east of Guirigor and Domboulie, and afterwards north-east, following the track, which, with Kanissipi, is left in Turkey. About 1½ kilom. north-north-west of Andiwar the line turns north-north-east, and follows the second wadi south of Jezireh-bin-Omar until it reaches the Tigris. The map on which Lieutenant-Colonel Anfré marked these indications for me is one made by the French army, and dated June and July 1929. It is based, as to its northern part, on the studies of the Frontier Commission.

5. The line of the route followed or to be followed by the railway is shown definitely on the same map, and runs thus: Just north of Mahamakie (about 2 kilom. due east of Nisibin). From there straight to a point 1½ kilom. due north of Dakehurié, and passing through Tell Ziwan; thence practically straight to the Wadi Katrani, leaving to the south a small tell 1½ kilom. west of the Wadi, after crossing which the line works in a direction a fraction more southerly, leaving two small tells to the south-east, straight to a point just a kilom. south of the old German colony, which is 10½ kilom. almost due south of Demir Kapou and on the left bank of the Wadi Remouele.

6. In slight correction of my previous despatches, written without maps, the true position of Nisibin, Kameshlie and Mahamakie should be noted. Mahamakie is a fraction over 2 kilom. due east of Nisibin. Kameshlie is 2 kilom. south-south-east of Nisibin, the fort being about 500 yards nearer to Nisibin.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad. His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, His Majesty's consul-general, Beirut, and to the British liaison officer, Beirut.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 718/718/89]

No. 146.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 17.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 31, 1930.

A LOCAL newspaper has published details regarding an alleged loan to be contracted in France by the Lebanese Government, of which the proceeds are to be devoted to various works of public utility, such as the carrying out of improvements in the town of Beirut, the enlargement of the port of Beirut, railway construction, irrigation and the improvement of Lebanese summer resorts. It states that the loan will be for 450 million francs, repayable in seventy years. The rate of interest is to be 5½ per cent., with a sinking fund of 1½ per cent. The loan is to be guaranteed by the surplus of the Lebanon's share in the excess customs revenue after meeting the amount payable by the Lebanon in respect of the Ottoman Public Debt.

2. There seems to be no reason to believe that this newspaper report is in its details correct. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that a scheme for a loan is at present under serious consideration and that the idea finds favour both with the French High Commissioner and with the Lebanese Government. The newspaper story is thus an attempt at an intelligent anticipation of coming events. Nothing has, however, yet been decided, and nothing will presumably be really settled until M. Ponsot goes to France in the summer. When the negotiations are finally concluded, the proposal will have to be submitted to the Lebanese Parliament for its approval. This body, being docile by disposition, will undoubtedly grant its approval to any scheme of the kind which may be laid before it.

3. How the money will be used, if and when obtained, cannot, of course, now be foreseen. The newspaper suggests that much of it will be used for railway construction, and in this connexion mentions the Beirut-Nakoura line. There seems no reason to believe that the French have any idea of building this line, whatever they may do elsewhere.

4. No mention is made as to Syrian participation in the loan. The explanation may well be that a newspaper published here has thought it advisable to suggest that the Lebanon alone is to benefit by the money and what is to be achieved with it. One of M. Ponsot's pet schemes is believed to be the building of the railway line from Homs to Deir-az-Zor in Syria, and if money is to be raised in France, it would seem likely that some of it at least will be used to further this scheme. The Damas-Hama et Prolongements Compagnie is unlikely to proceed with it unless it is assured of help of some kind. Further, the most suitable areas for the carrying out of irrigation schemes are also in Syria.

5. The plans of economic development with which M. Ponsot has for some time past been credited are slow of fruition, but something is being surely, if very slowly, prepared. A proof of this is that M. Reclus, who was for years the delegate of the High Commissioner at Aleppo, has been permanently transferred from there to Beirut and placed in charge of the Economic Section of the High Commission. Also there have of late been several meetings of the High Commissioner's delegates from different parts of the country with, it is alleged, the object of working out schemes of development. For the execution of these schemes money must be obtained from outside, and there is, therefore, good reason to believe that at no very distant date a loan may be secured.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 1542/1542/89]

No. 147.

Consul Monck-Mason to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 22. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, February 13, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that there seems ground for thinking that the transference of the Mutasarifieh of the Sanjak of Alexandretta from the latter place to Antioch, which has been discussed at regular intervals during the last five years, seems now to be in a fair way to be decided upon. Antioch is already the seat of Government during the summer months, and the military command is being transferred to Antioch this month for purely military reasons.

2. There are many good reasons why the change should be made. The surroundings of Antioch are healthier and infinitely more fertile. Road communications are much more convenient; there is only one road to Alexandretta, whereas Antioch could be reached (as soon as certain roads on which work is going on are built or repaired) easily from Aleppo, Latakia, and Alexandretta itself. Some excellent public buildings have been put up in recent years, and these contrast favourably with the insanitary dwellings of Alexandretta.

3. It is probable, however, that the reasons for the transfer which the delegation at Alexandretta is opposing vigorously, may be rather political than material. Mr. Catoni seems to think that Sheikh Tajeddin, who is losing ground at Damascus, has promised the leaders at Antioch that he will support their demands for the transference of the Mutasarifieh to Antioch in exchange for their votes at the next elections. This view is supported by the fact that the Syrian Government at Damascus has been bombarded of late with an unusual number of petitions.

4. The definite decision will rest with the French High Commission at Beirut, and is not likely to be influenced much by the frantic petitions, for and against the change, of merchants and politicians. M. Durieux, the assistant delegate at Alexandretta, stated at the New Year's Day reception that whether the Mutasarifieh were at Antioch or at Alexandretta there would be no change of policy. This is a statement which I think requires some qualification, for whereas the inhabitants of the port are more or less cosmopolitan in their outlook and are politically inarticulate, the same cannot be said of the people of Antioch, who are pro-Turk to a man and will have a very great influence on the Syrian officials. That that influence would be consistently against French policy can hardly be doubted. It is the considered opinion of an English missionary living at Alexandretta, who has a long experience of the country, that the French would be extremely unwise to make the change.

5. Though Antioch would stand to gain by the transfer thither of the seat of Government, Alexandretta would not lose much. The most immediate effect would arise from the loss to retail traders of the sums spent by the officials transferred, and to property owners of the rents paid for forty or fifty houses. As far as the real business of the port is concerned, there would be practically no change. Alexandretta lives on the handling of goods, import and export. I do not think that British interests would be affected in any way.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 1615/1615/89]

No. 148.

Lord Tyrrell to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 340.)

Sir,

Paris, March 27, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the report of the Finance Commission of the Chamber of Deputies on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs estimates for 1930 contains (p. 99) a statement of a certain interest respecting the future of French policy in Syria. The reporter states that "as soon as a regular Government is established in Syria the mandatory Power will favour the evolution of the country on national lines and be ready to negotiate with it a treaty defining anew by mutual agreement, as in the case of Iraq and Transjordan, the conditions under which article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations shall be applied."

2. To this subject M. Briand made a reference in the Senate on the 25th March. He said that the situation in Syria was now secure and economically very satisfactory. "If a few questions of difficulty are still at issue between certain personages and the French representatives, they are not of first-class importance, and there is every reason to hope that they will soon be smoothed away." The Mandates Commission of the League has already told the French Government not to go too fast in this matter, but France "will give to the Syrian populations all the privileges which they can desire, provided naturally that these privileges do not exceed the limits laid down by the League of Nations, and provided that France can execute her undertakings to their full extent."

I have, &c.

TYRRELL.

[E 2072/23/89]

No. 149.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 39. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 1, 1930.

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 99 of the 22nd October, I have the honour to report that M. Emile Eddé's Ministry came to an untimely end on the 20th March. As you are aware, his programme of reform had aroused dissatisfaction in various quarters and was considered by the Moslem community to be specially harmful to its interests. It is needless to enter into details as to the various intrigues and combinations which preceded the vote of non-confidence given against him at the sitting of the Chamber held on the 19th March, and it is sufficient to record that at that sitting a motion of non-confidence signed by twenty-five Deputies, some of whom belonged to M. Eddé's own party, was presented and voted by twenty-seven out of the thirty-nine Deputies present. Apparently, M. Eddé's partisans objected to some of the members of his Cabinet, and hoped that the result of their action would be that he would be asked to form another Ministry in which the objectionable Ministers would not figure. This expectation was not wholly realised, because, although M. Eddé was, indeed, asked and agreed to reconstitute his Ministry, he finally decided not to attempt to do so. Eventually Auguste Pasha Adib consented to form a Ministry, which is composed as follows:—

Presidency of Council, Finance and Agriculture: Auguste Pasha Adib.
Interior and Public Health: Moussa Namour.
Public Works: Hussein-el-Ahdab.
Justice: Ahmed-el-Husseini.
Education: Gabriel Tuéni.

Auguste Pasha, who is an elderly gentleman with a damaged leg, formed the first Lebanese Ministry in 1926. Of his collaborators, three are a legacy from M. Eddé's Cabinet. The fourth, Tuéni, is the proprietor of the "Al-Ahrar," the most widely read Beirut Arabic newspaper. It is apt to be violent and has a Nationalist complexion, which may, however, be a matter of sales policy.

2. The new Ministry is the seventh since the formation of the Lebanese Republic in 1926. That it will last even as long as some of its predecessors seems doubtful. It is illuminating to note that, after nearly four years of a parliamentary régime, the Lebanon is now back at the starting-point. Presumably, in a few months Auguste Pasha will fall, to be succeeded by one of the other ex-Presidents of the Council who have already tried and failed. As the result of what has happened, the parliamentary régime is now thoroughly discredited. M. de Jouvenel did the country an ill service in introducing it. It brings out all that is worst in the Lebanese, whose main weaknesses are place-hunting and intrigue. The small group of politicians who play their parts in the comedy have no interests at heart but their own, while the constant changes render impossible any settled policy of administration likely to benefit the country as a whole. There are, however, at present no signs that any change will take place. It is sometimes suggested that the French High Commissioner might intervene, and that, if he does not do so, it is because he is riding the Lebanese Government for a fall. It is much more likely that, knowing his intervention would only unite all parties in opposition to the French, he is allowing them to work out their own salvation.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 2173/23/89]

No. 150.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 40.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 7, 1930.

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 30 of the 1st April, I have the honour to report that Auguste Pasha Adib appeared before the Chamber on the 5th April and read his ministerial declaration. The programme of the new Ministry which will probably never be carried out, is on its main lines similar to that of its predecessor. Only such alterations of detail and such minor amendments of

M. Eddé's schemes as seem necessary will be effected. A motion of adjournment to study the programme was declared by Auguste Pasha to be unacceptable to him. He is reported to have said that there was nothing to discuss. He and his colleagues had neither decided anything nor promised anything. All they did was to guarantee not to undertake anything without the prior consent of the Chamber. The motion of adjournment was thereupon rejected by 27 votes to 5, and a vote of confidence given by 28 votes to 4, there being six abstentions.

A Bill annulling the system of "décrets-lois" was then passed, and the Chamber adjourned after a sitting lasting an hour and a half, part of which had been devoted to formal business.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 2289/66/89]

No. 151.

Consul Monck-Mason to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, April 11, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 37 of the 10th April, I have the honour to inform you that I, yesterday, had a conversation with Captain Gracey, D.S.O., the overseas delegate of the Armenian (Lord Mayor's) Fund, who has recently returned from a trip to the Armenian refugee settlements in the Bec de Canard. I append the following notes of information gathered from Captain Gracey, in the hope that they may be of interest. Captain Gracey has had special opportunities of getting at facts. I do not vouch for the figures of population he gives, but I think that the proportions of the various denominations are correct.

2. *Deir-ez-Zor*.—Apart from one Government school, all schools are rudimentary Moslem ones. Perhaps 1 per cent. of the population, and none of the women, are literate. Fecundity is high, but infant and child mortality appalling. Government health work is rudimentary for lack of funds. All property, except grazing rights in the desert, is in the hands of a few men, most of whom live at Deir-ez-Zor; the peasant is practically a serf. Money is hoarded, as there are no banks and no confidence. The rich have no conception of the higher uses of wealth, and few ever travel, even as far as Aleppo, though some go on pilgrimage. Economic resources are potentially great, but there are many barriers to progress, the chief of which are: Insecurity of life and property, lack of good roads, of capital and cheap credits, the locust scourge, lack of irrigation and reclamation works, illiteracy, ignorance of agricultural methods and loss of man power by disease. These questions are not being adequately dealt with.

3. *Hassetche*.—The River Khabour is calculated to be able to provide water power to run sixty to seventy flour mills. The population consists of the following families: 50 Moslems, 300 Syrian Orthodox, 50 Syrian Catholic, 30 Chaldean, 100 Armenian Catholic, 100 Armenian Gregorian and Protestant.

4. *Kameshlieh*.—The population in families is: 120 Moslem, 100 Jewish (emigrants from Nissibin), 300 Assyrian Orthodox, 40 Assyrian Catholic, 30 Armenian Catholic and nearly 400 Armenian, of which 300 are Kurdish-speaking emigrants from Turkey arrived within the last six months. A large part of the trade is with Turkey.

5. *Karamanié*.—The population in families is: 20 Moslems, 25 Syrian Christians, 15 Armenians of all rites. The Kurds are farmers, the artisans being Syrian and Armenian.

6. *Amoude*.—Four hundred and fifty families, of which: 250 Moslems (Kurds and Arabs), 90 Syrian Orthodox, 20 Syrian Catholic, 40–50 Kurdish-speaking Armenian refugees.

7. *Demir Kapu*.—Here the population is largely Kurdish, with a few Christians. Nomads are establishing villages in the most fertile districts.

8. *Armenian Refugees*.—Those arriving in Syria for the last six months are all Kurdish-speaking from the Diarbekir, Seirt, Kharpout and Mardin districts. They are a much finer physical type than the old refugees. They are independent and anxious to find work, and are not of the kind to become pauperised. Of these

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there are in Aleppo about 1,000 families; in the Kameshlieh district about 450 families, and more trickling in. Not all are destitute.

9. The mandatory authorities have done their best to deal with this fresh influx, and high hopes are held out of grants of land. There is plenty of land in the Jezireh, which has lain waste for centuries and could produce large crops of cereals and fruit.

10. It is thought that the best results in colonising with refugees would be obtained by the admixture in settlements of the hardier Kurdish-speaking Armenian element with the older refugees, as the former are, moreover, far more experienced farmers.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 2689/231/89]

No. 152.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Damascus, April 29, 1930.

MORE than a year has passed since the adjournment *sine die* of the Constituent Assembly. It will be remembered that in February 1928 the French High Commissioner allowed himself to be convinced by Sheikh Taj-ed-Din that he was in a position to form a Government with a working majority ready to carry out a policy dictated by the High Commission. The resignation of Damad Ahmed Namy Bey was provoked, and elections put in hand for a Constituent Assembly.

2. It was at once apparent that Taj-ed-Din's majority was illusory, and a strongly Nationalist Assembly was returned. Nevertheless Taj-ed-Din formed his Government, and a committee drafted the Constitution. The High Commission disapproved of the draft submitted, but was unable to enforce any modification; the Assembly was accordingly adjourned in August for three months, again in November and finally in February 1929.

3. Since that date there have been little or no outstanding events to report; negotiations have been carried on fairly continuously, but the Nationalists lost their cohesion when their leader, Fozi Ghazzi, was murdered by his wife in July 1929. There was a recrudescence of popular feeling at the time, and it was freely alleged that the mandatory authorities had made away with him; this was, however, at once disproved, and the population again relapsed into apathy.

4. It was hoped that on his return from leave in the autumn M. Ponsot, who had expressed great sympathy with Syrian national aspirations, would bring back some way out of the *impasse*. In proclaiming the elections, he had stated that the Constituent Assembly was entirely free to frame a Constitution: "L'Assemblée issue des élections donnera à la Syrie son statut définitif; elle l'élaborera en pleine indépendance, dans le cadre tracé par les accords internationaux." In adjourning the Assembly he had addressed a letter to the President, Hashem-el-Atassi, in which he expressed the hope "que les progrès déjà accomplis dans la voie de l'entente ne feront que s'affermir et que le succès viendra finalement récompenser nos efforts et justifier notre persévérante bonne volonté."

5. In spite of these excellent sentiments, Nationalists' hopes were again disappointed, and Hashem-el-Atassi, who was subject to much local criticism, was obliged to issue a *mise à point* justifying his apparent long inactivity. This was published on the 31st October, 1929, and forms the first enclosure to this despatch.* The most important passage is a criticism of the French thesis that the draft Constitution was in conflict with international agreements (or more simply the terms of the mandate), his argument being based on a reference to His Majesty's Government's policy in Iraq.

6. I did not at the time report on this manifesto, as negotiations were said to be so advanced that I hoped in the near future to be able to record some definite step forward; nothing, however, came of it, and the High Commissioner refused to be drawn.

7. During the last six months a constant stream of politicians has flowed through M. Ponsot's offices, each with its attendant eddy of hypothesis and

prophecy—Governments have been formed, monarchies founded, treaties have been signed, and President has succeeded President in the realms of speculation. In point of fact, nothing tangible has emerged from all these interviews and consultations, and M. Ponsot is still on the point of coming to a decision.

8. Hashem-el-Atassi has therefore been provoked to issue another statement, in which he throws the burden of responsibility for the long-drawn-out uncertainty on the French High Commissioner. This was communicated to the press on the 16th April and forms the second enclosure to this despatch.* It is moderate in tone and in no sense an ultimatum, and seems to be conceived more in weariness than in anger. It is at least doubtful if anything will come of it; nothing in M. Ponsot's record in Syria suggests that he will allow himself to be hurried into a decision.

9. In the meantime the customary rumours circulate on the best authority that Rikabi Pasha is to form a new Government, and that treaty and Constitution will be promulgated in the near future, the date being given accurately as the 17th May.

10. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, His Majesty's vice-consul at Beirut, the British Resident at Amman and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

[E 2666/231/89]

No. 153.

Lord Tyrrell to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 560.)

Sir,

Paris, May 23, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that there was published in Paris yesterday the text of a letter addressed by M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner at Beirut, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, transmitting the official texts, which together form the organic statute of the Syrian States under French mandate. Owing to their length the texts themselves are not being published here, but will be communicated to the League of Nations. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs have informed me that if I wish for information on any particular point they will be glad to give it to me.

2. It will be remembered that in Syria M. Ponsot has been negotiating with a Constituent Assembly respecting the drafting of a Constitution since June 1928. The uncompromising attitude of this Assembly, which insisted on the insertion in the Constitution of a number of articles which the French held to be inconsistent with the terms of the mandate, resulted in the Assembly's suspension in August 1928. It has never formally met again, though M. Ponsot has apparently negotiated with its leading members unofficially.

3. The Syrian Constitution now promulgated is that originally drafted by the Assembly, though it contains an additional article providing that nothing in the Constitution shall interfere with the exercise of the rights and duties which the mandatory Power holds in virtue of the existing international agreements. M. Ponsot's letter states that this article "will probably operate until the conclusion with a regularly constituted Government of the treaty, which will define anew, with the assent of the League of Nations, the conditions of the execution of the mandate." I enclose the text of the relevant portion of the article in question, No. 116.

4. In addition to the Constitution of the State of Syria, the organic statute forwarded in M. Ponsot's letter comprises the Constitution of the Lebanese Republic adopted on the 22nd May, 1927, and as last revised on the 8th May, 1929, the organic settlement of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, the organic statutes of Latakia and of the Jebel Druze and an arrangement respecting the discussion of matters interesting all these States in common.

I have, &c.

TYRRELL.

* Not printed.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 153.

Extract from the "Temps" of May 23, 1930.

LE STATUT DES ÉTATS SOUS MANDAT FRANÇAIS.

M. PONSOT, Haut-Commissaire de la République, dans les territoires du Levant confiés au mandat français, vient de promulguer, en plein accord avec le Gouvernement, le statut organique prévu par l'article 1^{er} du mandat. Voici en quels termes le Haut-Commissaire adresse au Ministre des Affaires étrangères, en vue de leur communication aux membres du Conseil de la Société des Nations, les textes officiels dont l'ensemble constitue le statut organique des États sous mandat français :

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à votre Excellence, en vue de leur communication aux membres du Conseil de la Société des Nations, les textes officiels dont l'ensemble constitue, suivant les prévisions de l'article 1^{er} de l'acte de mandat, le statut organique des États sous mandat français.

Ces textes définissent les bases juridiques de l'organisation des territoires dont la France doit aider le développement, favoriser et conseiller l'évolution.

Ils pourront, avec l'assentiment de la Puissance mandataire, être modifiés pour s'adapter à cette évolution, soit par le jeu des moyens constitutionnels qu'ils prévoient, soit par des traités conclus avec la Puissance mandataire, soit par des accords conclus entre les Gouvernements intéressés sous l'égide de la Puissance mandataire.

1. Le premier en date de ces textes est la Constitution de la République libanaise. Votée le 22 mai 1927 par le Conseil représentatif, promulguée par mon prédécesseur, M. de Jouvenel, modifiée à deux reprises avec l'agrément de la Puissance mandataire le 17 octobre 1927 et le 8 mai 1929, cette Constitution a déjà assuré à la République libanaise quatre années de vie constitutionnelle régulière.

2. Les nouveaux textes, promulgués par arrêté du Haut-Commissariat, intéressent l'État de Syrie et le Sandjak d'Alexandrette, le Gouvernement de Lattaquié et le Gouvernement du Djebel Druse. Ils sont complétés par le règlement organique de la conférence des intérêts communs.

3. La Constitution syrienne promulguée aujourd'hui reproduit dans son ensemble le texte qui avait été élaboré par le Comité de Rédaction de l'Assemblée constituante au cours des mois de juin et de juillet 1928, et qui avait été pris en considération par cette Assemblée le 7 août suivant.

Les seules modifications de principe apportées à ce texte ont eu pour objet de prévenir que l'application de la Constitution ne mette obstacle à l'exercice des droits et obligations que la Puissance mandataire tient des accords internationaux en vigueur. Les réserves du mandat ont ainsi reçu leur expression par l'adjonction à la Constitution d'un article provisoire dont l'arrêté de promulgation du Haut-Commissaire précise la portée. Cet article portera, en effet, jusqu'à conclusion avec un Gouvernement régulièrement constitué du traité appelé à définir à nouveau, avec l'assentiment de la Société des Nations, les conditions d'application du mandat suivant les principes inscrits à l'article 22 du Pacte, pour tenir compte de l'évolution accomplie et des progrès réalisés.

Les retouches de détail apportées au texte primitif avaient fait l'objet, à l'époque, d'échanges de vues avec le Bureau d'Assemblée, dont l'adhésion pouvait être escomptée.

4. Le règlement organique du Sandjak d'Alexandrette définit et précise, au point de vue administratif et financier, la situation particulière de cette province syrienne, réunit dans un seul document les divers textes qui la régissaient jusqu'à présent. Le régime spécial du sandjak respecte, dans le cadre des obligations internationales existantes, le vœu répété de ces populations.

5. Le statut organique du Gouvernement de Lattaquié et celui du Gouvernement du Djebel-Druse donnent une consécration nouvelle à l'organisation politique de ces territoires dotés depuis l'origine du mandat d'une autonomie qui répond à la fois au vœu des populations et à leurs intérêts liés à une collaboration plus directe de la Puissance mandataire à leur développement économique et social.

L'expérience acquise et les consultations effectuées ont permis de mettre au point ces statuts, tout en ménageant les évolutions ultérieures.

6. Le règlement organique de la conférence des intérêts communs complète les textes qui précèdent. Ce règlement, ainsi que l'arrêté qui le promulgue, précise les

conditions dans lesquelles les États et les Gouvernements intéressés, les pouvoirs et les intérêts locaux seront appelés à assister le représentant de la Puissance mandataire dans la gestion des intérêts communs aux territoires sous mandat français.

Rapprochés dans un contact direct sous l'égide de la Puissance mandataire, ces Gouvernements sauront affirmer chaque jour davantage l'esprit de solidarité qui doit harmoniser leur action pour la sauvegarde et le développement de leurs intérêts généraux.

Enclosure 2 in No. 153.

Relevant Section of Article 116 of the Syrian Constitution (text extracted from the "Temps" leading article of May 23, 1930).

AUCUNE disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations. Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et à la défense du pays et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures. Pendant toute la durée des obligations internationales de la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les Gouvernements français et syrien. En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution, dont l'application pourrait intéresser ces responsabilités, ne seront discutées et promulguées, conformément à la présente Constitution, qu'en exécution de cet accord. Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du Gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux Gouvernements.

[E 3269/66/89]

No. 154.

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 43. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, May 13, 1930.

WITH reference to Mr. Monck-Mason's despatch No. 21 of the 6th February, I have the honour to report that General Ernst and Captain Lunn, respectively president and secretary of the Turco-Syrian Frontier Commission, left Aleppo on the 4th May, the relative convention having been signed, according to my Turkish colleague, on the 3rd May.

2. In a statement to the press General Ernst remarked that the work of the commission, which had lasted four years and which had not been rendered easy by either side, was at last terminated and that the frontier between the Mediterranean on the one side and Iraq on the other had been marked out with 1,620 boundary stones. The question of the allotment of the islands in the Tigris had been resolved with the help of French and Turkish naval experts.

3. General Ernst told me that he was heartily glad to have finished this extremely trying piece of work. It is to be hoped that an era of stability has been reached, but in a general way the line does not appear to give satisfaction to any party. It is suggested in certain circles that the Turks have not even now given up all hope of recovering Aleppo, and it is certain that a large section of the Alexandretta district is Turkish. The Bezanti-Alep-Nisibin and Prolongements Railways officials regret very much that the railway line was not included in Syria. Indeed, the present line would seem to be neither geographical nor ethnical, and it appears to be generally considered that M. Franklin-Bouillon is scarcely to be congratulated on the result of his negotiations in this connexion.

4. The security on the frontier is stated to be improving, though far from perfect as yet, while accounts of minor frontier incidents, which may or may not have taken place between French and Turkish posts, occasionally find their way into the local or Mosul press.

5. I am informed on reliable authority that the French military authorities are making the necessary preparations to occupy the frontier posts in the north-eastern section of Syria towards the end of this month.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, the acting British consul-general at Beirut and to the British liaison officer at Beirut.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

[E 3485/66/89]

No. 155.

Acting-Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, June 5, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 43 of the 13th May, I have the honour to report that consequent on the signing of the Turco-Syrian frontier agreement on the 3rd May the French, on the 3rd June, occupied new posts, notably in the Duck's Bill, where the main forces, said to exceed 8,000 men, were concentrated.

2. In the course of a conversation I had yesterday with M. Lavastre, delegate of the High Commission, he volunteered the statement that the occupation had taken place to the best of his knowledge without a hitch, thus giving the lie to the rumours which had spread locally that trouble was expected and that preparations had actually been made in Aleppo to receive the wounded. If the Turkish soldiery may be judged by the wretched specimens I saw recently at Nisibin it is indeed unlikely that any resistance could be afforded.

3. It is, of course, possible that the French consider that by this show of strength in the Duck's Bill they will render more difficult any delimitation of the Iraq frontier on a line to the west of the present *de facto* boundary. Again, they may wish to impress the Kurds at the very outset with a display of force calculated to inspire respect among any unruly elements.

4. The movement was undoubtedly well prepared, M. Fenset himself visiting the district on the 25th May, while General Bigault de Granrut, commander-in-chief of the French troops in the Levant, is said to have been present on the 3rd June accompanied by two other generals.

5. It is also possible that this display was partly meant for the benefit of the Beduin tribes of the Sanjak of Deir-az-Zor, who appear to resent French methods of colonisation with the frequent interference and bullying on the part of French officers and non-commissioned officers, who are all too ready to beat them and call them liars, a great insult to the Bedu. I am informed that an attempt to make all members of these tribes, sedentary or nomadic, obtain an identity card has caused much dissatisfaction.

6. Security, however, is the order of the day, and for this the natives are thankful enough, as they are for the fillip to agriculture and trade generally which tends to accompany the presence of the troops.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, to the acting British consul-general at Beirut and to the British liaison officer at Beirut.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

[E 3486/231/89]

No. 156.

Consul Hole to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 30.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 27, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 27 of the 29th April, I have the honour to report that on the 22nd May the French High Commissioner promulgated, *inter alia*, a Syrian Constitution.

2. The text is broadly that of the draft prepared in 1928 by a committee of the Constituent Assembly: some modifications have been introduced in articles dealing with nationality, currency, official language and the term of office of the President of the Republic. An article is added formulating the reserves of the High Commission, which was refused by the Nationalists in February 1929. (Cf. my despatch No. 26 of the 14th February, 1929.)

3. The effect of this procedure is to endow Syria with a very liberal Constitution, which cannot fail to earn applause at Geneva, and will remain inoperative at the High Commissioner's pleasure.

4. By a further *arrêté* bearing the same date as the Constitution, but published a day later, the High Commissioner dissolved the Constituent Assembly. This *arrêté*, the preamble of which is not without interest, is enclosed.

5. The Constitution was received with the utmost indifference, though a meeting will be held by the Nationalists to decide on their future attitude. The opinion is gaining ground that too much attention may be paid to politics, and that the real solution of the question is in the economic sphere.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, the British Resident at Amman, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and His Majesty's consul at Aleppo.

I have, &c.

E. C. HOLE.

Enclosure in No. 156.

Arrêté No. 3116 du 14 Mai 1930 portant dissolution de l'Assemblée chargée d'élaborer la Constitution de l'Etat de Syrie.

LE Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu les décrets du Président de la République française en date du 23 novembre 1929 et du 3 septembre 1926;

Vu l'arrêté du Président du Conseil des Ministres de l'État de Syrie No. 18 du 10 mars 1928 portant convocation des collèges électoraux;

Vu l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1969 du 10 août portant convocation des candidats proclamés élus, à la suite des opérations électorales des 24 et 27 avril 1928, en vue de procéder à l'élaboration de la Constitution de l'État de Syrie;

Vu les arrêtés du Haut-Commissaire No. 2063 du 10 août 1928, No. 2195 du 5 novembre 1928 et No. 2385 du 5 février 1929, portant ajournement à trois mois et ajournement *sine die* de l'Assemblée chargée d'élaborer la Constitution de l'État de Syrie;

Attendu que depuis cette dernière date, le Président de l'Assemblée a, par ses manifestes des 11 août 1929, 31 octobre 1929 et 15 avril 1930, affirmé publiquement que le point de vue du Bureau de l'Assemblée demeurait invariable, éloignant ainsi tout espoir de voir l'Assemblée mettre elle-même en harmonie le texte du projet de Constitution pris par elle en considération le 7 août 1928, avec le droit public défini par l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations et par la Déclaration du Mandat du 24 juillet 1922;

Attendu, d'autre part, que les travaux de l'Assemblée et de ses Commissions ont représenté dans la plus large mesure la consultation des autorités et populations, visée par l'article 1^{er} de l'Acte de Mandat, puisqu'ils ont abouti à l'élaboration d'une Constitution que la Puissance mandataire promulgue aujourd'hui en la complétant par l'article des réserves du Mandat destiné à mettre son texte en harmonie avec les principes rappelés plus haut;

Attendu que, si l'Assemblée n'a pu dans ces conditions achever entièrement sa tâche, elle n'en a pas moins participé effectivement à l'élaboration de la Constitution, et que la promulgation de celle-ci met aujourd'hui fin à sa mission;

Pour ces motifs:

Arrête:

Article unique.—L'Assemblée réunie le 9 juin 1928 pour procéder à l'élaboration de la Constitution de l'État de Syrie, et dont les travaux sont suspendus depuis le 11 août 1928, est dissoute.

Le Haut-Commissaire,
HENRI PONSOT.

Le Secrétaire général,
D. TETREAU.

Beyrouth, le 14 mai 1930.

[22271]

[E 3484/231/89]

No. 157.

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, June 6, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 22nd May last M. Lavastre, delegate of the High Commissioner in Aleppo, called a meeting of the representatives of the local press and declared to them that the Syrian Constitution had been promulgated. The secret of this move had been well kept, and yet it scarcely made any impression either in Aleppo or in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, to which latter district it guarantees administrative and financial autonomy.

2. The Constitution was received with great satisfaction until article 116 was perceived, which is generally held to stultify the rest. "Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus" is the usual saying, while the Constitution is derisively nicknamed the "Constipation."

3. Although it may safely be said that the commercial-minded Aleppine or native of Alexandretta takes little interest in politics, considering them to be detrimental to his commerce, in which in view of the prevailing crisis he is utterly absorbed, nevertheless Nationalist meetings took place both in Aleppo and in Homs. The object and result of these meetings have been kept secret, but it is generally thought that Nationalist agitation is caused not so much by article 116 as by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which contained a Nationalist majority.

4. It is also rumoured that M. Ponsot has agreed to urge the acceptance of the six controversial articles of 1928 which led to the adjournment and subsequent dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, and which have been inserted, howbeit in a modified form, in the recently promulgated Constitution in return for a promise of good behaviour from the Nationalists during the coming elections.

5. It may be noted, however, that amid the general feeling of indifference or disillusion which has greeted the Constitution, an atmosphere of satisfaction is prevalent among the Christian elements, who are very apprehensive of their position under a Syrian Government which should not be well bridled by the mandatory Power.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem, to the acting British consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 136/41/93]

No. 158.

Mr. A. Henderson to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 69.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 8, 1930.

THE French Ambassador called upon me at the Foreign Office to-day. Referring to the aide-mémoire which he had communicated to the Foreign Office on the 20th December in regard to the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations in 1932, M. de Fleuriau warned me that M. Briand would probably raise the question with me when I met him at Geneva. I told M. de Fleuriau that the aide-mémoire was under consideration, and that I should be happy to discuss the matter with M. Briand at Geneva.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 1932/1932/93]

No. 159.

Mr. Edmonds to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 114.)

Sir,

Angora, April 8, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Ja'far Pasha-el-Askeri spent the inside of last week here on his way back to Bagdad. He met with a very warm reception. The Turkish Government wanted him to be its guest, but he preferred to stay with the Irak Minister. The banquets which were arranged in his honour were much more intimate than those which are the lot of most foreign statesmen here. He was greeted everywhere as an old friend and an old comrade in arms. He seems nowhere to have met with any sign of the resentment which a soldier who had changed his allegiance during hostilities might have expected.

2. Ja'far Pasha told me that in the course of a long private conversation with him the Ghazi confined himself mainly to war memories and carefully avoided politics. Tefik Rüstü Bey, in his official talk with the Pasha, seems to have abounded in friendly sentiments towards Irak and to have coupled them with an earnest plea for most-favoured-nation treatment in judicial matters. Thanks chiefly to Ja'far Pasha's own personality, this brief visit was a great success, and will doubtless prove to be of great value to the relations of the two countries.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 2553/1511/44]

No. 160.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir R. Clive.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 17.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 29, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your despatch No. 57, dated the 16th April, 1930, in which you informed me of a conversation which you had had with his Highness the Minister of Court concerning Kurdish Nationalist activities and his Highness's suspicions that British officials in Iraq were sympathetic towards the movement for an independent Kurdistan.

2. I suggest that, if his Highness should refer to this matter again, you might point out to him that, in consequence of the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations at the time when their decision was given in regard to the Mosul frontier dispute with Turkey, His Majesty's Government have an obligation to see that certain special privileges, such as the official use of their own language, are safeguarded for the Kurds in Iraq. It naturally follows that British officials in Iraq are concerned to see that this obligation is properly discharged.

[22271]

3. Far, however, from encouraging the ideas of Kurdish autonomy which are held among certain extreme Kurdish Nationalists, British officials in Iraq, including both of my immediate predecessors, have, as you are aware, taken special care to prevent Iraq from becoming a centre for Kurdish Nationalist intrigues aiming at creating unrest and disturbance among the Kurds in the territory of limitrophe States. Details of the measures adopted to this end in 1928 were communicated to you in the enclosures to Sir Henry Dobbs's confidential despatches No. 1633, dated the 14th July, and No. 1825, dated the 10th August, 1928. The Minister of Court might, perhaps, be reminded in particular of the incident described in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the former. Moreover, it was as the direct result of the special representation made from this High Commission that His Majesty's Government issued to all passport officers in February 1929 a special list of Kurdo-Armenian Nationalists to whom visas for Iraq should be refused.

4. I think that if his Highness the Minister of Court is reminded of these facts he will have little reasonable ground for continuing to entertain the suspicions which he has expressed regarding the attitude of the British authorities in Iraq towards the movement for an independent Kurdistan.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE.

[E 2584/400/65]

No. 161.

Extract from Final Minutes of the 4th Public Meeting of the 59th Session of the Council of the League of Nations, held on May 15.—(Received in Foreign Office, May 20, 1930.)

2639. *Palestine: Designation by the British Government of the Commission entrusted with the Final Settlement of the Question of the Wailing Wall.*

MR. HENDERSON asked the Council's permission to make a brief statement in regard to the situation in general in Palestine.

As the Council was aware, the Commission of Enquiry into the disturbance of August 1929 had presented its report, and copies had been in the hands of the public for some time. The report would be discussed by the Permanent Mandates Commission, and a full statement would then be made by the British accredited representative, but Mr. Henderson begged to be allowed to anticipate certain aspects of that statement which would be of especial interest to the members of the Council. Before doing so, however, he would refer to the evidence given before the commission. It was of vast bulk, and would, he gathered, amount to approximately 1,000 large pages of two columns each. Every effort was being made to accelerate the printing, but so far the printers had been unable to guarantee a date earlier than the middle of June. The evidence (except that given *in camera*) would be published as soon as it was ready, and would be simultaneously handed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for distribution to the Permanent Mandates Commission.

As regards matters arising out of the report, Mr. Henderson wished to refer first of all to the primary duty of the mandatory, as of any Government, namely, the preservation of order. In the first place, His Majesty's Government had increased the British military forces in Palestine. It had under consideration with its expert advisers the question of the garrison permanently required in that country, and, pending a clear decision on this subject, it did not propose to make any reduction in the present force. A highly qualified police officer, Mr. Dowbiggin, of Ceylon, had been sent in January to consider the reorganisation of the police. His full report had not been received, but certain interim recommendations for the better protection of Jewish colonies had been adopted and were being put into force. The British section of the police had been increased by 400 men, and a further increase of seventy-nine men was now being made.

The commission, in its report, had laid special emphasis on the problems relating to land and immigration. His Majesty's Government was impressed with the importance of these problems, and had selected Sir John Hope Simpson, whose name and abilities were well known to the members of the Council in connexion with his work as vice-president of the Refugee Settlement Commission at Athens, to proceed forthwith to Palestine to confer with the High Commissioner and report on land settlement, immigration and development.

Mr. Henderson wished to refer next to the presence in England of an Arab delegation from Palestine, with whom discussions as to future policy in that country had taken place. It was enough to say of these discussions that they had placed His Majesty's Government in full possession of the views of leading Arabs regarding the interests and aspirations of the Arab community.

The British Government was now engaged upon an examination of the problem of devising means, within the framework of the mandate, of satisfying legitimate aspirations and of removing any apprehensions that might still be entertained.

Finally, he would add that he proposed to submit for the approval of the Council, in private session, the names of three gentlemen who had been good enough to intimate that they would be prepared to serve on the commission to deal with the Wailing Wall. His Government regarded this matter as of great importance, and was much gratified by the prompt agreement of the Council to its proposals made in January last.

M. Procopé, *rapporteur*, attached great importance to the statement made by the representative of Great Britain, for it shed light on the situation in Palestine

and strengthened the Council's confidence in the action of the mandatory Power with a view to the just execution of the obligations incumbent upon it under the terms of the mandate for Palestine.

The Permanent Mandates Commission, whose duty it was to give expert advice to the Council on the matter, and which would shortly consider the question, would certainly take into consideration the various points raised in Mr. Henderson's statement. M. Procopé felt sure that the British Government would furnish the Mandates Commission with all the information necessary to enable it to form an opinion as to the policy which that Government intended to pursue in the territory in the future.

M. Procopé thought that his colleagues would agree with him in considering that the report which the Permanent Mandates Commission would forward to the Council would make it possible for the latter to obtain a better view of the situation in Palestine than was possible at the moment.

He would propose therefore that the Council should take note of the statement made by the representative of Great Britain.

The proposal of the *rapporteur* was adopted.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 2488/598/65]

No. 162.

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 40.)

Sir,

Aleppo, May 6, 1930.

WITH reference to Mr. Monck-Mason's despatch, No. 28 of the 27th February, I have the honour to report that in the course of a recent conversation with M. Audouin, director of the Bozanti-Alep-Nisibin and Prolongements Railways, he stated that he was confident that by the end of the year the railway line would have been prolonged by 11 kilom. to Tell Zionane. This will have the advantage of bringing the terminus into Syrian territory although, M. Audouin stated that, apart from certain initial difficulties when cars were not allowed to cross the frontier, he had no complaint to make against the Turkish officials. If anything they had been more obliging than the Syrian.

2. Regarding the 1931 programme, he informed me that although credits had not yet been allotted it was expected that the line would be extended by 17 kilom. to a point 3 kilom. south of Kubur-el-Bid. The line would then cover approximately half the distance from Nisibin to the Iraqi frontier and eliminate what, owing to the nature of the soil, is perhaps the worst stretch of road between Nisibin and Kirkuk.

3. M. Audouin stated that he was looking forward to the junction of the Bozanti-Alep-Nisibin and Prolongements and Iraq Railways, and hoped that his eagerness was shared in Iraq. He regretted that the Iraq railway system was not on the normal gauge and in this connexion uttered the hope that it might be found possible either to link up Mosul and the Syrian frontier by a normal gauge line or alternatively to lay a three-rail line so as to obviate the necessity of transferring passengers and goods from one train to another at a desolate frontier post.

4. He then touched on the possibility of the Tripoli-Homs Railway line being prolonged through Palmyra to Deir-az-Zor. Competition would then have to be expected from this direction, but he did not anticipate any early realisation of the project which was connected with the still nebulous question of a pipe-line from Iraq to a Mediterranean port.

5. In conclusion, M. Audouin stated that he was most optimistic regarding the future developments of his line. The number of passengers who had made use of the railway between Aleppo and Nisibin had exceeded all his expectations: there had been travellers to Iraq coming not only from Turkey and Europe but also from Southern Syria, Palestine and even Egypt who preferred the comfort of a sleeping-car to the fatiguing monotony of the Damascus-Bagdad desert service.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Ambassador at Istamboul, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, the acting British consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.